
Class. E) I4&1 



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PHILOSOPHY 




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SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART,, 



PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN EDINBURGH 
UNIVERSITY ; 



ARRANGED AND EDITED BY 



0. W. WIGHT, 

TRANSLATOR OF COUSIN'S "HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.' 



JOE THE USE OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES. 



Nous &p/J Kal Nous ukovci, T%\\a xufya. ical rv<p\d. 

Mind it seeth, Mind it heareth ; all beside is deaf and blind. 

Epiohaemdb (?X 



FIFTH EDITION, 



NEW-YOKK: 
D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 

346 & 348 BEOADWAY. 
M.DOCO.LVIII. 







Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1853, 

By D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
District of New York. 



• 



TO 



REV. LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., 

VICE-PRESIDENT OP UNION COLLEGE, LATE PROFESSOR OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN 

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL 6EMNAEV, AUTHOR OF "RATIONAL 

PSYCHOLOGY," ETC., ETC., 



THIS COLLECTION OP SIR WM. HAMILTON'S 

PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS AND DISSERTATIONS, 

£s SeUicateB; 

AS A TOKEN OF THE EDITOR'S ADMIRATION OF 

ONE OF THE VEEY ABLEST METAPHYSICIANS AMERICA HAS PRODUCED J 

AS 

A TRIBUTE JUSTLY DUE TO THE FAITHFUL TEACHER, 

■WHO HAS DEVOTED 

MANY YEARS OF HIS LIFE TO PREPARING YOUNG MEN FOE 

HIGH PUBLIC DUTIES, 

THUS FULFILLING THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICE OF 

A "KEEPER OF THE KEEPERS." 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/philosophyofsirw01hami 



PREFACE. 



In this publication we give to the readers and students 
of philosophy in America all, except part of an unfin- 
ished Dissertation, that Sir ¥m. Hamilton has pub- 
lished directly on the subject of metaphysics. The com- 
pleted supplementary Dissertations on Reid, 1 the foot- 
notes to Eeid that have an enduring interest, and the 
philosophical portion of the 'Discussions, 2 etc.,' have 
been used to make up this work. The article on Logic 
and the Appendix Logical, in the Discussions, might 
have been added, but these do not properly belong to 
the metaphysical system of Hamilton, and, moreover, 
have been reserved for another purpose. The place 
where each part of this volume may be found in the 
work from which it is taken, has been designated by a 
foot-note. 

In our collection and arrangement of Hamilton's Phi- 
losophy, we have followed a systematic plan. Any ex- 
planation or vindication of this plan would be, to those 
who are unacquainted with Sir "Wm.'s system, unintel- 

1 The works of Thomas Reid, D. D., now fully collected, with selec- 
tions from his unpublished letters. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary 
Dissertations, by Sir Win. Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh : 
Third Edition, 1852 : pp. 914 (not completed). 

2 Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University 
Reform. By Sir Wm. Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh, 1852 : 
pp. 15%. 



6 PEEFACE. 

ligible ; to those who have mastered its principles, su- 
perfluous. Our foot-notes are not very numerous, and 
consist mostly in references to other parts of the work, 
where some point indicated is more fully treated ; and in 
explanations of a few, more than usually difficult, pas- 
sages. In a single instance we have expressed our dis- 
sent from a position taken by Hamilton, the grounds 
of which we have briefly designated, without entering 
upon a systematic discussion. A severer study may 
convince us that Sir Wm. is right and that we are 
wrong. 

Hamilton has promised a General Preface to his Reid, 
and a Sequel of the Dissertations. When these appear, 
they will be added to this work in a separate volume, in 
which the Indices will be given to the whole. 

New York, June, 1853. 



INTRODUCTION 



We do not propose to give here a resume of Sir Wm. Hamilton's 
philosophy. A correct list, in technical language, of the principles 
of his system, would not be a clear exposition of his metaphysical 
doctrines. To attempt to put in a brief introduction the substance 
of several hundred pages of Hamilton's Philosophical Discussions and 
Dissertations would be presumptuous and preposterous. A philoso- 
pher, who thinks like Aristotle ; whose logic is as stern as that of 
St. Thomas, ' the lawgiver of the Church ;' who rivals Muretus as 
a critic ; whose erudition finds a parallel only in that of the younger 
Scaliger ; whose subtlety of thought and polemical power remind us 
of the dauntless prince 1 of Verona ; whose penetrating analysis reaches 
deeper than that of Kant, — such a one, it it our pleasure to introduce 
to the students of philosophy in America ; who, in a style severely 
elegant, with accuracy of statement, with precision of definition, in 
sequence and admirable order, will explain a system in many respects 
new, — a system that will provoke thought, that, consequently, carries 
in itself the germs of beneficial revolutions in literature and educa- 
tion, in all those things that are produced and regulated by mind 
in action. True to our plan of making the work as completely 
Hamilton's as possible, we shall offer, mostly in the language of 
our author, a few considerations on the utility of the study of phi- 
losophy. 

Philosophy is a necessity. Every man philosophizes as he thinks. 
The worth of his philosophy will depend upon the value of his think- 
ing. ' If to philosophize be right,' says Aristotle, in his Exhortative, 
: we must philosophize to realize the right ; if to philosophize be 

' The elder Scaliger. 



8 INTKODUOTION. 

wrong, we must philosophize to manifest the wrong : on any alterna- 
tive, therefore, philosophize we must.' 1 

No philosopher can explore the whole realm of truth. No single 
mind can compass the aggregate of what is possessed by all. Every 
system must, then, be incomplete ; it cannot be taken as an equiva- 
lent for all that can be thought. The most that any system can do 
for us is to aid us, to stimulate our minds, to infuse higher intellectual 
energy. ' If the accomplishment of philosophy,' says Hamilton (Dis. 
p. 39, et seq.), ' imply a cessation of discu&sion — if the result of specu- 
lation be a paralysis of itself, the consummation of knowledge is the 
condition of intellectual barbarism. Plato has profoundly defined 
man " the hunter of truth ;" for in this chase as in others, the pursuit 
is all in all, the success comparatively nothing. " Did the Almighty," 
says Lessing, " holding in his right hand Truth, and in his left, Search 
after Truth, deign to proffer me the one I might prefer, in all hu- 
mility, but without hesitation, I should request — Search after Truth" 
"We exist only as we energize ; pleasure 1 is the reflex of unimpeded 
energy ; energy is the mean by which our faculties are developed ; 
and a higher energy the end which their development proposes. In 
action is thus contained the existence, happiness, improvement, and 
perfection of our being ; and knowledge is only previous, as it may 
afford a stimulus to the exercise of our powers, and the condition of 
their more complete activity. Speculative truth is, therefore, sub- 
ordinate to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by 
the quantity of energy which it occasions — immediately in its dis- 
covery — mediately through its consequences. Life to Endymion 
was not preferable to death ; aloof from practice, a waking error is 
better than a sleeping truth. — Neither, in point of fact, is there found 
any proportion between the possession of truths, and the development 
of the mind in which they are deposited. Every learner in science 
is now familiar with more truths than Aristotle or Plato ever dreamt 
of knowing ; yet, compared with the Stagirite or the Athenian, how 
few among our masters of modern science rank higher than intel- 
lectual barbarians ! Ancient Greece and modern Europe prove, in- 
deed, that the " march of intellect" is no inseparable concomitant of 

1 Ei fiiv <pi\oco<p7iT£ov., <pi\oao(pr]Ttov' Kal cl pr) <pi\oao<pr)Tiov, ^iXocro^tlTtov' 
7t&VT<x>% Spa <f>l\o<TO<priTCOV. 

2 Aristotle defined happiness, Energizing according to virtue. It results from the 
healthy, unimpeded activity of every element of our nature. — W. 



INTEODUCTION. 9 

" the march of science ;•" that the cultivation of the individual ia not 
to be rashly confounded with the progress of the species. 

' But if the possession of theoretical facts he not convertible with 
mental improvement, and if the former be important only as subser- 
vient to the latter, it follows that the comparative utility of a study 
is not to be principally estimated by the complement of truths which 
it may communicate, but by the degree in which it determines our 
higher capacities to action. But though this be the standard by 
which the different methods, the different branches, and the different 
masters of philosophy ought to be principally (and it is the only 
criterion by which they can all be satisfactorily) tried, it is never- 
theless a standard by which neither methods, nor sciences, nor phi- 
losophers, have ever yet been even inadequately appreciated. The 
critical history of philosophy, in this spirit, has still to be written ; 
and when written, how opposite will be the rank which, on the 
higher and more certain standard, it will frequently adjudge to the 
various branches of knowledge, and the various modes of their culti- 
vation — to the different ages, and countries, and individuals, from 
that which has been hitherto partially awarded, on the vacillating 
authority of the lower ! 

' On this ground (which we have not been able fully to state, far 
less adequately to illustrate), we rest the pre-eminent utility of meta- 
physical speculations. That they comprehend all the sublimest ob- 
jects of our theoretical and moral interest ; that every (natural) con- 
clusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and future des- 
tiny of man, is exclusively metaphysical, will be at once admitted. 
But we do not found the importance on the paramount dignity of 
the pursuit. It is as the best gymnastic of the mind — as a mean 
principally and almost exclusively conducive to the highest education 
of our noblest powers, that we would vindicate to these speculations 
the necessity, which has too frequently been denied them. By no 
other intellectual application (and least of all by physical pursuits) 
is the soul thus reflected on itself, and its faculties concentrated in 
such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy ; by 
none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely 
evolved. " Where there is most life, there is the victory." 

'Let it not be believed that the mighty minds who have cultivated 
these studies, have toiled in vain. If they have not always realized 
truth, they have always determined exertion ; and in the genial elo- 

1* 



10 INTRODUCTION. 

quence of the elder Scaliger : — " Eas subtilitates, quanquarn sint animia 
otiosis atque inutiles, vegetis tanien ingeniis surnmani cognoscendi 
afferunt voluptatern, — sitse, scilicet in fastigio ejus sapientiaa, quie 
reruni omnium principia contemplatur. Et quamvis haruni indagatit> 
non sit utilis ad macliinas farinarias conficiendas ; exuit tamen ani 
mum inscitiaa rubigine, acuitque ad alia. Eo denique splendore afficit, 
ut prgeluceat sibi ad nanciscendum primi opificis similitudinem. Qui, 
ut omnia plene ac perfecte est, at praster et supra omnia ; ita eos, 
qui scientiarum studiosi sunt, suos esse voluit, ipsorumque intellectum 
reruni dominum constituit." 1 

' The practical dauger which has sometimes been apprehended from 
metaphysical pursuits, has in reality only been found to follow from 
their stunted and partial cultivation. The poisor aas grown up ; the 
antidote has been repressed. In Britain and in Germany, where 
speculation has remained comparatively free, the dominant result has 
been highly favorable to religion 2 and morals ; whilst the evils which 
arose in France, arose from the benumbing influence of a one effete 
philosophy ; 3 and have, in point of fact, mainly been corrected by 
the awakened spirit of metaphysical inquiry itself.' 

Hamilton again says (' Discussions,' p. 696, et seq.) : ' Yet is Philoso- 
phy (the science of science — the theory of what we can know and 
think and do, in a word, the knowledge of ourselves), the object of 
liberal education, at once of paramount importance in itself, and the 
requisite condition of every other liberal science. If men are really 



1 Bacon, himself, the great champion of physical pursuits, says : — ' Those sciences are 
not to he regarded as useless, which, considered in themselves, are valueless, if they 
sharpen the mind and reduce it to order. Hume, Burke, Kant, Stewart, &c, might he 
quoted to the same effect. — Compare Aristotle, Metaph. i. 2, Eth. Nic. v. 7. 

2 The philosophers of Germany, not as it is generally supposed in this country, and 
even by those who ought to know, have been more orthodox than the divines. Fichte, 
who was, for his country and his times, a singularly pious Christian, was persecuted by 
the theologians, on account of his orthodoxy. — W. 

3 'Since the metaphysic of Locke,' says M. Cousin, in 1S19, 'crossed the channel on 
the light and brilliant wings of Voltaire's imagination, sensualism has reigned in France 
without contradiction, and with an authority of which there is no parallel in the whole 
history of philosophy. It is a fact, marvellous but incontestable, that from the time of 
Condillac, there has not appeared among us any philosophical work, at variance with 
his doctrine, which has produced the smallest impression on the public mind. Condillac 
thus reigned in peace ; and his domination, prolonged even to our own days, through 
changes of every kind, pursued its tranquil course, apparently above the reach of dan- 
ger. Discussion had closed : his disciples had only to develop the words of their master : 
philosophy seemed accomplished.' — (Journal des Savans.) During the reign of sen- 
sualism in France, religion, languished, for she was deprived cf the aid of her most ef- 
ficient servant — philosophy. — W. 



INTRODUCTION. 11 

to know aught else, the human faculties, by which alone this knowl- 
edge may be realized, must be studied for themselves, in then* extent 
and in their limitations. To know, — we must understand our in- 
strument of knowing. " Know thyself" is, in fact, a heavenly precept, 
in Christianity as in heathenism. And this knowledge can be com- 
passed only by reflection, — only from within: "Ne te queesieris 
extra." It tells us at once of our weakness and our worth; it is the 
discipline both of humility and hope. On the other hand, a knowl- 
edge, drawn too exclusively from without, is not only imperfect in 
itself, but makes its votaries fatalists, materialists, pantheists — if they 
dare to think ; it is the dogmatism of despair. " Laudabilior," says 
Augustin, "laudabilior est animus, cui nota est infirmitas propria, 
quam qui, ea non respecta, moenia mundi, vias siderum, ftmdamenta 
terrarum et fastigia coelorum, etiam cogniturus, scrutatur." "We can 
know God only as we know ourselves. " Noverim me, noverim Te," 
is St. Austin's prayer ; St. Bernard : — " Principale, ad videndum 
Deum, est animus rationalis intuens seipsum ;" and even Averroes : — 
" Nosce teipsum, et cognosces creatorem tuum." 

' Nor is the omission of philosophy from an academical curriculum 
equivalent to an arrest on the philosophizing activity of the student. 
This stupor, however deplorable in itself, might still be a minor evil • 
for it is better, assuredly, to be without opinions, than to have them, 
not only superlatively untrue, but practically corruptive. Yet, even 
this paralysis, I say, is not accomplished. Eight or wrong, a man 
must philosophize, for he philosophizes as he thinks ; and the only 
effect, in the present day especially, of a University denying to its 
alumni the invigorating exercise of a right philosophy, is their aban- 
donment, not only without precaution, but even prepared by debili- 
tation, to the pernicious influence of a wrong : — " Sine vindice preeda." 
And in what country has a philosophy ever gravitating, as theoretical 
towards materialism, as practical towards fatalism, been most pecu- 
liar and pervasive ? 

' Again : — Philosophy, the thinking of thought, the recoil of mind 
upon itself, is the most improving of mental exercises, conducing, 
above all others, to evolve the highest and rarest of the intellectual 
powers. By this, the mind is not only trained to philosophy proper, 
but prepared, in general, for powerful, easy, and successful energy, 
in whatever department of knowledge it may more peculiarly apply 
itself. But the want of this superior discipline is but too apparent in 



12 INTRODUCTION. 

English [American] literature, and especially in those very fields of 
erudition hy preference cultivated in England [America]. 

' Of English [American] scholars as a class, both now and for gen- 
erations past, the observation of Godfrey Hermann holds good : — 
" They read but do not think ; they would be philologers, and have 
not learned to philosophize." The philosophy of a philology is shown 
primarily in its grammars, and its grammars for the use of schools. 
But in this respect, England [America] remained, till lately, nearly 
two centuries behind the rest of Christendom. If there were any 
principle in her pedagogical practice, "Gaudent sudoribus artes," 
must have been the rule ; and applied it was with a vengeance. The 
English [American] schoolboy was treated like the Eussian pack- 
horse ; the load in one pannier was balanced by a counter- weight 
of stones in the other. . . . The unhappy tyro was initiated in 
Latin, through a Latin book ; while the ten declensions, the thirteen 
conjugations, which had been reduced to three and two by Weller 
and Lancelot, still continued, among a mass of other abomina- 
tions, to complicate, in this country, the elementary instruction of 
Greek. . . . But all has now been changed — except the cause : for 
the same inertion of original and independent thought is equally ap- 
parent. As formerly, from want of thinking, the old sufficed; so 
now, from want of thinking, the new is borrowed. In fact, openly or 
occultly, honorably or dishonorably, the far greater part of the higher 
and lower philology published in this country is an importation, 
especially from Germany : but so passive is the ignorance of our 
compilers, that they are often (though affecting, of course, opin- 
ions), unaware even of what is best worthy of plagiarism or trans- 
plantation. 

' Theology — Christian theology is, as a human science, a philology 
and history applied by philosophy ; and the comparatively ineffectual 
character of our British [American] theology has, for generations, 
mainly resulted from the deficiency of its philosophical element. The 
want of a philosophical training in the Anglican [American] clergy, 
to be regretted at all times, may soon, indeed, become lamentably 
apparent, were they called on to resist an invasion, now so likely, of 
certain foreign philosophico-theological opinions. 1 In fact, this is the 

1 This invasion has already come with us. Dr. Hickok and a few others, who alone 
see the real danger, have faced it manfully and well armed. The spirit of the Absolute, 
which has found its way hither through various channels, from the country of Scholling 



INTRODUCTION". 13 

invasion, and -this the want of national preparation, for which even at 
the present juncture, I should be most alarmed. On the Universities, 1 
which have illegally dropped philosophy and its training from their 
course of discipline, will lie the responsibility of this singular and 
dangerous disarmature.' 

We commend Hamilton's philosophy to educators, not only for its 
great excellence as a metaphysical system, for its profound thought 
and affluent erudition, for its spirit of free inquiry, and, consequently, 
its power to quicken the mind ; but, above all, we commend it for its 
accordance with the principles of revealed religion. Sir Win., though 
metaphysically the ' most formidable man in Europe,' is an humble 
Christian ; though the most learned of men, he is ready to bow be- 
fore the spirit that ' informed' the mind of Paul. Hamilton says that 
he is confident that his philosophy is founded upon truth. ' To this 
confidence I have come, not merely through the convictions of my 
own consciousness, but by finding in this system a centre and con- 
ciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions. Above all, 
however, I am confirmed in my belief, by the harmony between the 
doctrines of this philosophy, and those of revealed truth. " Credo 
equidem, nee von fides." The philosophy of the Conditioned is indeed 
pre-eminently a discipline of humility ; a " learned ignorance," directly 
opposed to the false " knowledge which puffeth up." I may say with 
St. Chrysostom : — " The foundation of our philosophy is humility." — 
(Homil. de Perf. Evang.) For it is professedly a scientific demon- 
stration of the impossibility of that " wisdom in high matters" which 
the apostle prohibits us even to attempt ; and it proposes, from the 
limitations of the human powers, from our impotence to comprehend 
what, however, we must admit, to show articulately why the " secret 
things of God" cannot but be to man "past finding out." Humility 
thus becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation, but of reason. 
This scheme proves, moreover, that no difficulty emerges in theology, 
which had not previously emerged in philosophy ; that in fact, if the 
divine do not transcend what it has pleased the Deity to reveal, and 
wilfully indentify the doctrine of God's word with some arrogant ex- 



and Hegel, will not be exorcised by a solemn reading of creeds, and by repeating some 
stereotyped theological phrases ; it must be brought into the clear white light of thought ; 
like every other spectre of the night, it will vanish at the real dawn.— W. 

1 Our American colleges, instead of having ' dropped philosophy and its training from 
their course of discipline,' have never seriously taten it up.— W. 



14 INTRODUCTION. 

treme of human speculation, philosophy will be found the most use- 
ful auxiliary of theology. For a world of false, and pestilent, and 
presumptuous reasoning, by which philosophy and theology are now 
equally discredited, would be at once abolished, in the recognition of 
this rule of prudent nescience ; nor could it longer be too justly said 
of the code of consciousness, as by reformed divines it has been ac- 
knowledged of the Bible : — 

" This is the book, where each his dogma seeks ; 
And this the book, where each his dogma finds." ' 



CONTENTS.- 



PART FIRST. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OP COMMON SENSE ; OE, OUlt PEIMAEY BE- 
LIEFS CONSIDEEED AS THE ULTIMATE CEITEBION OF TEETH. 

Section I. The Meaning of the Doctrine, and Purport of the Argu- 
ment, of Common Sense 19 

II. The Conditions of the Legitimacy, and legitimate applica- 
tion, of the argument 86 

III. That it is one strictly Philosophical and scientific 41 

IV. The Essential Characters by which our primary beliefs, or 

the principles of Common Sense, are discriminated 47 

V. The Nomenclature, that is, the various appellations by 

which these have been designated 50 

VI. The Universality of the philosophy of Common Sense; or 
its general recognition, in reality and in name, shown by 
a chronological series of Testimonies from the dawn of 
speculation to the present day. 85 



PART SECOND. 

PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 

CHAPTEE I. — Elucidation of Seed's Doctrine of Perception, and ns 
Defence against Sm Thomas Bkown 165 

CHAPTEE II. — Presentative and Eepeesentative Knowledge. 

Section I. The distinction of Presentative, Intuitive, or Immediate, 
and of Eepresentative or Mediate cognition ; with the va- 
rious significations of the term Object, its conjugates and 
correlatives 238 

II. Errors of Beid and other Philosophers, in reference to the 

preceding distinctions 256 



16 CONTENTS. 



CHAPTEE III. — Various Theories of External Perception. 

Section I. Systematic Schemes, from different points of view, of the 
various theories of the relation of External Perception to 
its Object; and of the various systems of Philosophy 

founded thereon 265 

II. What is the character, in this respect, of Eeid's doctrine of 

Perception ? 272 

CHAPTEE IV. — Doctrine of Perception maintained by the Abso- 
lute Idealists. — Discussion on the Scheme of Arthur Collier. . 285 

CHAPTEE V. — Distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of 

Body. 

Section I. Historically considered 306 

II. Critically considered. Three classes (Primary, Secundo- 

Primary, and Secondary Qualities) established 352 

CHAPTEE VI. — Perception Proper and Sensation Proper. 

Section I. Principal momenta of the Editor's doctrine of Perception, 
(A) in itself, and (B) in contrast to that of Eeid, Stewart, 
Eoyer-Collard, and other philosophers of the Scottish 

School 412 

II. Historical notices in regard to the distinction of Perception 

proper and Sensation proper 432 



PART THIRD. 

PHILOSOPHY OE THE CONDITIONED. 

CHAPTEE I. — Befutation of the various Doctrines of thb Uncon- 
ditioned, ESPECIALLY OF COUSIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE INFLNITO- ABSO- 
LUTE 441 

CHAPTEE II. — Limitation of Thought and Knowledge. 

Section I. A Doctrine of the Eelative ; the Categories of Thought.... 484 
II. Philosophical Testimonies to the Limitation of our Knowl- 
edge, from the Limitation of our Faculties 517 



PAET PIEST. 



PHILOSOPHY 



COMMON SENSE 



"There is nothing that can pretend to judge of Eeason but itself: and, 
therefore, they who suppose that they can say aught against it, are forced 
(like jewellers, who beat true diamonds to powder to cut and polish false 
ones), to make use of it against itself. But in this they cheat themselves as 
well as others. For if what they say against Eeason, be without Eeason, 
they deserve to be neglected; and if with Eeason, they disprove them- 
selves. For they use it while they disclaim it ; and with as much contra- 
diction, as if a man should tell me that he cannot speak." 

Atjthoe of Hudibeas (Reflections upon Reason). 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE, 1 

OK, 

OUR PRIMARY BELIEFS CONSIDERED AS THE ULTIMATE 
CRITERION OF TRUTH. 



§ I. — The meaning of the doctrine, and purport of the 

ARGUMENT, OF COMMON SENSE. 

In the conception and application of the doctrine of Common 
Sense, the most signal mistakes have been committed ; and much 
unfounded prejudice has been excited against the argument which 
it affords, in consequence of the erroneous views which have been 
held in regard to its purport and conditions. "What is the veritable 
character of this doctrine, it is, therefore, necessary to consider. 

Our cognitions, it is evident, are not all at second hand. Con- 
sequents cannot, by an infinite regress, be evolved out of ante- 
cedents, which are themselves only consequents. Demonstration, 
if proof be possible, behooves us to repose at last on propositions, 
which, carrying their own evidence, necessitate their own admis- 
sion ; and which being, as primary, inexplicable, as inexplicable, 
incomprehensible, must consequently manifest themselves less in 
the character of cognitions than of facts, of which consciousness 
assures us under the simple form- of feeling or belief. 

Without at present attempting to determine the character, 
number, and relations — waiving, in short, all attempt at an artic- 



1 The Philosophy of Common Sense properly comes first in Hamilton's 
System, for he sets out from the ultimate facts of consciousness, or the pri- 
mary beliefs of mankind. The leading Supplementary Dissertation in his 
edition of Reid, constitutes the first general division in our arrangement of 
his philosophy. — W. 



20 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

ulate analysis and classification of the primary elements of cogni • 
tion, as carrying us into a discussion beyond our limits, and not 
of indispensable importance for the end we have in view ;* it is 
sufficient to have it conceded, in general, that such elements there 
are ; and this concession of their existence being supposed, I shall 
proceed to hazard some observations, principally in regard to their 
authority as warrants and criteria of truth. Nor can this as- 
sumption of the existence of some original bases of knowledge in 
the mind itself, be refused by any. For even those philosophers 
who profess to derive all our knowledge from experience, and who 
admit no universal truths of intelligence but such as are generalized 
from individual truths of fact — even these philosophers are forced 
virtually to acknowledge, at the root of the several acts of observa- 
tion from which their generalization starts, some law or principle 

* Such an analysis and classification is however in itself certainly one of 
the most interesting and important problems of philosophy ; and it is one 
in which much remains to be accomplished. Principles of cognition, which 
now stand as ultimate, may, I think, be reduced to simpler elements ; and 
some which are now viewed as direct and positive, may be shown to be 
merely indirect and negative ; their cogency depending, not on the immedi- 
ate necessity of thinking them — for if earned unconditionally out, they are 
themselves incogitable — but in the impossibility of thinking something to 
which they are directly opposed, and from which they are the immediate re- 
coils. An exposition of the axiom — That positive thought lies in the limita- 
tion or conditioning of one or other of two opposite extremes, neither of which 
as unconditioned, can be realized to the mind as possible, and yet of which, 
as contradictories, one or other must, by the fundamental laws of thought, 
be recognized as necessary : — The exposition of this great but unenounced 
axiom would show that some of the most illustrious principles are only its 
subordinate modifications as applied to certain primary notions, intuitions, 
data, forms, or categories of intelligence, as Existence, Quantity (protensive, 
Time — extensive, Space— intensive, Degree) Quality, etc. Such modifications, 
for example, are the principles of, Cause and Effect, 1 Substance and Phenom- 
enon, etc. 

I may here also observe, that though the primary truths of facts and the 
primary truths of intelligence (the contingent and necessary truths of Eeid) 
form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of conscious- 
ness ; there appears no sufficient ground to regard their sources as different, 
and therefore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret that 
I am unable to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his Elements, vol. ii. ch. 1, and 
bis account of Eeid. 

See Part Third of this vol. passim. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 21 

to which they can appeal as guaranteeing the procedure, should the 
validity of these primordial acts themselves be called in question- 
This acknowledgment is, among others, made even by Locke ; and 
on such fundamental guarantee of induction he even bestows the 
name of Common Sense. (See below, in Testimonies, No. 51.) 

Limiting, therefore, our consideration to the question of au- 
thority ; how, it is asked, do these primary propositions — these 
cognitions at first hand — these fundamental facts, feelings, beliefs, 
certify us of their own veracity ? To this the only possible an- 
swer is — that as elements of our mental constitution — as the es- 
sential conditions of our knowledge — they must by us be accept- 
ed as true. To suppose their falsehood, is to suppose that we are 
created capable of intelligence, in order to be made the victims 
of delusion ; that God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a 
lie. But such a supposition, if gratuitous, is manifestly illegiti- 
mate. For, on the contrary, the data of our original conscious- 
ness must, it is evident, in the first instance, be presumed true. It 
is only if proved false, that their authority can, in consequence of 
that proof, be, in the second instance, disallowed. Speaking, there- 
fore, generally, to argue from common sense, is simply to show, 
that the denial of a given proposition would involve the denial of 
some original datum of consciousness ; but as every original da- 
tum of consciousness is to be presumed true, that the proposition 
in question, as dependent on such a principle, must be admitted. 

But that such an argument is competent and conclusive, must 
be more articulately shown. 

Here, however, at the outset, it is proper to take a distinction, 
the neglect of which has been productive of considerable error 
and confusion. It is the distinction between the data or deliver- 
ances of consciousness considered simply, in themselves, as appre- 
hended facts or actual manifestations, and those deliverances 
considered as testimonies to the truth of facts beyond their otvn 
phenomenal reality. 

Viewed under the former limitation, they are above all skepti- 
cism. For as doubt is itself only a manifestation of consciousness, 



22 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

it is impossible to doubt that, what consciousness manifests, it 
does manifest, "without, in thus doubting, doubting that we actu- 
ally doubt ; that is, without the doubt contradicting and there- 
fore annihilating itself. Hence it is that the facts of conscious- 
ness, as mere phenomena, are by the unanimous confession of 
all Skeptics and Idealists, ancient and modern, placed high above 
the reach of question. Thus, Laertius, in Pyrrh., L. ix. seg. 103 ; 
— Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hypot., L. i. cc. 4, 10, et passim ; — 
Descartes, Med., ii. pp. 13, and iii. p. 16, ed. 1658; — Hume, 
Treatise on Human Nature, vol. i. pp. 123, 370, et alibi, orig. 
ed. ; — Schulze, Aenesidemus, p. 24, Kritik, vol. i. p. 51 ; — Plai- 
ner, Aphor., vol. i. § 708 ; — Reinhold, Theorie, p. 190 ; — Schad, 
in Fichte's Philos. Jour., vol. x. p. 270. See also St. Austin, 
Contra, Academ., L. iii. c. 11 ; De Trim, L. xv. c. 112; Scotus, 
in Sent., L. i. dist. 3, qu. 4, 10 ; — Bu filer, Prem. Verit., § 9 — 11 
40 ; — Mayne's Essay on Consciousness, p. 177, sq. ; — Reid, p. 
442, b. et alibi; — Cousin, Cours d'Hist. de la Philosophie Mo- 
rale, vol. ii. pp. 220, 236. 

On this ground, St. Austin was warranted in affirming — Ni- 
hil intelligenti tarn notum esse quain se sentire, se cogitare, se 
velle, se vivere ; and the cogito ergo sum of Descartes is a valid 
assertion, that in so far as we are conscious of certain modes of 
existence, in so far we possess an absolute certainty that we really 
exist. [Aug. De Lib. Arb., ii. 3 ; De Trim, x. 3 ; De Civ. Dei., 
xi. 26 ; Desc, 11. cc, et passim.) 

Viewed under the latter limitation, the deliverances of con- 
sciousness do not thus peremptorily repel even the possibility of 
doubt. I am conscious for example, in an act of sensible percep- 
tion, 1°, of myself, the subject knowing ; and 2°, of something 
given as different from myself, the object known. To take the 
second term of this relation : — that I am conscious in this act 
of an object given, as a non-ego 1 — that is, as not a modifica- 
tion of my mind — of this, as a phenomenon, doubt is impossi- 

1 Hamilton always uses ego, and non-ego, instead of me and not-nu, which, 
though convenient and common, involve a grammatical error. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 23 

ble. For, as has been seen, we cannot doubt the actuality 
of a fact of consciousness without doubting, that is subvert- 
ing, our doubt itself. To this extent, therefore, all skepticism is 
precluded. But though it cannot but be admitted that the object of 
which we are conscious in this cognition is given, not as a mode 
of self, but as a mode of something different from self, it is how- 
ever possible for us to suppose, without c ur supposition at least 
being felo de se, that, though given as a non-ego, this object may, 
in reality, be only a representation of a non-ego, in and by tha 
ego. Let this therefore be maintained : let the fact of the testi- 
mony be admitted, but the truth of the testimony, to aught be- 
yond its own ideal existence, be doubted or denied. How in this 
case are we to proceed ? It is evident that the doubt does not 
in this, as in the former case refute itself. It is not suicidal by 
self-contradiction. The Idealist, therefore, in denying the exist- 
ence of an external world, as more than a subjective phenome- 
non of the internal, does not advance a doctrine ab initio null, as 
a skepticism would be which denied the phenomena of the inter- 
nal world itself. Yet many distinguished philosophers have fall- 
en into this mistake ; and, among others, both Dr. Reid, proba- 
bly, and Mr. Stewart, certainly. The latter in his Philosophical 
Essays (pp. 6, V), explicitly states, " that the belief Avhich accom- 
panies consciousness, as to the present existence of its appropriate 
phenomena, rests on no foundation more solid than our belief 
of the existence of external objects." Reid does not make any 
declaration so explicit, but the same doctrine seems involved in 
various of his criticisms of Hume and of Descartes (Inq. 1 pp. 100 
a., 129, 130 ; Int. Pow., pp. 269 a., 442 b). Thus (p. 100 a.) 
he reprehends the latter for maintaining that consciousness affords 
a higher assurance of the reality of the internal phenomena, 
than sense affords of the reality of the external. He asks — Why 
did Descartes not attempt a proof of the existence of his thought ? 
and if consciousness be alleged as avouching this, he asks again, 

1 The reference is to Hamilton's edition of Eeid. — W. 



24: PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

— Who is to be our voucher that consciousness may not deceive 
us ? My observations on this point, which were printed above 
three years ago, in the foot-notes at pp. 129 and 442 b., 1 I am 

2 The following are the foot-notes referred to : 

"There is no skepticism possible touching the facts of consciousness in 
themselves. "We cannot doubt that the phenomena of consciousness are real, 
in so far as we are conscious of them. I cannot doubt, for example, that I 
am actually conscious of a certain feeling of fragrance, and of certain percep- 
tions of color, figure, etc., when I see and smell a rose. Of the reality of 
these, as experienced, I cannot doubt, because they are facts of conscious- 
ness ; and of consciousness I cannot doubt, because such doubt being 
itself an act of consciousness, would contradict, and, consequently, annihi- 
late itself. But of all beyond the mere phenomena of which we are con- 
scious, we may — without fear of self-contradiction at least — doubt. I may, 
for instance, doubt whether the rose I see and smell has any existence be- 
yond a phenomenal existence in my consciousness. I cannot doubt that I 
am conscious of it as something different from self, but whether it have, in- 
deed, any reality beyond my mind — whether the not-selj ? be not in truth only 
self — that I may philosophically question. In like manner, I am conscious 
of the memory of a certain past event. Of the contents of this memory, as 
a phenomenon given in consciousness, skepticism is impossible. But I may 
by possibility demur to the reality of all beyond these contents and the 
sphere of present consciousness. 

"In Beid's strictures upon Hume, he confounds two opposite things. He 
reproaches that philosopher with inconsequence, in holding to ' the belief 
of the existence of his own impressions and ideas.' Now, if, by the existence 
of impressions and ideas, Beid meant their existence as mere phenomena of 
consciousness, his criticism is inept ; for a disbelief of their existence, as such 
phenomena, would have been a suicidal act in the skeptic. If, again, he 
meant by impressions and ideas the hypothesis of representative entities dif- 
ferent from the mind and its modifications ; in that case the objection is 
equally invalid. Hume was a skeptic ; that is, he accepted the premises af- 
forded him by the dogmatist, and carried these premises to their legitimate 
consequences. To blame Hume, therefore, for not having doubted of his 
borrowed principles, is to blame the skeptic for not performing a part alto- 
gether inconsistent with his vocation. But, in point of fact, the hypothesis 
of such entities is of no value to the idealist or skeptic. Impressions and ideas, 
viewed as mental modes, would have answered Hume's purpose not a whit 
worse than impressions and ideas viewed as objects, but not as affections of 
mind. The most consistent scheme of idealism known in the history of phi- 
losophy is that of Fichte ; and Fichte's idealism is founded on a basis which 
excludes that crude hypothesis of ideas on which alone Beid imagined any 
doctrine of Idealism could possibly be established. And is the acknowl- 
edged result of the Fichtean dogmatism less a nihilism than the skepticism 
of Hume? 'The sum total,' says Fichte, 'is this: — There is absolutely 
nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing 
change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 25 

happy to find confirmed by the authority of M. Cousin. The fol- 
lowing passage is from his Lectures on the Scottish School, con- 
stituting the second volume of his " Course on the History of the 
Moral Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century," delivered in the 
years 1819, 1820, but only recently published by M. Vacherot. 1 
" It is not (he observes in reference to the preceding strictures of 
Keid upon Descartes) as a fact attested by consciousness, that 
Descartes declares his personal existence beyond a doubt ; it is 
because the negation of this fact would involve a contradiction." 
And after quoting the relative passage from Descartes : — " It is 
thus by a reasoning that Descartes establishes the existence of 
the thinking subject ; if he admit this existence, it is not because 
it is guaranteed by consciousness ; it is for this reason, that when 
he thinks — let him deceive himself or not — he exists in so far as 
he thinks." 

It is therefore manifest that we may throw wholly out of ac- 
count the phenomena of consciousness, considered merely in them- 
selves ; seeing that skepticism in regard to them, under this lim- 
itation, is confessedly impossible ; and that it is only requisite to 
consider the argument from common sense, as it enables us to 



I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images (Bilder) there are: they 
constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is 
after the manner of images ; images that pass and vanish without there be- 
ing aught to witness their transition ; that consist in fact of the images of 
images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these 
images ; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. 
All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of 
and without a mind to dream ; into a dream made up only of a dream of 
itself. Perception is a dream ; thought— the source of all the existence and 
all the reality which I imagine to myself of my existence, of my power, oi 
my destination — is the dream of that dream.' 

" In doubting the fact of his consciousness, the skeptic must at least af- 
firm his doubt ; but to affirm a doubt is to affirm the consciousness of it ; the 
doubt would therefore be self-contradictory — i. e. annihilate itself." — W. 

•"Since the above was written, M. Cousin has himself published the Course 
of 1819-20, and the Lectures on the Scottish School may now be found, am- 
plified, in the fourth volume of his first series. The same thing is stated 
with precision, clearness, and force, here and there in Cousin's second se- 
ries, the whole of which we have recently translated and p ablished.— W. 



26 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

vindicate the truth of these phenomena, viewed as attestations ol 
more than their own existence, seeing that they are not, in this 
respect, placed beyond the possibility of doubt. 

When, for example, consciousness assures us that, in percep- 
tion, we are immediately cognizant of an external and extended 
non-ego ; or that, in remembrance, through the imagination, of 
which we are immediately cognizant, we obtain a mediate knowl- 
edge of a real past ; how shall we repel the doubt — in the for- 
mer case, that what is given as the extended reality itself is not 
merely a representation of matter by mind — in the latter, that 
what is given as a mediate knowledge of the past, is not a mere 
present phantasm, containing an illusive reference to an unreal 
past ? We can do this only in one way. The legitimacy of such 
gratuitous doubt necessarily supposes that the deliverance of con- 
sciousness is not to be presumed true. If, therefore, it can be shown, 
on the one hand, that the deliverances of consciousness must 
philosophically be accepted, until their certain or probable false- 
hood has been positively evinced ; and if, on the other hand, it 
cannot be shown that any attempt to discredit the veracity of 
consciousness has ever yet succeeded ; it follows that, as philoso- 
phy now stands, the testimony of consciousness must be viewed 
as high above suspicion, and its declarations entitled to demand 
prompt and unconditional assent. 

In the first place, as has been said, it cannot but be acknowl- 
edged that the veracity of consciousness must, at least in the first 
instance, be conceded. " Neganti incumbit probatio." Nature is 
not gratuitously to be assumed to work, not only in vain, but in 
counteraction of herself; our faculty of knowledge is not, with- 
out a ground, to be supposed an instrument of illusion ; man, un- 
less the melancholy fact be proved, is not to be held organized for 
the attainment, and actuated by the love of truth, only to become 
the dupe and victim of a perfidious creator. 

But, in the second place, though the veracity of the primary 
convictions of consciousness must, in the outset, be admitted, it 
still remains competent to lead a proof that they are undeserving 



PHILOSOPHY OF COilMON SEIS T SE. 27 

of credit. But how is this to be done ? As the ultimate grounds 
of knowledge, these convictions cannot be redargued from any- 
higher knowledge ; and as original beliefs, they are paramount in 
certainty to eveiy derivative assurance. But they are many ; 
they are, in authority, co-ordinate ; and their testimony is clear 
and precise. It is therefore competent for us to view them in cor- 
relation ; to compare their declarations ; and to consider whether 
they contradict, and, by contradicting, invalidate each other. 
This mutual contradiction is possible, in two ways. 1°, It may 
be that the primary data themselves are directly or immediately 
contradictory of each other ; 2°, it may be that they are medi- 
ately or indirectly contradictory, inasmuch as the consequences to 
which they necessarily lead, and for the truth or falsehood of 
which they are therefore responsible, are mutually repugnant. By 
evincing either of these, the veracity of consciousness will be dis- 
proved ; for, in either case, consciousness is shown to be inconsist- 
ent with itself, and consequently inconsistent with the unity of 
truth. But by no other process of demonstration is this possible. 
For it will argue nothing against the trustworthiness of conscious- 
ness, that all or any of its deliverances are inexplicable — are in- 
comprehensible ; that is, that we are unable to conceive through 
a higher notion, how that is possible, which the deliverance 
avouches actually to be. To make the comprehensibility of a 
datum of consciousness the criterion of its truth, would be indeed 
the climax of absurdity. For the primary data of consciousness, 
as themselves the conditions under which all else is comprehended, 
are necessarily themselves incomprehensible. We know, and can 
know, only — That they are, not — How they can be. To ask how 
an immediate fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask how con- 
sciousness is possible ; and to ask how consciousness is possible, 
is to suppose that we have another consciousness, before and above 
that human consciousness, concerning whose mode of operation we 
inquire. Could we answer this, " verily we should be as gods." ' 

1 From what has now heen stated, it will be seen how far and on what 
grounds I hold, at once with Dr. Eeid and Mr. Stewart, that our original 



28 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

To take an example : — It would be unreasonable in the Cosmo- 
thetic or tbe Absolute Idealist, to require of the Natural Realist 1 a 
reason, through which to understand how a self can be conscious 
of a not-self — how an unextended subject can be cognizant of an 
extended object ; both of which are given us as facts by conscious- 
ness, and, as such, founded on by the Natural Realist. This is un- 
reasonable, because it is incompetent to demand the explanation 
of a datum of consciousness, which, as original and simple, is 
necessarily beyond analysis and explication. It is still further 
unreasonable, inasmuch as all philosophy being only a develop- 
ment of the primary data of consciousness, any philosophy, in 
not accepting the truth of these, pro tanto surrenders its own pos- 
sibility — is felo de se. But at the haads of the Cosmothetic Ideal- 
ists — and they constitute the great majority of philosophers — the 
question is peculiarly absurd ; for before proposing it, they are 
themselves bound to afford a solution of the far more insuperable 
difficulties which their own hypothesis involves — difficulties which, 
so far from attempting to solve, no Hypothetical Realist has ever 
yet even articulately stated. 2 

This being understood, the following propositions are either 
self-evident, or admit of easy proof: 

1. The end of philosophy is truth; and consciousness is the 
instrument and criterion of its acquisition. In other words, phi- 
losophy is the development and application of the constitutive 
and normal truths which consciousness immediately reveals. 

2. Philosophy is thus wholly dependent upon consciousness ; the 
possibility of the former supposing the trustworthiness of the latter. 

3. Consciousness is presumed to be trustworthy, until proved 
mendacious. 

4. The mendacity of consciousness is proved, if its data, imme- 

beliefs are to be established, but their authority not to be canvassed ; and 
with M. Jouffroy, that the question of their authority is not to be absolutely 
withdrawn, as a forbidden problem, from philosophy. 

1 On these terms see the third and fourth chapters of the second part of 
this vol. — W. 

9 For the illustration of this, see chapter first of the second part.— W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 29 

diately in themselves, or mediately in their necessary conse- 
quences, be shown to stand in mutual contradiction. 

5. The immediate or mediate repugnance of any two of its 
data being established, the presumption in favor of the general 
veracity of consciousness is abolished, or rather reversed. For 
while, on the one hand, all that is not contradictory is not there- 
fore true ; on the other, a positive proof of falsehood, in one in- 
stance, establishes a presumption of probable falsehood in all; 
for the maxim, "falsus in uno,falsus in omnibus" must deter- 
mine the credibility of consciousness, as the credibility of every 
other witness. 

6. No attempt to show that the data of consciousness are 
(either in themselves, or in their necessary consequences) mutually 
contradictory, has yet succeeded ; and the presumption in favor 
of the truth of consciousness and the possibility of philosophy 
has, therefore, never been redargued. In other words, an ori- 
ginal, universal, dogmatic subversion of knowledge has hitherto 
been found impossible. 

7. No philosopher has ever formally denied the truth or dis- 
claimed the authority of consciousness ; but few or none have 
been content implicitly to accept and consistently to follow out its 
dictates. Instead of humbly resorting to consciousness, to draw 
from thence his doctrines and their proof, each dogmatic specula- 
tor looked only into consciousness, there to discover his pre- 
adopted opinions. In philosophy, men have abused the code of 
natural, as in theology, the code of positive, revelation ; and the 
epigraph of a great protestant divine, on the book of scripture, is 
certainly not less applicable to the book of consciousness : 

" Hie liber est in quo quozril sua dogmata quisque ; 
,, Invenit, etpariter dogmata quisque sua." a 

8. The first and most obtrusive consequence of this proceedure 
has been, the multiplication of philosophical systems in every 
conceivable aberration from the unity of truth. 

1 " This is the book where each his dogma seeks ; 
And this the book where each his dogma finds." 



30 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

9. The second, but less obvious, consequence has teen, the vir- 
tual surrender, by each several system, of the possibility of phi- 
losophy in general. For, as the possibility of philosophy sup- 
poses the absolute truth of consciousness, every system which 
proceeded on the hypothesis, that even a single deliverance of 
consciousness is untrue, did, however it might eschew the overt 
declaration, thereby invalidate the general credibility of conscious- 
ness, and supply to the skeptic the premises he required to sub- 
vert philosophy, in so far as that system represented it. 

10. And yet, although the past history of philosophy has, in 
a great measure, been only a history of variation and error (yari- 
asse erroris est) ; yet the cause of this variation being known, we 
obtain a valid ground of hope for the destiny of philosophy in 
future. Because, since philosophy has hitherto been inconsistent 
with itself, only in being inconsistent with the dictates of our 
natural beliefs — 

" For Truth is catholic, and Nature one ;" 

it follows, that philosophy has simply to return to natural con- 
sciousness, to return to unity and truth. 

In doing this we have only to attend to the three following 
maxims or precautions : 

1°, That we admit nothing, not either an original datum oi 
consciousness, or the legitimate consequence of such a datum ; 

2°, That we embrace all the original data of consciousness, 
and all their legitimate consequences ; and 

3°, That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity 
neither distorted nor mutilated, and in its relative place, whether 
of pre-eminence or subordination. 

Nor can it be contended that consciousness has spoken in so 
feeble or ambiguous a voice, that philosophers have misappre- 
hended or misunderstood her enouncements. On the contrary, 
they have been usually agreed about the fact and purport of the 
deliverance, differing only as to the mode in which they might 
evade or qualify its acceptance. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 31 

Tliis I shall illustrate by a memorable example — by one in ref- 
erence to the very cardinal point of philosophy. In the act of 
sensible perception, I am conscious of two things ; — of myself as 
the perceiving subject, and of an external reality, in relation with 
my sense, as the object perceived. Of the existence of both these 
things I am convinced : because I am conscious of knowing each 
of them, not mediately, in something else, as represented, but im- 
mediately in itself, as existing. Of their mutual independence I 
am no less convinced ; because each is apprehended equally, and 
at once, in the same indivisible energy, the one not preceding or 
determining, the other not following or determined ; and because 
each is apprehended out of, and in direct contrast to the other. 

Such is the fact of perception as given in consciousness, and as 
it affords to mankind in general the conjunct assurance they pos- 
sess, of their own existence, and of the existence of an external 
world. Nor are the contents of the deliverance, considered as a 
phenomenon, denied by those who still hesitate to admit the truth 
of its testimony. As this point, however, is one of principal im- 
portance, I shall not content myself with assuming the preceding- 
statement of the fact of perception as a truth attested by the in- 
ternal experience of all ; but, in order to place it beyond the pos- 
sibility of doubt, quote in evidence, more than a competent num- 
ber of authoritative, and yet reluctant testimonies, and give 
articulate references to others. 

Descartes, the father of modern idealism, acknowledges, that 
in perception we suppose the qualities of the external realities to 
be themselves apprehended, and not merely represented, by the 
mind, in virtue or on occasion of certain movements of the sen- 
suous organism which they determine. " Putamus nos videre 
ipsam tadam, et audire ipsam campanam : non vero solum sen- 
tire motus qui ab ipsis proveniunt." De Passionibus art. xxiii. 
This, be it observed, is meant for a statement applicable to our 
perception of external objects in general, and not merely to our 
perception of their secondary qualities. 

De Raei, a distinguished follower of Descartes, frequently ad- 



32 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

mits, that what is conirnonly rejected by philosophers is univer- 
sally believed by mankind at large — " lies ipsas secundum se in 
sensum incurrereP De Mentis Humana? Facultatibus, Sectio II. 
§ 41, 70, 89. De Cognitione Humana, § 15, 39, et alibi. 

In like manner, Berkeley, contrasting the belief of the vulgar, 
and the belief of philosophers on this point, says : — " The former 
are of opinion that those things they immediately perceive are the 
real things ; and the latter, that the things immediately perceived 
are ideas which exist only in the mind." Three Dialogues, &c, 
Dial. III. prope finem. His brother idealist, Arthur Collier, might 
be quoted to the same purport ; though he does not, like Berke- 
ley, pretend that mankind at large are therefore idealists. 

Hume frequently states that, in the teeth of all philosophy, 
'• men are carried by a blind and powerful instinct of nature to 
suppose the very images presented by the senses to be the external 
objects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing 
but representations of the other." Inquiry concerning Human 
Understanding, Sect. XIL, Essays, ed. 1788, vol. ii. p. 154. 
Compare also ibid. p. 157 ; and Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 
i. B. i. P. iv. Sect. 2, pp. 330, 338, 353, 358, 361, 369. 

Schelling, in many passages of his works, repeats, amplifies, 
and illustrates the statement, that " the man of common sense be- 
lieves, and will not but believe, that the object he is conscious of 
perceiving is the real one." This is from his Philosophische Schrif- 
ten, I. p. 274; and it may be found with the context, translated 
by Coleridge — but given as his own — in the " Biographia Litera- 
ria," I. p. 262. See also among other passages, Philos. Schr., I. 
pp. 217, 238 ; Ideen zu einer Philosophic der !Natur, Einleit. pp. 
xix. xxvi. first edition (translated in Edinb. Rev., vol. lii. p. 202) ; 
Philosophisches Journal von Fichte und Niethhammer, vol. vii. 
p. 244. In these passages Schelling allows that it is only on the 
believed identity of the object known and of the object existing, and 
in our inability to discriminate in perceptive consciousness the 
representation from the thing, that mankind at large believe in the 
reality of an external world. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COiDION SENSE. 33 

But to adduce a more recent writer, and of a different school. — 
" From the natural point of view," says Stiedenroth, " the repre- 
sentation (Vorstellung) is not in sensible perception distinguished 
from the object represented ; for it appears as if the sense actu- 
ally apprehended the things out of itself, and in their proper 
space." (Psychologie, vol. i. p. 244.) " The things — the actual 
realities are not in our soul. Nevertheless, from the psychologi- 
cal point of view on which we are originally placed by nature, we 
do not suspect that our representation of external things and their 
relations is naught but representation. Before this can become a 
matter of consideration, the spatial relations are so far developed, 
that it seems as if the soul apprehended out of itself — as if it did 
not carry the image of things within itself, but perceived the 
things themselves in their proper space" (p. 267). "This belief 
(that our sensible percepts are the things themselves) is so strong 
and entire, that a light seems to break upon ns when we first 
learn, or bethink ourselves, that we are absolutely shut in within 
the circle of our own representations. Nay, it costs so painful an 
effort, consistently to maintain this acquired view, in opposition 
to that permanent and unremitted illusion, that we need not mar- 
vel, if, even to many philosophers, it should have been again lost" 
(p. 270). 

But it is needless to accumulate confessions as to a fact which 
has never, I believe, been openly denied ; I shall only therefore 
refer in general to the following authorities, who, all in like man- 
ner, even while denying the truth of the natural belief, acknowl- 
edge the fact of its existence. Malebranche, Becherche, L. iii. 
c. 1 ; Tetens, Versuche, vol. i. p. 375 ; fflchte, Bestimmung des 
Menschen, p. 56, ed. 1825 ; and in Philos. Journal, VLT. p. 35 ; 
Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ii. p. 294 (trans- 
lated in Edinb. Rev., vol. hi. p. 202) ; Fries, Neue Kritik, Voir., 
p. xxviii. sec. ed. ; Herbart, Allgemeine Metaphysik, H. Th., 
§ 327 ; Gerlach, Fundamental Philosophie, § 33 ; Beneke, Das Ver- 
haeltniss von Seele und Leib, p. 23 ; and Kant und die Philosc- 
phische Aufgabe unserer Zeit, p. 70 ; Stoeger, Pruefung, &c, p. 

2 



34 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

504. To these may be added, Jacobi, Werke, vol. i. p. 119 ; an<i 
in vol. ii., his " David Hume" passim, of which see a passage 
quoted infra in Testimonies, No. 87 c. 

The contents of the fact of perception, as given in conscious- 
ness, being thus established, what are the consequences to philos- 
ophy, according as the truth of its testimony (I.) is, or (II.) is not, 
admitted ? 

I. On the former alternative, the veracity of consciousness, in 
the fact of perception, being unconditionally acknowledged, we 
have established at once, without hypothesis or demonstration, the 
reality of mind, and the reality of matter ; while no concession 
is yielded to the skeptic, through which he may subvert philoso- 
phy in manifesting its self-contradiction. The one legitimate doc- 
trine, thus possible, may be called Natural Realism or Natural 
Dualism. 

II. On the latter alternative, five great variations from truth 
and nature may be conceived — and all of these have actually 
found their advocates — according as the testimony of conscious- 
ness, in the fact of perception, (A) is wholly, or (B) partially, 
rejected. 

A. If ivholly rejected, that is, if nothing but the phenomenal 
reality of the fact itself be allowed, the result is Nihilism. This 
may be conceived either as a dogmatical or as a skeptical opinion ; 
and Hume and Fichte have competently shown, that if the truth 
of consciousness be not unconditionally recognized, Nihilism is 
the conclusion in which our speculation, if consistent with itself, 
must end. 

B. On the other hand, if partially rejected, four schemes 
emerge, according to the way in which the fact is tampered with. 

i. If the veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise 
of the subject and object in the act, but disallowed to the reality 
of their antithesis, the system of Absolute Identity (whereof Pan- 
theism is the corollary) arises, which reduces mind and matter to 
phenomenal modifications of the same common substance. 

ii., iii. Again, if the testimony of consciousness be refused to 



PHILOSOPHY OF* COMMON SENSE. 35 

the equal originality and reciprocal independence of the subject 
and object in perception, two Unitarian schemes are determined, 
according as the one or as the other of these correlatives is sup- 
posed the prior and genetic. Is the object educed from the sub- 
ject ? Idealism ; is the subject educed from the object ? Materi- 
alism, is the result. 

iv. Finally, if the testimony of consciousness to our knowl- 
edge of an external world existing be rejected with the Idealist, 
but with the Realist the existence of that world be affirmed, we 
have a scheme which, as it by many various hypotheses, endeav- 
ors, on the one hand, not to give up the reality of an unknown 
material universe, and on the other, to explain the ideal illusion 
of its cognition, may be called the doctrine of Cosmothetic Ideal- 
ism, Hypothetical Realism, or Hypothetical Dualism. This last, 
though the most vacillating, inconsequent, and self-contradictory 
of all systems, is the one which, as less obnoxious in its acknowl- 
edged consequences (being a hind of compromise between specu- 
/ation and common sense), has found favor with the immense 
majority of philosophers. 1 

From the rejection of the fact of consciousness in this example 
of perception, we have thus, in the first j)lace, multiplicity, spec- 
ulative variation, error ; in the second, systems practically danger- 
ous ; and in the third, what concerns us exclusively at present, 
the incompetence of an appeal to the common sense of mankind 
by any of these systems against the conclusions of others. This 
last will, however, be more appropriately shown in our special 
consideration of the conditions of the argument of Common Sense, 
to which we now so on. 



1 See, in connection with this more general distribution of philosophical 
systems from the whole fact of consciousness in perception, other more spe- 
cial divisions, from the relation of the object to the sxxbject of perception, in 
the second part, chapter iii. — W. 



36 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 



§ II. — CoNDIHONS OF THE LEGITIMACY, AND LEGITIMATE APPLI- 
CATION, OF THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE. 

From what lias been stated, it is manifest that the argument 
drawn from Common Sense, for the truth or falsehood of any 
given thesis, proceeds on two suppositions : 

1°. That the proposition to be proved is either identical with, or 
necessarily evolved out ofa primary datum of consciousness ; 
and, 

2°. That the primary data of consciousness are, one and all of 
them, admitted, by the proponent of this argument, to be true. 

From this it follows, that each of these suppositions will con- 
stitute a condition, under which the legitimate application of this 
reasoning is exclusively competent. Whether these conditions 
have been ever previously enounced, I know not. But this I 
know, that while their necessity is so palpable, that they could 
never, if explicitly stated, be explicitly denied ; that in the hands 
of philosophers they have been always, more or less violated, 
implicitly and in fact, and this often not the least obtrusively 
by those who have been themselves the loudest in their appeal 
from the conclusions of an obnoxious speculation to the common 
convictions of mankind. It is not therefore to be marvelled at, 
if the argument itself should have sometimes shared in the con- 
tempt which its abusive application so frequently and so justly 
merited. 

1. That the first condition — that of originality — is indispens- 
able, is involved in the very conception of the argument. I 
should indeed hardly have deemed that it required an articulate 
statement, were it not that, in point of fact, many philosophers 
have attempted to establish, on the principles of common sense, 
propositions which are not original data of consciousness ; while 
the original data of consciousness, from which their propositions 
were derived, and to which they owed their whole necessity and 
truth — these data the same philosophers were (strange to say !) 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 37 

/ 

not disposed to admit. Thus, when it is argued by the Cosmo- 
thetic Idealists — " The external world exists, because we naturally 
believe it to exist ;" the illation is incompetent, inasmuch as it 
erroneously assumes that our belief of an external world is a pri- 
mary datum of consciousness. This is not the case. That an 
outer world exists is given us, not as a " miraculous revelation," 
not as a " cast of magic," not as an " instinctive feeling," not as 
a " blind belief." These expressions, in which die Cosmothetic 
Idealists shadow forth the difficulty they create, and attempt to 
solve, are wholly inapplicable to the real fact. Our belief of a 
material universe is not ultimate ; and that universe is not un- 
known. This belief is not a supernatural inspiration ; it is not an 
infused faith. "We are not compelled by a blind impulse to be- 
lieve in the external world, as in an unknown something ; on the 
contrary, we believe it to exist only because we are immediately 
cognizant of it as existing. If asked, indeed — How we know 
that we know it — how we know that what we apprehend in sen- 
sible perception is, as consciousness assures us, an object, external, 
extended, and numerically different from the conscious subject ? — 
how we know that this object is not a mere mode of mind, illu- 
sively presented to us as a mode of matter ? — then indeed we 
must reply, that we do not in propriety know that what we are 
compelled to perceive as not-self, is not a perception of self, 
and that we can only on reflection believe such to be the case, in 
reliance on the original necessity of so believing, imposed on us 
by our nature, 

Quaa nisi sit veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis. 

That this is a correct statement of the fact has been already 
shown ; and if such be the undenied and undeniable ground of 
the natural belief of mankind, in the reality of external things, 
the incompetence of the argument from common sense in the 
hands of the Cosmothetic Idealist is manifest, in so far as it does 
not fulfil the fundamental condition of that argument. 

This defect of the argument may in the present example in- 



38 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

deed, be easily supplied, by interpolating tbe medium which has 
been left out. But tbis cannot consistently be done by tbe Cos- 
motbetic Idealist, wbo is reduced to tbis dilemma — tbat if be ad- 
bere to bis hypothesis, be must renounce tbe argument ; and if 
be apply tbe argument, be must renounce bis bypotbesis. 

2. Tbe second condition, tbat of absolute truth, requires tbat 
be wbo applies tbe argument of common sense, by appealing to 
tbe veracity of consciousness, sbould not bimself, directly or indi- 
rectly, admit tbat consciousness is evei false ; in other words, be 
is bound, in applying tbis argument, to apply it thoroughly, im- 
partially, against himself no less than against others, and not ac- 
cording to the conveniences of his polemic, to approbate and rep- 
robate the testimony of our original beliefs. That our immediate 
consciousness, if competent to prove any thing, must be compe- 
tent to prove every thing it avoucbes, is a principle which none 
have been found, at least openly, to deny. It is proclaimed by 
Leibnitz : — " Si l'experience interne immediate pouvait nous trom- 
per, il ne saurait y avoir pour moi aucune verite de fait, j'ajoute, 
ni de raison. And by Lucretius : 

Denique ut in fabrica si prava 'st Eegula prima, 
Omnia mendosa fieri atque obstipa necessum 'st ; 
Sic igitur Ratio tibi rerum prava necesse 'st, 
Falsaque sit, falsis quaecunque ab Sensibus orta 'st. 

Compare Plotinus, En. V. Lib. v. c. 1 ; Buffier, Pr. Ver., § 71 ; 
Beid, Inq., p. 183, b. I. P. p. 260, b. 

Yet, however notorious the condition, that consciousness unless 
held trustworthy in all its revelations cannot be held trustworthy 
in any ; marvellous to say, philosophers have rarely scrupled, on 
the one hand, quietly to supersede the data of consciousness, so 
often as these did not fab 1 in with their preadopted opinions ; and 
on the other, clamorously to appeal to them, as irrecusable truths, 
so often as they could allege them in corroboration of their own, 
or in refutation of a hostile doctrine. 

I shall again take for an example the fact of perception, and 
the violation of the present condition by the Cosmothetic Ideal- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COiTMON SENSE. 39 

ists — 1°, in the constitution of their own doctrine ; 2°, in their 
polemic against more extreme opinions. 

In the first place, in the constitution of their doctrine, nothing 
can be imagined more monstrous than the procedure of these 
philosophers, in attempting to vindicate the reality of a material 
world, on the ground of a universal belief in its existence ; and 
yet rejecting the universal belief in the knowledge on which the 
universal belief in the existence is exclusively based. Here the 
absurdity is twofold. Firstly, in postulating a conclusion though 
rejecting its premises ; secondly, in founding their doctrine partly 
on the veracity, and partly on the mendacity, of consciousness. 

In the second place, with what consistency and effect do the 
Hypothetical Realists point the argument of common sense 
against the obnoxious conclusions of the thorough-going Idealist, 
the Materialist, the Absolutist, the Nihilist ? 

Take first their vindication of an external world against the 
Idealist. 

To prove this, do they, like Dr. Thomas Brown, simply found 
on the natural belief of mankind in its existence ? But they 
themselves, as we have seen, admitting the untruth of one natu 
ral belief — the belief in our immediate knowledge of external 
things — have no right to presume upon the truth of any other ; 
and the absurdity is carried to its climax, when the natural belief, 
which they regard as false, is the sole ground of the natural be- 
lief which they would assume and found upon as true. Again, 
do they like Descartes, allege that God would be a deceiver, were 
we constrained by nature to believe in the reality of an unreal 
world ? But the Deity, on their hypothesis, is a deceiver ; for 
that hypothesis assumes that our natural consciousness deludes us 
in the belief, that external objects are immediately, and in them- 
selves perceived. Either therefore maintaining the veracity of 
God, they must surrender their hypothesis ; or, maintaining their 
hypothesis, they must surrender the veracity of God. 

Against the Materialist, in proof of our Personal Identity, can 
they maintain that consciousness is able to identify self, at one 



iO PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

period, with self, at another ; when, in their theory of percep 
tion, consciousness, mistaking self for not-self, is unable, they 
virtually assert, to identify self with self, even at the same mo- 
ment of existence ? 

How, again, can they maintain the substantial Individuality 
and consequent Immateriality of the thinking principle, on the 
unity of consciousness, when the duality given in consciousness 
is not allowed substantially to discriminate the object from the 
subject in perception? 

But to take a broader view. . It is a maxim in philosophy, — 
That substances are not to be multiplied without necessity / in 
other words, — That a plurality of principles are not to be 
assumed, when the phenomena can possibly be explained by one. 
This regulative principle, which may be called the law or maxim 
of Parcimony, 1 throws it therefore on the advocates of a scheme 
of psychological Dualism, to prove the necessity of supposing 
more than a single substance for the phenomena of mind and 
matter. — Further, we know nothing whatever of mind and mat- 
ter, considered as substances ; they are only known to us as a 
twofold series of phenomena : and Ave can only justify, against 
the law of parcimony, the postulation of two substances, on the 
ground, that the two series of phenomena are, reciprocally, so 
contrary and incompatible, that the one cannot be reduced to the 
other, nor both be supposed to coinhere in the same common sub- 
stance. Is this ground shown to be invalid ? — the presumption 
against a dualistic theory at once recurs, and a unitarian scheme 
becomes, in the circumstances, philosophically necessary. 

Now the doctrine of Cosmothetic Idealism, in abolishing the 
incompatibility of the two series of phenomena, subverts the 
only ground on which a psychological Dualism can be maintained. 
This doctrine denies to mind a knowledge of aught beyond its 
own modifications. The qualities, which we call material — Exten- 

1 The rule of philosophizing, which Hamilton felicitously calls the law of 
parcimony, was often keenly applied by the logical Occam ; hence it i& 
sometimes designated as " Occam's razor."— W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 41 

sion, Figure, &c, — exist for us, only as they are Jcnown by us ; and, 
on this hypothesis, they are known by us only as modes of mind. 
The two series of phenomena, therefore, so far from being really, 
as they are apparently, opposed, are, on this doctrine, in fact, 
admitted to be all only manifestations of the same substance. 

Sc far, therefore, from the Hypothetical Dualist being able to 
resist tha conclusion of the Unitarian — whether Idealist, Materi- 
alist, or Absolutist ; the fundamental position of his philosophy — 
that the object immediately known is in every act of cognition 
identical xvith the subject knowing — in reality, establishes any 
and every doctrine but his own. On this principle, the Idealist 
may educe the object from the subject ; the Materialist educe the 
subject from the object ; the Absolutist carry both up into indif- 
ference ; nay the Nihilist subvert the substantial reality of either : 
and the Hypothetical Dualist is doomed to prove, that, while the 
only salvation against these melancholy results is an appeal to 
the natural convictions of mankind, that the argument from 
common sense is in his hands a weapon, either impotent against 
his opponents, or fatal equally to himself and them. 

§ HI. — The argument from Common Sense is one strictly 

PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC. 

We have thus seen, though the argument from common sense 
be an appeal to the natural convictions of mankind, that it is not 
an appeal from philosophy to blind feeling. It is only an appeal, 
from the heretical conclusions of particular philosophies, to the 
catholic principles of all philosophy. The prejudice, which, on 
this supposition, has sometimes been excited against the argu- 
ment, is groundless. 

Nor is it true, that the argument from common sense denies 
the decision to the judgment of philosophers, and accords it to 
the verdict of the vulgar. Nothing can be more erroneous. "We 
admit — nay we maintain, as D Alembert well expresses it, " that 
the truth in metaphysic, like the truth in matters of taste, is a 



42 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

truth of which all minds have the germ within themselves ; tc 
which indeed the greater number pay no attention, but which 
they recognize the moment it is pointed out to them. . . But if, 
in this sort, all are able to understand, all are not able to instruct. 
The merit of conveying easily to others true and simple notions 
is much greater than is commonly supposed; for experience 
proves how rarely this is to be met with. Sound metaphysical 
ideas are common truths, which every one apprehends, but which 
few have the talent to develop. So difficult is it on any subject 
to make our own what belongs to every one." (Melanges, t. iv. 
§ 6.) Or, to employ the words of the ingenious Lichtenberg — 
"Philosophy, twist the matter as we may, is always a sort of 
chemistry (Scheidekunst). The peasant employs all the princi- 
ples of abstract philosophy, only inveloped, latent, engaged, as the 
men of physical science express it ; the Philosopher exhibits the 
pure principle." (Hinterlassene Schriften, vol. ii. p. 67.) 

The first problem of Philosophy — and it is one of no easy 
accomplishment — being thus to seek out, purify, and establish, 
by intellectual analysis and criticism, the elementary feelings 
or beliefs, in which are given the elementary truths of which 
all are in possession ; and the argument from common sense 
being the allegation of these feelings or beliefs as explicated 
and ascertained, in proof of the relative truths and their neces- 
sary consequences ; — this argument is manifestly dependent on 
philosophy, as an art, as an acquired dexterity, and cannot, 
notwithstanding the errors which they have so frequently com- 
mitted, be taken out of the hands of the philosophers. Common 
Sense is like Common Law. Each may be laid down as the 
general rule of decision ; but in the one case it must be left to 
the jurist, in the other to the philosopher, to ascertain what are 
the contents of the rule ; and though in both instances the com- 
mon man may be cited as a witness, for the custom or the fact, 
in neither can he be allowed to officiate as advocate or as judge. 

MriSinore Kplveiv aSa/Jnovas av&pas idaorjs' 
Tfjv coQItiv co(pb; I9vvet t rixvas <$' hfi6Te\vos. 

Phootltdes. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 43 

It must be recollected, also, that in appealing to the conscious- 
ness of mankind in general, we only appeal to the consciousness 
of those not disqualified to pronounce a decision. " In saying" 
(to use the words of Aristotle), " simply and without qualifica- 
tion, that this or that is a known truth, we do not mean that it 
Is in fact recognized by all, but only by such as are of sound 
understanding; just as in saying absolutely that a thing is 
wholesome, we must be held to mean, to such as are of a hale 
constitution." (Top. L. vi. c. 4. § V.) — "We may, in short, say 
of the true philosopher what Erasmus, in an epistle to Hutten, 
said of Sir Thomas Moore : — " Nemo minus ducitur vulgi judi- 
cio ; sed rursus nemo minus abest a sensu communis 

When rightly understood, therefore, no valid objection can be 
taken to the argument of common sense, considered in itself. 
But it must be allowed that the way it has been sometimes 
applied was calculated to bring it into not unreasonable disfavor 
with the learned. (See C. L. Reinhold's Beytrsege zur leichtem 
Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophic, i. p. 61 ; and Nieth- 
hammer in his Journal, i. p. 43 sq.) In this country in particu- 
lar, some of those who opposed it to the skeptical conclusions of 
Hume did not sufficiently counteract the notion which the name 
might naturally suggest ; they did not emphatically proclaim 
that it was no appeal to the undeveloped beliefs of the unrefiect- 
ive many ; and they did not inculcate that it presupposed a 
critical analysis of these beliefs by the philosophers themselves. 
On the contrary, their language and procedure might even, some- 
times, warrant an opposite conclusion. This must be admitted 
without reserve of the writings of Beattie, and more especially 
of Oswald. But even Reid, in his earlier work, was not so 
explicit as to prevent his being occasionally classed in the same 
category. That the strictures on the " Scottish Philosophy of 
Common Sense" by Feder, Lambert, Tetens, Eberhard, Kant, 
Ulrich, Jacob, &c, were inapplicable to Reid, is sufficiently proved 
by the more articulate exposition of his doctrine, afterwards given 
in his Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers. But these 



4A PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

criticisms having been once recorded, we need not wonder at 
their subsequent repetition, without qualification or exception, by 
philosophers, and historians of philosophy. 

To take, as an example, the judgment of the most celebrated 
of these critics. " It is not" (says Kant, in the preface to his 
Prolegomena) " without a certain painful feeling, that we behold 
how completely Hume's opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and, 
at last, Priestley, missed the point of his problem ; and whilst 
they, on the one hand, constantly assumed the very positions 
which he did not allow, and on the other, demonstrated warmly, 
and often with great intemperance, what he had never dreamt 
of calling into question, they so little profited by the hint which 
he had given towards better things, that all remained in the 
same position as if the matter had never been agitated at all. 
The question mooted, was not — Whether the notion of Cause 
were right, applicable, and, in relation to all natural knowledge, 
indispensable ; for of this Hume had never insinuated a doubt ; 
but — Whether this notion were to the mind excogitated a priori, 
whether it thus possessed an intrinsic truth, independent of all 
experience, and consequently a more extensive applicability, one 
not limited merely to objects of experience ; on this Hume awaited 
a disclosure. In fact, the whole dispute regarded the origin of 
this notion, and not its indispensability in use. If the former 
be made out, all that respects the conditions of its use, and the 
sphere within which it can be validly applied, follow as corolla- 
ries, of themselves. In order satisfactorily to solve the problem, 
it behooved the opponents of this illustrious man to have pene- 
trated deeply into the nature of the mind, considered as exclu- 
sively occupied in pure thinking : but this did not suit them. 
They, therefore, discovered a more convenient method, in an 
appeal to the common understanding of mankind (gemeiner 
Menschenverstand) " — and so forth ; showing that Kant un- 
derstood by the common sense of the Scottish philosophers, 
only good sense, sound understanding, &c. (Prolegomena, 
p. 10.) 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 45 

I will not object to the general truth of the statements in this 
passage ; nor to their bearing in so far as they are applied to the 
British philosophers in general. For Reid, however, I must 
claim an exemption ; and this I shall establish with regard to 
the very notion of Cause to which Kant refers. 

That from the limited scope of his earlier work, the "Inquiry" 
Reid had not occasion to institute a critical analysis of the notion 
of Causality, affords no ground for holding that he did not con- 
sider such analysis to be necessary in the establishment of that 
and the other principles of common sense. This, indeed, he in 
that very work, once and again, explicitly declares. " We have 
taken notice of several original principles of belief in the course 
of this inquiry ; and when other faculties of the mind are exam- 
ined we shall find more. * * * * A clear explication and 
enumeration of the principles of a common sense, is one of the 
chief desiderata in Logic. We have only considered such of 
them as occurred in the examination of the five senses" And 
accordingly in his subsequent and more extensive work, the 
" Essays on the Intellectual powers," published within two years 
after Kant's "Prolegomena," we find the notion of Causality, 
among others, investigated by the very same critical process 
which the philosopher of Koenigsberg so successfully employed ; 
though there be no reason whatever for surmising that Reid had 
ever heard the name, far less seen the works, of his illustrious 
censor. The criterion — the index by which Kant discriminates 
the notions of pure or a priori origin from those elaborated from 
experience, is their quality of necessity ; and its quality of neces- 
sity is precisely the characteristic by which Reid proves that, 
among others, the notion of causality cannot be an educt of 
experience, but must form a part of the negative cognitions of 
the mind itself. It is doubtful, indeed, whether Reid, like Kant, 
was even indebted to Leibnitz for his knowledge of this touch- 
stone ; but the fact of its familiar employment by him in the dis- 
crimination and establishment of the fundamental principles of 
thought, more especially in his later works, sufficiently shows, 



46 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON" SENSE. 

that the reproach of an uncritical application of the argument 
from common sense, made against the Scottish philosophers in 
general, was, at least in reference to him, unfounded. Reid, 
however — and to his honor be it spoken — stands alone among 
the philosophers of this country in his appreciation and employ- 
ment of the criterion of necessity. 

[Since writing the above, I have met with the following pas- 
sage in the "Lettere Philosophiche" of Baron Galuppi, one of 
the two most distinguished of the present metaphysicians of Italy. 

" The philosopher of Koenigsberg makes Hume thus reason : 
— ' Metaphysical Causality is not in the objects observed ; it is, 
therefore, a product of imagination engendered upon custom.' — 
This reasoning, says Kant, is inexact. It ought to have pro- 
ceeded thus : — ' Causality is not in the things observed ; it is 
therefore in the observer.' But here Kant does not apprehend 
Hume's meaning, whose reasoning, as I have stated in the eighth 
letter, is altogether different. Metaphysical causality, he argues, 
is not in the things observed; it cannot, therefore, be in the 
observer, in whom all is derived from the things observed. Reid 
fully understands the purport of Hume's argument, and meets it 
precisely and conclusively with this counter-reasoning : — ' Meta- 
physical Causality is a fact in our intellect ; it is not derived 
from the things observed, and is therefore a subjective law of the 
observer.' Kant objects, that Reid has not attended to the state 
of the question. There is no dispute, he says, about the exist- 
ence of the notion of metaphysical causality; the only doubt 
regards its origin. This is altogether erroneous. Hume being 
unable to find the origin of the notion in experience, denied its 
existence. Kant's criticism of Reid is therefore unjust." P. 225., 

Kant, I think, is here but hardly dealt with. Hume did not, 
certainly, deny the existence of the notion of causality, meaning 
thereby its existence as a mental phenomenon ; he only (on the 
hypothesis of the then dominant doctrine of sensualism) showed 
that it had no objective validity — no legitimate genesis. In dif- 
ferent points of view, therefore, Hume may be said to deny, and 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 47 

not to deny, its reality. The dispute is a mere logomachy. 
Kant also stands clear of injustice towards Reid, when it is con- 
sidered that his strictures on the Scottish philosophers were prior 
to the appearance of the " Essays on the Intellectual Powers," 
the work in which Reid first expounded his doctrine of causality.] 

§ IV. — On the essential characters by which the princi- 
ples of Common Sense are discriminated. 

It now remains to consider what are the essential notes or 
characters by which we are enabled to distinguish our original 
from our derivative convictions. These characters, I think, may 
be reduced to four; — 1°, their Incomprehensibility — 2°, their 
Simplicity — 3°, their Necessity and absolute Universality — 4°, 
their comparative Evidence and Certainty. 

1. In reference to the first; — A conviction is incomprehensible 
when there is merely given us in consciousness — That its object 
is (on I'tfri) ; and when we are unable to comprehend through a 
higher notion or belief, Why or How it is (Sun stfri). When 
we are able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief of 
the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of conscious- 
ness, but a subsumption under the cognition or belief which 
affords its reason. 

2. As to the second ; — It is manifest that if a cognition or 
belief be made up of, and can be explicated into, a plurality of 
cognitions or beliefs, that, as compound, it cannot be original. 

3. Touching the third ; — Necessity and Universality may be 
regarded as coincident. For when a belief is necessary it is, eo 
ipso, universal ; and that a belief is universal, is a certain index 
that it must be necessary. (See Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, L. i. 
§ 4, p. 32.) To prove the necessity, the universality must, how- 
ever, be absolute ; for a relative universality indicates no more 
than custom and education, howbeit the subjects themselves may 
deem that they follow only the dictates of nature. As St. Jerome 
has it — " Unaquseque gens hoc legem naturae putat, quod didicit." 



48 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

It is to be observed, that the necessity here spoken of, is of tw< 
kinds. There is one necessity when we cannot construe it to our 
minds as possible, that the deliverance of consciousness should 
not be true. This logical impossibility occurs in the case of 
what are called necessary truths — truths of reason or intelligence ; 
as in the law of causality, the law of substance, and still more in 
the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. There 
is another necessity, when it is not unthinkable, that the deliver- 
ance of consciousness may possibly be false, but at the same 
time, when, we cannot but admit, that this deliverance is of such 
or such a purport. This is seen in the case of what are called con- 
tingent truths, or truths of fact. Thus, for example, I can theoreti- 
cally suppose that the external object I am conscious of in percep- 
tion, may be, in reality, nothing but a mode of mind or self. I am 
unable, however, to think that it does not appear to me — that 
consciousness does not compel me to regard it — as external — as 
a mode of matter or not-self. And such being the case, I cannot 
practically believe the supposition I am able speculatively to 
maintain. For I cannot believe this supposition, without believ- 
ing that the last ground of all belief is not to be believed ; which 
is self-contradictory. " Nature," says Pascal, " confounds the 
Pyrrhonist;" and, among many similar confessions, those of 
Hume, of Fichte, of Hommel may suffice for an acknowledg 
ment of the impossibility which the Skeptic, the Idealist, the 
Fatalist finds in practically believing the scheme which he views 
as theoretically demonstrated. The argument from common 
sense, it may be observed, is of principal importance in reference 
to the class of contingent truths. The others, from their converse 
being absolutely incogitable, sufficiently guard themselves. 

As this criterion of Necessity and Universality is signalized by 
nearly the whole series of authorities adduced in the sequel, it 
would be idle to refer to any in particular. 

4. The fourth and last character of our original beliefs is their 
comparative Evidence and Certainty. This, along with the third, 
is well stated by Aristotle.- — " What appears to all, that we affirm 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 49 

to be; and he who rejects this belief will assuredly advance 
nothing better deserving of credence? And again : — " If we know 
and believe through certain original principles, we must know and 
believe these with paramount certainty, for the very reason that 
we know and believe all else through them." And such are the 
truths in regard to which the Aphrodisian says, — " though some 
men may verbally dissent, all men are in their hearts agreed." 
This constitutes the first of Buffier's essential qualities of primary 
truths, which is, as he expresses it, — " to be so clear, that if we at- 
tempt to prove or to disprove them, this can be done only by 
propositions which are manifestly neither more evident nor more 
certain." Testimonies, nn. 3, 10, 63. Compare the others, passim. 
A good illustration of this character is afforded by the assur- 
ance — to which we have already so frequently referred — that in 
perception, mind is immediately cognizant of matter. How seli 
can be conscious of not-self, how mind can be cognizant of matter, 
we do not know ; but we know as little how mind can be per- 
cipient of itself. In both cases we only know the fact, on the 
authority of consciousness ; and when the conditions of the prob- 
lem are rightly understood — when it is established that it is only 
the primary qualities of body which are apprehended in them- 
selves, and this only in so far as they are in immediate relation to 
the organ of sense, the difficulty in the one case is not more than 
in the other. This in opposition to the simple Idealists. But the 
Cosmothetic Idealists — the Hypothetical Realists are far less rea- 
sonable; who, in the teeth of consciousness, on the ground of 
inconceivability, deny to mind all cognizance of matter, yet bestow 
on it the more inconceivable power of representing, and truly 
representing to itself the external world, which, ex hypothesi, it 
does not know. These theorists do not substitute, in place of the 
simple fact which they repudiate, another more easy and intelli- 
gible. On the contrary, they gratuitously involve themselves in a 
maze of unwarrantable postulates, difficulties, improbabilities, and 
self-contradictions, of such a character, that we well may wonder, 
how the doctrine of Cosmothetic Idealism has been able to enlist 

3 



50 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

under its banners, not a few merely, but the immense majority oi 
modern philosophers. The Cosmothetic Idealists, in truth, violate 
in their hypothesis every condition of a legitimate hypothesis. 1 

§ V. — The Nomenclature, that is, the various appellations 

BY WHICH THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMON SENSE HAVE BEEN 
DESIGNATED. 

It is evident that the foundations of our knowledge cannot prop- 
erly be themselves the objects of our knowledge; for as by them 
we know all else, by naught else can they themselves be known. 
We know them indeed, but only in the fact, that with and through 
them we know. / This it is, which has so generally induced philos- 
ophers to bestow on them appellations marking out the circum- 
stance, that in different points of view, they may, and they may 
not, be regarded as cognitions. They appear as cognitions, in so 
far as we are conscious that (on) they actually are ; they do not 
appear as cognitions, in so far as in them we are not conscious 
how (5i6t») they possibly can be. Philosophers accordingly, even 
when they view and designate them as cognitions, are wont to 
qualify their appellation under this character, by some restrictive 
epithet. For example, Cicero styling them intelligentia? does not 
do so simply ; but i. inchoate, i. adumbrate, i. obscurce, &c. A 
similar limitation is seen in the terms ultimate facts, primary 
data, &c, of consciousness ; for these and the analogous expres- 
sions are intended to show, that while their existence is within our 
apprehension, the reason or ground of their existence is beyond 
our comprehension. 

On the other hand we see the prevalence of the opposite point 
of view in the nomenclatures which seem to regard them not as 
cognitions wholly within consciousness, but as the bases of cogni- 
tion, and therefore partly without, and partly within conscious- 
ness. Such is the scope of the analogical designations applied to 

1 For illustration of this see chapter first of the second part of this vol. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 51 

them, of Senses, Feelings, Instincts, Revelations, Inspirations. 
Suggestions, Beliefs, Assents, Holdings, &c. It is the inexplica- 
ble and equivocal character which the roots of our knowledge 
thus exhibit, to which we ought to attribute the inadequacy, the 
vacillation and the ambiguity of the terms by which it has been 
attempted to denote them ; and it is with an indulgent recollec- 
tion of this, that we ought to criticise all and each of these de- 
nominations, — which, after this general observation, I proceed to 
consider in detail. In doing this, I shall group them according 
to the principal points of view from which it would seem they 
were imposed. 

I. The first condition, the consideration of which seems to have 
determined a certain class of names, is that of Immediacy. In our 
primitive cognitions we apprehend existence at once, and without 
the intervention of aught between the apprehending mind and the 
existence apprehended. 

Under this head the first appellations are those which, with 
some qualifying attribute, apply to these cognitions the name of 
— Sense. 

It is hardly necessary to observe, that the words corresponding 
to the term Sense and its conjugates, have in no language been 
limited to our perceptions of the external world, or to the feeling 
of our bodily affections. In every language they have been ex- 
tended to the operations of the higher faculties. Indeed, it can 
be shown, in almost every instance, that the names which ulti- 
mately came to be appropriated to the purest acts of intelligence, 
were, in their origin, significant of one or other of the functions of 
our organic sensibility. Such among others is the rationale of 
the terms moral sense (sensus boni), logical sense (sensus veri), 
wsthetical sense (sensus pulchri), which, even in modern philos- 
ophy, have been very commonly employed, though not employ- 
ed to denote any thing lower than the apprehensive faculty of 
intelligence in these different relations. On this transference of 
the term Sense, see Aristotle (De Anima, L. iii. c. 3)—Quintil- 
ian (Instit. L. viii. c. 5) — Budceus (in Pandectas, Tit. i.) — Sal- 



52 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

masius (ad Solinuui, p. 141) — Grotius (ad Acta Apostoloruni, 
vii. 32, and I. Petri, i. 12) — Claubergius (Exercitationes, 83-88) 
— Burmannus (ad Phsedrwn, L. ii. Ep. 13) — Gronovius (Dia- 
tribe ad Statium, c. 43) — J. A. Fabricius (Programma De Gus- 
tatu Pulcri, p. 5), &c, &c. 

This being, in general, premised, we have now to consider in 
particular: 1°, the ancient term Common Sense; and 2°, the 
modern term Internal Sense, as applied to our elementary con- 
sciousness. 

1. Sense Common (sensus communis, sensus communes, sensus 
publicus, sens commun, senso comune, Gemeinsinn), principles, 
axioms, maxims, truths, judgments, &c, of. 

The Greek tongue was for a long period destitute of any 
word to denote Consciousness ; and it was only after both the 
philosophy and language of Greece had passed their prime, that 
the terms rfuvaitf^avop-ai and rfuvaiV^rjtf^ were applied, not merely 
to denote the apperception of sense, but the primary condition of 
knowledge in general. The same analogy explains how in the 
Latin tongue the term Sensus Communis came, from a very an- 
cient period, to be employed with a similar latitude ; and as Lat- 
in, even after its extinction as a living language, was long the 
exclusive vehicle of religion and philosophy throughout western 
Europe, we need not wonder that the analysis and its expression, 
the thing and the word, passed not only into the dialects in which 
the Romanic, but into those also in which the Teutonic element 
was predominant. But as the expression is not unambiguous, it 
is requisite to distinguish its significations. 

The various meanings in which the term Common Sense is met 
with, in ancient and modern times, may I think be reduced to 
four ; and these fall into two categories, according as it is, or is 
not, limited to the sphere of sense proper. 

As restricted to sense proper. 

a. — Under this head Common Sense has only a single mean 
ing ; that, to wit, which it obtained in the Peripatetic philosophy 
and its derivative systems. Common Sense (xoivq a'/tf^o'i?) was 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 53 

employed by Aristotle to denote the faculty in which the various 
reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common 
apperception. This signification is determinate. The others are 
less precisely discriminated from each other. 

(I may observe, however, that a second meaning under this 
category might be found in the Cwncesthesis, common feeling or 
sensation, by which certain German physiologists have denomi- 
nated the sensus vagus or vital sense, and which some of them 
translate by common sense (Gemeinsinn). But as the term in 
this signification has been employed recently, rarely, abusively, 
and without imposing authority, I shall discount it.) 

As not limited to the sphere of sense proper, it comprises three 
meanings. 

/ b. — The second signification of Common Sense is when it de- 
notes the complement of those cognitions or convictions which we 
receive from nature ; which all men therefore possess in common ; 
and by which they test the truth of knowledge, and the morality 
of actions. This is the meaning in which the expression is now 
emphatically employed in philosophy, and which may be, there- 
fore, called its philosophical signification./ As authorities for its 
use in this relation, Reid (I. P. p. 423-425 ') has adduced legiti- 
mate examples from Bentley, Shaftesbury, Fenelon, Buffier, and 
Hume. Th3 others which he quotes from Cicero and Priestley, 
can hardly be considered as more than instances of the employ- 
ment of the words ; for the farmer, in the particular passage 
quoted, does not seem to mean by "sensus communes" more than 
the faculty of apprehending sensible relations which all possess ; 
and the latter explicitly states, that he uses the words in a mean- 
ing (the third) which we are hereafter to consider. Mr. Stewart 
(Elements, vol. ii. c. 7, sect. 3, p. 76), to the examples of Reid, 
adds only a single, and that not an unambiguous instance, from 
Bayle. It therefore still remains to show that in this signification 
its employment is not only of authorized usage, but, in fact, one 

1 The reference is to Hamilton's edition of Eeid.— W. 



54 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

long and universally established. This is done in the series of 
testimonies I shall adduce — principally indeed to prove that the 
doctrine of Common Sense, notwithstanding many schismatic 
aberrations, is the one catholic and pexennial philosophy, but 
which also concur in showing that this too is the name under 
which that doctrine has for two thousand years been most famil 
iarly known, at least, in the western world. Of these Lucretius, 
Cicero, Horace, Seneca, Tertullian, Arnobius, and St. Augustin ex- 
hibit the expression as recognized in the language and philosophy 
of ancient Rome ; while some fifty others prove its scientific and 
colloquial usage in every country of modern Europe. (See Nos. 
5-8, 12, 13, 15, 23, 25, 27-29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38-44, 47, 48, 
51-53, 55, 56, 58-69, 71-75, 78-85, 90.) 

The objections to the term Common Sense in this its jmiloso- 
phical application are obvious enough. It is not unambiguous. 
To ground an objection it has sometimes unintentionally, more 
frequently willingly, been taken in the third signification (v. p. 56 
c.) ; and its employment has even afforded a ground for suppo- 
sing that Reid and other Scottish philosophers proposed under it 
a certain peculiar sense, distinct from intelligence, by which truth 
is apprehended or revealed. See Fries, in Testimonies No. 70, 
and Franke, Leben des Gefuehls, § 42. 

On the other hand, besides that no other expression, to which 
valid objection may not be taken, has yet been proposed ; and be- 
sides, that it has itself been ratified by ancient and general usage ; 
the term Common Sense is not inappropriately applied to denote 
an original source of knowledge common to all mankind — a 
fountain of truths intelligible indeed, but like those of the senses 
revealed immediately as facts to be believed, but not as possibili- 
ties to be explained and understood. On this ground the term 
Sense has found favor, in this application, with the most ancient 
and the most recent philosophers. For example — Aristotle (Eth. 
Nic. L. vi. c. 11, and Eth. Eud. L. v. c. 11) says that vouj, Intelli- 
gence proper, the faculty of first principle is, in certain respects, a 
Sense ; and the ancient Scholiast, Eustratius, in his commentary 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 55 

on the former work (f. 110, b) explains it by observing, "that 
Intelligence and Sense have this exclusively in common — they 
are both immediate cognitions." Hence it is that Aristotle (Me- 
taph. xii. V), Theophrastus (see Test. No. 4), and Plotinus (En. vi. 
L. vii. cc. 36, 39, L. ix. c. 7) assimilate intellection, the noetic en- 
ergy, to touching in particular.* In reference to the apprehension 



* Among the Greeks the expression " Common Intellect" was, however, 
rarely, if ever, used for Common Sense in this its second, or philosophical 
meaning. The learned Mr. Harris (in a note on his Dialogue concerning 
Happiness) in stating the doctrine of the Greek philosophers, says — " The 
recognition of self-evident truths, or at least the ability to recognize them, is 
called koiv&s vov;, ' common sense, -1 as being a sense common to all, except 
lunatics and idiots." This is inaccurate ; for his statement of what was 
usual among the Greeks is founded (I presume, for he does not allege any 
authority) on a single, and singular, example of such usage. It is that of 
Epictetus (Diss. Arriani, L. hi. c. 6). This philosopher seems in that pas- 
sage to give the name of common intellect (koivos vovs, which H. "Wolflus and 
Upton translate by sensus communis) to the faculty of those common notions 
possessed by all who are of sound mind. Now were the epithet common 
here applied to intellect "because intellect is the repository of such common 
notions or inasmuch as it is common to all men — this, however likely a 
usage, is, I am confident, the only, or almost the only, example to be found 
in antiquity of such a nomenclature ; for though the expression in question 
is frequent among the Greek writers, I do not recollect to have elsewhere 
met with it in a similar import. It is employed in two significations. — lc, 
with \j%s in its stricter meaning, for the highest faculty of mind, koivos is 
used to mark its impersonality, its iinity. its general identity in men, or in 
man and God. 2°, With vovs, in its looser meaning for mind in general, it 
denotes a community of opinion or a community of social sentiment, corres- 
ponding to Sensus Communis among the Eomans, to be spoken of as the 
fourth signification. The only second instance, I believe, that can be brought 
is from the Aphrodisian. (On the Soul, f. 138, ed. Aid.) But there the epi- 
thet common is given to the natural in opposition to the acquired intellect, 
exclusively from the circumstance that the former is possessed by all of sound 
mind, the latter only by some ; nay, from a comparison of the two passages 
it is evident, that Alexander in his employment of the expression had Epic- 
tetus and this very instance immediately in his eye. But it is in fact by no 
means improbable that Epictetus here uses the expression only in the first 
of its two ordinary significations— as a Stoic, to denote the individual 
intellect, considered as a particle of the universal ; and this even the com- 
mentators are inclined to believe. See Hpton, ad locum. In illustration of 
this :— Plutarch in his treatise ' On Common Notions against the Stoics,' 
uses (after napa or Kara) Trjv koivtiv ewoiav or raj koivUs iwoia; at least twenty- 
three times, and without the adjective rr\v hvotav or ras hvotas, at least 



56 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

of primary truths, ' the soul,' says Dr. John Smith, ' has its 
senses, in like manner as the body ' (Select Discourses) ; and his 
friend Dr. Henry More designates the same by the name of intel- 
lectual sense. (Test. n. 45.) Jacobi defines Vernunft, his facul- 
ty of ' intellectual intuitions ' as ' the sense of the supersensible. 
(Test. n. 87.) De la Mennais could not find a more suitable ex- 
pression whereby to designate his theological system of univer- 
sal consent, or general reason, than that of Common Sense ; 
and Borger in his classical work ' De Mysticismo ' prefers sensus 
as the least exceptionable word by which to discriminate those 
notions, of which, while we are conscious of the existence, we are 
ignorant of the reason and origin. ' Cum igitur, qui has notiones 
sequitur, ilium sensum sequi dicimus, hoc dicimus, illas notiones 
non esse ratione [ratiocinatione] quaesitas, sed omni argumentatione 
antiquiores. Eo autem majori jure eos sensus vocabulo complecti 
mur, quod, adeo obscurae sunt, ut eorum ne distincte quidem no- 
bis conscii simus, sed eas esse, ex efficacia earum intelligamus, i. 
e. ex vi qua animum afficiunt.' (P. 259, ed. 2.) See also of Testi- 
monies the numbers already specified. 

c. — In the third signification, Common Sense may be used 
with emphasis on the adjective or on the substantive. 

In the former case, it denotes such an ordinary complement of 
intelligence, that, if a person be deficient therein, he is accounted 
mad or foolish. 

Sensus communis is thus used in Phaedrus, L. i. 7 ; — but Hor- 



iicenty-one times ; which last, by the by, Xylander always renders by ' Sen- 
sus communis.' Now how many times does Flutarch use as a synonym, 
koivov vovvl Not once. He does, indeed, once employ it and Kotvas <ppi- 
vas (p. 1077 of the folio editions); but in the sense of an agreement in 
thought with others — the sense which it obtains also in the only other ex- 
ample of the expression to be found in his writings. (P. 529 D). 

I see Forcellini (voce Sensus) has fallen into the same inaccuracy as 
Harris. 

I may here notice that Aristotle does not apply the epithet common to in- 
tellect at all ; for tov koivov (De An. i. S. § 5) does not, as Themistius sup- 
poses, mean ' of the common [intellect]' but ' of the composite,' made up 
if soul and body. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 57 

ace, Serai i. iii. 66, and Juvenal, Sat. viii. 7 3, are erroneously, 
though usually, interpreted in this signification. In modem La- 
tinity (as in Milton contra Salmasiuni, c. 8) and in most of the 
vulgar languages, the expression in this meaning is so familiar 
that it would be idle to adduce examples. Sir James Mackintosh 
(Dissertations, &c, p. 387 of collected edition) indeed, imagines 
that this is the only meaning of common sense ; and on this 
ground censures Reid for the adoption of the term ; and even Mr. 
Stewart's objections to it seem to proceed on the supposition, 
that this is its proper or more accredited signification. See Ele- 
ments ii. ch. 1, sec. 2. This is wrong ; but Reid himself, it must 
be acknowledged, does not sufficiently distinguish between the 
second and third acceptations ; as may be seen from the tenor of 
the second chapter of the sixth Essay on the Intellectual Powers, 
but especially from the concluding chapter of the Inquiry. 

In the latter case, it expresses native, practical intelligence, 
natural prudence, mother wit, tact in behavior, acuteness in the 
observation of character, &c, in contrast to habits of acquired 
learning, or of speculation away from the affairs of life. I recol- 
lect no unambiguous example of the phrase, in this precise ac- 
ceptation, in any ancient author. In the modern languages, and 
more particularly in French and English, it is of ordinary occur- 
rence. Thus, Voltaire's saying, ' Le sens commun n'est pas si 
commun ;' — which, I may notice, was stolen from Buffier (Meta- 
physique, § 69). 

With either emphasis it corresponds to the xoivog Xoyirf^s of 
the Greeks, and among them to the oe&og \6yog of the Stoics, to 
the gesunde Mensckenverstand of the Germans, to the Boris Sens 
of the French, and to the Good Sense of the English. The two 
emphases enable us to reconcile the following contradictions: — 
' Le bon sens (says Descartes) est la chose du monde la mieux 
partagee ;' ' Good sense (says Gibbon) is a quality of mind hardly 
Jess rare than genius.' 

d. — In the fourth and last signification, Common Sense is no 
longer a natural quality ; it denotes an acquired perception or 



58 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

feeling of the common duties and. proprieties expected from each 
member of society, — a gravitation of opinion — a sense of conven- 
tional decorum — communional sympathy — general bienstance — 
public spirit, &c. In this signification — at least as absolutely 
used — it is limited to the language of ancient Rome. This is the 
meaning in which it occurs in Cicero, De Orat. i. 3, ii. 16 — Or. 
pro Domo 37 ; in Horace, Serm. i. iii. 66 ; in Juvenal, Sat viii. 
73 ; in Quintilian, Instit. i. 2 ; and in Seneca, Epp. 5, 105, 
whose words in another place (which I cannot at the moment 
recover) are — ' Sic in beneficio sensus communis, locum, tempus, 
personam observet.' Shaftesbury and others, misled probably by 
Casaubon, do not seize the central notion in their interpretation 
of several of these texts. In this meaning the Greeks sometimes 
employed xoivoj vo-Jf — an ambiguous expression, for which Anto- 
ninus seems to have coined as a substitute, xoivovoTiixotfuv?]. To this 
head may be referred Hutcheson's employment of Sensus Com- 
munis for Sympathy. Synopsis Metaphysicse, P. ii. c. 1. 

2. — Sense inmost, interior, internal (sensus intimus, interior, 
internus, sens intime, interne). This was introduced as a con- 
vertible term with Consciousness in general by the philosophers 
of the Cartesian school ; and thus came to be frequently applied 
to denote the source, complement, or revelation of immediate 
truths. It is however not only in itself vague, but liable to be 
confounded Avith internal sense, in other very different significa- 
tions. We need not therefore regret that in this relation it has 
not (though Hutcheson set an example) been naturalized in 
British Philosophy. 

The third appellation determined by the condition of Imme- 
diacy is that of 

3. — Intuitions — Intuitive cognitions, notions, judgments (In- 
tuitiones — Intuitus — cognitio Intuitiva — Intuitions — -faculty In- 
tuitive — Anschauungen. We may add, stfi/^oXou — yvtitfig xotra 
wpwr^v stfi/SoX^v. In this sense avrorfrixbg, ifoifrixbg are rare. 

The term Intuition is not unambiguous. Besides its original 
and proper meaning (as a visual perception), it has been em- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 59 

ployed to denote a kind of apprehension, and a kind of judg- 
ment. 

Under the former head, Intuition, or intuitive knowledge, has 
been used in the six following significations : 

a. — To denote a perception of the actual and present, in oppo- 
sition to the ' abstractive' knowledge which we have of the possi- 
ble in imagination, and of the past in memory. 

b. — To denote an immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, 
in contrast to a representative, vicarious, or mediate, apprehension 
of it, in or through something else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, 
and others, Intuition is employed to designate the cognition, as 
opposed to the conception, of the Absolute.) 

c. — To denote the knowledge which we can adequately repre- 
sent in imagination, in contradistinction to the ' symbolical' 
knowledge which we cannot image, but only think or conceive, 
through and under a sign or word. (Hence probably Kant's 
aj>plication of the term to the forms of the Sensibility — the 
imaginations of Space and Time — in contrast to the forms or 
categories of the Understanding.) 

d. — To denote perception proper (the objective), in contrast 
to sensation proper (the subjective), in our sensitive conscious- 
ness. 

e. — To denote the simple apprehension of a notion, in contra- 
distinction to the com])lex apprehension of the terms of a propo- 
sition. 

Under the latter head, it has only a single signification ; viz. : 

f. — To denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, that 
the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, in what are 
called self-evident propositions. 

All these meanings, however, with the exception of the fourth, 
have this in common, that they express the condition of an 
immediate, in opposition to a mediate, knowledge. It is there- 
fore easy to see how the term was suggested in its application to 
our original cognitions ; and how far it marks out their distinc- 
tive character. It has been employed in this relation by Des- 



60 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

cartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Hernsterhuis, Beattie, Jacobi, Ancillon, 
Degerando, Thurot, and many others. 

II. The second condition, which, along with their Immediacy, 
seems to have determined a class of names, is the Incomprehensi- 
bility or Inexplicability of our original cognitions. 

Under this head there are two appellations which first present 
themselves — Feeling and Belief ; and these must be considered 
in correlation. 

A thing mediately known is conceived under a representation 
or notion, and therefore only known as possibly existing ; a thing 
immediately known is apprehended in itself, and therefore known 
as actually existing. 

This being understood, let us suppose an act of immediate 
knowledge. By external or internal perception, I apprehend a 
phenomenon, of mind or matter, as existing ; I therefore affirm 
it to be. Now if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I 
apprehend as a mode of mind may not be, in reality, a mod£ of 
matter, or that what I apprehend as a mode of matter may not, 
in reality, be a mode of mind, I can only say, using the simplest 
language, ' I know it to be true, because I feel and cannot but 
feel] or ' because I believe and cannot but believe it so to be.' 
And if farther interrogated how I know or am assured that I 
thus feel or thus believe, I can make no better answer than, in 
the one case, 'because I believe that I feel] in the other, 'because 
I feel that I believe.'' It thus appears, that when pushed to our 
last refuge, we must retire either upon Feeling or upon Belief, or 
upon both indifferently. And accordingly, among philosophers, 
we find that a great many employ one or other of these terms 
by which to indicate the nature of the ultimate ground to which 
our cognitions are reducible; while some employ both, even 
though they may accord a preference to one. 

1. — Feeling, in English (as Sentiment in French, Gefuehl in 
German, &c), is ambiguous : — And in its present ^application 
(to say nothing of its original meaning in relation to Touch) we 
must discharge that signification of the word by which we denote 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 61 

the phenomena of pain and pleasure. Feeling is a term prefera- 
ble to Consciousness, in so far as the latter does not mark so well 
the simplicity, ultimacy, and incomprehensibility of our original 
apprehensions, suggesting, as it does, always something of thought 
and reflection. In other respects, Consciousness — at least with a 
determining epithet — may be the preferable expression. In the 
sense now in question, Feeling is employed by Aristotle, Theo- 
phrastus, Pascal, Malebranche, Bossuet, Leibnitz, Buffier, 
D'Aguesseau, Berkeley, Hume, Karnes, Hemsterhuis, Jacobi, 
Schulze, Bouterweck, Fries, Koppen, Ancillon, Gerlach, Franke, 
and a hundred others. In this meaning it has been said, and 
truly, that ' Reason is only a developed Feeling.' 

2. — Belief or Faith (ILirfTig, Fides, Croyance, Foi, Glaube, 
&c). Simply, or with one or other of the epithets natural, pri- 
mary, instinctive, &c, and some other expressions of a similar 
import as Conviction, Assent, Trust, Adhesion, Holding for true 
or real, &c. fivyxaradstfig, Assensus, Fuerwahr-und-ioirklich- 
halten, &c), have, though not unobjectionable, found favor with 
a great number of philosophers, as terms whereby to designate 
the original warrants of cognition. Among these may be men- 
tioned Aristotle, Lucretius, Alexander, Clement of Alexandria, 
Proclus, Algazel, Luther, Hume, Reid, Beattie, Hemsterhuis, 
Kant, Heidenreich, Fichte, Jacobi, Bouterweck, Koppen, Ancil- 
lon, Hermes, Biunde, Esser, Elvanich, <fcc, <fec. 

Nor can any valid objection be taken to the expression. St. 
Austin accurately says — " We know what rests upon reason ; we 
believe what rests upon authority." But reason itself must rest 
at last upon authority ; for the original data of reason do not 
rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the 
authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in 
rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it is, that in the last 
resort, we must, per force, philosophically admit, that belief is the 
primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground 
of belief. We are compelled to surrender the proud Intellige ut 



02 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

credas l of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble Crede 
ut intelligas* of Anselrn. 

3. — A third denomination, under this head, is that of 

Instincts, rational or intellectual (Instinctus, Impetus sponta ■ 
nei, Instinctus intelligent'm, rationales). 

Instinctive beliefs, cognitions, judgments, &c. 

These terms are intended to express not so much the light as 
the dark side which the elementary facts of consciousness exhibit. 
They therefore stand opposed to the conceivable, the understood, 
the known. 

Notre faible Eaison se trouble et se confond ; 
Oui, la Eaison se tait, mais l'Instinct vous repond. 

Priestley (Examination, &c, passim) has attempted to ridicule 
Reicl's use of the terms Instinct and Instinctive, in this relation, 
as an innovation, not only in philosophy, but in language ; and 
Sir James Mackintosh (Dissert, p. 388) considers the term 
Instinct not less improper than the term Common Sense. 

As to the impropriety, though like most other psychological 
terms these are not unexceptionable, they are however less so 
than many, nay than most, others. An Instinct is an agent 
which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and 
knowledge. The terms, Instinctive belief, — judgment — cognition 
are therefore expressions not ill adapted to characterize a belief, 
judgment, cognition, which as the result of no anterior con- 
sciousness, is, like the products of animal instinct, the intelligent 
effect of (as far as we are concerned) an unknowing cause. In 
like manner, we can hardly find more suitable expressions to indi- 
cate those incomprehensible spontaneities themselves, of which 
the primary facts of consciousness are the manifestations, than 
rational or intellectual Instincts. In fact if Reason can justly 
be called a developed Feeling, it may with no less propriety be 
called an illuminated Instinct : — In the words of Ovid, 
Et quod nunc Eatio, Impetus ante fuit. 

1 "Know that you may believe." — W. 
3 "BeUeve that you may know." — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 63 

As to an innovation either in language or philosophy, this 
objection only betrays the ignorance of the objector. Mr. Stew- 
art (Essays, p. 87, 4to ed.) adduces Boscovich and D'Alembert 
as authorities for the employment of the terms Instinct and In- 
stinctive in Reid's signification. But before Reid he might have 
found them thus applied by Cicero, Scaliger, Bacon, Herbert, 
Descartes, Rapin, Pascal, Poiret, Barrow, Leibnitz, Musseus, 
Feuerlin, Hume, Bayer, Karnes, Reimarus, and a host of others ; 
while subsequent to the ' Inquiry into the Human Mind,' besides 
Beattie, Oswald, Campbell, Fergusson, among our Scottish philos- 
ophers, we have, with Hemsterhuis in Holland, in Germany Te- 
tens, Jacobi, Bouterweck, Neeb, Koppen, Ancillon, and many other 
metaphysicians who have adopted and defended the expressions. 
In fact, Instinct has been for ages familiarized as a philosophical 
term in the sense in question, that is, in application to the higher 
faculties of mind, intellectual and moral. In proof of this, take 
the article from the 'Lexicon Philosophicum ' of Micraelius, 
which appeared in 1653 : — ' Instinctus est rei ad aliquid tenden- 
tis inclinatio ; estque alius materialis in corporibus ; alius ratio- 
nalis in mente ;' and Chauvin is to the same purport, whose 
'Lexicon Philosophicum' was first published in 1691. In a 
moral relation, as a name for the natural tendencies to virtue, 
it was familiarly employed even by the philosophers of the six- 
teenth century (v. F. Picolominei ' Decern Gradus,' &c. Gr. iii, 
c. i. sq.) ; and in the seventeenth, it had become, in fact, their 
usual appellation (v. Veltbuysen De Principiis Justi, &c, p. 
73 sq.) 

4. — Revelations — Inspirations. — These expressions are in- 
tended metaphorically to characterize the incomprehensible man- 
ner in which we are made suddenly aware of existence ; and, 
perhaps, to indicate that our knowledge rests ultimately on a 
testimony which ought to be implicitly believed, however unable 
we may be explicitly to demonstrate, on rational grounds, its 
credibility. They have been thus employed, one or both, by 



64 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

Reid, Stewart, Degerando, Cousin, and others, but most emphat 
ically by Jacobi. 

5. — Suggestions (Suggestiones, Suggestus). — This term with 
some determining epithet is a favorite word of Reid, and in a 
similar signification. So also was it of St. Augustin and Tertul- 
lian. — By the \wg of Aristotle, the latter says — " non aliud quid 
intelligimus quam suggestum animse ingenitum et insitum et 
nativitus proprium." De Anima, c. 12. See also Testimonies, 
infra, No. 12 d ; and, supra, p. Ill a, note. 1 

6. — Facts — Data (ultimate — primary — original, &c.) of 
Consciousness or Intelligence. These expressions have found 

1 The following is the note referred to: 

"'The word suggest 1 (says Mr. Stewart, in reference to the preceding 
passage) 'is much used by Berkeley, in this appropriate and technical 
sense, not only in his ' Theory of Vision,' but in his ' Principles of Human 
Knowledge,' and in his ' Minute Philosopher.' It expresses, indeed, the 
cardinal principle on which his ' Theory of Vision ' hinges, and is now so 
incorporated with some of our best metaphysical speculations, that one can- 
not easily conceive how the use of it was so long dispensed with. Locke 
uses the word excite for the same purpose ; but it seems to imply an hypoth- 
esis concerning the mechanism of the mind, and by no means expresses the 
fact in question with the same force and precision. 

' It is remarkable, that Dr. Eeid should have thought it incumbent on 
him to apologize for introducing into philosophy a word so familiar to every 
person conversant with Berkeley's works. ' I beg leave to make use of the 
word suggestion, because,' &c. ..... 

' So far Dr. Eeid's use of the word coincides exactly with that of Berke- 
ley ; but the former will be ftrand to annex to it a meaning more extensive 
than the latter, by employing it to comprehend, not only those intimations 
which are the result of experience and habit ; but another class of intima- 
tions (quite overlooked by Berkeley), those which result from the original 
frame of the human mind.' — Dissertation on the History of Metaphysical 
and Ethical Science. P. 167. Second edition. 

" Mr. Stewart might have adduced, perhaps, a higher and, certainly a 
more proximate authority, in favor, not merely of the term in general, but 
of Eeid's restricted employment of it, as an intimation of what he and others 
have designated the Common Sense of mankind. The following sentence 
cf Tertullian contains a singular anticipation, both of the philosophy and 
of the philosephical phraseology of our author. Speaking of the universal 
belief of the soul's immortality : — ' Natura pleraque suggeruntur, quasi de 
publico sensu quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est.' — De Anuia, e. 2. 

" Some strictures on Eeid's employment of the term suggestion may be 
seen in the ' Versuche' of Tetens, I. p. 508, sqq." — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 65 

favor with many philosophers, among whom. Fergusson, Fichte, 
Creuzer, Krug, Ancillon, Gerlach, Cousin, Bautain, may be men- 
tioned. They are well adapted to denote, that our knowledge 
reposes upon what ought to be accepted as actually true, though 
why, or in what manner it is true, be inexplicable. 

III. — The third quality, in reference to which # our primary 
cognitions have obtained certain appellations, is their Originali- 
ty. . Under this head : 

1 . — First — Primary — Primitive — Primordial — Ultimate, 
as epithets applied to truths, principles of thought, laivs of intel- 
ligence, facts or data of consciousness, elements of reason, &c, are 
expressions which require no comment. 

2. — Principles ('Ap^ai, Principia, literally commencements 
— points of departure) Principles of Common Sense — first,proper, 
authentic (xupiwrarai) Principles of thought, reason, judgment, 
intelligence — Initia naturae, &c. 

Without entering on the various meanings of the term Princi- 
ple, which Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence any 
thing exists, is produced, or is known, it is sufficient to say that 
it is always used for that on which something else depends ; and 
thus both for an original law, and for an original element. In 
the former case it is regulative, in the latter a constitutive, prin- 
ciple ; and in either signification it may be very properly applied 
to our original cognitions. In this relation, Mr. Stewart would 
impose certain restrictions on the employment of the word. But 
admitting the propriety of his distinctions, in themselves, — and 
these are not new — it may be questioned whether the limitation 
he proposes of the generic term be expedient, or permissible. 
See his Elements, ii. c. 1, particularly pp. 59, 93 of 8vo editions. 

3. — Anticipations — Presumptions — Prenotions (rfpoXii-^sig, 
i-pouTrap^outfa yvZrfig, anticipationes, prwsumptiones, prcenotiones, 
informationes antecepta?, cognitiones anticipate, &c), with such 
attributes as common, natural, native, connate, innate, &c, have 
been employed to indicate that they are the antecedents, causes, 
or conditions of all knowledge These are more especially the 
4 



66 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

terms of ancient philosophy. — To this group may be added the 
expression Legitimate Prejudices, borrowed from the nomencla- 
ture of theology, but which have sometimes been applied by 
philosophers in a parallel signification.* 

4. — A priori — truths, principles, cognitions, notions, judg- 
ments, &c. 

The term a priori, by the influence of Kant and his school, is 
now very generally employed to characterize those elements of 
knowledge which are not obtained a posteriori, — are not evolved 
out of experience as factitious generalizations; but which, as 
native to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of 
experience, on occasion of which (as constituting its subjective 
conditions) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. 
These like many — indeed most — others of his technical expres- 
sions, are old words applied in a new signification. Previously 
to Kant the terms a priori a^id a posteriori were, in a sense 
which descended from Aristotle, properly and usually employed, 
— the former to denote a reasoning from cause to effect — the 
latter, a reasoning from effect to cause. The term a priori came, 
however, in modern times to be extended to any abstract reason- 
ing from a given notion to the conditions which such notion 
involved ; hence, for example, the title a priori bestowed on the 
ontoloeical and cosmolosical arguments for the existence of the 

o o o 

deity. The latter of these, in fact, starts from experience — from 
the observed contingency of the world, in order to construct the 
supposed notion on which it founds. Clarke's cosmological 
demonstration, called a priori, is therefore, so far, properly an 
argument a posteriori. 

5. — Categories of thought, understanding, reason, &c. 

The Categories of Aristotle and other philosophers were the 



* As by Trembley of Geneva. It is manifest, though. I have not his trea- 
tise at hand, that he borrowed this, not over-fortunate, expression from the 
Prejuges Legitimes contre les Calvinistes of Nicole, the work in which origina- 
ted the celebrated controversy in wbich Pajon, Basnage, &c, were engaged, 
Of this Mr. Stewart does not seem to be aware. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 67 

highest classes (under Being) to which the objects of our knowl- 
edge could be generalized. Kant contorted the term Category 
from its proper meaning of attribution ; and from an objective 
to a subjective application ; bestowing this name on the ultimate 
and necessary laws by which thought is governed in its mani- 
festations. The term, in this relation, has however found accep- 
tation; and been extended to designate, in general, all the a 
priori phenomena of mind, though Kant himself limited the 
word to a certain order of these. 

6. — Transcendental truths, principles, cognitions, judg- 
ments, &c. 

In the Schools transcendentalis and transcendens, were con- 
vertible expressions, employed to mark a term or notion which 
transcended, that is, which rose above, and thus contained under 
it the categories, or summa genera, of Aristotle. Such, for ex- 
ample, is Being, of which the ten categories are only subdivi- 
sions. Kant, according to his wont, twisted these old terms into 
a new signification. First of all, he distinguished them from 
each other. Transcendent (transcendens) he employed to denote 
what is wholly beyond experience, being given neither as an a 
posteriori nor a priori element of cognition — what therefore tran- 
scends every category of thought. Transcendental (transcenden- 
talis) he applied to signify the a priori or necessary cognitions 
which, though manifested in, as affording the conditions of, expe- 
rience, transcend the sphere of that contingent or adventitious 
knowledge which we acquire by experience. Transcendental is 
not therefore what transcends, but what in fact constitutes, a 
category of thought. This term, though probably from another 
quarter, has found favor with Mr. Stewart ; who proposes to ex- 
change the expression principles of common sense for, among 
other names, that of transcendental truths. 

Y. — Pure (rein) is another Kantian expression (borrowed with 
a modification of meaning from previous philosophers*) for cogni- 

* Pure knowledge (eognitio pura) was a term employed by the Cartesians 
and Leibnitians to denote that knowledge in which there was no mixture ol 



68 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

tions, in which there is mingled nothing foreign or adventitious, 
that is, nothing from experience, and which consequently are 
wholly native to the mind, wholly a priori. Such elements, 
however, are obtained only by a process of sundering and 
abstraction. In actual, or concrete, thinking, there is given 
nothing pure ; the native and foreign, the a priori and a posteri- 
ori are there presented in mutual fusion. 

IV. The fourth determining circumstance, is that the cogni- 
tions in question are natural, not conventional, native, not 
acquired. Hence their most universal denominations : 

1. — Nature (<putfj£ nature!) ; as, common Nature of man — light 
of Nature* — primary hypotheses of Nature — initio, Naturae, 
&c. 

Natural (<pv<fixog, naturalis) as conjoined with cognitions, 
notions, judgments anticipations, presumptions, prenotions, beliefs, 
truths, criteria, &c. 

2. — Native, Innate, Connate, Implanted, &c. (Ivoiu, §'f/,<pu<ro£, 
rfu[Mpvros, innatus, ingenitus, congenitus, insitus, &c), as applied to 
cognitions, notions, conceptions, judgments, intellections, beliefs, &c 
These terms may be used either to express a correct or an erro- 
neous doctrine. 

V. The fifth ground of nomenclature, is the Necessity of these 
cognitions, constituting as they do the indispensable foundations 
and elementary ingredients of every act of knowledge and thought. 
Hence they have been called in the one point of view, 



sensible images, being purely intellectual. Using the term Intellect less pre- 
cisely than the Aristotelians, the Cartesians found it necessary to employ, in 
ordinary, for the sake of discrimination, the expression pure Intellect (intel- 
lects purus) in contrast to Sense and Imagination. This term was, how- 
ever, borrowed from the Schools ; who again borrowed it, through the 
medium of St. Augustine, from the Platonists. — See Scoti Comm. Oxon. in 
Sen. L. i. dist. iii. qu. 4, § 22, Op. V. p. 491. 

* Light of Nature, or Lumen naturale (intellectus sc. agentis) a household 
expression with the Schoolmen, was, however, used to denote the natural 
revelation- of intelligence, in opposition to the supernatural light afforded 
through divine inspiration. The analogy of the active Intellect and light 
was suggested by Aristotle. — (De An. iii. § 1.) 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 09 

Fundamental — truths, laws of belief, principles of knowledge, 
intelligence, reason, &c. ; in the other, 

Essential or Constituent elements of reason — Original 
Stamina, of reason — Elemental laivs of thought, &c. These 
are Mr. Stewart's favorite denominations. 

VI. The sixth circumstance is, that they afford the conditions 
and regulative principles of all knowledge. Hence they obtain 
the name of 

Laws, or Canons — fundamental, ultimate, elemental, neces- 
sary, &c, of human belief, knowledge, thought, &c. 

VII. The seventh circumstance is their Universality ; this 
being at once the consequence of their necessity, and its index. 
Hence to designate them the attributes of 

Common — Universal — Catholic — Public, &c. (xoivog, com- 
munis, xa^oXixof, universalis, publicus), applied to sense, reason, 
intelligence — to cognitions, notions, conceptions, judgments, intel- 
lections, prenotions, anticipations, presumptions, principles, ax- 
ioms, beliefs, nature of man, &c, &c. I may observe, however, 
that a principle, &c, may be called common for one or other, 01 
for all of three reasons : — 1°, because common to all men (philos- 
ophers in general) ; 2°, because common to all sciences (Aristo- 
tle, Anal. Post. L. i. c. ii. § 5) ; 3°, by relation to the multitude 
of conclusions dependent from it (Calovius, Nool. c. 2). 

VIII. The eighth is their presumed Trustworthiness, either as 
veracious enouncements, or as accurate tests of truth. Hence, in 
the one relation, they have been styled 

1. — Truths {yeritates) first, primary, a priori, fundamental, 
&c. ; and in the other 

2. — Criteria (xpir^pia, normce) natural, authentic, &c. 

IX. The ninth is that the principles of our knowledge must 
be themselves Knowledges* 



* Knowledges, in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers tiL 
after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unno- 
ticed by any English Lexicographer. 



70 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

If viewed as cognitions, in general, they have been called 

1. a. — Cognitions or Knowledges (yvwrfeig, cognitiones,notv 
tice, informations, &c), with the discriminative attributes, first, 
primary, ultimate, original, fundamental, elemental, natural, 
common, pure, transcendental, a priori, native, innate, connate, 
implanted, &c. 

2. b. — Consciousness (conscientia, conscience, Beivusstseyn) 
facts, data, revelations, &c, of, have been very commonly em- 
ployed ; while 

Consciousnesses (conscientice, consciences), with or without 
an epithet, as connate, innate, has the authority of Tertullian, 
Kechermann, D'Aguesseau, Huber, and many others. 

If viewed as incomplex cognitions, they have more properly 
obtained the names of 

3. — Notions, Conceptions, Prenotions (i'woiai, swo^jxara, 
vo'/jf^ara, irpokri-^eig, notiones, conceptiones, conceptus, &c), some- 
times simply, but more usually limited by the same attributes ; 
though these terms were frequently extended to complex cogni- 
tions likewise. 

If viewed as complex cognitions they have been designated, 
either by the general name of 

4. — Judgments, Propositions (judicia, dvocpavdeig, opiating, 
effata, pronunciata, enunciata, &c), qualified by such adjectives as 
self-evident, intuitive, natural, common, a priori, &c. ; — or by 
some peculiar name. Of these last there are two which deserve 
special notice — Axiom and Maxim. 

5. — Axioms (d^iw^ara, dignitates, pronunciata honoraria, 
effata fide cligna, propositions illustres, xvpiai So%cu, rata;, firmai 
sentential, &c). 

The term Axiom is ambiguous ; the history of its employment 
obscure, and uninvestigated; and the received accounts of its 
signification, and the reasons of its signification, very erroneous. 
— I am aware of three very different meanings in which it has 
been used. Of these the first and second are of ancient, and the 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 71 

third of modern usurpation. The verb dgiow, originally and 
properly, means to rate a thing at a certain worth or value, to 
appreciate, to estimate. Now it is evident, that from this central 
signification it might very easily be deflected into two collateral 
meanings. 

a. — To rate a thing at its value, seems to presuppose that it 
has some value to be rated ; hence the verb came very naturally 
to signify — / deem worthy, &c. From it in this signification we 
have d|i'wf/.a, worth, dignity, authority ; and, applied in a logi- 
cal relation, a worthy, an authoritative proposition. But why 
worthy? — why authoritative? Either because a proposition 
worthy of acceptance (rfporutfig dgioiritfrri) ; or because a proposi- 
tion commanding and obtaining acceptance (xupia S6%a., pronuncia- 
tum honorarium, illustre). But of what nature are the proposi- 
tions worthy of, or which command, universal credence ? Mani- 
festly not, at least primarily, those Avhich, though true, and even 
admitted to be true, shine in a reflected light of truth, as depen- 
dent on other propositions for their evidence ; but those out of 
which the truth beams directly and immediately, which borrow 
not the proof from any which they afford to all, which are 
deserving of credit on their own authority — in a word, self-evident 
propositions (vrpoVatfsij au-roffj'tfrai). Hence the application of 
the term to judgments true, primary, immediate, common. To 
this result converge the authorities of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Alex- 
ander, Themistius, Proclus, Ammonius Hermiae, and Philoponus 

In this signification, as I can recollect, the oldest example of 
the word is to be found in Aristotle. That this philosopher 
limited the expression Axiom to those judgments which, on occa- 
sion of experience, arise naturally and necessarily in the conscious 
mind, and which are therefore virtually prior to experience, can- 
not, I think, be reasonably doubted. ' Of the immediate princi- 
ples,' he says, ' of syllogism, that which cannot be demonstrated, 
but which it is not necessary to possess as the prerequisite of all 
learning, I call Thesis ; and that Axiom, which he who would 



72 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

learn aught must himself bring, [and not receive from his instruct 
tor]. For some such principles there are ; and it is to these that 
we are accustomed to apply this name.' (Anal. Post., L. i. c. 1, 
§ 14.) And again, distinguishing the Axiom from the Hypothe- 
sis and Postulate, of the two latter he says — ' Neither of these of 
itself necessarily exists, and necessarily manifests its existence in 
thought.' (Ibid. c. 10, § 1.) He consequently supposes that an 
Axiom is not only something true, but something that we cannot 
but think to be true. All this is confirmed by sundry other pas- 
sages. (Of these, some will be seen in Testimonies, n. 3 ; where 
also, in a note, is given a solution of what may be said in oppo- 
sition to the attribution of this doctrine to the Stagirite.) The 
same is confirmed, also, by the ancient interpreters of the Poste- 
rior Analytics — Themistius (f. 2, a, ed. Aid.), and Philoponus, or 
rather Ammonius Hermiae (f. 9, b, ed. Aid.) These harbor no 
doubt in regard to the purport of the texts now quoted ; — and 
the same construction is given to Aristotle's doctrine on this 
point, by Alexander, elsewhere, but especially in his Commentary 
on the Topics (p. 12, ed. Aid.), and by Proclus in his Commen- 
taries on Euclid. (Libb. ii. iii.) 

The following definition by Theophrastus is preserved by The 
mistius (1. a). I translate the context, cautioning the reader that 
it is impossible to determine whether the latter part of the pas- 
sage belongs to Theophrastus, or, what is more probable, to The- 
mistius himself. ' Theophrastus thus defines an Axiom : — An 
axiom is a certain kind of opinion [or judgment], one species of 
which is [valid] of all things of the same class, as [under the cat- 
egory, Quantity] — If equals be taken from equals, the remainders 
are equal ; while another is [valid] of all things indifferently, as — 
Betiveen affirmation and negation there is no medium. For these 
are, as it were, connate and common to all. Whence also the 
reason of the denomination Axiom [worth, dignity, authori + y]. 
For what is set over, either all things absolutely, or certain classes 
of things universally, that we judge to have precedence, authori- 
ty, by reference to them.' 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 73 

In this sense the word is universally supposed to have been tech- 
nically employed by the mathematicians, from a very ancient 
period. But whether it was so prior to Aristotle, I should be vehe- 
mently disposed to doubt ; both from the tenor of the former pas- 
sage of the Posterior Analytics, just quoted, in which the philos- 
opher seems to attribute to himself this application of the term, 
and from the absence of all evidence to prove its earlier intro- 
Juction. I am aware indeed of a passage in the Metaphysics 
(L. iii. [iv.] c. 3), which, at first sight, and as it has always been 
understood, might appear unfavorable to this surmise ; for men- 
tion is there made of ' what in mathematics (Iv <ro7g (*a^(xarfi) 
are called Axioms.' But this text is, I suspect, misunderstood, 
and that it ought to be translated — ' what in our " Mathematics" 
are called Axioms.' But did Aristotle write on this subject? 
He did, one, if not two treatises ; as appears from the lists of 
Laertius (L. v. § 24) and the Anonymus Menagii. In the former 
we have Ma^jxanxov, a, ' On Mathematics, one book ;' in the 
latter — LTs^/ <rr)g sv roTg /xa^/xatfiv ovtfiug, " On the existence treated 
of in Mathematics. 1 Nay, the term is not to be found in the 
writings we possess of those geometricians who ascend the near- 
est to the age of Aristotle. Euclid, what may surprise the reader, 
does not employ it. There it stands, certainly, in all the editions 
and translations of the Elements in ordinary use. But this is 
only one of the many tamperings with his text, for which the 
perfidious editors and translators of Euclid are responsible ; and 
in the present instance the Aristotelizing commentary of Proclus 
6eems to have originally determined the conversion of ' Common 
Notions' into ' Axioms.' Archimedes (De Sphasra et Cylindro, 
sub initio) is, after Aristotle, the oldest authority extant for the 
term, in a mathematical relation ; though Archimedes, who only 
once employs it, does not apply it in the Aristotelic limitation, as 
equivalent to the Common Notions of Euclid, and exclusive of 
Postulates and Definitions. On the contrary, with him axiom is, 
if not convertible with definition, used only in the second or Sto- 
ical sense, for an enunciation in general. Turning indeed to the 



74 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

works of the other Greek Mathematicians which I have at hand, 
I cannot find the term in Apollonins of Perga, in Serenus, Dio- 
phantus, Pappus, Eutocius, Hero, or the Samian Aristarchus. 
Sextus Empiricus, in all his controversy with the Mathematicians, 
knows it not ; nor, except in the second technical meaning, is it 
to be found in Plutarch. Its application in mathematics was 
therefore, I surmise, comparatively late, and determined by the 
influence of Aristotle. This is not the only instance by which it 
might be shown that the Mathematicians are indebted to the Sta- 
girite for their language ; who, if he borrowed a part of his Log- 
ical nomenclature from Geometry, amply repaid the obligation. 

This first meaning is that which Axiom almost exclusively ob- 
tains in the writings of the Aristotelian, and (though Plato does 
not philosophically employ the term) of the Platonic school. 

b. — To rate a thing at its value, that is, to attribute or not to 
attribute to it a certain worth, is a meaning which would easily 
slide into denoting the affirmation or negation of qualities in re- 
gard to a subject ; for its qualities determine, positively or nega- 
tively, the value of any thing. Hence, in general, to be of opin- 
ion, to think so and so, to judge. (In like manner, among other 
analogical examples, the Latin verb existimo (that is ex-cestimo), 
its primary meaning falling into desuetude, was at last almost ex- 
clusively employed in the secondary, as — / think that, or / opine.) 
From this signification of the verb flowed a second logical mean- 
ing of the substantive ; Axiom being applied to denote, in gen- 
eral, an enunciation or proposition (properly a categorical), tohether 
true or false. In this sense it was used, sometimes by Aristotle 
(v. Top., L. viii. cc. 1, 3 — if this work be his — et ibi, Alexandrum), 
and, as far as I am aware, to say nothing of the Epicureans and 
Skeptics, always by the Stoics — though Simplicius (ad. Epict. 
Ench., c. 58) asserts, that they occasionally employed it, like the 
Aristotelians, in the first. Laelius, Varro, Cicero, Sergius, Agelli- 
us, Apuleius, Donatus, Martianus Capella, &c, render it by vari- 
ous Latin terms, in all of which, however, the present meaning 
exclusively, is embodied ; and in the same signification the Greek 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 75 

term axioma itself was, in modern times, adopted by Ramus and 
his school, as their common logical expression for " proposition." 

Thus in neither of its logical significations, I make bold to say, 
is the word Axiom to be found in any writing extant, prior to 
Aristotle ; and in its second, only in a work, the Topics, which is 
not with absolute certainty the production of the Stagirite. I 
may observe, that there is another account given of the logical 
applications of the word, but to this I think it wholly needless to 
advert. 

c. — The third and last meaning is that imposed upon the word 
by Bacon. He contorted Axiom to designate any higher propo- 
sition, obtained by generalization and induction from the obser- 
vation of individual instances — the enunciation of a general fact 
— an empirical law. 

So much for the meanings of the term Axiom itself — now for 
its translation. 

Dignitas was employed by Boethius to render Axioma in its 
first or Aristotelic meaning ; and from him came, in this appli- 
cation, into general use among the Latin schoolmen. But before 
Boethius, and as a translation of the term in its second or Stoical 
meaning, I find Dignitas employed by Priscian (Instit. Grammat., 
L. xvii. c. 1). No lexicographer, however, no philologist has 
noticed these authorities for the word, while Latin was still a 
living language. It has, indeed, till this hour, been universally 
taken for granted by philologers that dignitas in this relation is 
a mere modern barbarism. 'Inepte faciunt (says Muretus) qui 
d^iw^ocra dignitates vocant; cujus pravse consuetudinis Hermo- 
laus Barbaras auctor fuit.' (Varise Lectiones, L. vi. c. 2.) This 
is wrong, more especially as regards the author and era of the 
custom : nay, H. Barbaras is only reprehensible for not always, 
instead of rarely, translating the term, as it occurs in Themistius, 
by Dignitas, if translated into Latin it must be ; for his usual ver- 
sion by Proloquium or Pronuntiatum — expressions which only 
render the word in its Stoical meaning — has been the cause of 
considerable error and confusion among subsequent logicians, who, 



76 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

unable to resort to the one rare edition of the original, were thus 
led to suppose that the nomenclature of Theophrastus and The- 
mistius were different from that of Aristotle. The authority of 
Muretus has obtained, however, for his mistake a universal accep- 
tation ; and what is curious, JSTicolaus Loensis (Misc. Epiph., L. i. 
c i), in his criticism of the very chapter in which it occurs, 
omitting this solitary error, stupidly or perfidiously inculpates 
Muretus for assertions, which that illustrious scholar assuredly 
never dreamt of hazarding. 

6. Maxims — (maximce, propositiones maximce, supremce, prin- 
cipales, &c.) 

In Maxim we have the example of a word which all employ, 
but of whose meaning none seem to know the origin or reason.* 
Extant in all the languages of Christendom, this term is a bequest 
of that philosophy, once more extensive than Christianity itself, 
through which Aristotle, for a thousand years, swayed at once 
and with almost equal authority, the theology of the Bible and 
the Koran. But it was not original to the scholastic philosophy. 
The schoolmen received it from Boethius, who is the earliest au- 
thor to whom I trace the expression. He propounds it in his 
two works — ' In Topica Ciceronis,' and ' De Differentiis Topi- 
cis.' The following is one of his definitions : — ' Maximas propo- 
sitions [which he also styles propositiones supremee, principales, 
indemonstrabiles, per se notce, &c] vocamus quae et universales 

* I have had the curiosity to see how far this ignorance extended.- Our 
English Lexicographers, Johnson, Todd, Webster, are in outer darkness. 
They only venture to hint at some unknown relation between maxim and 
•' maximum, the greatest .'" Eichardson is not positively wrong. He is aware 
(probably from Furetiere or his copyist the Dictionaire de Trevoux, for there 
is a verbal coincidence in all three) that maxima was in low Latin used in a 
similar signification ; but his explanation of the reason is not only defective, 
but erroneous. In other dictionaries, real and verbal, if we find the word 
noticed at all, we find nothing beyond a bare statement of its actual meaning ; 
as may be seen in those of Goclenius, Micrselius, Martinius, Ducange, the 
Zedlerian Lexicon, to say nothing of our more modern Encyclopedias. Even 
the great Selden (On Fortescue, c. 8) in attempting to explain the term in 
its legal application, betrays his unacquaintance with its history and proper 
import. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 77 

sunt, et ita notae atque manifesto, ut probatione nou egeant, 
eaque potius quae in dubitatione sunt probent. Nam quae in 
dubitatee sunt, arnbiguorum demonstrationi solent esse principia ; 
qualis est — Omnem numerum vel parem vel imparem, et — JEqua- 
lia relinqui si cequalibus, cequalia detrahuntur, caeteraeque de 
Quarum nota veritate non quaeritur.' 

With Boethius maxima propositio (maxima be never uses abso- 
lutely) is thus only a synonym for axiom or self-evident judg- 
ment. He however applies the term specially to denote those 
dialectical principles, axioms, or canons, those catholic judgments 
which constitute what in logic and rhetoric have since Aristotle 
been called common-places , that is, the sources or receptacles of 
arguments applicable to every matter, and proper to none. Such 
propositions, he says, are styled maxima? or greatest, because as 
universal and primary, they implicitly contain the other proposi 
tions (minores posterioresque), and determine the whole inference 
of a reasoning (reliquas in se propositiones complectuntur, et per 
eas fit consequens et rata conclusio).* But he also sometimes in- 
dicates that they are entitled to this epithet, because, as evident 

* Thus in arguing, that a wise, is not an intemperate, man, by the syllo- 
gism — 

He is wise who controls his passions ; 

He is intemperate who does not control his passions ; 

Therefore a wise, is not an intemperate, man ; the whole reasomng is con- 
tained under, and therefore presupposes, the proposition — To what the defi- 
nition is inapplicable, to that is inapplicable the thing defined {cui non convenii 
definitio, non convenit definituin). This proposition (one of six co-ordinates 
which make up the common-place called of Definition) as containing under 
it a multitude of others (e. g., Cui non convenit definitio sapientis, nee con- 
venit nomen; cui non convenit definitio justi, pulchri, timidi, &c, &c, nee 
nomen) is not inappropriately styled p. maxima. I may observe, however, 
that, as thus employed, maxima can only, in strict propriety, qualify a propo- 
sition relatively, not absolutely, greatest. For every maxim of every dialecti- 
cal Place is itself contained within the sphere of one or other of the four 
logical laws of Identity, Contradiction, Excluded Middle, and Eeason and 
Consequent, of which it is only a subordinate modification. Thus the maxim 
adduced, is only a special application of the law of Contradiction. To the 
four laws, therefore, the name of propositiones maxima} should be exclusively 
applicable, if this expression were intended to denote an unconditioned uni- 
versality. 



78 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

in themselves and independent of all others, they afford to the 
unintuitive judgments they support, their primary proof (anti- 
quissimam probationer), and their greatest certainty (maximam 
fidem). Compare In Top. Cic. L. i. Op. p. 765— De Diff. Top. L. 
i. p. 859, L. ii. p. 865 sq. Boethius had likewise perhaps Aris- 
totle's saying in his thought — ' that principles, though what are 
least in magnitude, are what are greatest in power.' 

Maxima pj'opositio, as a dialectical expression, was adopted 
from Boethius by his friend and brother-consul, the patrician 
Cassiodorus ; and from these ' ultimi Romanorum' it passed to the 
schoolmen, with whom so soon as it became established as a com- 
mon term of art, propositio was very naturally dropt, and maxima 
thus came to be employed as a substantive — by many at last, who 
were not aware of the origin and rationale of its meaning. Finally, 
from the Latinity and philosophical nomenclature of the schools, 
it subsided, as a household word, into all the vernacular languages 
of Europe ; with this restriction however — that in them it is not 
usually applied except in a practical relation ; denoting a moral 
apophthegm, a rule of conduct, an ethical, a political, a legal ca- 
non, &c, and this too, enouncing, not so much what is always and 
necessarily, but what is for the most part and probably, true. It 
sounds strange in our ears to hear of a mathematical or logical 
maxim, in the sense of axiom, self-evident principle, or law — 
though this is the sense in which it was commonly employed, 
among others, by Locke and Leibnitz. To this restriction, its 
special employment in Dialectic (the logic of contingent matter) 
probably prepared the way ; though by the schoolmen, as by Boe- 
thius, it continued to be used as convertible with axiom. ' Dig- 
nitas dicitur (says Albertus Magnus) quia omnibus dignior est, eo 
quod omnibus infiuit cognitionem et veritatem ; et dicitur Max- 
ima, eo quod virtute influentiae lucis et veritatis omnia excedit 
immediata principia.' (In i. Post. Anal., c. 1.) St. Thomas and 
Scotus might be adduced to the same effect ; see also P. Hispa- 
nus (Summulse, tr. v. c. 3, et ibi Versor). At an early period, it 
was borrowed as a term of art, into the Common Law of Eng- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE, 79 

[and ; Maxims there denoting what by the civilians were tech- 
nically denominated Regulce Juris. (Fortescue, De Laudibns 
legum Anglise, c. 8. — Doctor and Student, c. 8.) By Kant 
Maxim was employed to designate a subjective principle, theo- 
retical or practical, i. e. one not of objective validity, being exclu- 
sively relative to some interest of the subject. Maxim and Reg- 
ulative principle are, in the Critical philosophy, opposed to Law 
and Constitutive principle. 

Besides the preceding designations under this head, names have 
been given to the original deliverances of Consciousness, consid- 
ered as the manifestations of some special faculty ; that is, Con- 
sciousness as performing this peculiar function has obtained a par- 
ticular name. In this respect it has been called Season, and, 
with greater propriety, Intellect or Intelligence. 

V. Reason (Xoyog, ratio, raison, Vemunft), truths, principles, 
beliefs, feelings, intuitions, &c, of. 

Reason is a very vague, vacillating, and equivocal word. Throw- 
ing aside various accidental significations which it has obtained 
in particular languages, as in Greek denoting not only the ratio 
but the oratio of the Latins ; throwing aside its employment, in 
most languages, for cause, motive, argument, principle of proba- 
tion, or middle term of a syllogism, and considering it only as a 
philosophical word denoting a faculty or complement of faculties ; 
in this relation it is found employed in the following meanings, 
not only by different individuals, but frequently, to a greater or 
less extent, by the same philosopher. 

a. — It has both in ancient and modern times been very com- 
monly employed, like understanding and intellect, to denote our 
intelligent nature in general (Xoyixov (xs'^oj) ; and this usually as 
distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagi- 
nation, memory — but always, and emphatically, as in contrast to 
the feelings and desires. In this signification, to folloAV the Aris- 
totelic division, it comprehends — 1°, Conception, or Simple Ap- 
prehension (svvoia, voTjtfis- ruv aSiougeruv, conceptus, conceptio, ap- 
prehensio simplex, das Begreifen) ; 2°, the Compositive and Divi- 



80 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

sive process, Affirmation and Negation, Judgment (cfuv6s<fig xai 
Siuigscfig, drfocpavrfig, judicium) ; — 3°, Reasoning or the Discursive 
faculty (Siavoicc, \oyog, XoyHfpbg, to tfuXXoyj'^stfdai, discursus, ratio- 
cinatio); — 4°, Intellect or Intelligence proper, either as the intui- 
tion, or as the place, of principles or self-evident truths (voOf, intel- 
lects, intelligentia, mens). 

b. — In close connection with the preceding signification, from 
which perhaps it ought not to be separated, is that meaning in 
which reason, the rational, the reasonable, is used to characterize 
the legitimate employment of our faculties in general, in contra- 
distinction to the irregular or insubordinate action of one or more 
even of our rational faculties, which, if exercised out of their 
proper s])here, may be viewed as opposed to reason. Thus the 
plain sense of one of Moliere's characters complains — 

Kaisonner est l'emploi de toute ma maison, 
Et le raisonnement en bannit la raison. 

c. — It has not unfrequently been employed to comprehend the 
third and fourth of the special functions above enumerated — to 
wit, the dianoetic and noetic. In this meaning it is taken by Eeid 
in his later works. Thus in the Intellectual Powers (p. 425 ab.) 
he states, that Reason, in its first office or degree [the noetic], is 
identical with Common Sense, in its second [the dianoetic], with 
Reasoning. 

d. — It has very generally, both in ancient and modern philos 
ophy, been employed for the third of the above special func- 
tions ; — Xoyoj and ~koy\<1\>A>g, Ratio and Ratiocinatio, Reason and 
Reasoning being thus confounded. Reid thus applied it in his 
earlier work the Inquiry. See pp. 100, b., 108, a., 127, a. b. 

e. — In the ancient systems it was very rarely used exclusively 
for the fourth special function, the noetic in contrast to the dia- 
noetic. Aristotle, indeed (Eth. Nic, L. vi. c. 11 (12), Eth. Eud., 
L. v. c. 8), expressly says that reason is not the faculty of prin- 
ciples, that faculty being Intelligence proper. Boethius (De Cons. 
Phil., L. v. Pr. 5) states that Reason or Discursive Intellect be- 
longs to man, while Intelligence or Intuitive Intellect is the exclu- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 81 

sive attribute of Divinity. ' Ratio humani tanturn generis est, 
sicuti Intelligentia sola divini ;' while Porphyry somewhere says 
' that we have Intelligence in common with the Gods, and rea- 
son in common with the brutes.' Sometimes, however, it was 
apparently so employed. Thus St. Augustine seems to view 
Reason as the faculty of intuitive truths, and as opposed to Rea- 
soning : — ' Ratio est quidam mentis adspectus, quo, per seipsam 
non per corpus, verum intuetur ; Ratiocinatio autem est rationis 
inquisitio, a certis ad incertorum indagationem nitens cogitatio.' 
(De Quant. An., § 53 — De Immort. An., §§ 1, 10.) This, how- 
ever, is almost a singular exception. 

In modern times, though we frequently meet with Reason, as 
a general faculty, distinguished from Reasoning, as a particular ; 
yet until Kant, I am not aware that Reason (Vernunft) was ever 
exclusively, or even emphatically, used in a signification corres- 
ponding to the noetic faculty, in its strict and special meaning, 
and opposed to understanding (Verstand) viewed as comprehend- 
ing the other functions of thought — unless Crusins (Weg. &c. § 62 
sq.) may be regarded as Kant's forerunner in this innovation. In- 
deed the Vernunft of Kant, in its special signification (for he also 
uses it for Reason in the first or more general meaning, as indeed 
nothing can be more vague and various than his employment of 
the word), cannot without considerable qualification be considered 
analogous to Nous, far less to Common Sense ; though his usur- 
pation of the term for the faculty of principles, probably deter- 
mined Jacobi (who had originally, like philosophers in general, 
confounded Vernunft with Verstand, Reason with Reasoning) to 
appropriate the term Reason to what he had at first opposed to 
it, under the name of Belief (Glaube). Accordingly in his ma- 
turer writings, ' Vernunft, Reason — ' Vernunft- Glaube] Belief of 
Reason — ' Vernunft- Gefuehl] Feeling of Reason — ' Rationale 
AnschauungJ Rational Intuition — ' Sinn, Organ fuer das CTeber 
sinnlichef Sense or Organ of the Supersensible, &c, are the terms 
by which we may roundly say that Jacobi denominates the noetic 
faculty or common sense. 
5 



82 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

Kant's abusive employment of the term 1 Reason, for the faculty 
of the Unconditioned, determined also its adoption, under the 
same signification, in the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel; though Noug, Intellectus, Intelligentia, which had been 
applied by the Platonists in a similar sense, were (through Ver- 
stand, by which they had been always rendered into German) 
the only words suitable to express that cognition of the Absolute, 
in which subject and object, knowledge and existence, God and 
man, are supposed to be identified. But even in this, to add to 
the confusion, no consistency was maintained. For though that 
absolute cognition was emphatically the act of Reason, it was 
yet by Fichte and Schelling denominated the Intuition of Intel- 
lect (intellectual e Anschauung). F. Schlegel was therefore jus- 
tified in his attempt to reverse the relative superiority of Ver- 
nunft and Verstand. "What were his reasons I know not ;• but 
as they have excited no attention, they were probably of little 
weight. 

Though Common Sense be not therefore opposed to Reason, ex- 
cept perhaps in its fourth signification, still the term Reason is of 
so general and ambiguous an import, that its employment in so de- 
terminate a meaning as a synonym of Common Sense ought to 
be avoided. It is only, we have seen, as an expression for the 
noetic faculty, or Intellect proper, that Reason can be substituted 
for Common Sense ; and as the former is hardly allowable, still 
less is the latter. 

Besides the more precise employment of Reason as a synonym 
for Common Sense by the recent German philosophers, it will be 
found more vaguely applied in the same meaning — usually, how- 
ever, with some restrictive epithet, like common, universal, funda- 
mental, &c. — by many older authorities, of whom Heraclitus, the 
Stoics, Turretin, Lyons, Bentley, Shaftesbury, De la Mennais, 
are among the Testimonies adduced in the sequel. 

8. — Intellect, Intelligence (yovg, 2 intellectus, intelligentia, 



1 See below, p. 454. — W. 9 See above, p. 54, b. note. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 83 

mens, entendement, intelligence, intellect, Verstand), truths, prin- 
ciples, axioms, dicta, intuitions, &c, of. 

Intellections (yor^sig, intellectiones, intelligentice, intellections, 
intelligences), primary, natural, common, &c. 

By Aristotle, from whom it finally obtained the import, which 
it subsequently retained, the term Noifc is used in two principal 
significations. In the one (like Reason in its first meaning) it de- 
notes, in general, our higher faculties of thought and knowledge ; 
in the other it denotes, in special, the faculty, habit, place, of 
principles, that is, of self-evident and self-evidencing notions and 
judgments. The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by 
intellectus and intelligentia ;* and some of them appropriated 
the former of these terms to its first, or general signification, the 
latter to its second or special. Cicero does not employ the term 
intellectus; and the Ciceronian epidemic prevalent after the revival 
of letters, probably induced the Latin translators of the Greek phi- 
losophers to render it more usually by the term mens. In one and 
all of our modern languages the words derived from, or corres- 
ponding to, Intellectus, Intellectio, Intelligentia, have been so 
loosely and variously employed, that they offer no temptation to 
substitute them for that of Common Sense. The case is different 
with the adjective noetic. The correlatives noetic and dianoetic 
would afford the best philosophical designations — the former for 
an intuitive principle, or truth at first hand ; the latter for a dem- 
onstrative proposition, or truth at second hand. Noology and 
Noological, Dianoialogy and Dianoialogical would be also tech- 
nical terms of much convenience in various departments of philos- 
ophy. On the doctrine of first principles as a department of 



* Intelligentia (like Intellectio) properly denotes the act or energy of Intellec- 
tus. How it came that the term Intelligentice was latterly applied to denote 
the higher order of created existences, as angels, &c, is explained by Aqui- 
nas (S. Th., P. i. qu. 79, art. 10), as an innovation introduced by certain 
translations from the Arabic. I shall not commemorate the distinction of 
Intellectus and Intelligentia given in the contradictory farrago attributed to 
St. Augustine, under the title Be Spiritu et Anima. See cc. 37, 88. 



84 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

' Gnostology,' the philosophy of knowledge, we have indeed du- 
ring the seventeenth century, by German authors alone, a series 
of special treatises, under the titles — of ' Noologia] by Calovius, 
1651, Mejerus, 1662, Wagnerus, 1670, and Zeidlerus, 1680, — 
and of ' Intelligentia] by Gutkius, 1625, and Geilfussius, 1662. 
i Archelogia,'' again, was the title preferred for their works upon 
the same subject by Alstedius, 1620, and Micraelius, 1658. Of 
these treatises, in so far as I have seen them, the execution disap- 
points the curiosity awakened by the title and attempt. 

In this sense, besides the ordinary employment of Intellectus, 
and Intelligentia by the ancient and modern Aristotelians ; Cice- 
ro, St. Austin, and others, in like manner, use Intelligentie, either 
simply, or with some differential epithet, as inchoate, adumbrates, 
complicate, involute, prime, communes, <fec. ; as is done like- 
wise by Pascal and other French philosophers with the terms In- 
telligence and Intelligences. 

X. The tenth and last circumstance is, that the native contri- 
butions by the mind itself to our concrete cognitions have, prior 
to their elicitation into consciousness through experience, only a 
potential, and in actual experience only an applied, engaged, or 
implicate, existence. Hence their designation of — 

Habits (possessions), Dispositions, Virtualities, &c, with 
some discriminating epithet. Thus, by Aristotle, noetic Intelli- 
gence is called the (natural) Habit of principles (sf i£ <rwv a£%wv) ; 
and principles themselves are characterized by Leibnitz, as natu- 
ral Habits, Dispositions, Virtualities. As prior to experience, 
Galen styles them things occult or delitescent (jcsx^ujx^e'va), in con- 
trast to the manifestations made in experience itself (paivo'/xsva). 
Cicero and others call them Intelligentie, obscure, inchoate, 
complicate, involute, &c. To the same head are to be referred 
the metaphorical denominations they have obtained of — Seeds 
(Xo'yoi tfirs^anxo/, semina scientie, semina eternitatis, &c.) — or 
Sparks (scintille, igniculi, ^wtfuga svaJtfjaara, dirivQrjgsg, &c.) 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 85 



VI. The Universality of the philosophy of Common 
Sense ; or its general recognition, in Eeality and 
in Name, shown by a chronological series of Testi- 
monies from the dawn of speculation to the present 



1. — Hesiod thus terminates his Works and Days: 

fyflUr) 5' oviTOTt irdpirav airdWvTal rjv riva xoXXoi 
Aaol tyrinltyvcrt.' 6i6; vi ri% IstX Kal ahrfj. 

' The Word proclaimed by the concordant voice 
Of mankind fails not ; for in man speaks God.' 

Hence the adage ? — Vox Populi, vox Dei. 

2. — Heraclitus. — The doctrine held hy this philosopher of a 
Common Eeason (guvo? Xo'yoj), the source and the criterion of 
truth, in opposition to individual wisdom QSia cp govrigtg), the 
principle of opinion and error, may be regarded as one of Com- 
mon Sense. Its symbol — ra xoiv?) cpaivo^sva iftjira — Sextus Em- 
piricus thus briefly expounds : — ' What appears to all, that is to 
be believed ; for it is apprehended by the Reason which is Com- 
mon and Divine ; whereas, what is presented to individual minds, 
is unworthy of belief, and for the counter cause.' — I. Adv. Log. 

§ 131 - 

In so far, however, as our scanty sources of information enable 
us to judge, Heraclitus mistook the import, and transgressed the 
boundaries of the genuine doctrine, in the same way as is done 



* In throwing together these testimonies, I had originally in view, merely 
to adduce such as hore explicitly and directly on the doctrine of Common 
Sense, word and thing ; subsequently, I found it proper to take in certain 
others, in which that doctrine is clearly, though only implicitly or indirectly, 
asserted. These last, I have admitted, in preference, from those schools 
which ascribe the least to the mind itself, as a fountain of knowledge, and a 
criterion of truth ; and have, in consequence, taken little or nothing from 
the Platonic. I have also been ohliged to limit the testimonies, almost ex- 
clusively, to Common Sense, considered on its speculative side. On its prac- 
tical, there could have been no end. 



86 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

in the system of ' Common Sense,' ' Universal Consent,' or ' Com- 
mon Reason,' so 'ingeniously maintained by the eloquent Abbe 
DeLa Mennais (No. 101). Both vilipend all private judgment 
as opinion ; and opinion both denounce as a disease. Both sac- 
rifice the intelligence of individual men at the shrine of the 
common reason of mankind ; and both celebrate the apotheosis 
of this Common Reason or Sense, as an immediate ray of the 
divinity. Both, finally, in proclaiming — ' that we ought to follow 
the Common' (SeTvutfstfdai <rw guvw), mean, that we should resort 
to this, not merely as a catholic criterion, or a source of element- 
ary truths, but as a magazine of ready fabrics ed dogmas. Herac- 
litus and La Mennais are the first and last philosophers in our 
series : philosophy would thus seem to end as it began. — In re- 
lation to the former, see Schleiermacher, in Wolf and Butt- 
mann's Museum, i. pp. 313, seq. ; and Brandis Geschichte der 
Philosophic, i. § 44. In relation to the latter, see his Catechisme 
du Sens Commun — Essais sur L'Indifference, &c, passim ; with 
Bautain, Psychologie, i. Disc. Prelim., pp. xliv. seq. ; and Biunde, 
Fund. Phil., pp. 129, seq. 166. (To these is now to be added the 
Esquisse d'une Philosophie par F. Lamennais, 1840, L. i. ch. 1. 
Here the doctrine in question is presented in a far less objection- 
able form ; but as its previous statements are not withdrawn, I 
have not thought it necessary to cancel the preceding observa- 
tions, which were written befoi-e I had received this remarkable 
work.) 

3. — Aristotle. — He lays it down in general as the condition 
of the possibility of knowledge that it does not regress to infinity, 
but depart from certain primary facts, beliefs, or principles — true, 
and whose truth commands assent, through themselves, and 
themselves alone. These, as the foundations, are not objects, of 
Science ; as the elements of Demonstration they are themselves 
indemonstrable. The fountains of certainty to all else, they are 
themselves pre-eminently certain, and if denied in words, they are 
still always mentally admitted. The faculty of such principles 
i"s not Reason, the discursive or dianoetic faculty (Xo'yos, <5iavoia), 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 87 

but Intellect or Intelligence proper, the noetic faculty (voGV). 
Intellect as an immediate apprehension of what is, may be viewed 
as a Sense {aiders 15). Compare Analyt. Post. L. i. cc. 2, 3, 10, 
32— L. ii. c. ult. — Top. L. i. c. 1— Metaph. L. i. c. 7 — L. ii. (A 
minor) c. 2 — L. ii. (iii. Duvallio) cc. 3, 4, 6 — L. hi. (iv.) c. 6 — 
Eth. Nic. L. vi. cc. 6, 11, (12)— Eth. Eud. L. v. cc. 6, 8— L. vii. 
c. 14 — Mag. Mor. L. i. c. 35. 

In particular, that Aristotle founds knowledge on belief, and 
the objective certainty of science on the subjective necessity of 
believing, is, while not formally enounced, manifest from many 
passages — though he might certainly have been more explicit. 
Compare Post. Anal. L. i. c. 2, §§ 1, 2, 16, 17, 18 ; c. 10, § 7 ; 
c. 31, § 3 ; Top. L. i. c. 1, § 6, &c. ; Eth. Nic. vii. c. 3 ; Magn. 
Mor. L. ii. c. 6. 

' Since Aristotle,' says the profound Jacobi ("Werke ii. p. 11), 
' there has been manifested a continual and increasing ter^ ency 
in the philosophical schools to subordinate, in general, immedi- 
ate to mediate knowledge — the powers of primary apprehension, 
on which all is founded, to the powers of reflection as determined 
by abstraction — the prototype to the ectype — the thing to the 
word — the Reason [Vernunft — Aristotle's noetic faculty or Intel- 
lect] to the Intellect [Verstand — Aristotle's dianoetic faculty or 
Reason] ; nay, to allow the former to be wholly subjugated and 
even lost.' In this Jacobi (and to Jacobi may be added Fries) 
does Aristotle the most signal injustice ; for there is no philoso- 
pher who more emphatically denounces the folly of those ' who 
require a reason of those things of which there is no reason to 
be given, not considering that the principle of demonstration is 
not itself demonstrable.' Metaph. iii. 6. See No. 4 a. In fact 
Jacobi's own doctrine in its most perfect form, will be found to 
bear a wonderful analogy to that of Aristotle. See No. 87 d. 
In determining indeed the question whether Aristotle does or 
does not derive all our knowledge from experience and induction, 
there is some difficulty, from the vagueness with which the 
problem has usually been stated. In so far, however, as it con- 



88 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

cerns the doctrine of Common Sense, the opinion of Aristotle 
admits of no reasonable doubt.* 

* The doctrine of those passages (as Post. An. L. ii. c. ult., Eth. Nic. L. vi. 
c. 3. Eth, Eud. L. v. c. 3, &o.) in which Aristotle asserts that our knowledge 
of principles is derived from sense, experience, induction, may be reconciled 
with the doctrine of those others in which he makes the intellect itself their 
source (see above, p. 70 b, and quotations a. b. c. that follow) — in two ways. 

The first is that adopted by a majority of his Greek and Latin expositors. 
They suppose that our knowledge of principles is dependent on both, but in 
different manners, and in different degrees. On the intellect this knowledge 
is principally dependent, as on its proximate, efficient, essential cause (afria 
ytwrtwcri, noivTiKr), causa, causa per se, origo, &c.) On sense, experience, in- 
duction, it is dependent, as on its exciting, disponent, permissive, manifesta- 
tive, subsidiary, instrumental, occasional cause (aipopuri, fyopp}), -xp6<pacis, alrta 
virovpybs, \drpis, virripeTis, &c.) Of the Greek interpreter, see Alexander in 
Top. pp. 12, 47, 48, ed. Aid. (Test n. 10)— Themistius in Post. An. ff. 2, 
14, 15, and De An. f. 90, ed. Aid. — Philoponus (or Ammonius), in Post. An. 
f. 100, ed. Aid. and De Anima, Proem. — Eustratius in Post. An. f. 63, sq., 
ed. Aid. in Eth. Nic. f. 89 b, ed. Aid. Of the Latin expositors, among 
many, Fonseca, in Metaph. L. i. c. 1, q. 4 — Conimbricenses, Org. Post. Anal. 
L. i. c. 1. q. 1 — Sonerus in Metaph. L. i. c. 1, p. 67, sq. Of Testimonies 
infra, see Nos. 10, 20, 21, 22. On this interpretation, Aristotle justly views 
our knowledge as chronologically commencing with Sense, but logically 
originating in Intellect. As one of the oldest of nis modern antagonists has 
incomparably enounced it, — ' Cognitio nostra omnis a Mente primam origi- 
nem, a Sensibus exordium habet primum ;' — a text on which an appropriate 
commentary may be sought for in the opening chapter of Kant's Critique of 
pure Eeason, and in the seventeenth Lecture of Cousin upon Locke. 

The second mode of reconciling the contradiction, and which has not I 
think been attempted, is — that on the supposition of the mind virtually 
containing, antecedent to all actual experience, certain universal principles 
of knowledge, in the form of certain necessities of thinking ; still it is only 
by repeated and comparative experiment, that we compass the certainty — 
on the one hand, that such and such cognitions cannot but be thought, and 
are, therefore, as necessary, native generalities, — and on the other, that, such 
and such cognitions may or may not be thought, and are, therefore, as con- 
tingent, factitious generalizations. To this process of experiment, analysis, 
and classification, through which we attain to a scientific knowledge of prin- 
ciples, it might be shown that Aristotle, not improbably, applies the term 
Induction. 

In regard to the passage (De An. L. iii. c. 5) in which the intellect prior 
to experience is compared to a tablet on which nothing has actually been 
written, the context shows that the import of this simile is with Aristotle 
very different from what it was with the Stoics ; to whom, it may be noticed, 
and not, as is usually supposed, to the Stagirite, are we to refer the first 
enouncement of the brocard — In Intellectu nihil est, quod non priusfuerit in 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 89 

But to adduce some special testimonies. These I shall translate. 1 
a. — Top. L. i. c. 1, § 6. — ' First truths are such as are believed, 
not through aught else, but through themselves alone. For in 
regard to the principles of science we ought not to require the 
reason Why [but only the fact That they are given] ; for each 
such principle behooves to be itself a belief in and of itself.' 

b. — Pr. Analyt. L. i. c. 3, § 4. — Maintaining against one party 
that demonstrative science is competent to man, and against 
another, that this science cannot itself be founded on propositions 
which admit of demonstration, Aristotle says — ' We assert not 
only that science does exist, but also that there is given a certain 
beginning or principle of science, in so far as [or on another 
interpretation of the term rj — ' by which'] we recognize the im- 
port of the terms.' On the one interpretation the meaning of 
the passage is — ' We assert not only that [demonstrative] science 
does exist, but also that there is given a certain [indemonstrable] 
beginning or principle of science [that is, Intellect which comes 
into operation], so soon as we apprehend the meaning of the 
terms.' For example, when we once become aware of the sense 
of the terms whole and part, then the intellect of itself spontane- 
ously enounces the axiom — The whole is greater than its part. — 
On the other interpretation ; — ' We assert not only that [demon- 
strative] science does exist, but also that there is given a certain 
[indemonstrable] beginning or principle of science [viz. intellect] 
by which we recognize the import of the terms,' i. e. recognize 
them in their necessary relation, and thereupon explicitly enounce 
the axiom which that relation implies. 



In making intellect a source of knowledge, Aristotle was preceded by 
Plato. But the Platonic definition of ' Intellection? is { The principle of 
science ;' and Aristotle's merit is not the abolition of intellect as such, but 
its reduction from a sole to a conjunct principle of science. 

x The original of the more essential points : — ZtjTtlv \oynv &<pivTa; rt/v alcdrj- 
fti', appuiia rts e si Siavota$. — Aristotle. Tlpoaixuv ov 8c7 -aavra rolg fiia tOv \oymv, 
&\\a TToWdxi; /^aXXov rots $aivonivoi.s.- — Id. Ti? afoOrjasi /laWov tj tS Aoyta viaev- 
Ttov' kou rots Ai/yot s, iav hjioXoyoiii&va. SsiKvvtain rols' (paivonivois. — Id. 'H a'aQtiaii 
{Tri<r*UT]S sx ei Sivaptv. — Id 



90 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

c — Anal. Post. L. i. c. 2, § 16. — ' But it is not only necessary 
that we should be endowed with an antecedent knowledge of 
first principles — all or some — but that this knowledge should, 
likewise, be of paramount certainty. For whatever communicates 
a quality to other things must itself possess that quality in a 
still higher degree ; as that on account of which we love all 
objects that partake of it, cannot but be itself, pre-eminently, an 
object of our love. Hence if we know and believe through cer- 
tain first principles, we must know and believe these themselves 
in a superlative degree, for the very reason that we know and 
believe [all] secondary truths through them.' 

In connection herewith, compare the passages quoted above, 
p. 70 b. 

d. — Rhet. L. i. c. 1. — 'By nature man is competently organ- 
ized for truth ; and truth, in general, is not beyond his reach.' 

e. — Metaph. L. ii. (A minor) c. 1. — ' The theory of Truth is in 
one respect difficult, in another easy ; as shown indeed by this 
— that while enough has been denied to any, some has been 
conceded to all.' 

f. — Eth. Nic. L. x. c. 2. — Arguing against a paradox of certain 
Platonists, in regard to the Pleasurable, he says — ' But they who 
oppose themselves to Eudoxus, as if what all nature desiderates 
were not a good, talk idly. For what appears to all, that we 
affirm to be ; and he who would subvert this belief, will himself 
assuredly advance nothing more deserving of credit. — Compare 
also L. vii. c. 13 (14 Zuing.). 

In his paraphrase on the above passage, the Pseudo-Androni- 
cus (Heliodorus Prusensis) in one place uses the expression com- 
mon opinion, and in another all but uses (what indeed he could 
hardly do in this meaning as an Aristotelian, if indeed in Greek 
at all) the expression common sense, which D. Heinsius in his 
Latin version actually employs. ' But, that what all beings de- 
sire is a good, this is manifest to every one endowed with sense' 
— (foiffi roTg h aMrjtfei, ' omnibus comrnuni sensu prseditis'.) See 
No. 31. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 91 

g. — Etli. Eud. L. i. c. 6. — ' But of all these we must eucleavor 
to seek out rational grounds of belief, by adducing manifest testi- 
monies and examples. For it is the strongest evidence of a doc- 
trine, if all men can be adduced as the manifest confessors of its 
positions ; because every individual has in him a kind of private 
organ of the truth. . . . Hence we ought not always to 
look only to the conclusions of reasoning, but frequently rather 
to what appears [and is believed] to be.' See Nos. 10, 30. 

h. — Ibid. L. vii. c. 14. — 'The problem is this: — What is the 
beginning or principle of motion in the soul ? Now it is evident, 
that as God is in the universe, and the universe in God, that [I 
read xivsTv xai] the divinity in us is also, in a certain sort, the 
universal mover of the mind. For the principle of Reason is not 
Reason, but something better. Now what can we say is better 
than even science, except God?' — The import of this singular 
passage is very obscure. It has excited, I see, the attention, and 
exercised the ingenuity of Pomponatius, J. C. Scaliger, De Raei, 
Leibnitz, Leidenfrost, Jacobi, &c. But without viewing it as of 
pantheistic tendency, as Leibnitz is inclined to do, it may be 
interpreted as a declaration, that Intellect, which Aristotle else- 
where allows to be pre-existent and immortal, is a spark of the 
Divinity ; whilst its data (from which, as principles more certain 
than their deductions, Reason, Demonstration, Science must 
depart) are to be reverenced as the revelation of truths which 
would otherwise lie hid from man. That, in short, 

' The voice of Nature is the voice of God.' 

By the by, it is remarkable that this text was not employed by 
any of those Aristotelians who endeavored to identify the Active 
Intellect with the Deity. 

i- — Phys. L. viii. c. 3. — Speaking of those who from the con- 
tradictions in our conception of the possibility, denied the fact of 
motion: — 'But to assert that all things are at rest, and to 
attempt a proof of this by reasoning, throwing the testimony of 
sense out of account, is a sign not of any strength, but of a cer- 



92 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

tain imbecility of reason.' And in the same chapter — 'Against 
all these reasonings, there suffices the belief [of sense] alone.' 
See Simplicius ad locum, ed. Aid. ff. 276, 277. 

k. — De Gen. Anim. L. iii. c. 10. — -'We ought to accord our 
belief to sense, in preference to reasoning; and of reasonings, 
especially to those whose conclusions are in conformity with the 
phenomena.' And somewhere in the same work he also says, 
' Sense is equivalent to. or has the force of science.' 

I. — See also De Coelo, L. i. c. 3, text 22. 

m. — Ibid. L. iii. c. 7, text 61. 

n. — Meteor. L. i. c. 13. 

4. — Theophrastus. — a. — Metaph. c. 8 (ed. Sylb. p. 260, 
Brand, p. 319). The following testimony of this philosopher (if 
the treatise be indeed his) is important, both in itself, and as illus- 
trative of the original peripatetic doctrine touching the cognition of 
first principles, which he clearly refuses to Sense and induction, and 
asserts to Intelligence and intuition. It has, however, been wholly 
overlooked ; probably in consequence of being nearly unintelligible 
in the original from the corruption of the common text, and in the 
version of Bessarion — also from a misapprehension of his author's 
meaning. 

Having observed that it was difficult to determine up to what 
point, and in regard to what things the investigation of causes or 
reasons is legitimate ; — that this difficulty applies to the objects 
both of Sense and of Intelligence, in reference to either of which 
a regress to infinity is at once a negation of them as objects of 
understanding and of philosophy ; — that Sense and Intelligence, 
severally furnish a point of departure, a principle, the one relative, 
or to us, the other absolute, or in nature ; — and that each is the 
converse of the other, the first in nature being the last to us ; — 
he goes on to state what these counter processes severally avail 
in the research, or, as he calls it, after Aristotle, the speculation 
of principles. ' Up to a certain point, taking our departure from 
the Senses, we are able, rising from reason to reason, to carry on 
the speculation of principles ; but when we arrive at those which 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 93 

are [not merely comparatively prior but] absolutely supreme and 
primary, we can no more ; because, either that a reason is no 
longer to be found, or of our own imbecility, unable, as it were, 
to look from mere excess of light. [Compare Arist. Metapb. A 
minor, c. 1 ; which supports the reading, cpasivorara.] But the 
otber procedure is probably the more authentic, which accords 
the speculation of principles to the touch, as it may be called, 
and feeling of Intelligence (<n3 vw diyovrt xai oiov a-^ctf/ivw). 
[Comp. Aristot. Metapb. xii. 7.] For in this case there is no 
room for illusion in regard to these.' He then observes — ' That 
it is even in the sciences of detail, of great, but in the universal 
sciences, of paramount importance, to determine wherein, and at 
what point the limit to a research of reasons should be fixed.' 
And why ? 'Because they who require a reason for every thing, 
subvert, at once, the foundations of reason and of hnowledge? 

b. — See above, p. 74 a, where from his doctrine in regard to 
first principles it apj)ears that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, founds 
knowledge on natural Belief. 

5. — Lucretius. — De Berum Natura, L. i. v. 423, sq. 

' Corpus enim per se cow/munis deliquat esse 
Sensus ; quo nisi prima Jides fundata valebit, 
Haud -erit, occultis de rebus quo referentes, 
Confirmare animi quicquam ratione queamus.' 

Sensus communis here means Sense, strictly so called, as tes- 
tifying not only in all men, but in all animals. It is a transla- 
tion of the expression of Epicurus — •/? a/V^tfij sVj tfavrwv (Laert. 
x. 39) ; and as in the Epicurean philosophy all our knowledge is 
merely an educt of Sense, the truth of the derived, depends 
wholly upon the truth of the original evidence. See L. iv. vv 
480, sq. 

6. — Cicero. — a. — De Fin. L. iv. c. 19. — Speaking of the 
Stoical paradoxes (' recte facta omnia sequalia, — omnia peccata 
paria,' &c.) he says — ' Quas cum magnifice primo dici videntur, 
considerata, minus probantur. Sensus enim cujusque [i.e. S. 
communis] et natura rerum, atque ipsa Veritas clamat, quodam 



94: PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

modo, non posse adduci, ut inter eas res quas Zeno exsequaret, 
nihil interesset.' (See No. 7.) 

b. — Tusc. Disp. L. i. c. 13. — 'Omnia autem in re consensio 
omniuni gentium lex naturae putanda est.' Compare also c. 15. 

c. — De Nat. Deor. L. i. c. 16. — The Epicurean Velleius there 
speaking the doctrine of his sect: — 'Intelligi necesse est, esse 
Deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones 
kabemus.* Be quo autem, omnium natura consentit, id verum 
esse necesse est. Esse igitur Deos confitendum est.' Compare 
Plato, De Legibus, L. x. ; Aristotle, De Ccelo, L. i. c. 3 ; Plutarch, 
Amatores; Seneca, Epistohe, 117. 

d. — For 'Sensus Communis] and 'Sensus Communes] as the 
sources of moral judgment, see the Orations Pro Cluentio 6. — Pro 
Plancio, 13, 14. — Pro Domo, 36. 

e. — For 'Sensus Communis 1 as criterion of judgment in the 
arts, see De Orat. L. iii. c. 50 ; quoted by Eeid, p. 424, b ; com- 
pare L. i. c. 3. 

7. — Horace. — Sermones, I. iii. 96. Speaking like Cicero 
(No. 6, a.) of the Stoical paradox, he says — 

' Queis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant, 
Quurn ventum ad verum est ; Sensus moresque repugnant.' 

That is, as Aero (to say nothing of Torrentius, Baxter, and other 
moderns) interprets it — ' communis hominum sensus. 1 \ 



* It is not to be supposed that the Koival evvoiai, tpvaiKal itpo\ij\ptis, of the 
Stoics, far less of the Epicureans (however, as in the present instance, styled 
innate or implanted), were more than generalizations a posteriori. Yet this 
is a mistake, into which, among many others, even Lipsius and Leibnitz 
have fallen, in regard to the former. See Manud. ad Stoic. Philos. L. ii. 
diss. 11 ; and Nouv. Ess. Pref. 

t This gloss of Aero is not to be found in any of the editions of the two 
Horatian scholiasts. But I am in possession of extracts made by the cele- 
brated William Canter, from a more complete MS. of these commentators* 
than any to which Fabricius and their other editors had access. This codex 
belonged to Canter himself ; and he gives its character, and a few specimens 
of its anecdota, in his Novas Zectiones. The copy of Horace (one of the first 
editions of Lambinus) in which these extracts are found, contains also the 
full collation of Canter's 'Manuscript! Codices Antiquissimi' of the poet (tw« 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 95 

8. — Seneca. — a. — Epist. 117. — 'Multum dare solernus prse- 
surnptioni omnium hominum. Apud nos vcritatis argumentum 
est, aliquid omnibus videri.' 

I), — Ep. 9. ' Ut scias autem hos sensus communes esse, natura 
scilicet dictante, apud poetam comicum invenies, 

" Non est beatus, esse se qui non putet." ' 

c. — Ep. 120. 'Natura semina nobis scientiae dedit, scientiam 
non dedit.' 

9. — Pliny the Younger. — Paneg., c. 64. — 'Melius omnibus 
quam singulis creditur. • Singuli enim decipere et decipi possunt : 
nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt.' 

9* — Quintilian. — Inst., L. v. c. 10, § 12. — 'Pro certis habe- 
mus ea, in qu.ee communi opinione consensum est.' 

10. — Alexander of Aphrodisias, tbe oldest and ablest of 
the interpreters of Aristotle whose writings bave come down to 
us, follows his master, in resting truth and philosophy on the 
natural convictions of mankind. 

a.— On Fate, § 2, edd. Lond. et Orell. Ou xsvov ou£' aoVo^ov 
<r' akrj6ovs tj xoivri <rwv dv^wwwv (putfig, x.r.X. ' The common na- 
ture of man is neither itself void of truth, nor is it an erring in- 
dex of the true ;* in virtue whereof all men are on certain points 
mutually agreed, those only excepted, who, through preconceived 
opinions, and a desire to follow these out consistently, find them- 
selves compelled verballyf to dissent.' And he adds, that ' An- 
axagoras of Clazomene, however otherwise distinguished as a 
physical philosopher, is undeserving of credit in opposing his tes- 
timony touching fate to the common belief of mankind.' This 
he elsewhere calls their ' common presumptions? their ' common 
and natural notions? See §§ 8, 14, 26, of the same work, and 

only, I can prove, and not three, as the Novas Leetiones fallaciously state), 
and which, from the many remarkable readings to be found exclusively in 
them, must, in all probability, have perished — perhaps in the inundaticu by 
which Canter's celebrated library was, in a great measure, destroyed. 

* See Aristotle, No. 3, d. 

t Verbally, not mentally. He has Aristotle (Anal. Post., L. i. c. 10, § 7) in 
view. See Burner, No. 63. 



96 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

the chapter on Fate in the second book of his treatise On the 
Soul, f. 161, ed. Aid. 1534. 

b. — On the Topics of Aristotle (p. 48, ed. Aid.) ' The induc- 
tion useful in the employment of axioms is useful for illustrating 
the application to particulars of the axiomatic rule [read tupi 
Xot|m</3avo|X£va], but not in demonstrating its universality ; for this, 
as an object of intellect, is self-evident, nor can it, in propriety, be 
proved by induction at all.' Compare also p. 12. 

1 1 . — Clement of Alexandria. — Stromata. After stating (L. v., 
Op. ed. 1688, p. 544) that there is neither knowledge without be- 
lief, nor belief without knowledge, and having shown (L. viii. p. 
771), after Aristotle and others, that the supposition of proof or 
demonstration being founded on propositions themselves capable 
of being proved, involves the absurdity of an infinite regress, and 
therefore subverts the possibility of demonstration, he says — ' Thus 
the philosophers confess that the beginnings, the principles of all 
knowledge, are indemonstrable; consequently if demonstration 
there be, it is necessary that there should be something prior, be- 
lievable of itself, something first and indemonstrable. All demon- 
stration is thus ultimately resolved into an indemonstrable belief? 

12. — Tertullian. — a. — De Testimonio animae adversus Gentes, 
c. 5. — 'Haec testimonia animae, quanto vera tanto simplicia, 
quanto simplicia tanto vulgaria, quanto vulgaria tanto communia, 
quanto communia tanto naturalia, quanto naturalia tanto divina ; 
non putem cuiquam frivolum et frigidum videri posse, si recogitet 
naturae majestatem, ex qua censetur auctoritas animae. Quantum 
dederis magistrae, tantum adjudicabis discipulae. Magistra natu- 
ra, anima discipula. Quicquid aut ilia edocuit, aut ista perdidi- 
cit, a Deo traditum est, magistro scilicet ipsius magistrae. Quid 
anima possit de principali institutore praesumere, in te est aesti- 
rnare de ea quae in te est. . . . Sed qui ejusmodi eruptiones 
animae non putavit doctrinam esse naturae, et congenita? et inge- 
nitae conscientiaz* tacita commissa, dicet potius de ventilatis in 

* Tertullian is the only ancient writer who uses the word Conscieniia in a 
psychological sense, corresponding with our Consciousness. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 97 

vulgus opinionibus, publicataruin litterarum usum jam, et quasi 
vitium, corroboratum taliter sermocinandi. Certe prior anirna 
quam littera, et prior serrno quani liber, et prior sensus quam sty- 
lus, et prior homo ipse quam philosophus et poeta. Nunquid 
ergo credeudum est ante litteraturam et divulgationem ejus, mutos 
absque hujusmodi pronunciatiouibus homines vixisse \ . \ . 
Et unde ordo ipsis litteris contigit, nosse, et in usmn loquelae dis- 
seminare, quse nulla unquam mens conceperat, aut lingua protu- 
lerat, aut auris exceperat?' — He alludes to I. Corinthians ii. 
9, &c. 

b. — De Resurrectione Carnis, c. 3. — ' Est quidem et de com- 
munibus sensibus sapere in Dei rebus. . . . Utar et consci- 
entia populi, contestants Deum Deorum ; utar et reliquis com- 
munibus sensibus, etc. . . Communes enim sensus simplicitas 
ipsa commendat, et compassio sententiarum, et familiaritas opini- 
onum, eoque fideliores existimantur, quia nuda et aperta et omni- 
bus noto definiunt. Ratio enim divina in medulla est, non in su- 
perficie, et plerumque aemula manifestis.' 

c. — Ibid., c. 5. — ' Igitur quoniam et rudes quique de commu- 
nibus adhuc sensibus sapiunt,' &c. 

d. — De Anima, c. 2. — SpeaMng of the sources from which 
a merely human philosophy had derived its knowledge of 
the mind, he concludes — 'Sed et natura pleraque suggerun- 
tur quasi de publico sensu, quo animam Deus dotare digna- 
tus est.' 

e. — Praescr. 28. — ' Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est 
erratum sed traditum.' 

13. — Arnobius. — Adversus Gentes, L. ii. p. 92, ed. 1651. 
' Quid est a nobis factum contra sensum judiciumque commune, 
si majora et certiora delegimus, nee sumus nos passi falsorum re- 
ligionibus attineri?' Add., pp. 66, 127. 

14. — Lactantius. — Institut., L. iii. c. 5. — ' Debuit ergo Arce- 

silaus siquid saperet, distinguere, quae sciri possent, quseve ne- 

sciri. Sed si id fecisset, ipse se in populum redigisset. Nam 

vulgus interdum plus sapit, quia tantum, quantum opus est, sapit.' 

6 



98 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

Quaere- — Had Lactantius the line of Martial in his eye ? 

' Quisquis plus justo non sapit, ille sapit ;' 

or the precept of St. Paul ? — ' Non plus sapere quam oportet sa- 
pere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem.' 

15. — St. Augustine. — -a. — De duabus Animabus, c. 10. ' Qui- 
vis enim homines, quos modo a communi sensu generis humani 
nulla disrupisset amentia,' &c. 

b. — De Trinitate., Lib. xiii. c. 1. — 'Novimus certissima scientia 
et clamante Conscientia.' That is, Conscience, not Conscious- 
ness, as sometimes supposed. 

c— De Magistro, c. 11. — 'Ait Propheta [Is., vii. 9], Nisi cre- 
dideritis non intelligetis ; quod: non dixisset profecto, si nihil 
distare judicasset. Quod ergo intelligo, id etiam credo ; at non 
omne quod credo, etiam intelligo. Omne autem quod intelligo scio ; 
non omne quod credo scio. Quare pleraque cum scire non pos- 
sim, quanta tamen utilitate credantur scio.' 

16. — Proclus (In Platonis Theologiam, Lib. i. c. 25) has still 
more remarkable declarations of the truth, that Belief is the 
foundation of knowledge. Speaking of the faith of the gods, 
which he describes as anterior to the act of cognition (rfpsrffiv- 
regov <t% yvu<f<nxris evsgysiag), he says that it is not only to be dis- 
tinguished from our belief, or rather error, in regard to things sen- 
sible ; but likewise from the belief we have of what are called 
Common Notions, with which it, however agrees, in that these 
common notions command assent, prior to all reflection or reason- 
ing: (xoti yag roug xoivaTg svvoia^ tf£o ■7rav<ro£ Xoyou tfjtfrsuo/xsv). See 
below, Hermes, No.. 99. Among other Platonists the same doc- 
trine is advanced by the pseudo Hermes Trismegistus, L. xvi. sub 
fine, p. 436, ed. Patricii, 1593. 

17. — Ammonius Hermit (as extracted and interpolated by 
Philoponus) in his Commentary on Aristotle ' On the Soul,' In- 
troduction, p. 1-3, ed. Trincavelli, 1535. 'The function of Intel- 
tect (vous) is by immediate application [or intuition, at'koug 
rfg6<f(3oka7s], to reach or compass reality, and this end it accom- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 99 

plishes more certainly than through the medium of demonstra- 
tion. For as Sense, by applying itself at once to a colored or 
figured object, obtains a knowledge of it better than through 
demonstration — for there needs no syllogism to prove that this or 
the other thing is white, such being perceived by the simple ap- 
pliance of the sense ; so also the Intellect apprehends its appro- 
priate object by a simple appliance [a simple intuitive jet, arf'ky 
sV»€oX?i], better than could be done through any process of demon- 
stration.' . . . 

'I say that the rational soul has in, and co-essential with it, 
the reasons (Xoyovg) of things; but, in consequence of being 
clothed in matter, they are, as it were, oppressed and smothered, 
like the spark which lies hid under the ashes. And as, when the 
ashes are slightly dug into, the spark forthwith gleams out, the 
digger not however making the spark, but only removing an im- 
pediment ; in like manner, Opinion, excited by the senses, elicits 
the reasons of existences from latency into manifestation. Hence 
they [the Platonists] affirm that teachers do not infuse into us 
knowledge, but only call out into the light that which previously 
existed in us, as it were, concealed. ... It is, however, more 
correct to say that these are Common Notions or adumbrations of 
the Intellect ; for whatever we know more certainly than through 
demonstration, that we know in a common notion.' .... 
Such common notions are — ' Things that are equal to the same 
are equal to one another,' — ' If equals be taken from equals the 
remainders are equal,'—' Every thing must be either affirmed or 
denied.' 

18. — St. Anselm professes the maxim — 'Crede ut intelligas; 
which became celebrated in the schools, as opposed to the ' In- 
tellige ut credas' of Abelard. 

19. — Algazel of Bagdad, 'the Imaum of the world,' some- 
where (in his Destruction of the Philosophers, if I recollect aright) 
says, as the Latin version gives it — 'Radix cognitionis fides.' 

20. — St. Thomas Aquinas. — a. — De veritate fidei catholics 
contra Gentiles, L. i. c. 7, § 1. 'Ea quae naturaliter rationi insi- 



100 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

ta, verissima esse constat ; intantum, ut nee ea falsa esse possibilt 

cogitare Principiorum naturaliter notorum cognitio 

nobis divinitus est indita, cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostras natu- 
rae. Hcec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quic- 
quid igitur principiis hujusmodi contrarium est, est divina? sapi- 
entise contrarium : non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae 
ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali 
cognitioni esse contraria.' 

b. — Expositio in Libb. Metaph. Aristot. Lect. v. — ' Et quia 
talis cognitio principiorum (tbose of Contradiction and of Ex- 
cluded Middle) inest nobis station a natura, concludit.' &c. 

c. — Summa Theologise, P. i. Partis ii. Qu. 51, art, 1. — ' Intel- 
lects principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim 
natura animaa intellectualis convenit bomini, quod, statim cogni- 
to quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum 
est majus sua parte, et simile in cseteris. Sed quid sit totum et 
quid sit pars cognoscere non potest, nisi per species intelligibiles a 
pbantasmatibus acceptas, et propter boc Pbilosopbus, in fine Poste- 
rioram, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit ex sensu.' 

d. — De Veritate, Qu. xi. De Magistro, conclusio. — ' Dicenduni 
est similiter de scientise acquisitione, quod pneexistunt in nobis 
principia quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, per 
species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa ut dignitates, 
sive incomplexa, sicut entis et unius et bujusmodi qua? statim 
intellectus apprebendit. Ex istis autem principiis universabbus 
omnia principia sequuntur, sicut ex quibusdam rationibus semi- 
nalibus? &c. 

e. — Summa Tbeologiae, P. i. Partis ii. Qu. 5, art. 3. — ' Quod 
ab omnibus dicitur non potest totaliter falsum esse. Videtur 
enim naturale quod in pluribus est ; natura autem non totaliter 
deficit.' Compare Nos. 1 and 3, f. 

21. — Joannes Duns Scotus bolds a doctrine of Common 
Sense, witb reference, more especially, to necessary trutbs, in 
whicb the genuine doctrine of Aristotle is admirably enounced, 
and cogently defended. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 101 

On the one hand he maintains (against Averroes) that princi- 
ples are not, in a certain sense, innate in the Intellect ; i. e. not 
as actual cognitions chronologically anterior to experience. — ' Di- 
cendum quod non habet aliquam cognitionem naturalem secun- 
dum naturam suam, neque simplicium, neque complexorum, quia 
omnis nostra cognitio orturn habet ex sensu. Primo enim move- 
tur sensus ab aliquo simplici non complexo, et a sensu moto 
movetur intellectus, et intelligit simplicia, quod est primus actus 
intellectus; deinde post apprehensionem simplicium, sequitur 
alius actus, qui est componere simplicia ad invicem ; post illam 
autem compositionem, habet intellectus ex lumine naturali quod 
assentiat illi veritati complexorum, si illud complexum sit prin- 
cipium primum.' Quaestt. super libros Metaph. L. ii. q. 1, § 2. 

On the other hand he maintains (against Henry of Ghent) 
that, in a different sense, principles are naturally inherent in the 
mind. For he shows that the intellect is not dependent upon 
sense and experience, except accidentally, in so far as these are 
requisite, in affording a knowledge of the terms, to afford the 
occasion on which, by its native and proper light (in other 
words, by the suggestion of common sense), it actually mani- 
fests the principles which it potentially contained; and that 
these principles are certain, even were those phenomena of sense 
illusive, in reference to which they are elicited. ' Respondeo, 
quod quantum ad istam notitiam (principiorum sc), intellectus 
non habet sensus pro causa [vel origine, as he elsewhere has it], 
sed tantum pro occasione : quia intellectus non potest habere 
notitiam simplicium nisi acceptam a sensibus, ilia tamen accepta 
potest simplicia virtute sua componere et, si ex ratione talium 
simplicium sit complexio evidenter vera, intellectus virtute pro- 
pria et terminorum assentiet illi complexioni, non virtute sensus, 
a quo accipit terminos exterius. Exemplum ; — si ratio totius et 
ratio majoritatis accipiantur a sensu, et intellectus componat 
istam — Omne totum est mains sua parte, intellectus virtute sui 
et istorum terminorum assentiet indubitanter isti complexioni, 
et non tantum quia vidit terminos conjunctos in re, sicut assen- 



102 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

tit isti — Socrates est albits, quia vidit terminos in re uniri. Imrnc 
dico, quod si omnes sensus essent falsi,' &c. In Libros Sent. 
Comm. Oxon. L. i. Dist. 3, qu. 4, § 8. — See also §§ 12, 23 ; and 
Qusestt. super Metaph., L. i. qu. 4, §§ 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, 16 ; L, 
ii. qu. 1, §§ 2, 3, et alibi ; where it is frequently repeated that 
sense and experience are not the cause or origin, but only the 
occasion on which the natural light of Intellect reveals its prin- 
ciples or first truths. 

I may observe, that like Locke, the Subtle Doctor divides our 
acquisition of knowledge between two sources, Sense and Reflec- 
tion. — ' Nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu, vera est 
de eo quod est, prirnum intelligibile, scilicet quod quid est [to on] 
rei rnaterialis, non autem de omnibus per se intelligibilibus ; nam 
multa per se intelliguntur, non quia speciem faciunt in Sensu, 
sed per Reflexionem intellectus.'' Qusestt. super Univ. Porph. 
q. 3. But what Locke was sometimes compelled virtually to 
confess, in opposition to the general tenor of his doctrine (see 
No. 51), Scotus professedly lays down as the very foundation of 
his — that Reflection finds in the mind, or intellect itself, princi- 
ples, or necessary cognitions, which are not the educts of experi- 
ence, howbeit not actually manifested prior to, or except on 
occasion of, some empirical act of knowledge.* 

22. — Antonius Andreas, an immediate disciple of Scotus, — 
the Doctor Dulcifluus. Qusestt. super libros Metaph. L. ii. qu. 1. 
— ' Respondeo, et dico duo. 

'Primum; — Quod notitia Prirnorum Principiorum non est 
nobis a natura ; quia omnis nostra cognitio intellectiva habet 
ortum a sensu, et, per consequens, non inest a natura. . . Primo 

* The edition I use, is that by the Irish Franciscans, Lyons, 1639, of the 
Opera Omnia of Scotus, 12 vols, in folio. This is the only edition in which 
the Subtle Doctor can be conveniently studied. His editor and commenta- 
tors of course maintain him to be a countryman ; but the patriotism of 
Father Maurice (t. iii. p. 254), makes no scruple in holding him out as 
actually inspired : — ' Suppono, cum Moyse in monte hoc vidit, aut cum 
Paulo ad tertium coelmn ascendit, aut certe cum alio Joanne supra pectus 
aapientise recubuit.' 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 103 

enirn motu movetur sensus ab objecto siinplici n an complexo ; 
et a sensu moto movetur intellectus, et intelligit simplicia, qui est 
primus actus iutellectus. Deinde post apprehensionem simplicium 
sequitur alius actus, qui est componere simplicia ad invicem ; et 
post istam compositiouem babet intellectus, ex lumine naturali ut 
assentiat illi veritati complexje, si illud complexum sit primum 
principium. 

'Secundum; — Quod notitia Primorum Principiorum [recte] 
dicitur nobis inesse naturaliter, quatenus, ex lumine naturali 
intellectus, sunt nobis inesse nota, babita notitia simplici termi- 
norum, quia "principia cognoscimus inquantum terminos cog- 
noscimus" (ex primo Posteriorum).' 

To tbis scboolman we owe tbe first enouncement of tbe Princi- 
ple of Identity. 

Tbose who are curious in tbis matter will find many acute 
observations on tbe nature of principles in tbe other schoolmen ; 
more especially in Averroes on the Analytics and Metaphysics, 
in Albertus Magnus on the Predicables and Pr. Analytics, and 
in Hales, 3d and 4th books of his Metaphysics. 

23. — Budjsus. — In Pandectas, Tit. i. — ' Ista igitur fere qua? 
juri naturali ascribuntur, id est, quae natura docuisse nos cre- 
ditur, versantur in Sensu Communi] &c. 

24. — Luther. — Weisheit, Th. iii. Abth. 2. — ' All things have 
their root in Belief, which we can neither perceive nor compre- 
hend. He who would make this Belief visible, manifest, and 
conceivable, has sorrow for his pains.' 

25. — Melanchthon. — a. — De Dialectica, ed. Lugd. 1542, p. 
90. — Speaking of the Dicta de Omni et de Nullo — ' Neo opus est 
procul quaerere harum regularum interpretationem ; si quis sen- 
sum communem consuluerit, statim intelliget eas. Nam ut Arith- 
metica et aliae artes initia sumunt a sensu communi, ita Dialec- 
ticae principia nobiscum nascuntur.' 

b. — Ibid., p. 103. — Speaking of tbe process in the Expository 
Syllogism, — ' Habet causam hsec consequentia in natura positam 
quandam xoiv^v I'woiav, ut vocant, hoc est, sententiam quam om- 



104 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

nis natura docet, de qua satis est sensum communem consulere. 
And again, — ' Est et hujus consequential ratio sumpta a com 
muni sensu? 

e. — Erotemata Dialectica L. iv. in Loco, ab Absurdo, p. 1040 ; 
ed. 3, Strigelii, 15*79 — i Absurdum in Philosophia vocatur opinio 
pugnans cum Sensu Communi, id est vel cum principiis naturae 
notis, vel cum universali experientia.' Reid (see n. 79 a) says 
repeatedly tbe very same. 

d. — Ibid., p. 853. — ' Quare Principia sunt certa ? I. Quia noti- 
tia principiorum est lumen naturale, insitum humanis mentibus 
divinitus. II. Quia dato opposito sequitur destructio natura?.' 
See also pp. 798, 857, and tbe relative commentary of Strigelius, 
Wbat Melancbtbon states in regard to tbe cognition of Principles 
and Ligbt of Nature is borrowed from tbe schoolmen. See 
above, Nos. 20, 21, 22. Consult also bis treatise De Anima in 
tbe cbapters De Intellectu ; more especially tbat entitled — Estne 
verum dictum, notitias aliquas nobiscum nasci ? 

26. — Julius Caesar Scaliger. — De Subtilitate, Exerc. cccvii. 
§ 18. — ' Sunt cum anima nostra quaedan cognatce notitice, quae 
idcirco vous dicuntur a pbilosopbo. Nemo enim tarn infans est, 
quern cognitio lateat pluris et paucioris. Infanti duo poma 
apponito. Uno recepto, alteram item poscet. Ab bis principiis 
actus Mentis, a sensilibus excitatus.' — Sucb principles, be con- 
tends, are innate in tbe buman Intellect, precisely as tbe instincts 
of tbe lower animals are innate in tbeir bigbest power. Tbey 
may therefore be denominated Intellectual Instincts. Compare 
§§21, 22. 

Tbe doctrine of this acute philosopher was adopted and illus- 
trated, among others, by his two expositors Rodolphus Goclenius 
of Marburg, and Joannes Sperlingius of Wittemberg ; by tbe for- 
mer in his Adversaria and Scaligeri Exercitationes, 1594 (qq. 41, 
51, 60) ; by tbe latter, not indeed in his Meditationes ad Scali- 
geri Exercitationes, but in his Pbysica Antbropologica, 1668 (L. 
i. c. 3, § 8). In these the arguments of Gassendi and Locke for 
the counter opinion, are refuted by anticipation ; though, in fact. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE, 105 

Locke himself is at last, as we shall see, obliged to appeal to 
Common Sense, identical with the Tntellectus, Mens, and Lumen 
Naturale of these and other philosophers. (No. 51.) Otto Cas- 
mann, the disciple of Goclenius, may also be consulted in his 
Psychologia Anthropologica, 1594. (c. 5, § 5.) 

27. — Omphalius. — ISTomologia, f. 72 b. 'Non eget his prse- 
ceptis [dictis scilicet de omni et de nullo] qui Sensum Commit- 
nem consulit. Natura siquidein plerasque xoivag ivvoiag animis 
nostris insevit quibus rerum naturam pervidemus.' 

28. — Antonius Gove anus. — Pro Aristotele Responsio adver- 
sus Petri Rami Calumnias. Opera Omnia, ed. Meermanniana, 
p. 802 a. — 'An non ex hominem communi sensu desumptse enun- 
ciationum reciprocationes has videntur ? . . . Sumpta hsec 
Rame, sunt e communi hominum intelligentia, cujus cum mater 
natura sit, quid est, quseso, cur negemus naturae decreta hasc et 
prsecepta esse V 

29. — Nunnesius. — De Constitutione Dialecticse, f. 56 b. ed. 
1554. — ' Sed cum Dialectica contenta sit Sensu Communi? &c. 

30. — Muretus. — In Aristotelus Ethica ad Nicomachum Com- 
mentarius, 1583. Opera Omnia, Ruhnkenii, t. iii. p. 230. 

In proof of the immortality of the soul, in general, and in par- 
ticular, in disproof of an old and ever-recurring opinion — one, in- 
deed, which agitates, at the present moment, the divines and phi- 
losophers of Germany — that the intellect in man, as a merely pas- 
sing manifestation of the universal soul, the Absolute, can pretend 
to no individual, no personal, existence beyond the grave ; he addu- 
ces the argument drawn front the common sense of mankind, in the 
following noble, though hitherto unnoticed passage : — touchirig 
the eloquence of which, it should be borne in mind, that what is 
now read as a commentary was originally listened to by a great 
and mingled auditory, as improvisations from the mouth of him, 
for whose equal as a Latin orator, we must ascend to Cicero himself. 

' Neque laborandum est etiamsi haec [nisi] naturalibus argu- 
mentis probare nequeamus, neque fortassis dissolvere rationes 
quasdam, quas aflerunt ii, qui contrarias opiniones tuentur. Na- 



106 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

turalis enira omnium gentium consensus multo plus ponderis apud 
nos, quam omnia istorum argumenta, habere debet. Neque quio 
quam est aliud gigantum more bellare cum diis, quam repugnare 
naturae,* et insitas ab ea in omnium animis opiniones acutis ac 
fallacibus conclusiunculis velle subvertere. Itaque ut senes illi 
Trojani, apud Homerum, dicebant, pulcbram quidam esse Hele- 
nam, sed tamen ablegandum ad suos, ne exitio esset civitati ; ita 
nos, si quando afferetur nobis ab istis acutum aliquod argument- 
um, quo colligatur .... animos interire una cum corpo- 
ribus, aut si quid supersit, commune quiddam esse, et ut unurn 
solem,f ita unum esse omnium mentum, . . . respondearuus : 
— Ingeniosus quidem es, o bone, et eruditus, et in disputando po- 
tens ; sed babe tibi istas preeclaras rationes tuas ; ego eas, ne 
mibi exitiosse sint, admittere in animum meum nolo. Accipite, 
enim, gravissime viri, . . . studiosissimi adolesoentes, . . 
prasclararu, et immortali memoria dignam, summi philosopbi 
Aristotelis sententiam, quam in omnibus bujus generis disjmta- 
tionibus teneatis, quam sequamini, ad quam sensus cogitationes- 
que vestras peipetuo dirigatis. Ex illius enim divini bominis 
pectore, tanquam ex augustissimo quodam sapientise sacrario, 
baec prodierunt, quae primo Etbicorum ad Eudemum leguntur — 
n^otfg'^siv ou SsT ifavra roTg Sia rwv Xoywv, dXka ifoXkaxig (xaXXov 
To7g (paivojasvoig-. Convertam bsec in Latinum sermonem, utinam- 
que possem in omnes omnium populorum linguas convertere, at- 
que in omnium hominum animis, ita ut nunquam delerentur, in- 
sculpere : — non semper, neque omnibus in rebus, assentiendum est 
Us quce rationibus et argumentis probantur ; immo potius ea ple- 

* Cic. De Sen. c. 2. Quid enim est aliud gigantum more bellare cum diis, 
nisi naturaa repugnare ? 

+ Had Muretus the following passage of Bessarion in Lis eye ? — 'Intellectwn 
deforis aclvenire [Aristotle's dictum], Theophrastus, Alexander, Themistius, 
Averroes, ita accipiunt, ut jam quisque ortus, illico intellectus sibi applicatam 
excipiat portionem, ita extinctus relinquat in commune ; non aliter, ac si 
quis Sole, nascens, participare dicatur, moriens, privari ; et non esse animam 
particularem, quse deforis advenit, sed ex commuui acceptam application 
nem.' In Calumn. Plat. L. iii. c. 27. — The simile of the sun is however to 
be found in Plotinus, and — I think — in Themistius. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 107 

rumque tenenda, quce communi hominum sententia comprobantur. 
Quid enim est tarn falsurn, tamque abhorrens a vero, ut non ad 
id probanduni ab ingeniosis et exercitatis hominibus argumenta 
excogitari queant ? . . . . Vidistisne unquam in tenebrosa 
nocte accensam aliquam facem e longinquo loco micantem ? II- 
lam, igitur, quarnvis dissitam, videbatis ; neque tamen quicquam, 
in illo longo, interjecto inter oculum vestrum et facem, densis ob- 
sito tenebris spatio, videre poteratis. Idem putatote animis acci- 
dere. Saspa animus noster "eritatem alicujus enunciationis tan- 
quam eminus fulgentem ac collucentem videt, etiamsi propter 
illam, qua circumfusus est, caliginem, videre ea quae intermedia 
sunt, et per quae ad earn pervenitur, non potest. ... Si iter ali- 
quod ingressurus, duas videres vias, quae eodem ferrent ; unam ex- 
peditam, planam, tutam, et eo quo constituisses, sine ulla erratione, 
ducentem ; alteram tortuosam, asperam, periculosam, et quam qui 
sequerentur, propter varios et multiplices anfractus, saepe aberarent ; 
— dubitares utram potius eligeres ? Duae sunt viae quibus homines 
ad aliquam cognitionem Dei et animi sui pervenire posse se putant. 
Aut enim eo contendunt disputando, et cur quicquam ita sit sub- 
tiliter inquirendo ; aut sine dubitatione ulla assentiendo iis, quae 
majores summo consensu, partim naturali lumine cognita, partim 
divinitus inspirata, tradiderunt. Illam qui secuti sunt, omnibus sae- 
culis in multiplices errores inciderunt. At haec illorum signata 
est vestigiis, quos in ccelum sublatos veneramur et colimus.'* 
31. — Giphanius. — Commentarii in libros Etbicorum ad Nico- 

* Of none of the great scholars of the sixteenth century — the second golden 
age of Latin letters — have the works been so frequently republished, so 
learnedly annotated, so industriously collected, as those of the pattern critic, 
the incomparable Muretus. There however still remains a considerable 
gleaning. I have myself taken note of some twenty scattered anecdota, in 
prose and verse, in Greek, Latin, and French, which, if the excellent edi- 
tion (excellent, even after that of Euhnkenius) of the Opera Omnia, by Pro- 
fessor Frotscher of Leipsic, now unfortunately interrupted, be not finally 
abandoned, I should have great pleasure in communicating to the learned 
editor. — How is it, that whilst Italy, Germany, and Holland have, for centu- 
ries, been emulating each other in paying homage to the genius of Muretus, 
France has done absolutely nothing to testify her admiration of so illustrious 
a son? 



108 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

machmn, L. x. c. 2. — ' Quod omnibus videtur, id (inquit Aristo- 
teles) esse dicimus. Nam communis hominum sensus et judi- 
cium est tanquam lex naturae.' See n. 3, f. 

32. — Mariana. De Rege et Regis institutione, L. i. c. 6. ' Et 
est communis sensus quasi quaedam naturae vox [lex ?] mentibus 
nostris iudita, auribus insonans lex [vox ?] qua a turpi honestum 
secernimus.' 

33. — Sir John Davies. Of the immortality of the Soul, 1 
ed. 1599, pp. 63, 97. 

' If then all souls, both good and bad, do teach, 

"With general voice, that souls can never die ; 
'Tis not man's nattering gloss, but nature's speech, 
Which, like God's oracle, can never lie.' 

****** * 

1 But how can that be false, which every tongue 

Of every mortal man affirms for true ? 
"Which truth has in all ages stood so strong, 

That, loadstone-like, all hearts it ever drew. 
For not the Christian or the Jew alone, 

The Persian or the Turk, acknowledge this ; 
This mystery to the wild Indian known, 

And to the Cannibal and Tartar is.' 

These latter stanzas were probably suggested by a passage in 
the first Dissertation of Maximus Tyrius. This 'learned poet' re- 
quires and eminently deserves, a commentary. 

34. — Keckermannus (Systema Logicum, L. iii. c. 13), treat- 
ing of Necessary Testimony : — 'Testimonium necessarium estvel 
Dei vel Sensuum.' Having spoken of the former, he proceeds : 
1 Restat testimonium sensuum, quod suus cuique sensns dictat. 
Estque vel externum vel internum. Internum est, quod leges na- 
turae, tarn theoreticce quam practices dictant ; itemque conscientia. 
Externum est, quod sensus externi, ut visus, auditus, &c, recte dis- 
positi, adeoque ipsa sensualis observatio, et experientia compro- 
bat.' In illustration of the testimony of Internal Sense, Conscien- 
tia, he says : ' Magna est vis testimonii Conscientiae in utramque 
partem ; et sicut leges seu principia naturae duplicia sunt — theo- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 109 

retica, ut, totum est major sua parte — et practica, ut, quod tibi fieri 
non vis, alteri ne feceris : ita duplex est Conscientia, theoretica 
nimirum et practica, per quam conclusiones theoreticae et practicse 
firmiter nobis probantur.' 

The employment here of Conscientia, for the noetic faculty or 
faculty of principles, is (if we except the single precedent of Ter- 
tullian) unexampled, as far as I have observed, previous to the ex- 
tension given to the word by Descartes. The internal and ex- 
ternal sense of Keckermann are, taken together, nearly equivalent 
to the expression common sense, in the meaning under considera- 
tion ; an expression, it may be added, which this author had 
himself, in the same work, previously employed. (L. i. c. 5.) 

35. — Lord Herbert of Cherbury. — In 1624, at Paris and 
London, was first published his work ' De Veritate ;' and to the 
third edition, London, 1645, was annexed his correlative treatise 
' De Causis Errorum.' These works, especially the former, con- 
tain a more formal and articulate enouncement of the doctrine of 
Common Sense, than had (I might almost say than has) hitherto 
appeared. It is truly marvellous, that the speculations of so able 
and original a thinker, and otherwise of so remarkable a man, 
should have escaped the observation of those who, subsequently, 
in Great Britain, philosophized in a congenial spirit ; yet he is 
noticed by Locke, and carefully criticised by Gassendi. The fol- 
lowing is an abstract of his doctrine — strictly in reference to our 
present subject. The edition I use is the third, that of 1645. 

Lord Herbert makes a fourfold distribution. of the human fac- 
ulties ; — into Natural Instinct — Internal Sense — External Sense 
and the Discursive faculty (Discursus) p. 37. These names he 
employs in significations often peculiar to himself. Each of these 
powers is the guarantee of a certain class of truths ; and there is 
given no truth which is not made known to us through one or 
other of these attesting faculties. Let us not, therefore, be wise 
beyond our powers. {JVe sapiamus ultra facilitates!) 

But of these there is one whose truths are of a relatively higher 
order, as commanding universal assent, and therefore of indubita- 



110 PHILOSOPHY OP COMMON SENSE. 

ble certainty. This faculty, which he calls Natural Instinct 
(Instinctus Naturalis), might with more discriminative propriety 
have been styled Intellectual Instinct ; and it corresponds, as is 
manifest, with the N0O9 of Aristotle, the Intelligentia of the 
schoolmen, and the Common Sense of philosophers in general. 
Natural Instinct may be considered either as a faculty or the 
manifestation of a faculty. In the former signification, Instinct, 
or the Noetic faculty, is the proximate instrument of the univer- 
sal intelligence of God ; in fact, a certain portion thereof ingrafted 
on the mind of man. In the latter signification, Natural Instincts 
are those Catholic Cognitions or Common Notions (xoiva; swoi'ai, 
notitije communes) which exist in every human being of sound 
and entire mind ; and with which we are naturally or divinely 
furnished, to the end that we may truly decide touching the 
objects with which we are conversant dming the present life (pp. 
27, 29, 44). These Instincts or Common Notions he denomi- 
nates also Primary Truths — Common Principles — Received 
Principles of Demonstration — Sacred Principles, against which 
it is unlawful to contend, &c. These are so far from being mere 
products of experience and observation, that, without some of 
them, no experience or observation is possible (pp. 28, 48, 54). 
But, unless excited by an object, they remain silent ; have then 
a virtual, not an actual existence (pp. 39, 42). The comparison 
of the mind to a tabula rasa or blank book, on which objects 
inscribe themselves, must be rejected ; but it may be resembled 
to a closed book, only opened on the presentation of objects (p. 54). 
The sole criterion by which we can discriminate principles, natu- 
ral or divine, is universal agreement ; though, at the same time, 
the higher and more necessary the truth, the more liable it is to 
be alloyed with error (p, 52). Our natural Instincts operate 
irrationally ; that v=., they operate without reasoning or discur- 
sion ; and Reason (Ratio), which is the deduction of these com- 
mon notions to their lower and lowest applications, has no other 
appeal, in the last resort, except to them (p. 42). 

The primary truths, or truths of Instinct, ai\3 discriminated 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. Ill 

from secondary truths (those, to wit, which are not obtained 
without the intervention of the Discursive faculty) by six charac- 
ters. 

1°. By their Priority. For Natural Instinct is the first, Dis- 
cursion the last of our faculties. 

2°. By their Independence. For if a truth depend upon a 
common notion, it is only secondary ; whereas a truth is primary, 
which itself hanging upon no superior truth, affords dependence 
to a chain of subordinate propositions. 

3°. By their Universality. Universal consent is indeed the 
most unequivocal criterion of an instinctive truth. The Particu- 
lar is always to be suspected as false, or, at least, as partially 
erroneous ; whereas Common Notions, drawn, as it were, from 
the very wisdom of nature, are, in themselves, universal, howbeit, 
in reasoning, they may be brought clown and applied to particulars. 

4°. By their Certainty. For such is their authority, that he 
who should call them into doubt, woidd disturb the whole con- 
stitution of things, and, in a certain sort, denude himself of his 
humanity. It is, therefore, unlawful to dispute against these 
principles, which, if clearly understood, cannot possibly be gain- 
said. (Compare No. 25, d.) 

5°. — By their Necessity. For there is none which does not 
conduce to the conservation of man. 

6°. — By the Manner of their Formation or Manifestation. 
For they are elicited, instantaneously and without hesitation, so 
soon as we apprehend the significance of the relative objects or 
words. The discursive understanding, on the other hand, is in 
its operation slow and vacillating-— advancing only to recede — 
exposed to innumerable errors — in frequent confliction with sense 
— attributing to one faculty what is of the province of another, and 
not observing that each has its legitimate boundaries, transcend- 
ing which, its deliverances are incompetent or null (pp. 60, 61).* 

* I was surprised to find an eloquent and very just appreciation of Herbert 
(for he it is who is referred to), by a learned and orthodox theologian at 
Cambridge — Nathaniel Culverwell, in his ' Discourse of the Light of Nature,' 



112 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

36. — Joannes Cameron, the celebrated theologian. — De Ec- 
clesia iv. Op. ed. 1642, p. — . l Sensus Communis seu Ratio,' <fcc. 

37. — Descartes proclaims as the leading maxim of philosophy 
a principle which it would have been well for his own doctrine 
had he always faithfully applied. ' Certum autem est, nihil 
nos unquam falsum pro vero admissuros, si tantum iis assen- 
sum prsebeamus quse clare et distincte percipiemus. Certum, 
inquam, quia cum Deus non sit fallax, facultas percipiendi, quam 
nobis dedit [sive Lumen JVaturce\, non potest tendere in falsum , 
ut neque etiam facultas assentiendi, cum tantum ad ea, quoe clare 
percipiuntur, se extendit. Et quamvis hoc nulla ratione probare- 
tur, ita omnium animis a natura impressum est, ut quoties aliquid 
clare percipimus, ei sponte assentiamur, et nulla modo possimus 
dubitare quin sit verum.' Princ. i. § 43, with §§ 30, 45 ; De 
Meth. § 4 ; Med. iii. iv. ; Resp, ad Obj. ii. passim. What Des- 
cartes, after the schoolmen, calls the ' Light of Nature,' is only 
another term for Common Sense (see Nos. 20, 21, 22, 25) ; and 
Common Sense is the name which Descartes' illustrious disciple, 
Fenelon, subsequently gave it. See No. 60. There are some 
good observations on Descartes' Light of Nature, &c. in Gravii 
Specimina Philosophise Veteris, L. ii. c. 16 ; and in Regis, Meta- 
physique, L. i. P. i. ch. 12, who identifies it with consciousness. 

That Descartes did not hold the crude and very erroneous doc- 
trine of innate ideas which Locke took the trouble to refute, I 
may have another opportunity of more fully showing. ' Nun- 
quam scripsi vel judicavi (he says) mentem indigere id eis innatis, 
quae sint aliquid diversum ah ejus facultate cogitandi.'' Notse in 
Programma (Regii) § 12. — Compare § 13 with Responsiones et 
Objectiones iii. it. 5, 10. By innate ideas in general, Descartes 
means simply the innate faculty we possess of forming or eliciting 
certain manifestations in consciousness (whether of necessary or 



written in 1646, p. 93. Culverwell does not deserve the oblivion into which 
he has fallen ; for he is a compeer worthy of More, Spencer, Smith, Cud- 
worth, and Taylor — the illustrious and congenial hand by which that univer- 
sity was illustrated during the latter half of the seventeenth century. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 113 

contingent truths) on occasion of, but wholly different from, both 
the qualities of the reality affecting, and the movements of the 
organism affected ; these manifestations or ideas being nothing 
else than states of the conscious substance itself. On this ground 
he occasionally calls the secondary qualities innate ; in so far as 
they are, actually, mere modes of mind, and, potentially, subjec- 
tive predispositions to being thus or thus modified. 

His doctrine in -egard to principles, when fully considered, 
seems identical with that of Aristotle, as adopted and expounded 
by the schoolmen ; and I have no doubt that had he and Locke 
expressed themselves with the clearness and precision of Scotus, 
their opinions on this subject would have been found coincident 
both with each other and with the truth. 

38. — Sir Thomas Brown (Religio Medici, First Part, sect. 36) 
has ' Common Sense,'' word and thing. 

39. — Balzac in Le Barbon (Sallengre Histoire de Pierre de 
Montmauer, t. ii. p. 88, and (Euvres de Balzac), ' Sens Commun,' 
word and thing. 

40. — Chanet (Traite de l'Esprit, p. 15) notices that the term 
Common Sense had in French a meaning different from its Scho- 
lastic or Aristotelic signification, ' being equivalent to common or 
universal reason, and by some denominated natural logic.'' 

41. — P. Irenjsus a Sancto Jacobo, a Thomist philosopher, 
and Professor of Theology at Rennes. — Integra Philosophia, 
1655 ; Logica c. iv. sectio 4. § 2. — In reference to the question, 
' Quid sit habitus ille primorum principiorum V he says — ' Proba- 
bilior apparet sententia dicentium habitum primorum principio- 
rum esse lumen naturale, seu naturaliter inditum (intellectus sc.) 

. . . Favet communis omnium sensus, qui diffiteri nequit 
all qua esse naturaliter et seipsis cognoscibilia ; ergo principium 
talis cognitionis debet censeri signatum super nos natural lu- 
men? 

42. — Lescalopier. — Humanitas Theologica, &c, L. i. p. 87. — 
' Quid gravius in sentiendo, quod sequamur, habere possumus, 
quam constans naturse judicium, aetatum omnium cana sapien- 
1 



114 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

tia et perpetuo suffragio confirmatum ? Possunt errare singuli 
labi possunt viri sapientes sibi suoque arbitrio perruissi ; at totam 
boininis naturam tanta erroris contagio invadere non potest. . . . 
Quod in communibus hominum sensibus positum, id quoque in 
ipsa natura situm atque fixum esse, vel ipse Orator coram judice 
non diffitetur. [Pro Clnentio, c. 6.] Itaque communis ille sensus, 
naturae certissima vox est ; immo, ' vox Populi,' ut trito fertur ada- 
gio, ' vox Dei.' 

43. — Pascal. — Pensees ; editions of Bossut and Renouard. 

a. — Partie i. art. x. § 4 (cb. 31 old editions), 'Tout notre rai- 
sonnement se reduit a ceder au Sentiment.' Tbis feeling be, be- 
fore and after, calls ' Sens Commun.' Art. vi. § 17, (cb. 25) — 
art. xi. § 2 (wanting in old editions). 

b. — Partie ii. art. i. § 1 (cb 21). Speaking tbe doctrine of tbe 
Skeptics — ' 'Nous n'avons aucun certitude de la verite des princi- 
pes (bors la foi et la revelation) sinon en ce que nous les sentons 
naturellement en nous.' .... And having stated tbeir principal 
arguments why tbis is not conclusive, he takes up the doctrine of 
the Dogmatists. 

' L'unique fort des Dogmatistes, c'est qu'en parlant de bonne 
foi et sincerement, on ne peut douter des principes naturels. 
Nous connoissons, disent-ils, la verite, non seulement par rai- 
sonnement, mais aussi par sentiment, et par une intelligence vive 
et lumineuse ; et c'est de cette derniere sorte que nous connois- 
sons les premiers principes. C'est en vain que le raisonnement, 
qui n'y a point de part, essaie de les combattre. Les Pyrrho- 
niens, qui n'ont que cela pour objet, y travaillent inutilement. Nous 
savon's que nous ne revons point, quelque impuissance ou. nous 
soyons de le prouver par raison [which he uses convertibly with 
raisonnement]. Cette impuissance ne conclut autre chose que la 
foiblesse de notre raison, mais non pas l'incertitude de toutes nos 
connoissances, comme ils le pretendent : car la connoissance des 
premiers principes, comme, par exemple, qu'il y a espace, temps, 
mouvement, nombre, matiere, est aussi ferme qu'aucune de celles 
que nos raisonnements nous donnent. Et c'est sur ces connois- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 115 

sances cV intelligence et de sentiment qu'il faut que la raison s'ap- 
puie, et qu'elle fonde tout son discours. Je sens qu'il y a trois 
dimensions dans l'espace, et que les nombres sont infinis ; et la 
raison demontre ensuite qu'il n'y a point deux nombres carres 
dont l'un soit double de l'autre. Les principes se sentent; les 
propositions se concluent ; le tout avec certitude, quoique par dif- 
ferentes voies. Et il est aussi ridicule que la raison demande au 
sentiment et a V intelligence des preuves de ces premiers principes 
pour y consentir, qu'il seroit ridicule que V intelligence demandat 
a, la raison un sentiment de toutes les propositions qu'elle de- 
montre. Cette impuissance ne peut done servir qu'a bumilier la 
raison qui voudroit juger de tout, mais non pas a, combattre no- 
tre certitude, comme s'il n'y avoit que la raison capable de nous 
instruire. Plut a Dieu que nous n'en eussions au contraire 
jamais besoin, et que nous connussions toutes cboses par instinct 
et par sentiment ! Mais la nature nous a refuse ce bien et elle 
ne nous a donne que tres peu de connoissances de cette sorte ; 
toutes les autres ne peu vent etre acquises que par le raison ne- 
ment.' . . . 

' Qui demelera cet embrouillement ? La nature confond les 
Pyrrhoniens, et la raison confond les Dogmatistes. Que devien- 
drez vous done, 6 homme, qui cbercbez votre veritable condition 
par votre raison naturelle ? Vous ne pouvez fnir une de ces 
sectes, ni subsister dans aucune. Voila, ce qu'est l'homme a l'e- 
gard de la verite.' 

44. — La Chambre. — Systeme de l'Ame, L. ii. c. 3. — ' Sens 
Commun] word and thing. 

45. — Henry More. — Confutatio Cabbala? : Opera Omnia, p. 
528. 'Hoc Externus Sensus, corporeave Imaginatio non dictat, 
sed Sensus Intellectualis, innataque ipsiits mentis sagacitas, inter 
cujus notiones communes seu axiomata, noematice vel immediate 
vera, supra numeratum est.' — Compare Epistola H. Mori, ad. 
V. C. § 1*7, Opera, p. 117, and Enchiridion Ethicum, L. i. cc. 
4,5. 

46. — Rapin. — Comparaison de Platon et d'Aristote, ch. vii. § 



116 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

11. — ' Ce consentement general de tous les peuples, est un instinct 
de la nature qui ne peut estre faux, estant si universel.' 

47. — Duhamel. — Philosophia Burgundiae, t. i. Disp. ii. in Ca- 
teg. qu. 4, art. 2. ' Communis Sensusf name and thing. 

48. — Malebranche. — Recherche de la Verite — Entretiens sur 
la Metaphysique — Traite de Morale, &c, passim. 

He holds, 1°, that there is a supreme absolute essential Reason 
or Intelligence, an eternal light illuminating all other minds, con- 
taining in itself and revealing to them the necessary principles of 
science and of duty ; and manifesting also to us the contingent 
existence of an external, extended universe. This Intelligence is 
the Deity ; these revelations, these manifestations, a: e Ideas. He 
holds, 2°, that there is a natural Reason common to all men — 
an eye, as it were, fitted to receive the light, and to attend to the 
ideas in the supreme Intelligence ; in so far therefore an infallible 
and ' Common Sense." 1 But, 3o, at the same time, this Reason is 
obnoxious to the intrusions, deceptions, and solicitations of the 
senses, the imagination, and the passions ; and, in so far, is per- 
sonal, fallible, and factitious. He opposes objective knowledge, 
' par idee,' to subjective knowledge, ' par conscience,' or ' sentiment 
interieur.' To the latter belong all the Beliefs ; which, when ne- 
cessary, as determined by Ideas in the Supernal Reason, are 
always veracious. — It could, however, easily be shown that, in so 
far as regards, the representative perception of the external world, 
his principles would refute his theory. A similar doctrine in re- 1 
gard to the infallibility and divinity of our Intelligence or Com- 
mon Sense was held by Bossuet. 

49. — Poiret. — The objects of our cognitions are either things 
themselves — realities ; or the representations of realities, their 
shadows, pictures, — ideas. Realities are divided into two classes ; 
corporeal things, and spiritual things. Each of these species of 
object has an appropriate faculty by which it is cognized. 1°, 
Corporeal realities are perceived by the animal or sensual Intel- 
lect — in a word by Sense ; this is merely passive. 2°, Spiritual 
realities — original truths — are perceived by the passive or receptive 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 117 

Intellect, which may be called Intelligence ; it is the sense of the su- 
persensible. [This corresponds not to the passive intellect of Aris- 
totle, but to his intellect considered as the place of principles and to 
Common Sense ; it coincides also with the Vernunft of Jacobi and 
other German philosophers, but is more correctly named.] — These 
two faculties of apj:>rehension are veracious, as God is veracious. 3 °, 
The faculty of calling up and complicating Ideas is the active — 
ideal — reflective Intellect, or human Reason. [This answers not 
to the active or efficient, but to the discursive or dianoetic, intel- 
lect of Aristotle and the older philosophers in general, also to the 
Verstandof Kant, Jacobi, and the recent philosophers of Germany, 
but is more properly denominated.] (De Eruditione Solida, &c. 
ed. 2. Meth. P. i. § 43-50, and Lib. i. § 4-7, asd Lib. ii. § 3-8 
and Def. p. 468 sq. — Cogitationes Rationales, &c, ed. 2, disc 
pr. § 45, L. ii. c. 4, § 2. — Fides et ratio, &c, p. 28 sq. p. 81, sq 
p. 131 sq. — Defensio Methodi, &c. Op. post. p. 113 sq. — CEcono- 
mia Divina, L. iv. c. 20-25. — Vera et Cognita, passim.) — ' In- 
nate principles' he indifferently denominates ' Instincts.' (Fides et 
Ratio, Pr. pp. 13, 45.— Def. Meth. Op. post. pp. 131, 133, 136, 
172.— Vindicia3, ibid. p. 602.) 

This profound but mystical thinker has not yet obtained the 
consideration he deserves from philosophers and historians of 
philosophy ; — why, is sufficiently apparent. 

50. — Bossuet. — OZuvres inedites, Logique, L. iii. c. 22. — 
' Le Sentiment de genre humain est considere comme la voix de 
toute la nature, et par consequent en quelque facon, comme celle 
ile Dieu. C'est pourquoi la preuve est invincible.' — Alibi. 

51. — Locke. — Essay, B. i. c. 3. § 4. ' He would be thought 
void of common sense, who asked on the one side, or on the other, 
went to give, a reason, why it is impossible for the same thing 
to be or [and] not to be.' In other words — Common Sense or 
intellect, as the source, is the guarantee, of the principle of con- 
tradiction. There is here a confession, the importance of which 
has been observed neither by Locke nor his antagonists. Had 
Locke, not relying exclusively on Gassendi, prepared himself by 



118 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 

a study of the question concerning the origin of our knowledge 
in the writings of previous philosophers, more especially of Aris- 
totle, his Greek commentators, and the Schoolmen (see Nos. 3, 
1 0, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, &c.) ; and had he not been led astray in the 
pursuit of an ignis fatuus, in his refutation, I mean of the Carte- 
sian theory of Innate Ideas, which, certainly, as impugned by 
him, neither Descartes, nor the representatives of his school, ever 
dreamt of holding ; he would have seen, that in thus appealing 
to common sense or intellect, he was, in fact, surrendering his 
thesis — that all our knowledge is an educt from experience. For 
in admitting, as he here virtually does, that experience must ulti- 
mately ground its procedure on the laws of intellect, he admits 
that intellect contains principles of judgment, on which experience 
being dependent, cannot possibly be their precursor or their 
cause. Compare Locke's language with that of the intellect- 
ualist, Price, as given in No. 78. They are, in substance, identi- 
cal. — What Locke here calls common sense, he elsewhere by 
another ordinary synonym denominates Intuition (B. iv. c. 2, § 
1, c. 3, § 8 et alibi) ; also Self -evidence (B. iv. c. *7, § 1, sq.) As 
I have already observed, had Descartes and Locke expressed them- 
selves on the subject of innate ideas and principles with due pre- 
cision, the latter would not so have misunderstood the former, 
and both would have been found in harmony with each other 
and with the truth. 

52. — Bentley. — Quoted by Reid, I. P., p. 423 a. 'Common 
Sense,' word and thing. 

53. — Serjeant, Locke's earliest antagonist. — Solid Philosophy 
Asserted, p. 296. — 'These Ideas of Act and Power are so natural 
that common sense forces us to acknowledge them,' &c. So alibi. 

53.* — Abercromby. — Fur Academicus, Sectt. 2, 30. — ' Com- 
munis hominum Sensus] — name and thing. 

54. — Leibnitz. — This great philosopher held a doctrine, on the 
point in question, substantially corresponding to that of Aristotle, 
the Schoolmen, and Descartes. It is most fully evolved in his 
posthumous work the Nouveaux Essais ; which I refer to in the 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 119 

original edition by Raspe. Leibnitz admitted innate truths, 
which he explains to be cognitions not actually, but only virtually, 
existent in the mind, anterior to experience ; by which they are 
occasioned, excited, registered, exemplified, and manifested, but 
not properly caused or contributed, or their infallibility and eter- 
nal certainty demonstrated (pp. 5, 6, 37). For, as necessary to 
be thought, and therefore absolutely universal, they cannot be the 
product of sense, experience, induction ; these at best being only 
competent to establish the relatively general (pp. 5, sq. 36, 116). 
See also Opera by Dutens, t. v. p. 358, and t. vi. p. 274. These 
truths are consequently given ' as natural habitudes, that is, dis- 
positions, aptitudes, preformations, active and passive, which ren- 
der the intellect more than a mere tabula rasa? (p. 62). Truths 
thus innate are manifested in two forms ; either as Instincts, or as 
the Light of Nature (p. 48). But both become known to us as 
facts of consciousness, that is, in an immediate, internal experi- 
ence ; and if this experience deceive us, we can have no assurance 
of any truth, be it one of fact, or be it one of reason (p. 197). — 
Leibnitz's Natural Light and Instinct are, together, equivalent to 
Common Sense. 

55. — Toland. — Christianity not Mysterious, Sect. i. ch. i. p. 9. 
' Common Sense, or Reason in general.' See Leibnitz (Opera, t. 
v. p. 143). This testimony belongs perhaps rather to the third 
signification of the term. 

56. — Christian Thomasius gave ' Fundamenta Juris Naturae 
et Gentium ex Sensu Communi deducta ;' and in his introduc- 
tory chapter, § 26, he says — 'Rogo ut considerent, quod ubique 
mihi posuerim sequi sensum communem, atque non stabilire in- 
tenderim sententias, quae multis subtilibus abstractionibus opus 
habent, sed quarum veritatem quilibet, si modo paululum atten- 
tior esse velit, intra se sentiV Compare also his Philosophia 
Aulica., c. v. §§ 26, 35. 

57. — Ridiger, in 1709 published his work '■Be Sensu Veri et 
Falsi? By this he does not, however, designate the Common 
Sense of mankind as a natural principle, but the dexterity, 



120 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

' qua quid in unaquaque re sit verurn, falsumve, sentire quea- 
mus.' 

58. — Feuerlix. — De genuina ratione probandi a consensu gen- 
tium existentiam Dei. — 'Hcec est preecipui argumenti fades: — 
Ad cujuseunque rei existentiam agnoscendam mentes bumanae 
[ab instinctu naturali, to wit, as be frequently states], peculiarem 
babent inclinationem, ea vere existit,' &c., p. 28. 

59. — A. Turretinus. — Cogitationes et Disputationes Tbeologi- 
cse, Vol. i. p. 43, sq. 

'De Sensu Communi. 

§ xv. Religio sensum communem supponit ; nee enim truncos, 
aut bruta, aut ebrios aut mente captos, sed bomines sui compotes, 
alloquitur. 

§ xvi. In artibus omnibus atque disciplinis, non modo licet, sed 
et necesse est adhibere sensum communem. Quis capiat earn so- 
lam artem, earn solam disciplinam, quae omnium praestantissima 
est, sensus communis usum adimere 1 

§ xvii. Nisi supponatur sensus communis, nulla fides, nulla re- 
ligio, consistere potest : Etenim, quo organo res sacras percipimus, 
verasque a falsis, aequas ab iniquis, utiles a noxiis, dignoscimus, 
nisi ope sensus communis? 

§ xviii. Quomodo gentes notitiam Dei babuerunt, nisi ope sen- 
sus communis ? — Quid est ' Lex in cordibus scripta,' de qua Pau- 
lus (Rom. ii.), nisi ipsemet sensus communis, quatenus de mori- 
bus pronuntiat ? 

§ xix. Divinitas Scripturae, quibus argumentis probari potest, 
nisi argumentis e sensu communi depromptis ? 

§ xx. Sensus Scripturas, quibus regulis erui potest, nisi regulis 
a sensu communi subministratis ? 

§ xxi. Scriptura perpetuo provocat ad sensum communem : ete- 
nim quotiescunque ratiocinatur, toties supponit sensum communem 
esse in nobis, et sensu communi utendum esse. 

§ xxii. In syllogismis tbeologicis pene omnibus, quis nescit 
praeinissarum alteram, imo saspissme utramque, a sensu communi 
desumptam esse ? 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 121 

§ xxiii. Divinae veracitati non minus repugnat, sensum commu- 
nem nos fallere, quam Scripturam Sacram aliquid falsum docere ; 
etenim sensus communis non minus opus Dei quam Scriptura 
Sacra. 

§ xxiv. Pessimum est indicium, cum aliquis non vult de suis 
placitis ex sensu communi judicari. 

§ xxv. Nullus est error magis noxius, magisque Religioni inju- 
rius, quam isqui statuit, Religioni credi non posse, quin sensui 
communi nuntius mittatur. 

§ xxvi. Nulla datur major absurditas, quam ea quae nullis non 
absurditatibus portam aperit, quseque ad eas revincendas omnem 
prsecludit viam : atque talis est eorum sententia, qui nolunt sen- 
sum communem adhiberi in Religione. 

§ xxvii. Quae bactenus diximus de sensu communi, a nemine, 
ut quidem putamus, improbabuntur : at si loco Sensus Commu- 
nis, vocem Bationis subjiciamus, multi illico caperata fronte et 
torvis oculis nos adspicient. Quid ita ? cum sensus communis, 
lumen naturale, et ratio, unum idemque sint.' 

60. — Fenelon. — De l'Existence de Dieu. Partie ii. ch. 2. — 
'Mais qu'est-ce que le Sens Commun? N'est-ce pasf les pre- 
mieres notions que tous les bommes ont egalement des memes 
cboses ? Ce Sens Commun qui est toujours et par-tout le meme, 
qui previentf tout examen, qui rend l'examen meme de certaines 
questions ridicule, qui reduit l'bomme a ne pouvoir douterf quel- 
que effort qu'il fit pour se mettre dans un vrai doute ; ce Sens 
Commun qui est celui de tout horn me ; ce Sens, qui n'attend que 
d'etre consulte, qui se montre au premier coup-d'oeil, et qui decou- 
vre aussitot l'evidence ou l'absurdite de la question ; n'est-ce pas 
ce que j'appelle mes idees ? Les voila done ces idees ou notions 
generates que je ne puis ni contredire ni examiner, suivant lesquelles 
au contraire j'examine et je decide tout : en sort que je ris au lieu 
de repondre, toutes les fois qu'on me propose ce qui est clairement 
oppose a, ce que ces idees immuables me represented. 

' Ce principe est constant, et il n'y auroit que son application 
qui pourroit etre fautive : e'est-a-dire qu'il faut sans hesiter sui- 



122 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

vre toutes mes idees claires ; inais qu'il faut bien prendre garde 
de ne prendre jamais pour idee clair celle qui renferme quelque 
chose d'obscur. Aussi veux-je suivre exactement cette regie dans 
les choses que je vais mediter.' 

Common Sense is declared by Fenelon to be identical with the 
Natural Light of Descartes. See No. 37. The preceding pas- 
sage is partly quoted by Reid from a garbled and blundering 
translation (p. 424). The obeli mark the places where the prin- 
cipal errors have been committed. Like Melanchthon, Reid, &c. 
(Nos. 25, 79), Fenelon calls what is contrary to common sense, 
the absurd. 

61. — Shaftesbury. — Quoted by Reid, I. P. p. 424 a., ' Com- 
mon Sense? word and thing. 

62. D'Aguesseau. — Meditations Metaphysiques, Med. iv. (Eu- 
vres, 4° t. xi. p. 127. — ' Je m'arrete done a ces deux principes, 
qui sont comme la conclusion generale de tout ce que je viens 
d'etablir sur l'assurance ou l'homme peut etre d'avoir decouvert 
la verite. 

' L'un, que cet etat de certitude n'est en lui-meme qu'un senti- 
ment ou une conscience interieure. 

' L'autre, que les trois causes que j'en eu distinguees se reduis- 
sent encore a un autre sentiment. 

' Sentiment simple, qui se prouve lui-meme comme dans ces 
verites, fexiste, je %>ense, je veux, je suis libre, et que je puis appel- 
ler un sentiment de pure conscience. 

' Sentiment Justine, ou sentiment de l'evidence qui est dans le 
chose meme, ou de cette proposition, que tout ce qui est evident 
est vrai, et je l'appellerai un sentiment cVevidence. 

' Enfin, sentiment que peut aussi etre appelle, un sentiment jus- 
tifies par le poids du temoignage qui l'excite, et qui a pour fonde- 
ment une evidence d'autorite. Je l'appellerai done par cette rai- 
son, le sentiment d'une autorite evidente? 

62.* — Berkeley. — Quoted by Reid, I. P. pp. 283, 284; com- 
pare p. 423 a., ' Common Sense? name and reality. 

63. — Buffier's ' Traite des Premieres Veritez,' was first pub- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 123 

lished in 171 7, his ' Eleuiens de Metaphysique' in 1724. If we ex- 
cept Lord Herbert's treatise ' De Veritate,' these works exhibit the 
first regular and comprehensive attempt to found philosophy on cer- 
tain primary truths, given in certain primary sentiments or feelings : 
these feelings, and the truths of which they are the sources, he dis- 
tinguishes into two kinds One is Internal Feeling (sentiment 
intime), the self-consciousness of our existence, and of what passes 
in our minds. By this he designates our conviction of the facts of 
consciousness in themselves, as merely present and ideal phe- 
nomena. But these phenomena, as we have seen, testify also 
to the reality of what lies beyond themselves ; and to our instinc- 
tive belief in the truth of this testimony, he gives, by perhaps an 
arbitrary limitation of words, the name of common natural feel- 
ing (sentiment commun de la nature), or employing a more famil- 
iar expression, Common Sense (sens commun). Buffier did not 
fall into the error of Mr. Stewart and others, in holding that we 
have the same evidence for the objective reality of the external 
world, as we have for the subjective reality of the internal. ' If,' 
he says, ' a man deny the truths of internal feeling, he is self- 
contradictory ; if he deny the truths of common sense, he is not 
self-contradictory — he is only mad.' 

Common Sense he thus defines : — ' J'entens done ici par le 
Sens Commun la disposition que la nature a mise dans tous les 
hommes ou manifestment dans la plupart d'entre eux ; pour 
leur faire porter, quand ils ont ateint l'usage de la raison ; 
un jugement commun et uniforme, sur des objets diferens du 
sentiment intime de leur propre perception ; jugement qui n'est 
point la consequence d'aucun principe interieur.' — Prem. Ver. 
§ 33. And in his ' Metaphysique,' — Le sentiment qui est mani- 
festement le plus commun aux hommes de tous les temps et 
de tous les pays, quand ils ont ateint l'usage de la raison, et 
des choses sur quoi ils portent leur jugement.' — § 67. 

He then gives in both works not a full enumeration, but exam- 
ples, of First Truths or sentiments common to all men. These 
are more fully expressed in the ' Metaphysique,' from which as 



124 PHILOSOPHY OP COMMON SENSE. 

the later work, and not noticed by Reid (p. 467 b), I quote, 
leaving always the author's orthography intact. 

1. II est quel que chose qui existe hors de moi ; et ce qui 
existe hors de moi, est autre que rnoi. 

2. II est quel que chose que j'apelle ame, esprit, pensee, dans 
les autres homines et dans moi, et la pensee n'est point ce qui 
s'apelle corps ou matiere. 

3. Ce qui est connu par le sentiment ou par l'experience de 
tous les hommes, doit etre recu pour vrai ; et on n'en peut dis- 
convenir sans se brouiller avec le sens comrnun.' — § 78. 

[These three he calls ' veritez externes, qui soient des senti- 
ments communs a tous les hommes.' The third is not given in 
the ' Traite des Premieres Veritez.'] 

' 4. II est dans les hommes quelque chose qui s'apelle raison 
et qui est opose a I' 'extravagance ; quelque chose qui s'apelle pru- 
dence, qui est opose a, Vimprudence ; quelque chose qui s'apelle 
liberie, opose a la necessite d'agir. 

5. Ce qui reunit un grand nombre de parties diferentes pour 
un effet qui revient regulierement, ne sauroit etre le pur efFet du 
hazard ; mais c'est 1' efFet de ce que nous apellons une intelligence. 

6. Un fait ateste par un tres grand nombre de gens sensez, 
qui assurent en avoir ete les temoins, ne peut sensement etre 
revoque en doute.' — § 82. 

These examples are not beyond the reach of criticism. 

In the Treatise on First Truths he gives a statement and 
exposition of their three essential characters. The statement is 
as follows : ' 

' 1. Le premier de ces caracteres est, qu'elles soient si claires, 
que quand on entreprend de les prouver, ou de les ataquer, on 
ne le puisse faire que par des propositions, qui, manifestement, ne 
sont ni plus clairs ni plus certaines. 

2. D'etre si universellement recues parmi les hommes en tous 
terns, en tous lieux, et par toutes sortes d'esprits ; que ceux qui 
les ataquent se trouvent dans le genre humain, etre manifestement 
moins d'un contre cent, ou meme contre mille. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 125 

3. D'etre si fortement imprimees dans nous, que nous y con- 
forniions notre conduite, inalgre les rafinemens de ceux qui imagi- 
nent des opinions contraires ; et qui eux-menies agissent con- 
formement, non a leurs opinions imaginees, mais aux premieres 
veritez universellement recues.' — § 51-52. Compare Alexander, 
n. 10 a* 



* We are now only considering the natural data of consciousness in their 
most catholic relations, — and it would be out of place to descend to any dis- 
cussion of them in a subordinate point of view. But, though alluding to 
matters beyond our present purpose, I cannot refrain irom doing, by the 
way, an act of justice to this acute philosopher, to whom, as to Gassendi, his 
countrymen have never, I think, accorded the attention he deserves. 

No subject, perhaps, in modern speculation, has excited an intenser inter- 
est or more vehement controversy than Kant's famous distinction of Analyt- 
ic and Synthetic judgments a priori, or, as I think they might with far less of 
ambiguity be denominated, Explicative and Ampliative judgments. The 
interest in the distinction itself was naturally extended to its history. The 
records of past philosophy were again ransacked ; and, for a moment, it was 
thought that the Prussian sage had been forestalled, in the very ground- 
work of his system, by the Megaric Stilpo. But the originality (I say noth- 
ing of the truth) of Kant's distinction still stands untouched ; the origi- 
nality of its author, a very different question, was always above any reason- 
able doubt. Kant himself is disposed, indeed, to allow, that Locke (B. iv. 
ch. 3, § 9, sq.) had, perhaps, a glimpse of the discrimination ; but looking 
tc the place referred to, this seems, on the part of Kant, an almost gratui- 
tous concession. Locke, in fact, came far nearer to it in another passage (B. 
i. ch. 2, §§19, 20); but there although the examples on which the distinc- 
tion could have been established are stated, and even stated in contrast, the 
principle was not apprehended, and the distinction, consequently permit- 
ted to escape. 

But this passage and its instances seem to have suggested, what was 
overlooked by Locke himself, to Burner ; who, although his name has not, 
as far as I am aware, ever yet been mentioned in connection with this sub- 
ject, may claim the honor of having been the first to recognize, to evolve, 
and even to designate, this celebrated distinction, almost as precisely as the 
philosopher who erected on it so splendid an edifice of speculation. I can- 
not now do more than merely indicate the fact of the anticipation ; men- 
tioning only that, leaving to Kant's analytic _ judgment its previous title of 
identical, Buffier preoccupies Kant's designation of synthetic in that of con- 
junctive (or logical) judgment, which he himself proposes. Those inter- 
ested in the question will find the exposition in the 'Veritez de Conse- 
quence,' Log. ii. Art. xxi. 

I may further, however, when on this matter, notice, that before Kant, 
another philosopher had also signalized the same distinction. I refer to 



V2Q PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

I should not have deemed it necessary to make any comment 
on Burner's doctrine of Common Sense, were it not that it is 
proper to warn my readers against the misrepresentations of the 
anonymous English translator of his Treatise on Primary Truths ; 
for not only have these never been exposed, but Mr. Stewart has 
bestowed on that individual an adventitious importance, by laud- 
ing his ' acuteness and intelligence,' while acquiescing in his 
' severe but just animadversions' on Dr. Beattie. (Elements, vol. 
ii. c. 1, § 3, pp. 87, 89, 2 sd.) 

Burner does not reduce Reason (which he employs for the 
complement of our higher faculties in general) to Reasoning ; he 
does not contra-distinguish Common Sense from Reason, of 
which it ss constituent; but while be views the former as a nat- 
ural sentiment, he views it as a sentiment of our rational nature ; 
and he only requires, as the condition of the exercise of common 
sense in particular, the actual possession of Reason or under- 
standing in general, and of the object requisite to call that 
Reason into use. Common Sense, on Burner's doctrine, is thus 
the primary, spontaneous, unreasoning, and as it were, instinctive 
energy of our rational constitution. Compare Pr. Ver. §§ 41, 66 
-72, 93. Met. §§ 65, 72, 73. 

The translator to his version, which appeared in 1780, has 
annexed an elaborate Preface, the sole purport of which is to 



Principal Campbell of Aberdeen, in the chapter on intuitive evidence, of 
his philosophy of Ehetoric (B. i. c. 5, S. 1, p. 1)— first published in 1776, 
and therefore four years prior to the Critique on Pure Eeason ; for the dis- 
tinction in question is to be found, at least explicitly, neither in the treatise 
'TJeber die Evidenz,' nor in the Dissertation 'DeMundi Sensibilis atque 
Inteligibilis forma et principiis,' which appeared in 1763 and 1770. But Camp- 
bell manifestly only repeats Buffier (with whose works he was intimately ac- 
quainted, and from which he frequently borrows), and with inferior preci- 
sion ; so that, if we may respect the shrewdness, which took note, and ap- 
preciated the value, of the observation, we must condemn the disingenuity 
which palmed it on the world as his own. Campbell's doctrine, I may finally 
observe, attracted the attention of Mr. Stewart (El. ii. p. 32 sq.) ; but he 
was not aware either of its relation to Buffier or of its bearing upon 
Kant. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 127 

inveigh against Reid, Beattie, and Oswald — more especially the 
two last — for at once stealing and spoiling the doctrine of the 
learned Jesuit. 

In regard to the spoiling, the translator is the only culprit. 
According to him, Burner's ' Common Sense is a disposition of 
mind not natural but acquired by age and time' (pp. iv. xxxiv.) 
' Those first truths which are its object require experience and 
meditation to be conceived, and the judgments thence derived 
are the result of exercising reason,' (p. v.) ' The use of Eeason is 
Reasoning ;' and Common Sense is that degree of understanding 
in all things to which the generality of mankind are capable of 
attaining by the exertion of their rational faculty' (p. xvii.) In 
fact Burner's first truths, on his translator's showing, are last 
truths ; for when ' by time we arrive at the knowledge of an 
infinitude of things, and by the use of reason (i. e. by reasoning) 
form our judgment on them, those judgments are then justly to 
be considered as first truths' If / (p. xviii.) 

But how, it will be asked, does he give any color to so unpar- 
alleled a perversion ? By the very easy process of — 1°, throwing 
out of account, or perverting, what his author does say ; — 2°, of 
interpolating what his author not only does not say, but what is 
in the very teeth of his assertions ; and 3°, by founding on these 
perversions and interpolations as on the authentic words of his 
author. 

As to the plagiarism, I may take this opportunity of putting 
down, once and for ever, this imputation, although the character 
of the man might have well exempted Reid from all suspicion of 
so unworthy an act. It applies only to the ' Inquiry ;' and there 
the internal evidence is almost of itself sufficient to prove that 
Reid could not, prior to that publication, have been acquainted 
with Burner's Treatise. The strongest, indeed the sole, presump- 
tion arises from the employment, by both philosophers, of the 
term Common Sense, which, strange to say, sounded to many in 
this country as singular and new ; whilst it was even commonly 
believed, that before Reid Buffier was the first, indeed the only 



128 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

philosopher, who had. taken notice of this principle, as one of the 
genuine sources of our knowledge. See Beattie, n. 82 ; Camp- 
bell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, B. i. c. 5, part 3 ; and Stewart's 
Account of Reid, p. 27. 

After the testimonies now adfluced, and to be adduced, it 
would be the apex of absurdity to presume that none but Buffier 
could have suggested to Reid either the principle or its designa- 
tion. Here are given forty-eight authorities, ancient and mod- 
ern, for the philosophical employment of the term Common 
Sense, previous to Reid, and from any of these Reid may be said 
to have borrowed it with equal justice as from Buffier ; but, taken 
together, they concur in proving that the expression, in the ap- 
plication in question, was one in general use, and free as the air 
to all and each who chose thus to employ it. — But, in fact, what 
has not been noticed, we know, from an incidental statement of 
Reid himself — and this, be it noticed, prior to the charge of 
plagiarism, — that he only became acquainted with the treatise 
of Buffier, after the publication of his own Inquiry. For in his 
Account of Aristotle's Logic, written and published some ten 
years subsequently to that work, he says — ' I have lately met 
with a very judicious treatise written by Father Buffier,' &c, p. 
713, b. Compare also Intellectual Powers, p. 468, b. In this 
last work, however, published after the translation of Buffier, 
though indirectly defending the less manifestly innocent partners 
in the accusation, from the charge advanced, his self-respect pre- 
vents him from saying a single word in his own vindication. 

64. — Lyons. — About the year 1720 was published the first 
edition of the following curious, and now rare, work : 

' The Infallibility of Human Judgment, its Dignity and Excel- 
lence. Being a New Art of Reasoning, and discovering Truth, 
by reducing all disputable cases to general and self-evident 
propositions. Illustrated by bringing several well-known disputes 
to such self-evident and universal conclusions. With the Supple- 
ment answering all objections which have been made to it and 
the design thereby perfected, in proving this method of Reasoning 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 129 

to be as forcibly conclusive and universal as Arithmetick and 
as easie. Also a Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity. The 
fourth edition. To which is now added a postscript obviating 
the complaints made to it, and to account for some things 
which occurred to it and the author. By Mr. Lyons. London, 
1724.' 

He gives (p. 83-94) ' A Recapitulation of the whole work, 
being the principles of a Rationalist reduced to certain stated 
articles containing the Laws of Reason, the Elements of Religion, 
of Morals, and of Politicks ; with the Art of reducing all disputes 
to universal determinations.' From these articles (twenty-three 
in number) I extract the first three. 

1. ' Reason is the distinguishing excellency, dignity, and beauty 
of mankind. 

2. ' There is no other use of Reason — than to judge of Good 
and Bad, Justice and Injustice, Wisdom and Folly, and the like ; 
that a man may thereby attain Knowledge to distinguish Truth 
from Error, and to determine his Actions accordingly. 

3. ' This Reason is known to us also by the names of Judg- 
ment, Light of Nature, Conscience, and Common Sense ; only 
varying its name according to its different uses and appearances, 
but is one and the same thing.' 

The conclusion of the whole is given in the maxim — '■Exert 
with Diligence and Fortitude the Common Use of Common 
Sense? 

It is probable that Lyons was not unacquainted with the treat- 
ise of Turretini. 

65. — Amherst. — Terrge Filius, No. 21. — Natural reason and 
common sense," 1 used as convertible terms. 

66. — Wollaston. — Religion of Nature Delineated (ed. 1721, 
p. 23). ' They who deduce the difference between good and evil 
from the Common Sense of mankind, and certain principles that 
are born with us, put,' <fcc. 

67. — Vulpius (Volpi). — Scholae Duse, p. 45. 'Non certe 
quod putaret Aristoteles, summos illos viros (Parmenidem et 



130 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

Melissum) tarn longe a communi sensu abhorruisse, ut opinarentui 
nullam esse omnino rerum dissimilitudinem,' &c. 

68. — Vico frequently employs the terms ' communis sensus' 
and ' senso commit for our primary beliefs. See his Latin and 
Italian works, passim. 

69, — Wolfius. — Ontologia, § 125. — 'Veritates ad sensum 
communem reducimus, dum in notiones resolvuntur, quas ad judi- 
candum utitur ipsum vulgus imperitum naturali quodam acumine, 
quse distincte enunciata maxime abstracta sunt, in rebus obviis 
confuse percipiens. ... Id igitur in Philosophia prima agi- 
mus, ut notiones quse confusae vulgo sunt, distinctas reddamus, et 
terminis generalibus enunciemus : ita enim demum in disciplinis 
cseteris, quae sublimia sunt, et a cognitione vulgi remota, ad noti- 
ones eidem familiares revocare, sicque ad Sensum Communem 
reducere licebit.' . . . 

§ 245. . . . ' Nemo miretur, quod notiones primas, quas fun- 
damentales merito dixeris, cum omnis tandem nostra cognitio 
iisdem innitatur, notionibus vulgi conformes probemus. Miran- 
dum potius esset, quod non dudum de reductione philosophise ad 
notiones communes cogitaverint philosophi, nisi constaret singu- 
lare requiri acumen, ut, quid notionibus communibus insit, dis- 
tincte et pervidere, et verbis minime ambiguis enunciare vale- 
amus, quod nonnisi peculiari et continuo quodam exercitio obti- 
netur in Psychologia exponendo.' — See also a curious letter of 
Wolf among the ' Epistolse Physical of Krazenstein, regarding 
Common Sense. 

70. — Huber. — In 1732 appeared the first edition of Le Monde 
Fou prefere au Monde Sage. This treatise is anonymous, but 
known to be the work of Mademoiselle Huber. Its intrinsic 
merit, independently of its interest as the production of a Lady, 
might have saved it from the oblivion into which it seems to 
have fallen. — Consciousness (conscience) is considered as the 
faculty of ' uncreated, primary, simple, and universal truths,' in 
contrast to 'truths created, particular, distinct, limited' (i. pp. 180, 
220). Consciousness is superior to Reasoning ; and as primitive 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 131 

is above all definition (i. pp. 103, 130, 140). ' Les veritez less 
plus simples sont, par leur relation avec la verite primitive si fort 
audessus des preuves, qu'elles ne paroissent douteuses que parce 
qu'on entrepend de les prouver ; leur idee seule, ou le sentiment 
que l'on en a, prouve qu'elles existent ; l'existence de la Con- 
science, par example, est prouve par son langage meme ; elle se 
fait entendre, done elle est ; son temoignage est invariablement 
droit, done il est infaillible, done les veritez particulieres qu'il 
adopte sont indubitables, par cela seul qu'elles n'ont pas besoin 
d'autres preuves' (i. p. 189). 

71. — Genovesi. — Elementorum Metapbysicee, Pars Prior, p. 
94. In reference to our moral liberty, be says — Appello ad 
sensum, non plebeiorum modo, ne tantas res judicio imperitorum 
judicari quis opponat, sed pbilosopborum maxime, communem, 
quern qui erroris reprebendere non veretur, is vecors sit oportet.' 
See also Pars Altera, p. 160, et alibi. 

72. — Hume. — Quoted by Reid, p. 424 b. '•Common Sense,'' 
word and tbing. 

73. — Crusius. — a. — Weg zur Gewissbeit, § 256, et alibi. 'Tbe 
bigbest principle of all knowledge and reasoning is : — That which 
toe cannot but think to be true, is true ; and that which we abso- 
lutely cannot think at all, [?] or cannot but think to be false, isfalse." 1 

b. — Entwurf notbwendigen Vernunftwabrbeiten, Pref. 2 ed. 
' Tbe Leibnitio-Wolfian system does not quadrate witb tbe com- 
mon sense of mankind (sensus communis).' His German expres- 
sion is ' gemeiner Menscbensinn.' 

74. — D'Alembert bolds tbat pbilosopby is an evolution from, 
and must, if legitimate, be conformed to, tbe primary truths of 
wbicb all men are naturally in possession. Tbe complement Oi 
tbese truths is ' sens commun^ Compare Melanges, t. iv. §§ 4, 6, 
pp. 28, 46 t. v. § 76, p. 269, ed. Amst. 1763. 

75. — Oetinger. — Inquisitio in Sensum Communem et Ratio- 
nem, necnon utriusque regulas, pro dijudicandis philosophorum 
theoriis, &c. Tubingse, 1753. — l Sensus Communis' is defined 
(§ 11), 'Viva et penetrans perceptio objectorum, toti bumanitati 



132 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

obviorum, ex immediato tactu et intuitu eorum, quae sunt sim 
plicissima, utilissinia et maxime necessaria,' &c. — § 18. . . . 
' Objecta Sensus Communis sunt veritates omni tempore et loco 
omnibus utiles, apprehensu faciles, ad quas conservandas Deus 
illos secreto impulsu indesinenter urget, ut sunt moralia,' &c, &c. 
So far, so well. The book, however, turns out but a mystical 
farrago. The author appears to have had no knowledge of Buf- 
fier's treatise on First Truths. Solomon and Confucius are his 
staple authorities. The former affords him all his rules ; and 
even materials for a separate publication on the same subject, 
in the same year — ' Die Wahrheit des Sensus Communis in den 
erklaerten Spruechen Salomonis.' This I have not seen. 

16. — Eschenbaoh. — Sammlung, &c. 11 56. In the appendix 
to his translation of the English Idealists, Berkeley and Collier, 
after showing that the previous attempts of philosophers to 
demonstrate the existence of an external world were inconclusive, 
the learned Professor gives us his own, which is one of common 
sense. — ' How is the Idealist to prove his existence as a thinking 
reality ? He can only say — / know that I so exist, because I feel 
that I so exist.'' This feeling being thus the only ground on 
which the Idealist can justify the conviction he has of his exist- 
ence, as a mind, our author goes on to show, that the same feel- 
ing, if allowed to be veracious, will likewise prove the existence, 
immediately, of our bodily organism, and, through that, of a 
material world. P. 549-552. 

11. — Gesner, prelecting on his 'Isagoge in Eruditionem Uni- 
versalem,' § 808, speaking of Grotius, says : — ' De jure gentium 
eleganter scripsit, et auctor classicus est. Imprimis, quod repre- 
hendunt imperiti, laudandum in eo libro est hoc, quod omnia 
veterum auctorum locis ac testimoniis probat. Nam ita provoca- 
tur quasi ad totum genus humanum. Nam si videmus, illos 
viros laudari, et afferri eorum testimonia, qui dicuntur sensum 
communem omnium hominum habuisse ; si posteri dicant, se ita 
sentire, ut illi olim scripserint : est hoc citare genus humanum. 
Proferuntur enjm illi in medium, quos omnes pro sapientibus 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 133 

habuerunt. Verum est, potest unusquisque stultus dicere ; ' Ego 
habeo se?isum communem ;' sed sensus communis est, quod con- 
sensu humano dictum sit per omnia specula. Ita etiam in reli- 
gione naturali videndum est, quid olim homines communi con- 
sensu dixerint : nee ea ad religionem et tbeologiam naturalem 
referenda sunt, quse aliunde accepimus. Sic egit Grotius in opere 
preestantissimo. Ostendit, lioc Rornanorum, lioc Gallorum, lega- 
tes dixisse; hoc ab omni tempore fuisse jus gentium, hoc est, 
illucl jus, ex quo totae gentes judicari, et agi secum, voluerint. 
Sermo est de eo jure quod toti populi et illi sapientissimi scrip- 
tores nomine et consensu populorum totorum, pro jure gentium 
habuere ; de eo, quo gentes inter se teneantur ; non de jure puta- 
tivo, quod unusquisque sibi excogitavit. Hsec enim est labes, 
hoc est vitium sseculi nostri, quod unusquisque ponit principium, 
ex quo deducit deinde conclusiones. Bene est, et laudandi sunt, 
quod in hoc cavent sibi, ut in fine conveniant in conclusionibus ; 
quod ex diversis principiis efHciunt easdem conclusiones : Sed 
Grotius provocat simpliciter ad consensum generis humani et 
sensum communem? 

78. — Price, in his Review of the principal Questions on Mor- 
als, 1 ed. 1758, speaking of the necessity of supposing a cause 
for every event, and having stated examples, says — ' I know 
nothing that can be said or done to a person who professes to 
deny these things, besides referring him to common sense and 
reason] p. 35. And again: 'Were the question — whether our 
ideas of number, diversity, causation, proportion, &c, represent 
truth and reality perceived by the understanding, or particular 
impressions made by the object to which we ascribe them on our 
minds ; — were this, I say, the question, would it not be sufficient 
to appeal to common sense, and to leave it to be determined by 
every person's private consciousness?'' p. 65. See also 2 ed. p. 
81, note : ' Common sense the faculty of self-evident truths.' 

79. — Reid. — a. — Inquiry, &c, p. 108 ' — 'If there be certain 

1 Here, as elsewhere, Hamilton refers to his own edition of Eeid.— W. 



134 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our 
nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to 
take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being 
able to give a reason for them ; these are what we call the prm- 
cities of common sense ; and what is manifestly contrary to them 
is what we call absurd.'' — See also p. 209. Compare Melanchthon 
n. 25, c, Fenelon n. 60, Buffier n. 63. 

b. — Intellectual Powers, p. 425. — ' It is absurd to conceive that 
there can be any ojmosition between Reason and Common Sense. 
Common Sense is indeed the first-born of Reason ; and they are 
inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to Reason two offices oi 
two degrees ; the first is to judge of things self-evident ; [this is 
Intellect, vofc.] The second is to draio conclusions that are not 
self-evident from those that are ; [this is Reasoning, or £t<xvoia.] 
The first of these is the province, and the sole province of Com- 
mon Sense ; and therefore it coincides with Reason in its whole 
extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree 
of Reason.' — I have already observed that of these offices, the 
former (Common Sense) might be well denominated the noetic 
function of Reason, or rather Intellect, and the latter (Reasoning) 
its dianoetic or discursive. See p. 81. 

80. — Hiller. — Curriculum Philosophise, 1765. Pars iii. § 
34. — 'Sensus communis 1 used in its philosophical meaning. 

81. — Hemsterhuis, 'the Batavian Plato,' founds his philoso- 
phy on the original feelings or beliefs of our intelligent nature, as 
on ultimate facts. Feeling, or the faculty of primitive intuition 
(sentiment, sensation, faculte intuitive) is prior to reasoning ; on 
which it confers all its validity, and which it supplies with the 
necessary conditions of its activity. It is not logical inference 
which affords us the assurance of any real existence ; it is belief — 
feeling — the instinctive judgment of the intuitive faculty. (This 
he sometimes calls common sense — sens commun.) Demonstra- 
tion is the ladder to remoter truths. But demonstrations can 
yield us information neither as to the ground on which the lad- 
der rests, nor as to the points on which it is supported. — Of his 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 135 

works, see in particular, ' Sophyle' and ' Lettre sur I'Homrne et 
ses Rapports,' passim. 

82.— Beattie.— Essay on Truth, 1773, p. 40. 'The term 
Common Sense hath, in modern times, been used by philoso- 
phers, both French and British, to signify that power of the mind 
which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive 
argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresisti- 
ble impulse ; derived neither from education nor from habit, but 
from nature ; acting independently of our will, whenever its 
object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore 
properly called Sense ; and acting in a similar manner upon all, 
or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and therefore 
properly called Common Sense? 

I should hardly have thought it necessary to quote Beattie's 
definition of common sense any more than those of Campbell, 
Oswald, Fergusson, and other Scottish philosoj:>hers in the train 
of Reid, were it not to remark that Mr. Stewart (Elements, vol. 
ii. c. 1, sect. 3), contrary to his usual tone of criticism, is greatly 
too unmeasured in his reprehension of this and another passage 
of the same Essay. In fact if we discount the identification of 
Reason with Reasoning — in which Beattie only follows the great 
majority of philosophers, ancient and modern — his consequent 
distinction of Reason from Common Sense, and his error in 
regard to the late and limited employment of this latter term, an 
error shared with him by Mr. Stewart, there is far more in this 
definition to be praised than censured. The attack on Beattie 
by the English translator of Buffier is futile and false. Mr. 
Stewart's approbation of it is to me a matter of wonder. See 
No. 63. 

83. — Von Storchenau. — Grundsaetze der Logik, 1774. Com- 
mon Sense (der allgemeine Menschensinn) defined and founded 
on, as an infallible criterion of truth, in reference to all matters 
not beyond its sphere. 

84. — Stattler. — Dissertatio Logica de valore Sensus Commu- 
nis, 1780. — A treatise chiefly in reference to the proof of the 



136 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON" SENSE. 

being of a God from the general agreement of mankind. — See 
also his Logica. 

85. — Hexxert. — Aphorismi philosophic! Utrecht, 1781. — 
•Sensus Communis, sen sensns immediatae evidential, intimus est 
sensns,' § 112. 'Sensus Communis est cos et norma omnis veri,' 
§ 2. ' Natura mortalibns tribuit sensum communem, qui omnes 
edocet quibus in rebus consentire debeant,' &c, § 1. 

86. — Kaxt is a remarkable confessor of the supreme authority 
of natural belief; not only by reason of bis rare profundity as a 
thinker, but because we see him, by a signal yet praiseworthy 
inconsequence, finally re-establishing in authority the principle, 
which he had originally disparaged and renounced. His theo- 
retical philosophy, which he first developed, proceeds on a rejec- 
tion, in certain respects, of the necessary convictions of mankind ; 
while on these convictions his practical philosophy, the result of 
his maturer contemplations, is wholly established. As Jacobi 
well expresses it — ' The Critical philosophy, first out of love to 
science, theoretically subverts metaphysic; then — when all is 
about to sink into the yawning abyss of an absolute subjectivity 
— it again, out of love to metaphysic, subverts science' (Werke ii. 
p. 44). The rejection of the common sense of mankind as a 
criterion of truth, is the weakest point of the speculative philos- 
ophy of Kant. When he says — 'Allowing idealism to be as 
dangerous as it truly is, it would still remain a scandal to phi- 
losophy and human reason in general, to be forced to accept the 
existence of external things on the testimony of mere belief (Cr. 
d. r. V. Vorr.) : yet, that very belief alone is what makes the sup- 
position of an external world incumbent; and the proof of its 
reality which Kant attempted, independently of that belief, is 
now admitted by one and all of his disciples, to be so inconse- 
quent that it may reasonably be doubted whether he ever 
intended it for more than an exoteric disclaimer of the esoteric 
idealism of his doctrine. But the philosopher who deemed it ' a 
scandal to philosophy and human reason' to found the proof of a 
material world — in itself to us a matter of supreme indifference — 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 137 

on belief; on belief, on feeling, afterwards established the proof 
of all the highest objects of our interest — God — Free Will — and 
Immortality. In the character he ascribes to this Feeling and 
Belief, Kant, indeed, erred. For he ought to have regarded it, 
not as a mere spiritual craving, but as an immediate manifesta- 
tion to intelligence ; not as a postulate, but as a datum ; not as 
an interest in certain truths, but as the fact, the principle, the 
warrant of their cognition and reality. Kant's doctrine on this 
point is too prominent and pervading, and withal too well known, 
to render any quotation necessary ; and I only refer to his Cri- 
tique of Practical Reason, and his moral treatises in general. — 
See also on Kant's variation in this respect, among others, Jaco- 
bi's Introduction to his collected philosophical writings (Werke 
vol. ii. p. 3-126), with the Appendix on Transcendental Idealism 
(ibid. p. 289-309) ; and Platner's Philosophical Aphorisms (vol. 
i. Pref. p. vi.) ; to which may be added Schoppenhauer's letter in 
preface to the first volume of Kant's collected works by Rosen- 
krantz and Schubert. 

87. — Jacobi. — The philosophy of Jacobi — who from the char- 
acter and profundity of his speculations merited and obtained the 
appellation of the Plato of Germany — in its last and most per- 
fect exposition establishes two faculties immediately apprehensive 
(vernehmend, wahrnehmend) of reality ; Sense of corporeal ex- 
istence, Reason (Vernunft) of supersensible truths.* Both as 
primary are inconceivable, being only cognitions of the fact. 
Both are therefore incapable of definition, and are variously and 
vaguely characterized as revelations, intuitions, feelings, beliefs, 
instincts. 



* This last corresponds to the vovs proper of the Greek philosophers ; and 
the employment of the term Eeason in this limitation by Jacobi in his later 
works (to which he was manifestly led by Kant), is not a fortunate nomen- 
clature. In his earlier writings he does not discriminate Eeason from Under- 
standing (Verstand), viewing it as a faculty of mediate knowledge, and as 
opposed to Belief, in which Jacobi always held that we obtain the revelation 
Df all reality — all original cognition. See p. 80. 



138 



PHILOSOPHY OP COMMON SENSE. 



The resistless belief or feeling of reality which in eithei cogni 
don affords the surrogate of its truth, is equivalent to the com- 
mon sense of Reid. lieid was an especial favorite with Jacobi ; 
and through Jacobi's powerful polemic we may trace the influence 
of the Scottish philosophy on the whole subsequent speculation 
of Germany. See Preface. 

a.- — Die Lehre des Spinoza, &c, 1*785, p, 162. sq. — Werke, 
vol. iv. p. 210, 'Dear Mendelsohn, we are all born in belief 
(Glaube*), and in belief we must remain, as we were all born in 
society, and in society must remain. How can we strive after 
certainty, were certainty not already known to us ; and known to 
us, how can it be unless through something which we already 
know with certainty ? This leads to the notion of an immediate 
certainty, which not only stands in need of no proof, but abso- 
lutely excludes all proof, being itself, and itself alone, the repre- 
sentation (Vorstellungfy corresponding with' the represented thing, 
and therefore having its sufficient reason within itself. The con- 
viction, through proof or demonstration, is a conviction of sec- 
ond hand ; rests upon comparison ; and can never be altogether 
sure and perfect. If, then, all assent, all holding for true (Fuer- 
wahrhalten), not depending on such grounds of reasoning, be a 
belief; it follows, that the conviction from reasoning itself, must 
spring out of belief, and from belief receive all the cogency it 
possesses. 

' Through belief we know that we have a body, and that, ex- 
ternal to us, there are found other bodies, and other intelligent 
existences. A truly miraculous [marvellous J] revelation! For 



* The Germans have only this one word for philosophical Belief and theo- 
.ogical Faitli. Hence much scandal, confusion, and misrepresentation, on 
its first employment by Jacobi. 

t Vorstellung in this place might perhaps be rendered presentation. But I 
adhere to the usual translation ; for Jacobi never seems to have risen to the 
pure doctrine of Natural Kealism. 

X The Germans have only one word, wunder, wunderbar, to express marvel 
ttnd miracle, marvellous and miraculous. Hence often confusion and ambi- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 139 

we have only a sensation (Empfinden) of our body, under this or 
that modification ; and whilst we have a sensation of our body 
thus modified, we are at the same time, aware or percipient, not 
only of its changes, but likewise of — what is wholly different 
from mere sensation, or a mere thought — we are aware or per- 
cipient of other real things, and this too with a certainty, the same 
as that with which we are percipient of our own existence ; for 
without a Thou an /is impossible. [? — See above, p. 19. sq.] 

' We have thus a revelation of nature, which does not recommend 
merely, but compels, all and each of us to believe, and, through be- 
lief, to receive those eternal truths which are vouchsafed to man.' 

P. 223. — ' V. We can only demonstrate similarities (coinci- 
dences, conditioned necessary truths) in a series of identical pro- 
positions. Every proof supposes, as its basis, something already 
established, the principle of which is a revelation. 

' VI. The element of all human knowledge and activity is Be- 
lief.' 

P. 193. (Given as an aphorism of Spinoza.) — 'An immediate 
cognition, considered in and for itself, is without representation — 
is a Feeling.' — The three last words do not appear in the original 
edition ; and I cannot find their warrant in Spinoza. 

b. — From the Dialogue entitled ' David Hume upon Belief, 
or Idealism and Realism,' which appeared two years later (1787). 
Werke, vol. ii. p. 143, sq. 

'/. — That things appear as external to us, requires no argument. 
But that these things are not mere appearances in us — are not 
mere modifications of our proper self, and consequently null as 
representations of aught external to ourselves ; hut that as repre- 
sentations in us, they have still reference to something really ex- 
ternal and self-existent, which they express, and from which they 
are taken — in the face of this, not only is doubt possible, it has 

guity in their theology. The superiority we have over them in the two in- 
stances noticed in this and the penult note is, however, rare. The making 
perception a revelation and not an apprehension of existence belongs also to 
a Cosmothetic Idealism, struggling into Natural Eealism. 



140 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

been often satisfactorily demonstrated, that such doubt cannot be 
solved by any process of reasoning strictly so denominated. Your 
immediate certainty of external things would, therefore, on the 
analogy of my Belief, be a blind certainty.'' 

(After defending the propriety of the term Glaube employed 
by him in his previous writings (which, in consequence of the 
word denoting in German both positive faith and general belief, 
had exposed him to the accusation of mysticism), by examples of 
a similar usage of the word Belief, in the philosophical writings 
of Hume, Reid, &c. ; he proceeds to vindicate another term he 
had employed — Offenbarung, revelation.) 

' /. — In so far as the universal usage of language is concerned, 
is there required any special examples or authorities ? We say 
commonly in German, that objects offenbaren, reveal, i. e. mani- 
fest, themselves through the senses. The same expression is prev- 
alent in French, English, Latin, and many other languages. 
With the particular emphasis which I have laid on it, this expres- 
sion does not occur in Hume ; — among other reasons because he 
leaves it undetermined, whether we perceive things really external 
or only as external. . . . The decided Realist, on the contrary, 
who unhesitatingly accepts an external existence, on the evidence 
of his senses, considers this certainty as an original conviction, 
and cannot but think, that on this fundamental experience, all 
our speculation touching a knowledge of the external world must 
rest — such a decided Realist, how shall he denominate the mean 
through which he obtains his certainty of external objects, as of 
existences independent of his representation of them ? He has 
nothing on which his judgment can rest, except the things them- 
selves — nothing but the fact, that the objects stand there, actually 
before him. In these circumstances, can be express himself by a 
more appropriate word than the word Revelation.* And should 
we not rather inquire, regarding the root of this word, and the 
origin of its employment. 



* This looks very like Natural Eealism. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 141 

' He. — So it certainly appears. 

' /. — That this Revelation deserves to be called truly miracu- 
lous [marvellous] follows of course. For if we consider suffi- 
ciently the reasons for the proposition — " That consciousness is 
exclusively conversant with the modifications of our proper self," 
Idealism will appear in all its force, and as the only scheme 
which our speculative reason can admit. Supjwse, however, that 
our Realist, notwithstanding, still remains a Realist, and holds 
fast by the belief that — for example — this object here, which we 
call a table, is no mere sensation — no mere existence found only 
in us, but an existence external and independent of our represen- 
tation, and by us only perceived ; I would boldly ask him for a 
more appropriate epithet for the Revelation of which he boasts, 
inasmuch as he maintains that something external to him is 
presented (sich darstelle) to his consciousness. For the presented 
existence (Daseyn) of such a thing external to us, we have no 
other proof than the presented existence of this thing itself ; and 
we must admit it to be wholly inconceivable, how that existence 
can possibly be perceived by us. But still, as was said, we main- 
tain that we do perceive it ; maintain with the most assured con- 
viction, that things there are, extant really out of us, that our rep- 
resentations and notions are conformed to these external things, 
and that not the things which we only fancy external are con- 
formed to our representations and notions. I ask on what does 
this conviction rest ? In truth on nothing, except on a revela- 
tion, which we can denominate no otherwise than one truly mi- 
raculous [marvellous].' 

c. — Allwills Briefsammlung, 1792. Werke, vol. i. p. 120. — 
4 "We admit, proceeded Allwill, freely and at once, that we do not 
comprehend how it is that, through the mere excitation and 
movement of our organs of sense, we are not only sensitive but 
sensitive of something ; — become aware of, perceive, something 
wholly different from us ; and that we comprehend, least of all, 
how wo distinguish and apprehend our proper self, and what per- 
tains to our internal states, in a manner wholly different from all 



142 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

sensitive perception. But we deem it more secure here to appeal 
to an original Instinct, with which every cognition of truth he- 
gins, than, on account of that incomprehensibility, to maintain — 
that the mind can conceive and represent in an infinitely various 
fashion not itself, and not other things, but, exclusively and alone, 
what is neither itself, nor any other thing.''* 

d. — From the Preface to the second volume of his "Works, form- 
ing the ' Introduction to the authors collected philosophical 
writings ;' this was published in 1815, and exhibits the last and 
most authentic view of the Jacobian doctrine. 

P. 58 sq. — ' Like every other system of cognitions, Philosophy 
receives its Form exclusively from the Understanding (Verstand) 
as, in general, the faculty of Concepts (Begriffe). "Without no- 
tions or concepts there can be no reconsciousness, no conscious- 
ness of cognitions, consequently no discrimination and compari- 
son, no separation and connection, no weighing, re-weighing, 
estimating, of these ; in a word, no seizing possession (Besitzer- 
greifung) of any truth whatever. On the other hand the con- 
tents — the peculiar contents, of philosophy are given exclusively 
by the Reason (Vernunft),f by the faculty, to wit, of cognitions, 
independent of sense, and beyond its reach. The Reason fash- 
ions no concepts, builds no systems, pronounces no judgments, 
but, like the external senses, it merely reveals, it merely announces 
the fact. 

' Above all, we must consider — that as there is a sensible in- 
tuition, an intuition through the Sense, so there is likewise a ra- 
tional intuition through the Reason. Each, as a peculiar source 
of knowledge, stands counter to the other ; and we can no more 
educe the latter from the former, than we can educe the former 
from the latter. So likewise, both hold a similar relation to the 
Understanding (Verstand), and consequently to demonstration. 



* And to be represented, a thing must be known. But ex fiypothesi, the 
external reality is unknown ; it cannot therefore be represented, 
t See note at p. 137 a, and references. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 14:3 

Opposed to the intuition of sense no demonstration is valid ; for 
all demonstration is only a reducing, a carrying back of the con- 
cept to the sensible intuition (empirical or pure), which affords 
its guarantee : and this, in reference to physical science, is the first 
and the last, the unconditionally valid, the absolute. On the 
same principle, no demonstration avails in opposition to the in- 
tuition of reason, which affords us a knowledge of supersensible 
objects, that is, affords us assurance of their reality and truth.* 

' We are compelled to employ the expression rational intuition, 
or intuition of reason (Vernunft-Anschauung), because the lan- 
guage possesses no other to denote the mean and the manner, in 
which the understanding is enabled to take cognizance of what, 
unattainable by the sense, is given by Feeling alone, and yet, not 
as a subjective excogitation, but as an objective reality. 

' When a man says — i" know, we have a right to ask him — 
Whence he knows ? And in answering our question, he must, in 
the end, inevitably resort to one or other of these two sources — 
either to the Sensation of Sense (Sinnes-Empfindung), or to the 
Feeling of the Mind (Geistes-Gefuehl). Whatever we know 
from mental feeling, that, we say, we believe. So speak we all. 
Virtue — consequently, Moral Liberty — consequently, Mind and 
God — these can only be believed. But the sensation on which 
knowledge in the intuition of sense — knowledge properly so call- 
ed — reposes, is as little superior to the Feeling on which the 
knowledge in belief is founded, as the brute creation is to the hu- 
man, the material to the intellectual world, nature to its creator.f 

' The power of Feeling, I maintain, is the power in man para- 
mount to every other ; it is that alone which specifically distin- 
guishes him from the brutes, that is, which, affording a differ- 

* Compare this with. Aristotle's doctrine, No. 3, especially a. b. c. f. and 
p. 86, b. 

t As will be seen from what follows, Jacobi applies the terms Feeling and 
Belief 'to both Sense and Eeason. Sensation, as properly the mere conscious- 
ness of a subjective sensual state,— of the agreeable or disagreeable in our 
corporeal organism, is a term that ought to have been here avoided. 



14A PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

ence not merely in degree but in kind, raises him to an incom- 
parable eminence above them : it is, I maintain, one and the 
same with reason ; or, as we may with propriety express our- 
selves — what we call Reason, what transcends mere understand- 
ing solely applied to nature, springs exclusively and alone out of 
the power of Feeling. As the senses refer the understanding to 
Sensation, so the Reason refers it to Feeling. The consciousness 
of that which Feeling manifests, I call Idea.''* 

P. 107. — 'As the reality, revealed by the external senses, re- 
quires no guarantee, itself affording the best assurance of its 
truth ; so the reality, revealed by that deep internal sense which 
we call Reason, needs no guarantee, being, in like manner, alone 
and of itself the most competent witness of its veracity. Of neces- 
sity, man believes his senses ; of necessity, he believes his reason ; 
and there is no certainty superior to the certainty which this be- 
lief contains. 

' When men attempted to demonstrate scientifically the truth 
of our representations (Vorstellungen) of a material world, exist- 
ing beyond, and independent of, these representations, the object 
which they wished to establish vanished from the demonstrators ; 
there remained naught but mere subjectivity, mere sensation : 
they found Idealism. 

' When men attempted to demonstrate scientifically the truth 
of our representations of an immaterial world, existing beyond 
these representations, — the truth of the substantiality of the hu- 
man mind, — and the truth of a free creator of the universe, dis- 
tinct from the universe itself, that is, an administrator, endowed 
with consciousness, personality, and veritable providence ; in like 
manner the object vanished from the demonstrators ; there re- 
mained for them mere logical phantasms : they found — Nihil- 
ism. 

' All reality, whether corporeal, revealed by the senses, or spir- 



* Without entering on details, I may observe that Jaeobi, like Kant, lim- 
its the term Idea to the highest notions of pure intellect, or Eeason. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 145 

itual, revealed by the reason, is assured to us alone by Feeling ;* 
beyond and above this there is no guarantee.' 

Among those who have adopted the principles of Jacobi, and 
who thus philosophize in a congenial spirit with Reid, besides 
Koeppen and Ancillon (Nos. 96, 9*7), I may refer, in general, to 
Bouterwek, Lehrb. d. philos. Wissensch., i. § 26, 27, and Lehrb. 
d. philos. Vorkent., §§ 12, 2*7. — Neeb, Verm. Schr.,vol. i. p. 154 
sq. vol. ii. p. 18, 70, 245 sq. 251, vol. hi. p. 141 sq. 

88. — Heidenreich, one of the most distinguished of the older 
Kantians. Betrachtungen, &c, P. i. p. 213,227. — 'Inasmuch 
as the conviction of certain cognitions (as of our own existence, of 
the existence of an external world, &c), does not depend upon an 
apprehension of reasons, but is exclusively an immediate innate 
reliance of the subject on self and nature, I call it natural belief 
(Natur-glaube). Every other cognition, notion, and demonstra- 
tion, reposes upon this natural belief, and without it cannot be 
brought to bear.' 

89.— L. Creuzer. — Skeptische Betrachtungen, &c, p. 110. — 
' We accord reality to the external .world because our conscious- 
ness impels us so to do That we are 

unable to explain, conceive, justify all this, argues nothing against 
its truth. Our whole knowledge rests ultimately on facts of con- 
sciousness, of which we not only cannot assign the reason, but 
cannot even think the possibility.' He does not however rise 
above Hypothetical Realism ; see p. 108. 

90. — Platner. — Philosophische Aphorismen, 2d ed. Pref. p. 
vi. — ' There is, I am persuaded, only one philosophy ; and that the 
true ; which in the outset of its inquiries departs from the princi- 
ple, that the certainty of human knowledge is demonstrable, only 
relatively to our faculty of knowing, and which, at the end of ita 
speculative career, returns within the thoughts — Experience, Com- 
mon Sense, and Morality — the best results of our whole earthly 
wisdom.' 



*In regard to the term Feeling, see p. 60, a. 
9 



14:6 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

91. — Fichte is a more remarkable, because a more reluctant, 
confessor of the paramount authority of Belief than even Kant. 
Departing from the principle common to Kant and philosophers 
in general, that the mind cannot transcend itself, Fichte devel- 
oped, with the most admirable rigor of demonstration, a scheme 
of Idealism, the purest, simplest, and most consistent which the 
history of philosophy exhibits. And so confident was Fichte in 
the necessity of his proof, that on one occasion he was provoked 
to imprecate eternal damnation on his head, should he ever 
swerve from any, even the least, of the doctrines which he had so 
victoriously established. But even Fichte in the end confesses 
that natural belief is paramount to every logical proof, and that 
his own idealism he could not believe. 

In the foot-note at page 129 b, 1 1 have given the result as 
stated by himself of his theoretical philosophy — Nihilism. After 
the passage there quoted, he; thus proceeds: — 'All cognition 
strictly so called (Wissen) is only an effigiation (Abbildung), and 
there is always in it something wanted, that to which the image 
or effigies (Bild) corresponds. This want can be supplied through 
no cognition ; and a system of cognitions is necessarily a system 
of mere images, destitute of reality, significance, or aim.' These 
passages are from the conclusion of the second book of his ' Bes- 
tiuimung des Menschen,' entitled ' Wissen,' pp. 130, 132, ed. 
1825. 

But in his Practical Philosophy Fichte became convinced that 
he had found an organ by which to lay hold on the internal and 
external worlds, which had escaped from him in his Theoretical. 
' I have discovered, he says, the instrument by which to seize on 
this Reality, and therewith, in all likelihood, on every other. 
Knowledge (das Wissen) is not this instrument: no cognition can 
be its own basis and its own proof; every cognition supposes 
another still higher, as its reason, and this ascent has no termina- 
tion. The instrument I mean, is Belief (Glaube).' (Po. book 

1 The note may be found above p. 24. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 147 

third, entitled 'Glaube,' p. 146.) — 'All ray conviction is only Be- 
lief, and it proceeds from Feeling or Sentiment (Gesinnung), not 
from the discursive Understanding (Verstand).' (lb. p. 147.) 'I 
possess, when once I am aware of this, the touchstone of all truth 
and of all conviction. The root of truth is in the Conscience (Ge- 
wissen) alone.' (lb. p. 148.) Compare St. Austin, supra, No. 15, 
b. — See also to the same effect Fichte's ' System der Sittenlehre,' 
p. 18 ; his work ' Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, p. 21, 
sq., and the ' Philosophische Journal,' vol. x. p. 7. Still more 
explicit is the recognition of 'internal sense' and 'belief as an 
irrecusable testimony of the reality of our perception of external 
realities, subsequently given by Fichte in his lectures at Erlangen 
in 1805, and reported by Gley in his 'Essai sur les Elements de 
la Philosophie,' p. 141, sq., and in his 'Philosophia Turonensis,' 
vol. i. p. 237. — I regret that I have not yet seen Fichte's 'Hinter- 
lassene Schriften,' lately published by his son. 

After these admissions it need not surprise us to find Fichte 
confessing, that ' How evident soever may be the demonstration 
that every object of consciousness (Vorstellung) is only illusion 
and dream, I am unable to believe it ;' and in like manner main- 
taining, that Spinoza never could have believed the system which 
he deduced with so logical a necessity. (Philos. Journ. vii. p. 35.) 

93. — Krug. — The Transcendental Synthetism of this philoso- 
pher is a scheme of dualism founded on the acceptance of the ori- 
ginal datum of consciousness, that we are immediately cognizant, 
at once, of an internal, and of an external world. It is thus a 
scheme of philosophy, really, though not professedly, founded on 
Common Sense. Krug is a Kantian ; and as originally promul- 
gated in his 'Entwurf eines neuen Organons,' 1801 (§ 5), his 
system was, like Kant's, a mere Cosmothetic Idealism ; for while 
he allowed a knowledge of the internal world, he only allowed a 
belief of the external. The polemic of Schulze against the com- 
mon theory of sensitive representation, and in professed conform- 
ity with Reid's doctrine of perception, was published in the same 
year ; and it was probably the consideration of this that deter- 



148 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

mined Krug to a fundamental change in his system. For in his 
treatise 'Ueber die verschiedenen Methoden,' &c. 1802 (p. 44), 
and still more explicitly in his 'Fundamental Philosophie,' 1803 
(§ 68), the mere belief in the unknown existence of external things 
is commuted into a cognition, and an immediate perception appa- 
rently allowed, as well of the phenomena of matter, as of the phe- 
nomena of mind. See also his pamphlet ' Ueber das Verhaelt- 
niss der Philosophie zum gesunden Menschenverstande,' 1835, in 
reference to Hegel's paradox, — ' That the world of Common 
Sense, and the world of Philosophy, are, to each other, worlds up- 
side down.' 

94. — Degerando. — Histoire comparee des Systemes de Philo- 
sophie, t. iii. p. 343, original edition. ' Concluons: la realite de 
nos connaissances [of the external world] ne se demontre pas ; elle 
se reconnait. Elle se reconnait, par l'effet de cette meme conscience 
qui nous revele notre connaissance elle-meme. Tel est le privi- 
lege de l'intelligence humaine. Elle apercoit les objets, elle s'aper- 
coit ensuite elle-meme, elle apercoit qu'elle a apercu. Elle est 
toute lumiere, mais une lumiere qui reflechit indefiniment sur elle- 
meme. On nous opposera ce principe abstrait : qu'une sensation 
ne pent nous insiruire que de notre propre existence. . . . Sans 
doute lorsqu'on commence par confondre la sensation avec la per- 
ception, par definir celle-ci une maniere d'etre du moi, on ne peut 
leur attribuer d'autre instruction que celle dont notre propre exis- 
tence est 1'objet. Mais evitons ici les disputes de mots ; il s'agit 
seulement de cohstater un fait ; sayoir, si dans certains cas, en re- 
flechissant sur nos operations, en demelant toutes leurs circons- 
tances, nous n'y decouvrons pas la perception immediate et primi- 
tive d'une existence etrangere, perception a la quelle on donnera 
tel nom qu'on jugera convenable. Si ce fait est exact, constant, 
universe!, si ce fait est primitif, il est non seulement inutile, mais 
absurde, d'en demander le pjourquoi et le comment. Car nous 
n'avons aucune donnee pour l'expliquer.' 

95. — Fries, a distinguished philosopher of the Kantian school, 
but whose opinions have been considerably modified by the infra- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 149 

ence of the Jacobian philosophy of belief, professes in his Feeling 
of Truth (Wahrheitsgefuehl) a doctrine of common sense. This 
doctrine is in every essential respect the same as Eeid's ; for Fries 
is altogether wrong in the assertion which, in different works, he 
once and again hazards, that, under Common Sense, Eeid had in 
view a special organ of truth — a peculiar sense, distinct from rea- 
son or intelligence in general. See in particular his Krit. vol. i. 
§ So.— Metaph. § 17.— Gesch. d. Phil. vol. ii. § ll2. Anthr. vol. 
i. § 52. ii. Vorr. p. xvi. — Log. § 84. 

96. — Koeppen— a philosopher of the school of Jacobi. — Dars- 
tellung des Wesens der Philosophie, § 11. — ' Human knowledge, 
(Wissen) considered in its totality, exhibits a twofold character. It 
is either Apprehension (Wahrnehmung) or Conception (Begriff) ; 
either an immediate conviction, or a mediate insight obtained 
through reasons. By the former we are said to believe, by the 
latter to conceive [or comprehend].' After an articulate exposition 
of this, and having shown, with Jacobi and Hume, that belief as 
convertible with feeling constitutes the ultimate ground both of 
action and cognition, he proceeds : — ' In a philosophical sense, be- 
lieved is tantamount to apprehended. For all apprehension is an 
immediate conviction which cannot be founded upon reflection 
and conception. In our human individuality we possess a double 
faculty of apprehension — Reason [intelligence, voSs] and sense. 
What, therefore, through reason and sense is an object of our 
apprehension is believed. . . . The belief of reason and the belief 
of sense, are our guarantees for the certainty of what we appre- 
hend. The former relies on the testimony of reason, the latter on 
the testimony of sense. Is this twofold testimony false, there is 
absolutely no truth of apprehension. The combinations of con- 
ceptions afford no foundation for this original truth. Belief is 
thus the first in our cognition, because apprehension is the first ; 
conception is the second, because it regards the relations of what is 
given through apprehension. If, then, I exclusively appropriate 
to the result of conceptions the name of knowledge (Wissen) — still 
all knowledge presupposes belief, and on belief does the truth of 



150 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

knowledge repose. Belief lays hold on the originally given ; 
knowledge develops the relations of the given, in conformity with 
the laws of thought,' &c. 

97. — Ancillon (the Son). — German by birth, French by line- 
age, writing in either language with equal elegance, and repre- 
senting in himself the highest and most peculiar qualities of both 
his nations ; we have still farther to admire in the prime minister 
of Prussia, at once, the metaphysician and moralist, the historian 
and statesman, the preacher and man of the world. He philoso- 
phized in the spirit of Jacobi ; and from his treatise Ueber Glaube 
(On Belief), one of his later writings, I translate the following 



P. 36. — 'Existences, realities, are given us. We apprehend 
them by means of an internal mental intuition (geistige Anschau- 
ung), which, in respect of its clearness, as in respect of its cer- 
tainty, is as evident as universal, and as resistless and indubitable 
as evident. 

' Were no such internal, immediate, mental intuition given us, 
there would be given us no existence, no reality. The universe — 
the worlds of mind and matter — would then resolve themselves 
into apparency. All realities would be mere appearances, appear- 
ing to another mere appearance — Man ; whilst no answer could 
be afforded to the ever-recurring questions — What is it that ap- 
pears ? and To whom is the appearance made ? Even language 
resists such assertions, and reproves the lie. 

' Had we no such internal, immediate, mental intuition, exist- 
ences would be beyond the reach of every faculty we possess. 
For neither our abstractive nor reflective powers, neither the anal- 
ysis of notions, nor notions themselves, neither synthesis nor rea- 
soning, could ever lead us to reality and existence.'* 

(Having shown this in regard to each of these in detail, he 
proceeds : p. 40.) — ' This root of all reality, this ground of exist- 

* Fichte says the same : — ' From cognition to pass out to an object of cog- 
nition — this is impossible ; we must therefore depart from the reality, other- 
wise we should remain forever unable to reach it.' 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 151 

ence, is the Reason (Vernunft), 1 out of which all reasonings pro- 
ceed, and on which alone they repose. 

' The Reason of which I here speak is not an instrument which 
serves for this or that performance, but a true productive force, a 
creative power, which has its own revelation; which does not 
show what is already manifested, but, as a primary conscious- 
ness, itself contemplates existence ; which is not content to collect 
data, and from these data to draw an inference, but which itself 
furnishes Reality as a datum. This Reason is no arithmetical 
machine, but an active principle ; it does not reach the truth 
after toil and time, but departs from the truth, because it finds 
the truth within itself. 

'This Reason, this internal eye,* which immediately receives 
the light of existence, and apprehends existences, as the bodily 
eye the outlines and the colors of the sensuous world, is an im- 
mediate sense which contemplates the invisible. 

' This Reason is the ground, the principle, of all knowledge 
(Wissen) ; for all knowledge bears reference to reality and exist- 
ences. 

' All knowledge must, first or last, rest on facts (Thatsachen), 
universal facts, necessary facts, of the internal sense; — on facts 
which give us ourselves, our own existence, and a conviction of 
the existence of other supersensible beings. 

'These facts are for us mental intuitions. Inasmuch as they 
give us an instantaneous, clear, objective perception of reality, 
they are entitled to the name of Intuition (Anscahaung) ; inas- 
much as this intuition regards the objects of the invisible world, 
they deserve the attribute of mental. 

' Such an intuition, such a mental feeling (Gefuehl), engenders 
Philosophical Belief. This belief consists in the immediate ap- 
prehending of existences wholly concealed and excluded from the 

1 On the employment of the word Reason hy the German philosophers, su- 
pra, p. 79, sq. — W. 

* Plato, Aristotle, and many philosophers after them, say this of Intelli- 
gence, VOVi. 



152 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

senses, which reveal themselves to us in our inmost consciousness, 
and this too with a necessary conviction of their objectivity 
(reality). 

'Belief, in the philosophical sense, means, the apprehension 
without proof, reasoning or deduction of any kind, of those higher 
truths which belong to the supersensible world, and not to the 
world of appearances.' .... 

P. 43. — ' Philosophical belief apprehends existences which can 
neither be conceived nor demonstrated. Belief is therefore a 
knowledge conversant about existences, but it does not know ex- 
istences, if under knowledge be understood — demonstrating, com- 
prehending, conceiving.' .... 

P. 44. — ' The internal intuition which affords us the apprehen- 
sion of certain existences, and allows us not to doubt -in regard to 
the certainty of their reality, does not inform us concerning their 
nature. This internal intuition is given us in Feeling and through 
Feeling.' .... 

P. 48. — ' This internal universal sense, this highest power of 
mental vision in man, seems to have much in it of the instinctive, 
and may therefore appropriately be styled intellectual Instinct. 
For on the one hand it manifests itself through sudden, rapid, 
uniform, resistless promptings ; and on the other hand, these 
promptings relate to objects, which lie not within the domain of 
the senses, but belong to the suj)ersensible world. 

'Let no offence be taken at the expression Instinct. For, 
&c.' .... 

P. 50. — 'Had man not an intellectual instinct, or a reason 
giving out, revealing, but not demonstrating, truths rooted in 
itself, for want of a point of attachment and support, he would 
move himself in all directions, but without progress ; and on a 
level, too, lower than the brutes, for he could not compass that 
kind of perfection which the brute possesses, and would be dis- 
qualified from attaining any other. 

'The immediate Reason elicits internal mental intuitions ; these 
intuitions have an evidence, which works on us like an intellec- 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 153 

tual instinct, and generates in us a philosophical belief, which 
constitutes the foundation of our knowledge. To which soever of 
these expressions the preference be accorded, all their notions 
have a common character, and are so interlinked together, that 
they all equally result in the same very simple proposition : — 
There is either no truth, or there are fundamental truths, which 
admit as little of demonstration as of doubt? .... 

P. 51. — 'Had we not in ourselves an active principle of truth, 
we should have neither a rule, nor a touchstone, nor a standard, 
of the true. Had we not in ourselves the consciousness of exist- 
ences, there would be for us no means of knowing, whether what 
comes from without be not mere illusion, and whether what the 
mind itself fashions and combines be aught but an empty play 
with notions. In a word — the truth must be in us, as a consti- 
tutive, and as a regulative, principle ; or we shoidd never attain 
to truth. Only with determinate points of commencement and 
termination, and with a central point of knowledge, from which 
every thing departs, and to which every thing tends to return, 
are other cognitions possible ; failing this primary condition, 
nothing can be given us to know, and nothing certain can exist.' 

And in the Preface (p. xi.) he had said : — ' The Reason in- 
vents, discovers, creates, in propriety, nothing ; it enounces only 
what it harbors, it only reveals what God himself has deposited 
within it ; but so soon as it is conscious to itself of this, it speaks 
out with a force which inspires us with a rational belief, a faith 
of reason ( Vernunftglaube), — a belief which takes priority of eveiy 
other, and which serves to every other as a point of departure and 
of support. How can we believe the word of God, if we do not 
already believe that a God exists V 

Compare also his ' Zur Vermittlung der Extreme,' vol. ii. 
p. 253, sq., and his ' Moi Humain' passim. 

98. — Gerlach. — Fundamental Philosophie, § 16. — ' So soon 
as a man is convinced of any thing — be his conviction of the 
True, of the Good, or of the Beautiful — he rests upon his Con- 
sciousness ; for in himself and in his Consciousness alone does he 



154 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

possess the elements which constitute the knowledge of things, 
and it is herein alone that he finds the necessity of all and each 
of his judgments. In a word, that only has an existence for us 
of which we are conscious.' 

99. — Hermes, the late illustrious ornament of the Catholic fac- 
ulty of Theology in Bonn, a thinker of whom any country may 
well be proud, is the author of a philosophy of cognition which, 
in its fundamental principles, is one of Common Sense. It is con- 
tained in the first volume of his ' Introduction to Christian Cath- 
olic Theology,' a work which, since the author's death, has ob- 
tained a celebrity, apart from its great intrinsic merits, through 
the agitation consequent on its condemnation at Eome, for doc- 
trines, which, except on some notoriously open questions, the 
Hermesians — in Germany, now a numerous and able school — 
strenuously deny that it contains. 

To speak only of his theoretical philosophy. — For the terms 
Feeling of Truth, Belief, &c, Hermes substitutes the term Hold- 
ing-for-true (Fuerwahrhalten) which is only inadequately express- 
ed by the Latin assensus, assentio, adh<%sio,ike Greek <fvyxara6s<fig, 
or any English term. Holding-for-true involves in it a duplicity ; 
— viz : a Holding-for-fr^e of the knoivledge, and a Holding-for- 
real (Fuerwirklichhalten) of the thing known. Both of these parts 
are united in the decision — that the knowledge and the thing 
known coincide. 

Holding -for-real is not consequent on reflection ; it is not the 
result of a recognition ; it is the concomitant, not the consequent 
of apprehension. It is a constituent element of the primary con- 
sciousness of a perception external or internal ; it is what, in the 
language of the Scottish philosophers, might be called an instinct- 
ive belief. ' This holding-for-real (says Hermes) is manifestly 
given in me prior to all Eeflection ; for, with the first conscious- 
ness, with the consciousness " that I know," from which all Reflec- 
tion departs, the consciousness is also there, " that I hold the 
thing known for real," ' Einl., vol. i. p. 182. See Nos. 3, 15* (at 
end), 16, &c. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 155 

The necessity we find of assenting or holding is the last and 
highest security we can obtain for truth and reality. The neces- 
sary holding of a thing for real is not itself reality ; it is only the 
instrument, the mean, the surrogate, the guarantee, of reality. It 
is not an objective, it is only a subjective, certainty. It constitutes, 
however, all the assurance or certainty of which the human mind 
is capable. ' The [necessary] Holding,' says Hermes, ' of some- 
thing known [for real], can afford no other certainty of the ob- 
jective existence of what is known but this — that I (the 
subject) must hold the thing known for objectively existent ; or 
(meaning always by the word subjective what is in me, in the 
subject) — of the objective existence of a thing known there can 
possibly be given only the highest subjective certainty. But no 
one who knows what he would be at, will ever ask after any 
other certainty ; not merely because it is unattainable, but be- 
cause it is contradictory for human thought : in other words, can 
a subject be any otherwise certain than that it is certain — than 
that itself, the subject, is certain ? To be objectively certain (tak- 
ing the term objective in a sense corresponding to the term sub- 
jective as here employed) the subject, must, in fact, no longer re- 
main the subject, it must also be the object, and, as such, be able 
to become certain ; and yet in conformity to our notion of cer- 
tainty (Gewissheit) — or whatever more suitable expression may 
be found for it — all questions concerning certainty must be re- 
ferred to the subject (to the Ego) : the attempt to refer them to 
the object involves a contradiction.' Ibid. p. 186. 

This is clearly and cogently stated ; and it would seem as if 
we had only to appeal to the subjective certainty we have, in our 
being compelled to hold that in perception the ego is immedi- 
ately cognisant, not only of itself as subject, but of a non-ego as 
object — to prove that the external world being actually known 
as existing, actually exists. (See above, p. 26, sq.) This 
Hermes does not, however, do. He seems not, indeed, to have 
contemplated the possibility of the mind being conscious or im- 
mediately cognitive of aught but self ; and only furnishes us 



156 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

with, an improved edition of the old and inconclusive reasoning, 
that an external world must he admitted, as the necessary ground 
or reason of our internal representation of it. 

100. — Cousin. — Fragmens Philosophiques, Third edition, 
Vol. i. 

a. — P. 243. — ' Philosophy is already realized, for human 
thought is there. 

' There is not, and there cannot be, a philosophy absolutely 
false ; for it would behoove the author of such a philosophy to 
place himself out of his own thought, in other words out of his 
humanity. This power has been given to no man. 

' How then may philosophy err ? — By considering thought 
only on a single, side, and by seeing, in that single side, the total- 
ity of thought. There are no false, but many incomplete sys- 
tems ; — systems true in themselves, but vicious in their preten- 
sions, each to comprise that absolute truth which is only found 
distributed through all. 

' The incomplete, and by consequence, the exclusive — this is the 
one only vice of philosophy, or rather, to speak more correctly, 
of philosophers, for philosophy rises above all the systems. The 
full portrait of the real, which philosophy presents, is indeed 
made up of features borrowed from every several system ; for of 
these each reflects reality ; but unfortunately reflects it. under a 
single angle.* 

' To compass possession of reality full and entire, it is requi- 
site to sist ourselves at the centre. To reconstitute the intellect- 
ual life, mutilated in the several systems, it behooves us to re- 
enter Consciousness, and there, weaned from a systematic and 
exclusive spirit, to analyze thought into its elements, and all its 
elements, and to seek out in it the characters, and all the charac- 
ters under zohich it is at present manifested to the eye of conscious- 
wm.' — Du Fait de Conscience. 

b. — P. 181. — 'The fundamental principle of knowledge and 

* The like lias been said by Leibnitz and Hegel ; but not so finely. 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 157 

intellectual life is Consciousness. Life begins with consciousness, 
and with consciousness it ends : in consciousness it is that we 
apprehend ourselves; and it is in and through consciousness 
that we apprehend the external world. "Were it possible to rise 
above consciousness, to place ourselves, so to speak, behind it, to 
penetrate into the secret workshop where intelligence blocks out 
and fabricates the various phenomena, there to officiate, as it 
were, at the birth, and to watch the evolution of consciousness ; 
— then might we hope to comprehend its nature, and the different 
steps through which it rises to the form in which it is first actu- 
ally revealed. But, as all knowledge commences with conscious- 
ness, it is able to remount no higher. Here a prudent analysis 
will therefore stop, and occupy itself with what is given." 1 

Other testimonies might easily be quoted from the subsequent 
writings of M. Cousin — were this not superfluous ; for I presume 
that few who take an interest in philosophical inquiries can now 
be ignorant of these celebrated works. 

100. — De La Mennais. — See No. 2. 

OMITTED. 

9**. — Mlius Aristides. — Platonic Oration, ii. (Opera, ed. 
Canter, t. iii. p. 249 ; ed. Jebb. t. ii. p. 150) — ' That the Many 
are not to be contemned, and their opinion held of no account; 
but that in them, too, there is a presentiment, an unerring in- 
stinct, which by a kind of divine fatality, seizes darkling on the 
truth ; this we have Plato himself teaching, and ages earlier than 
Plato, this old Hesiod, with posterity in chorus, in these familiar 
verses sang: — 

' The Fame, lorn of the many-nation? d voice 
Of mankind, dies not / for it lives as God? 

For Hesiod, see No. 1. These verses are likewise adduced by 

Aristotle as proverbial. (Eth. Nic. vii. 13 [14]). They may 

be also rendered thus : — 

' The Word, forth sent by the conclamant voice 
Of mankind, errs not ; for its truth is God's.'' 



158 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 

Fame (Public Opinion) had her temple in Athens. See Pausa- 
nias. 

Plato is referred to in the Laws (L. xii. § 5, ed. Bekk. t. ii. 
p. 950, ed. Steph.). Another passage, in the Crito, which Canter 
indicates, is irrelevant. In the former, Plato attributes to man- 
kind at large a certain divine sense or vaticination of the truth 
(6s7ov rixai slVro^ov), by which, in our natural judgments, we are 
preserved from error. I did not, however, find the statement 
sufficiently generalized to quote the context as a testimony. 

15*. — Theodoret. — The Curative of Greek Affections, Ser- 
mon i., on Belief. (Opera, ed. Sirmondi, t. iv. p. 478.) — ' Belief 
[or Faith], therefore, is a matter of the greatest moment. For, 
according to the Pythagorean Epicharmus, 

Mind, it seeth ; Mind, it Tieareth; 
All leeide is deaf and Mind ; 

and Heraclitus, in like manner, exhorts us to submit to the 
guidance of belief, in these Avords : — Unless ye hope, ye shall not 
find the unhoped for, v)hich is inscrutable and impermeable. . . . 
And let none of you, my friends, say aught in disparagement of 
belief. For belief is called by Aristotle the Criterion of Science ; 
whilst Epicurus says, that it is the Anticipation of Reason, and 
that anticipation, having indued Knowledge, results in Compre- 
hension. — But, as we define it, Belief is — a spontaneous assent 
or adhesion of the mind, — ox the intuition of the unapparmt, 
— or the taking possession of the real (*££< to ov htfratfig — v. 
Bud. in Pand. et Com. L. G.), and natural apprehension of 
the \mperceivable, — or an unvacillating propension established 
in the mind of the believer. — But, on the one hand, Belief re- 
quires knowledge, as on the other, Knowledge requires belief. 
For there can subsist, neither belief without knowledge, nor 
knowledge without belief. Belief precedes knowledge, knowl- 
edge follows belief; while desire is attendant upon knowledge, 
and action consequent upon desire. For it is necessary, — to 
believe first ; then to learn ; knowing, to desire ; and desiring to 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 159 

act. . . . — Belief, therefore, my friends, is a concern common 
to all ; . . . for all who would learn any thing must first 
believe. [So Aristotle.] Belief is, therefore, the founiation and 
basis of science. For your philosophers have defined Belief — a 
voluntary assent or adhesion of the mind ; and Science — an im- 
mutable habit, accompanied with reason.'' — This is a testimony 
which I should regret to have totally forgotten. Compare Nos. 
3, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 81, 86, 87, 91, 96, 97, 99, &c. 

17*. — Simplicius. — Commentary on the Manual of Epictetus ; 
and there speaking in the language of the Porch, rather than in 
that of the Lyceum or the Academy. 

a. — C. 33, Heins. 23, Sch weigh. — 'The Common Notions of 
men concerning the nature of things, according to which, in place 
of varying from each other, they are in opinion mutually agreed 
(as, that the good is useful, and the useful good, that all things 
desiderate the good, that the equal is neither surpassing nor sur- 
passed, that twice two is four) — these notions, and the like, sug- 
gested in us by right reason, and tested by experience and time, 
are true, and in accordance with the nature of things ; whereas 
the notions proper to individual men are frequently fallacious.' 

b. — C. 72, Heins. 48, Schweigh. — 'But Reason, according to 
the ])roverb, is a Mercury common to all ; for, although, as in 
us individually, reasons are plural, or numerically different, they 
are in species one and the same ; so that, by reason all men fol- 
low after the same things as good, and eschew the same things 
as bad, and think the same things to be true or to be false.' 

In these passages, Reason, in the vaguer meaning of the 
Stoics, is employed, where Intellect, in the precise acceptation of 
the Aristotelians and Platonists, might have been expected from 
Simplicius. But he is here speaking by accomrr odation to his 
author. 



160 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 



As a chronological table was luckily omitted at the head of 
the Series, I here append, ethnographically subarranged, the fol- 
lowing 

LIST OF THE PRECEDING TESTIMONIES. 



Greek. — 1, Hesiod; 2, Heraclitus; 3, Aristotle; 4, Theophrastus ; 
9**, iElius Aristides, see at end; 10, Alexander Aphrodisiensis ; 
11, Clemens Alexandrinus; 15, Theodoret, see at end; 16, Proclus; 
17, Ammonius Hermiaa; 17 *, Simplicius, see at end. 

Eoman. — 5, Lucretius ; 6, Cicero ; 7, Horace ; 8, Seneca ; 9, Pliny 
the younger; 9* Quintilian; 12, Tertullian; 13, Arnobius; 14, 
Lactantius ; 15, St. Augustin. 

Arabian. — 19, Algazel. 

Italian. — 18, St. Anselm (ambiguously French); 20, Aquinas; 
26, Julius Csesar Scaliger ; 67, Yulpius ; 68, Vico ; 71, Genovesi. 

Spanish. — 22, Antonius Andreas ; 28, Antonius Goveanus {Por- 
tuguese) : 29, Nunnesius ; 32, Mariana. 

French. — 23, Budasus; 27, Omphalitis; 30, Muretus; 37, Des- 
cartes; 39, Balzac; 40, Chanet; 41, Irenasus a Sancto Jacobo; 42, 
Lescalopier; 43, Pascal; 44, La Chambre; 46, Le Pere Eapin; 47, 
Du Hamel; 48, Malebranche; 49, Poiret; 50, Bossuet; 59, John 
Alphonso Turretini (Genevese); 60, Fenelon; 62, D Aguesseau ; 63, 
Burner ; 70, Huber ; 74, D Alembert ; 94, Degerando ; 100, Cousin ; 
101, De La Mennais. 

British. — 21, Duns Scotus; 33, Sir John Davies; 35, Lord Her- 
bert; 36, Cameron; 38, Sir Thomas Brown; 45, Henry More ; 51, 
Locke ; 52, Bentley ; 53, John Serjeant ; 53 *, Abercromby ; 55, 
Toland; 61, Shaftesbury; 62 *, Berkeley; 64, Lyons; 65, Amherst; 
66, Wollaston; 72, Hume; 78, Price; 79, Eeid; 82, Beattie. (Of 
these, 21, [?] 36, 53 * 72, 79, 82, are Scottish.) 

German. — 24, Luther; 25, Melanchthon; 34, Eeckermann; 54, 
Leibnitz; 56, Christian Thomasius; 57, Eidiger; 58, Fuerlin; 69, 
Christian "Wolf; 73, Crusius; 75, (Etinger; 76, Eschenbacb; 77, 
John Matthew Gesner; 80, Hiller; 83, Storchenau; 84, Stattler; 
86, Kant ; 87, Jacobi , 88, Heidenreich ; 89, Leonhard Creuzer ; 90, 



PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 161 

Plainer; 91, Fichte; 93, Krug; 95, Fries; 96, Koeppen; 97, Ancil- 
lon, the son; 98, Gerlach; 99, George Hermes. 

Belgian. — 31, Giphanius; 81, Hemsterhuis ; 85, Hennert. 

In all, one hundred and six Witnesses. 



We are amazed at such a shoreless sea of erudition, but it has a use beyond 
mere show, for it is an important contribution to the history of opinion. Our 
confidence in the Common Sense Philosophy is increased when we see that 
the greatest thinkers of every age have, directly or indirectly, recognized its 
principles. The pursuit of Philosophy is ennobled when some higher 
ground is reached, whereon apparently conflicting systems may be con- 
ciliated. Bossuet somewhere says, ' Every error is a truth abused.' Cousin, 
the most catholic of all the historians of Philosophy, continually repeats the 
same pregnant truth. Hamilton claims that in his own system may be found 
' a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions ' 
— W. 

10 



PART SECOND. 



PHILOSOPHY 



PERCEPTIO 



"No man seeks a reason for believing what he se*.s cr feels ; and, if he 
did, it would be difficult to find one. But, though he can give no reason for 
believing his senses, his belief remains as firm as if it were grounded on 
demonstration. . . . The statesman continues to plod, the soldier to 
fight, and the merchant lo export and import, without being in the least 
moved by the demonstrations that have been offered of the non-existence 
of those things about which they are so seriously employed. And a man 
may as soon, by reasoning, pull the moon out of her orbit, as destroy the 
belief of the objects of sense." — Eeid, Essay ii. chap. xx. pp. 27S-4. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 



CHAPTER I. 



ELUCIDATION OF EEID'S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION, AND ITS 
DEFENCE AGAINST THOMAS BROWN. 1 

We rejoice in the appearance of this work, 2 and for two rea- 
sons. We hail it as another sign of the convalescence of Philos- 
ophy in a great and influential nation ; and prize it as a seasona- 
ble testimony, by intelligent foreigners, to the merits of a philos- 
opher whose merits are under a momentary eclipse at home. 

Apart from the practical corruption, of which (in the emphatic 
language of Fichte) ' the dirt philosophy' may have been the 
cause, we regard the doctrine of mind, long dominant in France, 
as more pernicious, through the stagnation of thought which it 
occasioned, than for the speculative errors which it set afloat. 
The salutary fermentation which the skepticism of Hume 3 deter- 



1 The substance of this chapter was, originally, an article in the Edinburgh 
Review for October, 1830. It may be found in ' The Discussions on Philos- 
ophy, etc.,' pp. 38-98. It has been translated into French by M. Peisse ; 
into Italian by S. Lo Gatto ; and is contained in Cross's Selections from the 
Edinburgh Review. — W. 

2 The work referred to is the ' CEuvres Completes de Thomas Reid, Chef 
de rEcole Ecossaise. Publiees par M. Th. Joitffroy, avec des Fragments de 
M. Royer-Collard, et une Introduction de l'Editeur.' Tomes ii.-vi. 8vo., 
Paris, 1828-9, (not completed).— W. 

3 The usual criticism of Hume, as Hamilton well remarks (Reid, p. 444), 
proceeds upon the erroneous hypothesis that he was a Dogmatist. He was 
a Skeptic, that is, he accepted the principles asserted by the prevalent Dog- 
matism ; and only showed that such and such conclusions were, on iliese prin- 
ciples, inevitable. Hume destroyed Sensualism (Sensuism is better, and still 
better is Sensism, as Mr. Brownson has it) by reducing it to absurdity. Yet 



166 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

mined in Scotland and in Germany, did not extend to that coun- 
try ; and the dogmatist there slumbered on, unsuspicious of his 
principles, nay even resigned to conclusions which would make 
philosophy to man the solution of the terrific oracle to (Edipus : 

' Mayst thou ne'er learn the truth of what thou art !' 

The present contrast, 1 indeed, which the philosophical enthusi- 
asm of France exhibits to the speculative apathy of Britain, is 
any thing but nattering to ourselves. The new spirit of meta- 
physical inquiry, which the French imbibed from Germany and 
Scotland, arose with them precisely at the time when the popu- 
larity of psychological researches began to decline with us ; and 
now, when all interest in these speculations seems here to be 
extinct, they are there seen flourishing, in public favor, with a 
universality and vigor corresponding to their encouragement. 

The only example, indeed, that can be adduced of any interest 
in such subjects, recently exhibited in this country, is the favor- 
able reception of Dr. Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the 
Mind. This work, however, we regard as a concurrent cause of 
the very indifference we lament, and as a striking proof of its 
reality. 

As a cause : — These lectures have certainly done much to jus- 
tify the general neglect of psychological pursuits. Dr. Brown's 
high reputation for metaphysical acuteness, gave a presumptive 
authority to any doctrine he might promulgate ; and the personal 
relations in which he stood to Mr. Stewart afforded every assu- 
rance that he would not revolt against that philosopher's opin- 

in the human mind there is something that could see the absurdity, some- 
thing that could make the absurdity apparent ; ' intelligence supposes prin- 
ciples, ■which, as the conditions of its activity, cannot be the results of its 
operation.' Seizing this higher truth, Eeid and Kant have reared a new 
p] iloscphy, the last word of which is the incomparable system of Hamilton. 
— W. 

1 We have omitted six paragraphs and part of another, which were omit- 
ted when the article was first published in the Edinburgh Eeview. They 
are, with the exception of a few lines , contained in the Introduction to this 
volume. Seep. 7. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 167 

ions, rashly, or except on grounds that would fully vindicate his 
dissent. In these circumstances, what was the impression on the 
public mind; when all that was deemed best established — all 
that was claimed as original and most important in the philoso- 
phy of Eeid and Stewart, was proclaimed by their disciple and 
successor to be naught but a series of misconceptions, only less 
wonderful in their commission than in the general acquiescence in 
their truth ? Confidence was at once withdrawn from a pursuit, 
in which the most sagacious inquirers were thus at fault ; and 
the few who did not relinquish the study in despair, clung with 
implicit faith to the revelation of the new apostle. 

As a proof: — These lectures afford evidence of how greatly 
talent has, of late, been withdrawn from the field of metaphysics] 
discussion. This work has now been before the world for ten 
years. In itself it combines many of the qualities calculated to 
attract public, and even popular attention ; while its admirers 
have exhausted hyperbole in its praise, and disparaged every 
philosophic name to exalt the reputation of its author. Yet, 
thpugh attention has been thus concentred on these lectures for 
so long a period, and though the high ability and higher author- 
ity of Dr. Brown, deserved and would have recompensed the 
labor ; we are not aware that any adequate attempt has yet been 
made to subject them, in whole or in part, to an enlightened and 
impartial criticism. The radical inconsistencies which they 
involve, in every branch of their subject, remain undeveloped ; 
their unacknowledged appropriations are still lauded as original ; 
their endless mistakes, in the history of philosophy, stand yet 
uncorrected ; and their frequent misrepresentations of other phi- 
losophers continue to mislead.* In particular, nothing has more 



* We shall, in the sequel, afford samples of these 'inconsistencies,' 
'mistakes,' 'misrepresentations,' — but not of Brown's 'appropriations.' 
To complete the cycle, and vindicate our assertion, we may here adduce one 
specimen of the way in which discoveries have been lavished on him, in 
consequence of his omission (excusable, perhaps, in the circumstances) to 
advertise his pupil when he was not original. Brown's doctrine of General- 



168 PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 

convinced us of the general neglect in this country, of psycholo- 
gical science, than that Dr. Brown's ignorant attack on Reid, 
and, through Eeid, confessedly on Stewart, has not long since 
been repelled; — except, indeed, the general belief that it was 
triumphant. 

In these circumstances, we felt gratified, as we said, with 
the present honorable testimony to the value of Dr. Reid's spec- 
ulations in a foreign country ; and have deemed this a seasonable 
opportunity of expressing our own opinion on the subject, and of 
again vindicating, we trust, to that philosopher, the well-earned 
reputation of which he has been too long defrauded in his own. 
If we are not mistaken in our view, we shall, in fact, reverse the 
marvel, and retort the accusation ; in proving that Dr. Brown 
himself is guilty of that ' series of wonderful misconceptions,' of 
which he so confidently arraigns his predecessors. 

' Turpe est doctori, cum culpa redarguit ipsum.' 

This, however, let it be recollected, is no point of merely per- 
sonal concernment. It is true, indeed, that either Reid accom- 
plished nothing, or the science has retrograded under Brown. 
But the question itself regards the cardinal point of metaphysical 
philosophy ; and its determination involves the proof or the refu- 
tation of skepticism. 

The subject we have undertaken can, with difficulty, be com- 
pressed within the limits of a single article. This must stand our 
excuse for not, at present, noticing the valuable accompaniment 

ization is identical with, that commonly taught by philosophers — not Scot- 
tish ; and, among these, by authors, with whose works his lectures prove 
him to have been well acquainted. But if a writer, one of the best informed 
of those who, in this country, have of late cultivated this branch of philoso- 
phy, could, among other expressions equally encomiastic, speak of Brown's 
return to the vulgar opinion, on such a point, as of ' a discovery, &c; which 
will, in all future ages, be regarded as one of the most important steps ever 
made in metaphysical science ? how incompetent must ordinary readers be 
to place Brown on his proper level— how desirable would have been a criti- 
cal examination of his Lectures to distribute to him his own, and to estimate 
his property at its true value. — See Part ii. chap. v. p. 398, 399, alibi. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 169 

to Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in the Fragments of 
M. Royer-Collard's Lectures, which are appended to the third and 
fourth volumes of the translation. A more appropriate occasion ' 
for considering these may, however, occur, when the first volume, 
containing M. Jouftroy's Introduction, appears ; of which, from 
other specimens of his ability, we entertain no humble expec- 
tations. 

' Reid,' says Dr. Brown, ' considers his confutation of the ideal 
system as involving almost every thing which is truly his. Yet 
there are few circumstances connected with the fortune of modern 
philosophy, that appear to me more wonderful, than that a mind 
like Dr. Reid's, so learned in the history of metaphysical science, 
should have conceived, that on this point, any great merit, at least 
any merit of originality, was justly referable to him particularly. 
Indeed, the only circumstance which appears to me wonderful, is, 
that the claim thus made by him should have been so readily and 
generally admitted.' {Led. xxv. p. 155.) 

Dr. Brown then proceeds, at great length, to show : 1°, That 
Reid, in his attempt to overthrow what he conceived ' the com- 
mon theory of ideas,' wholly misunderstood the catholic opinion, 
which was, in fact, identical with his own ; and actually attrib- 
uted to all philosophers ' a theory which had been universally, or, 
at least, almost universally, abandoned at the time he wrote ;' 
and 2°, That the doctrine of perception, which Reid so absurdly 
fancies he had first established, affords, in truth, no better evi- 
dence of the existence of an external world, than even the long 
abandoned hypothesis which he had taken such idle labor to 
refute. 

In every particular of this statement, Dr. Brown is completely, 
and even curiously, wrong. He is out in his prelusive flourish, — 
out in his serious assault. Reid is neither 'so learned in the 
history of metaphysical science' as he verbally proclaims, nor so 
sheer an ignorant as he would really demonstrate. Estimated by 

1 The hopes of Sir William, like those of every mortal, have not all been 
fulfilled.— W. 



170 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

aught above a very vulgar standard, Reid's knowledge of Philo- 
sophical opinions was neither extensive nor exact ; and Mr. Stew- 
art was himself too competent and candid a judge, not fully to 
acknowledge the deficiency.'* But Reid's merits as a thinker are 
too high, and too securely established, to make it necessary to 
claim for his reputation an erudition to which he himself advances 
no pretension. And be his learning what it may, his critic, at 
least, has not been able to convict him of a single error ; while 
Dr. Brown himself rarely opens his mouth upon the older authors, 
without betraying his absolute unacquaintance with the matters 
on which he so intrepidly discourses. — Nor, as a speculator, does 
Reid's superiority admit, we conceive, of doubt. "With all admi- 
ration of Brown's general talent, we do not hesitate to assert, 
that, in the points at issue between the two philosophers, to say 
nothing of others, he has completely misapprehended Reid's phi- 
losophy, even in its fundamental position, — the import of the 
skeptical reasoning, — and the significance of the only argument by 
which that reasoning is resisted. But, on the other hand, as 
Reid can only be defended on the ground of misconception, the 
very fact, that his great doctrine of perception could actually be 
reversed by so acute an intellect as Brown's, would prove that 
there must exist some confusion and obscurity in his own devel- 
opment of that doctrine, to render such a misinterpretation pos- 
sible. Nor is this presumption wrong. In truth, Reid did not 
generalize to himself an adequate notion of the various possible 
theories of perception, some of which he has accordingly con- 
founded: while his error of commission in discriminating con- 
sciousness as a special faculty, and his error of omission in not dis- 
criminating intuitive from representative knowledge, — a distinction 
without which his peculiar philosophy is naught, — have contrib- 
uted to render his doctrine of the intellectual faculties prolix, 
vacillating, perplexed, and sometimes even contradictory. 

Before proceeding to consider the doctrine of perception in 

* {Dissertation, &c, Part ii. p. 107.) [In my foot-notes to Eeid will be 
found abundant evidence of this deficiency.] 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 171 

relation to the points at issue between Reid and his antagonist 
it is therefore necessary to disintricate the question, by relieving 
it of these two errors, bad in themselves, but worse in the confu- 
sion which they occasion ; for, as Bacon truly observes, — ' citius 
emergit Veritas ex errore quam ex confusione.' And, first, of 
consciousness. 

Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, and philosophers in general, have 
regarded Consciousness, not as a particular faculty, but as the 
universal condition of intelligence. Eeid, on the contrary, fol- 
lowing, probably, Hutcheson, and followed by Stewart, Royer- 
Collard, and others, has classed consciousness as a co-ordinate 
faculty with the other intellectual powers; distinguished from 
them, not as the species from the individual, but as the individual 
from the individual. And as the particular faculties have each 
their peculiar object, so the peculiar object of consciousness is, the 
operations of the other faculties themselves, to the exclusion of the 
objects about which these operations are conversant. 

This analysis we regard as false. For it is impossible : in the 
first place, to discriminate consciousness from all the other cogni- 
tive faculties, or to discriminate any one of these from conscious- 
ness ; and, in the second, to conceive a faculty cognizant of the 
various mental operations, without being also cognizant of their 
several objects. 

We hioio ; and We knoiv that we know : — these propositions, 
logically distinct, are really identical ; each implies the other. 
We know (i. e. feel, perceive, imagine, remember, &c.) only as we 
knoiu that toe thus Tcnow ; and we know that we k?ioiv, only as we 
know in some particular manner (i. e.feel, perceive, &c). So true 
is the scholastic brocard : — ' JVon sentimus nisi sentiamus nos 
sentire ; non sentimus nos sentire nisi sentiamus? The attempt 
to analyze the cognition I know, and the cognition I know that 1 
know, into the separate energies of distinct faculties, is therefore 
vain. But this is the analysis of Reid. Consciousness, which 
the formula / know that I know adequately expresses, he views as 
a power specifically distinct from the various cognitive faculties 



172 PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 

comprehended under the formula I Mow, precisely as these facul- 
ties are severally contradistinguished from each other. Bui here 
the parallel does not hold. I can feel without perceiving, I can 
perceive without imagining, I can imagine without remembering, 
I can remember without judging (in the emphatic signification), 
I can judge without willing. One of these acts does not imme- 
diately suppose the other. Though modes merely of the same 
indivisible subject, they are modes in relation to each other, 
really distinct, and admit, therefore, of psychological discrimina- 
tion. But can I feel without being conscious that I feel ? — can I 
remember, without being conscious that I remember ? or, can I 
be conscious, without being conscious that I perceive, or imagine, 
or reason, — that I energize, in short, in some determinate mode, 
which Reid would view as the act of a faculty .specifically differ- 
ent from consciousness ? That this is impossible, Reid himself 
admits. ' Unde,' says Tertullian, — ' unde ista tormenta cruciandse 
simplicitatis et suspendendse veritatis ? Quis mihi exhibebit sen- 
sum non intelligentem se sentire ?' But if, on the one hand, con- 
sciousness be only realized under specific modes, and cannot there- 
fore exist apart from the several faculties in cumulo ; and if, on 
the other, these faculties can all and each only be exerted under 
the condition of consciousness ; consciousness, consequently, is not 
one of the special modes into which our mental activity may be 
resolved, but the fundamental form, — the generic condition of 
them all. Every intelligent act is thus a modified consciousness ; 
and consciousness a comprehensive term for the complement of our 
cognitive energies. 

But the vice of Dr. Reid's analysis is further manifested in his ar- 
bitrary limitation of the sphere of consciousness ; proposing to it the 
various intellectual ojjerations, but excluding their objects. ' I am 
conscious,' he says, ' of perception, but not of the object I perceive ; 
I am conscious of memory, but not of the object I remember.' 

The reduction of consciousness to a particular faculty entailed 
this limitation. For, once admitting consciousness to be cogni-s 
zant of objects as of operations, Reid could not, without ab- ! 






PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 173 

surdity, degrade it to the level of a special power. For thus, in 
the first place, consciousness coextensive with all our cognitive 
faculties, would yet be made co-ordinate with each ; and, in the 
second, two faculties would be supposed to be simultaneously 
exercised about the same object, to the same intent. 

But the alternative which Reid has chosen is, at least, equally 
untenable. The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act of 
knowledge, without being conscious of its object, is virtually sui- 
cidal. A mental operation is only what it is, by relation to its 
object ; the object at once determining its existence, and specify- 
ing the character of its existence. But if a relation cannot be 
comprehended in one of its terms, so we cannot be conscious of 
an operation, without being conscious of the object to which it 
exists only as correlative. For example, We are conscious of a 
perception, says Reid, but are not conscious of its object. Yet 
how can we be conscious of a perception, that is, how can we 
know that a perception exists, — that it is a perception, and not 
another mental state, — and that it is the perception of a rose, 
and of nothing but a rose ; unless this consciousness involve a 
knowledge (or consciousness) of the object, which at once deter- 
mines the existence of the act, — specifies its kind, — and distin- 
guishes its individuality ? Annihilate the object, you annihilate 
the operation ; annihilate the consciousness of the object, you an- 
nihilate the consciousness of the operation. In the greater num- 
ber indeed of our cognitive energies, the two terms of the relation 
of knowledge exist only as identical ; the object admitting only 
of a logical discrimination from the subject. I imagine a Hip- 
pogryph. The Hippogryph is at once the object of the act and 
the act itself. Abstract the one, the other has no existence : de- 
ny me the consciousness of the Hij)pogryph, you deny me the 
consciousness of the imagination ; ! I am conscious of zero ; I am 
not conscious at all. 



1 'Aristotle and Hobbes call imagination a dying sense; and Descartes 
is equally explicit.' ' Imagining should not be confounded with Conceiv- 



174 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

A difficulty may here be started in regard to two faculties, — 
Memory and Perception. 

Memory is defined by Eeid ' an immediate knowledge of the 
past ;' and is thus distinguished from consciousness, which, with 
all philosophers, he views as ' an immediate knowledge of the_pm- 
enV We may therefore be conscious of the act of memory as 
■present, but of its object as past, consciousness is impossible. And 
certainly, if Reid's definition of memory be admitted, this infer- 
ence cannot be disallowed. But memory is not an immediate 
knowledge of the past ; an immediate knowledge of the p>ast is a 
contradiction in terms. This is manifest, whether we look from 
the act to the object, ox from the object to the act. — To be known 
immediately, an object must be known in itself ; to be known in 
itself, it must be known as actual, now existent, present. But the 
object of memory is r p as t — not present, not now existent, not ac- 
tual ; it cannot therefore be known in itself. If known at all, it 
must be known in something different from itself — i. e. mediate- 
ly ; and memory as an ' immediate knowledge of the past, 1 is 
thus impossible. — Again : memory 2 is an act of knowledge ; an 



ing, &c. ; though, some philosophers, as Gassendi, have not attended to the 
distinction. The words Conception, Concept, Notion, should not be limited 
to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagination, as the 
thought suggested by the general term. The Leibnitzians call this symbolical, 
in contrast to intuitive knowledge. This is the sense in which conception and 
conceptus have been usually and correctly employed. Mr. Stewart, on the 
other hand, arbitrarily limits conception to the reproduction, in imagination, 
of an object of sense as actually perceived.'— Foot-notes to Eeid, pp. 227, 
860.— W. 

2 ' In memory, we cannot possibly be conscious or immediately cognizant 
of any object beyond the modifications of the ego itself. In perception (if 
an immediate perception be allowed) we must be conscious, or immediately 
cognizant, of some phenomenon of the non-ego. -1 ' An immediate knowledge 
of a past thing is a contradiction. For we can only know a thing immediately, 
if we know it in itself, or as existing ; but what is past cannot be known in 
itself, for it is non-existent.' ' The datum of Memory does not stand upon 
the same ground as the datum of simple Consciousness. In so far as mem- 
ory is consciousness, it cannot be denied. "We cannot, without contradiction, 
deny the fact of memory as a present consciousness ; but we may, without 
contradiction, suppose that the past given therein, is only an illusion of the 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 175 

act exists only as present ; and a present knowledge can be im- 
mediately cognizant only of a present object. But tbe object 
known in memory is past ; consequently, either memory is not 
an act of knowledge at all, or tbe object immediately known is 
present ; and tbe past, if known, is known only through the me- 
dium of the present ; on either alternative memory is not ' an 
immediate knowledge of the past.'' Thus, memory, like our other 
faculties, affords only an immediate knowledge of the present ; and, 
like them, is nothing more than consciousness variously modi- 
fied.* 



present.' ' Whatever is the immediate object of thought, of that we are 
necessarily conscious. But of Alexander, for example, as existing, we are ne- 
cessarily not conscious. Alexander, as existing, cannot, therefore, possibly be 
an immediate object of thought ; consequently, if we can be said to think of 
Alexander at all, we can only be said to think of him mediately, in and 
through a representation of which we are conscious ; and that representation 
is the immediate object of thought. It makes no difference whether this im- 
mediate object be viewed as a tertitim quid, distinct from the existing reality 
and from the conscious mind ; or whether as a mere modality of the con- 
scious mind itself— as the mere act of thought considered in its relation to 
something beyond the sphere of consciousness. In neither case can we be 
said (be it in the imagination of a possible or the recollection of a past exist- 
ence) to know a thing as existing — that is, immediately ; and, therefore, if in 
these operations we be said to know aught out the mind at all, we can only 
be said to know it mediately — in other words, as a mediate object. The 
whole perplexity arises from the ambiguity of the term object, that term 
being used both for the external reality of which we are here not conscious, 
and cannot therefore know in itself, and for the mental representation which 
we know in itself, but which is known only as relative to the other. 
Eeid chooses to abolish the former signification, on the supposition that it 
only applies to representative entity different from the act of thought. In 
this supposition, however, he is wrong ; nor does he obtain an immediate 
knowledge, even in perception, by merely denying the crude hypothesis of 
representation.' — Foot-notes to Eeid, pp. 329, 339, 444, 279. — W. 

* The only parallel we know to this misconception of Eeid's is the opin- 
ion on which Fromondus animadverts. ' In primis displicet nobis pluri- 
morum recentiorum philosophia, qui sensuum interiorum operationes, ut 
phantasiationem, memorationem, et reminiscentiam, circa imagines, recen- 
tur aut olim spiritibus vel cerebro impressas, versari negant ; sect proxime 
circa objecta quceforis sunt. Ut cum quis meminit se vidisse leporem cur- 
rentem ; memoria, inquiunt, non intuetur et attingit imaginem leporis in 
cerebro asservatam, sed solum leporem ipsum qui cursu trajiciebat campum, 
&c, &c.' {PMlcsopJiia Christiana de Anima. Lovanii. 1649. L. hi. c. 8. 



176 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

In regard to Perception : Reid allows an immediate knoivledge 
of the affections of the subject of thought, mind, or self, and an 
immediate knowledge of the qualities of an object really different 
from self — matter. To the former, he gives the name of conscious- 
ness, to the latter, that of perception. Is consciousness, as an im- 
mediate know! edge, ^>«re?y subjective, not to be discriminated from 
perception, as an immediate knowledge, really objective ? — A log- 
ical difference we admit ; a psychological we deny. 

Relatives are known only together : the science of opposites is 
one. Subject and object, mind and matter, are known only in 
correlation and contrast, — and by tbe same common act : while 
knowledge, as at once a synthesis and an antithesis of both, may 
be indifferently defined an antithetic synthesis, or a synthetic an- 
tithesis of its terms. Every conception of self, necessarily in- 
volves a conception of not-self : every perception of what is dif- 
ferent from me, implies a recognition of the percipient subject in 
contradistinction from the object perceived. In one act of knowl- 
edge, indeed, the object is the prominent element, in another the 
subject ; but there is none in which either is known out of rela- 
tion to the other. The immediate knowledge which Reid allows 
of things different from the mind, and the immediate knowledge 
of mind itself, cannot therefore be split into two distinct acts. In 
perception, as in the other faculties, the same indivisible conscious- 
ness is conversant about both terms of the relation of knowledge. 
Distinguish the cognition of the subject from the cognition of the 
object of perception, and you either annihilate the relation of 
knowledge itself, which exists only in its terms being comprehend- 
ed together in the unity of consciousness ; or you must postulate 
a higher faculty, which shall again reduce to one, the two cogni- 
tions you have distinguished ; — that is, you are at last compelled 



art. 8.) Who the advocates of this opinion were, we are ignorant ; but 
more than suspect that, as stated, it is only a misrepresentation of the 
Cartesian doctrine, then on the ascendant. [Lord Monboddo has, how- 
ever, a doctrine of the sort.] 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 177 

to admit, in an unphilosophical complexity, that common con- 
sciousness of subject and object, which you set out with denying 
in its philosophical simplicity. Consciousness and immediate 
knowledge are thus terms universally convertible ; and if there be 
an immediate knowledge of things external, there is consequently 
the consciousness of an outer world* 

Reid's erroneous analysis of consciousness is not perhaps of so 
much importance in itself, as from causing confusion in its conse- 
quences. Had he employed this term as tantamount to imme- 
diate knowledge in general, whether of self or not, and thus dis- 
tinctly expressed what he certainly [?] taught, that mind and 
matter are both equally known to us as existent and in them- 
selves ; Dr. Brown could hardly have so far misconceived his doc- 
trine, as actually to lend him the very opinion which his whole 
philosophy was intended to refute, viz. that an 'immediate, and 



* How correctly Aristotle reasoned on this subject, may be seen from 
the following passage : — ' When we perceive (ala9av6jit6a l — the Greeks, 
perhaps fortunately, had no special term for consciousness) — 'when we 
perceive that we see, hear, &c., it is necessary, that by sight itself we per- 
ceive that we see, or by another sense. If by another sense, then this also 
must be a sense of sight, conversant equally about the object of sight, 
color. Consequently, there must either be two senses of the same object, 
or every sense must be percipient of itself. Moreover, if the sense per- 
cipient of sight be different from sight itself, it foUows, either that there 
is a regress to infinity, or we must admit, at last, some sense percipient 
of itself ; but if so, it is more reasonable to admit this in the original 
sense at once.' (Be Anima, L. iii. c. 2. text. 136.) Here Aristotle ought 
not to be supposed to mean that every sense is an independent faculty of 
perception, and, as such, conscious of itself. Compare De Sorfi. et Vig. c. 2. 
and Prdbl. (if indeed his) sect. xi. § 33. His older commentators — Alexan- 
der, Themistiu3, Simplicius — follow their master. Philoponus and Michael 
Ephesius desert his doctrine, and attribute this self-consciousness to a pecu- 
liar faculty which they call Attention (i-d irpoaeKTiKdv). This is the earliest ex- 
ample we know of this false analysis, which, when carried to its last absur- 
dity, has given us consciousness, and attention, and reflection, as distinct 
powers. Of the schoolmen, satius est silere, quam parum dicere. Nemc- 
sius, and Plutarchus of Athens preserved by Philoponus, accord this reflex 
consciousness to intellect as opposed to sense. Plato varies in his Thesetetus 
and Charmides. Some, however, of the Greek commentators on Aristotle, 
as I have elsewhere observed, introduced the term Hvvatadwis, employing it, 
by extension, for consciousness in general. 
11 



178 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

consequently a real, knowledge of external things is impossible. 
But this by anticipation. 

This leads us to the second error, — the non-distinction of repre- 
sentative from presentative or intuitive knowledge. 1 The reduc- 
tion of consciousness to a special faculty, involved this confusion. 
For had Reid perceived that all our faculties are only conscious- 
ness, and that consciousness as an immediate knowledge is only 
of the present and actual, he would also have discovered that the 
past and piossible, either could not be known to us at all, or could 
be known only in and through the present and actual, i. e. medi- 
ately. But a mediate knowledge is necessarily a representative 
knowledge. For if the present, or actual in itself, makes known 
to us the past and possible through .itself, this can only be done 
by a vicarious substitution or representation. And as the knowl- 
edge of the past is given in memory (using that term in its vulgar 
universality), and tbat of the possible in imagination, these two 
faculties are powers of representative knowledge. Memory is an 
immediate knowledge of a present thought, involving an absolute 
belief that this thought represents another act of knowledge that 
has been. Imagination (which we use in its widest signification, 
to include conception or simple apprehension) is an immediate 
knowledge of an actual thought, which, as not subjectively self- 
contradictory (i. e. logically possible), involves the hypothetical 
belief that it objectively mag be (i. e. is really possible). 

Nor is philosophy here at variance with nature. 2 The learned 



1 See Part Second, chapter ii. pp. 239-260.— W. 

2 ' The term Nature," 1 says Hamilton (Eeid, p. 216), ' is used sometimes in 
a wider, sometimes in a narrower extension. When employed in its most 
extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. When 
employed in its more restricted signification, it is a synonym for the latter 
only, and is then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek 
philosophy, the word ipiais was general in its meaning ; and the great branch 
of philosophy styled "physical or physiological,' 1 '' included under it not only 
the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term Nature is 
more vaguely extensive than the terms, physics, physical, physiology, physio- 
logical, or even than the adjective natural; whereas, in the philosophy of 
Germany, Natur, and its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin derivation, 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 179 

and unlearned agree, that in memory and imagination, naught of 
which we are conscious lies beyond the sphere of self, and that in 
these acts the object Jcnoion is only relative to a reality supposed 
to be. Nothing but Reid's superstitious horror of the ideal theory, 
could have blinded him so far as not to see that these faculties 
are, of necessity, mediate and representative. In this, however, 
he not only over-shot the truth, but almost frustrated his whole 
philosophy. For, he thus affords a ground (and the only ground? 
though not perceived by Brown), on which it could be argued 
that his doctrine of perception was not intuitive — was not pre- 
sentative. For if he reject the doctrine of ideas not less in mem- 
ory and imagination, which must be representative faculties, than 
in perception, which may be intuitive, and if he predicate imme- 
diate knowledge equally of all ; it can plausibly be contended, in 
favor of Brown's conclusion, that Reid did not really intend to 
allow a proper intuitive or presentative perception, and that he 
only abusively gave the name of immediate knowledge' to the 
simplest form of the representative theoiy, in contradistinction to 
the more complex. But this also by anticipation. 

There exists, therefore, a distinction of knowledge, — as immedi- 
ate, intuitive, or presentative, and as mediate or representative. — 



are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast to the world of 
intelligence.' 

'Nature,' says the great Pascal, 'confounds the Pyrrhonians, and Eea- 
son confounds the Dogmatists.' 

' Nature,' says Hume, (Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, § 12, 
part ii.), ' is always too strong for principle ; and, though a Pyrrhonian 
may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion 
by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to 
flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same in every point of 
action and speculation with the philosophers of every other sect, or with 
those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. 
"When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in tbe laugh 
against himself, and to confess that all his objections are mere amusement, 
and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition 
of mankind, who must act, and reason, and believe, though they are not 
able, by tbeir most diligent inquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the 
foundation of the operations, or to remove the objections which may be 
raised against them.' — W. 



ISO PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

The former is logically simple, as only contemplative : the lattei 
logically complex, as both representative and contemplative of 
the representation. — In the one, the object is single, and the word 
univocal : in the other it is double, and the term ^equivocal ; the 
object known and representing, being different from the object 
unknown and represented. — The knowledge in an intuitive act, 
as convertible with existence, is assertory ; and the reality of its 
only object is given unconditionally, as a fact : the knowledge in 
a representative act, as not convertible with existence is problem- 
atical ; and the reality of its principal object is given hypothet- 
ically as an inference. — Representative knowledge is purely sub 
jective, for its object known is always ideal ; presentative may be 
either subjective or objective, for its one object may be either 
ideal or material. — Considered in themselves : an intuitive cogni- 
tion is complete, as absolute and irrespective of aught beyond the 
compass of knowledge ; a representative incomplete, as relative 
to a transcendent something, beyond the sphere of consciousness. 
— Considered in relation to their objects : the former is complete, 
its object being known and real ; the latter incomj)lete, its object 
known, being unreal, and its real object unknown. — Considered 
in relation to each other : immediate knowledge is complete, as 
all sufficient in itself; mediate incomplete, as realized only 
through the other.* 

* This distinction of intuitive or presentative and of representative knowl- 
edge, overlooked, or rather abolished, in the theories of modern philoso- 
phy, is correspondent to the division of knowledge by certain of the school- 
men, into intuitive and abstractive. By the latter term, they also expressed 
abstract knowledge in its present signification. — 'Cognitio intuitiva,' 1 says 
the Doctor Besolutissimus, 'est ilia qua? immediate tendit -ad rem sibi prce- 
sentem objective, secundum ejus actualem existeniiam; sicut cum video colo- 
rem existentem in pariete, vel rosam, quam in manu teneo. Aostractiva, 
dicitur omnis cognitio, quse habetur de re non sic realiter pmsente in ra- 
tione object! immediate cogniti.' Now, when with a knowledge of this 
distinction of which Eeid was ignorant, and rejecting equally with him not 
only species but a representative perception, we say that many of the school- 
men have, in this respect, left behind them all modern philosophers ; we 
assert a paradox, but one which we are easily able to prove. Leibnitz 
spoke truly, when he said — 'Aurum latere in stercore illo scholastico bar- 
barieV 



PHILOSOPHY OP PERCEPTION. 181 

So far there is no difficulty, or ought to have been none. The 
past and possible can only be known mediately by representa- 
tion. But a more arduous, at least a more perplexed question 
arises, when we ask : — Is all knowledge of the present or actual 
intuitive ? Is the knoioledge of mind and matter equally imme- 
diate ? 

In regard to the immediate knowledge of mind, there is noxo 
at least no difficulty ; it is admitted not to be representative. 
The problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive percep- 
tion of the qualities of matter. 

(To obviate misapprehension, we may here parenthetically 
observe, that all we do intuitively know of self, — all that we 
may intuitively know of not-self, is only relative. 1 Existence ab- 
solutely and in itself, is to us as zero ; and while nothing is, so 
nothing is known to us, except those phases of being which stand 
in analogy to our faculties of knowledge. These we call qualities, 
phenomena, properties, &c. When we say, therefore, that a thing 
is known in itself, we mean only that it stands face to face, in 
direct and immediate relation to the conscious mind ; in other 
words, that, as existing, its phenomena form part of the circle of 
our knowledge, — exist, since they are known, and are known 
because they exist.) 

If we interrogate consciousness concerning the point in ques- 
tion, the response is categorical and clear. When I concentrate 
my attention in the simplest act of perception, I return from my 
observation with the most irresistible conviction of two facts, or 
rather, two branches of the same fact, — that / am, — and that 
something different from me exists. In this act, I am conscious 
of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as 
the object perceived ; and I am conscious of both existences m 
the same indivisible amount of intuition. The knowledge of the 
subject does not precede or follow the knowledge of the object ; 
— -neither determines, neither is determined by, the other. The 

1 See Part Third, Philosophy of the Conditioned.— W. 



182 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

two terms of correlation stand in mutual counterpoise and equal 
independence ; they are given as connected in the synthesis of 
knowledge, but as contrasted in the antithesis of existence. 

Such is the fact of perception revealed in consciousness, and as 
it determines mankind in general in their equal assurance of the 
reality of an external world, and of the existence of their own 
minds. Consciousness declares our knowledge of material quali- 
ties to be intuitive. Nor is the fact, as given, denied even by 
those who disallow its truth. So clear is the deliverance, that 
even the philosophers (as we shall hereafter see) who reject an 
intuitive perception, find it impossible not to admit, that their 
doctrine stands decidedly opposed to the voice of consciousness 
and the natural conviction of mankind. [This doctrine is, how- 
ever, to be asserted only in subordination to the distinction of the 
Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary Qualities of Matter}] 

According as the truth of the fact of consciousness in percep- 
tion is entirely accepted, accepted in part, or wholly rejected, six 
possible and actual systems of philosophy result. We say expli- 
citly — the truth of the fact. For the fact, as a phenomenon of 
consciousness cannot be doubted; since to doubt that we are 
conscious of this or that is impossible. The doubt, as itself a 
phenomena of consciousness, would annihilate itself. 2 

1. If the veracity of consciousness be unconditionally admitted, 
— if the intuitive knowledge of mind and matter, and the conse- 
quent reality of their antithesis be taken as truths, to be ex- 
plained if possible, but in themselves are held as paramount to 
all doubt, the doctrine is established which we would call the 
scheme of Natural Realism or Natural Dualism. — 2. If the 
veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise of the object 
and subject in the act, but rejected as to the reality of their 
antithesisjthe system of Absolute Identity emerges, which reduces 
both mind and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same 
common substance. — 3 and 4. If the testimony of consciousness 

1 See Part Second, chapter v.— W. 2 See Part Second, chapter hi. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 183 

be refused to the co-originality and reciprocal independence of 
the subject and object, two schemes are determined, according as 
the one or the other of the terms is placed as the original and 
genetic. Is the object educed from the subject, Idealism ; is the 
subject educed from the object, Materialism, is the result. — 
5. Again, is the consciousness itself recognized only as a phe- 
nomenon, and the substantial reality of both subject and object 
denied, the issue is Nihilism. 

6. These systems are all conclusions from an original interpre- 
tation of the fact of consciousness in perception, carried intrepidly 
forth to its legitimate issue. But there is one scheme, which, 
violating the integrity of this fact, and, with the complete ideal- 
ist, regarding the object of consciousness in perception as only a 
modification of the percipient subject, or, at least, a phenomenon 
numerically different from the object it represents, — endeavors, 
however, to stop short of the negation of an external world, the 
reality of which and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks by 
various hypotheses, to establish and explain. This scheme, 
which we would term Cosmothetic Idealism, Hypothetical Real- 
ism, or Hypothetical Dualism, — although the most inconsequent 
of all systems, has been embraced, under various forms, by the 
immense majority of philosophers. 1 

Of these systems, Dr. Brown adheres to the last. He holds 
that the mind is conscious or immediately cognizant of nothing 
beyond its subjective states ; but he assumes the existence of an 
external world beyond the sphere of consciousness, exclusively on 
the ground of our irresistible belief in its unknown reality. In- 
dependent of this belief, there is no reasoning on which the exist- 
ence of matter can be vindicated ; the logic of the idealist he 
admits to be unassailable. 

But Brown not only embraces the scheme of hypothetical 
realism himself, he never suspects that Reid entertained any other 
doctrine. Brown's transmutation of Reid from a natural to a 

1 See page 292, infra.— W. 



184 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

hypothetical realist, as a misconception of the grand and dis- 
tinctive tenet of a school, by one even of its disciples, is without 
a parallel in the whole history of philosophy : and this portentous 
error is prolific ; Chimcera chimceram parit. Were the evidence 
of the mistake less unambiguous, we should be disposed rather to 
question our own perspicacity, than to tax so subtle an intellect 
with so gross a blunder. 

Before establishing against his antagonist the true opinion of 
Reid, it will be proper first to generalize the possible forms tinder 
which the hypothesis of a representative perception can be realized, 
as a confusion of some of these as actually held; on the part both 
of Reid and Brown, has tended to introduce no small confusion 
into the discussion. 

The hypothetical realist contends, that he is wholly ignorant 

of things in themselves, and that these are known to him, only 

through a vicarious phenomenon, of which he is conscious in 

perception ; 

' — i?erwwique ignarus, Imagine gaudet.' 

In other words, that the object immediately known and repre- 
senting is numerically different from the object really existing and 
represented. Now this vicarious phenomenon, or immediate object, 
must either be numerically different from the percipient intellect, 
or a modification of that intellect itself, If the latter, it must, 
again, either be a modification of the thinking substance, with a 
transcendent existence beyond the act of thought, or a modifica- 
tion identical with the act of perception itself. 

All possible forms of the representative hypothesis are thus 
reduced to three, and these have all been actually maintained. 

1. The representative object not a modification of mind. 

2. The representative object a modification of mind, dependent 
for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on the act of co>i- 
sciousness. 

3. The representative object a modification of mind, non-exist- 
ent out of consciousness ; — the idea and its perception only dif- 
ferent relations of an act {state) really identical. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEBCEPTTON. 185 

In the first, the various opinions touching the nature and 
origin of the representative object ; whether material, immate- 
rial, or between both ; whether physical or hyperphysical ; wheth- 
er propagated from the external object or generated in the medi- 
um ; whether fabricated by the intelligent soul or in the animal 
life ; whether infused by God, or angels, or identical with the 
divine substance : — these afford in the history of philosophy so 
many subordinate modifications of this form of the hypothesis. 
In the two latter, the subaltern theories have been determined by 
the difficulty to connect the representation with the reality, in a 
relation of causal dependence; and while some philosophers 
have left it altogether unexplained, the others have been com- 
pelled to resort to the hyperphysical theories of divine assistance 
and a pre-established harmony. Under the second, opinions 
have varied, whether the representative object be innate or facti- 
tious. 1 

The third of these forms of representation Reid does not seem 
to have understood. The illusion which made him view, in his 
doctrine, memory. and imagination as powers of immediate knowl- 
edge, though only representative faculties, under the third form, 
has, in the history of opinions regarding perception, puzzled him, 
as we shall see, in his exposition of the doctrine of Arnauld. He 
was not aware that there was a theory, neither identical with an 
intuitive perception, nor with the first or second form of the 
representative hypothesis ; with both of which he was sufficiently 
acquainted. Dr. Brown, on the contrary, who adopts the third 
and simplest modification of that hypothesis, appears ignorant of 
its discrimination from the second; and accordingly views the 
philosophers who held this latter form, as not distinguished in 
opinion from himself. Of the doctrine of intuition he does not 
seem almost to have conceived the possibility. 

These being premised, we proceed to consider the greatest of 
all Brown's errors, in itself and in its consequences, — his miscon- 

1 See below, chapter iii. Various Theories of External Perception.— W. 



186 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

ception of the cardinal position of Reid's philosophy, in supposing 
that philosopher as a hypothetical realist, to hold with himself the 
third form of the representative hypothesis, and not, as a natural 
realist, the doctrine of an intuitive perception. 1 

In the first place, knowledge and existence are then only con- 
" ertible when the reality is known in itself ; for then only can 
we say, that it is known because it exists, and exists since it is 
known. And this constitutes an immediate, presentative, or intu- 
itive cognition, rigorously so called. Nor did Reid contemplate 
any other. ' It seems admitted,' he says, ' as a first principle, by 
the learned and the unlearned, that what is really perceived must 
exist, and that to perceive what does not exist is impossible. So 
far the unlearned man and the philosopher agree.' — [Essays on 
the Intellectual Powers, p. 142.) 

In the second place, philosophers agree, that the idea or repre- 
sentative object in their theory, is in the strictest sense immedi- 
ately perceived. And so Reid understands them. 'I perceive 
not, says the Cartesian, the external object itself (so far he agrees 
with the Peripatetic, and differs from the unlearned man) ; but 
I perceive an image, or form, or idea, in my own mind, or in my 
brain. / am certain of the existence of the idea ; because I imme- 
diately perceive it.'' (L. c.) 

In the third place, philosophers concur in acknowledging, that 
mankind at large believe, that the external reality itself consti- 
tutes the immediate and only object of perception — So also Reid. 
' On the same principle, the unlearned man says, / perceive the 
external object, and I perceive it to exist? (L. c.) — 'The vulgar 
undoubtedly believe, that it is the external object which we imme- 
diately perceive, and not a representative image of it only. It is 
for this reason, that they look upon it as perfect lunacy to call in 
question the existence of external objects? (L. c.) — ' The vulgar 
are firmly persuaded, that the very identical objects which they 
perceive continue to exist when they do not perceive them ; and 

1 See Part Second, chapter iii. § 2. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 187 

are no less firmly persuaded, that when ten men loot at the sun 
or the moon they all see the same individual object." 1 (P. 166.) — 
Speaking of Berkeley : ' The vulgar opinion he reduces to this, 
that the very things which tve perceive by our senses do really 
exist. This he grants.'' (P. 165.) — 'It is therefore acknowl- 
edged by this philosopher (Hume) to be a natural instinct or pre- 
possession, a universal and primary opinion of all men, that the 
objects which we immediately perceive, by our senses, are not 
images in our minds, but external objects, and that their existence 
is independent of us and our perception.' (P. 201. See also pp. 
143, 198, 199, 200, 206.) 

In these circumstances, if Reid : either 1°, — maintains, that 
his immediate perception of external things is convertible with 
their reality ; or 2°, — asserts that in his doctrine of perception, 
the external reality stands to the percipient mind face to face, in 
the same immediacy of relation which the idea holds in the rep- 
resentative theory of the philosophers ; or 3°, — declares the iden- 
tity of his own opinion with the vulgar belief, as thus expounded 
by himself and the philosophers : — he could not more emphat- 
ically proclaim himself a natural realist, and his doctrine of per- 
ception, as intended, at least, a doctrine of intuition. And he 
does all three. 

The first and second. — 'We have before examined the rea- 
sons given by philosophers to prove that ideas, and not external 
objects, are the immediate objects of perception. We shall only 
here observe, that if external objects be perceived immedi- 
ately' [and he had just before asserted for the hundredth time 
that they were so perceived], ' we have the same reason to 

BELIEVE THEIR EXISTENCE, AS PHILOSOPHERS HAVE TO BELIEVE 
THE EXISTENCE OF IDEAS, WHILE THEY HOLD THEM TO BE THE 
IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.' (P. 589. See also pp. 118, 

138.) 

The third. — Speaking of the perception of the external world — 
' We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory 
opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side 



188 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTTON. 

stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical re- 
searches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of 
nature. On the other side, stand all the philosophers, ancient 
and modern ; every man, without exception, who reflects. In this 

DIVISION, TO MY GREAT HUMILIATION, I FIND MYSELF CLASSED 
WITH THE VULGAR.' (P. 207.) 

Various other proofs of the same conclusion, could be adduced ; 
these, for brevity, we omit. — Brown's interpretation of the funda- 
mental tenet of Reid's philosophy is, therefore, not a simple mis- 
conception, but an absolute reversal of its real and even unambig- 
uous import. [This is too strong. 1 ] 

But the ground on which Brown vindicates his interpretation, 
is not unworthy of the interpretation itself. The possibility of an 
intuition beyond the sphere of self, he can hardly be said to have 
contemplated ; but on one occasion, Reid's language seems, for a 
moment, to have actually suggested to him the question : — Might 
that philosopher not possibly regard the material object, as iden- 
tical with the object of consciousness in perception ? — On what 
ground does he reject the affirmative as absurd ? His reasoning 
is to this effect : — To assert an intuitive perception of matter, is to 
assert an identity of matter and mind [for an immediacy ofknoiol- 
edge is convertible with a unity of existence) ; But JReid was a 
sturdy dualist : Therefore he could not maintain an immediate 
perception of the qualities of matter. {Led. xxv. pp. 159, 160.) 
In this syllogism, the major is a mere petitio principii, which 
Brown has not attempted to prove ; and which, as tried by the 
standard of all philosophical truth, is not only false, but even the 
converse of the truth ; while, admitting its accuracy, it cannot be 
so connected with the minor, as to legitimate the conclusion. 

If we appeal to consciousness, consciousness gives, even in the 
last analysis, — in the unity of knowledge, a duality of existence ; 
and peremptorily falsifies Brown's assumption, that not-self, as 
known, is identical with self as knowing. Reid therefore, as a 

^ee p. 273, below.— W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 189 

dualist, and on the supreme authority of consciousness, might 
safely maintain the immediacy of perception ; — nay, as a dualist 
Reid could not, consistently, have adopted the opinion which 
Brown argues, that, as a dualist, he must be regarded to have 
held. Mind and matter exist to us only in their qualities ; and 
these qualities exist to us only as they are known by us, i. e., as 
phenomena. It is thus merely from knowledge that we can infer 
existence, and only from the supposed repugnance or compatibility 
of phenomena, within our experience, are we able to ascend to the 
transcendent difference or identity of substances. Now, on the 
hypothesis that all we immediately know, is only a state or 
modification or quality or phenomenon of the cognitive subject 
itself, — how can we contend, that the phenomena of mind and 
matter, known only as modifications of the same must be the 
modifications of different substances ; — nay, that only on this hy- 
pothesis of their substantial unity in knowledge, can their substan- 
tial duality in existence be maintained ? But of this again. 

Brown's assumption has no better foundation than the exagge- 
ration of a crotchet of philosophers ; which, though contrary to 
the evidence of consciousness, and consequently not only toith- 
out but against all evidence, has yet exerted a more extensive 
and important influence, than any principle in the whole history 
of philosophy. This subject deserves a volume ; we can only 
afford it a few sentences. — Some' philosophers (as Anaxagoras, 
Heraclitus, Alcmseon) maintained that knowledge implied even a 
contrariety of subject and object. But since the time of Em- 
pedocles, no opinion has been more universally admitted, than 
that the relation of knowledge inferred the analogy of existence. 
This analogy may be supposed in two potences. What knows 
and what is known, are either 1°, similar, or, 2°, the same ; and 
if the general principle be true, the latter is the more philoso- 
phical. This principle it was, which immediately determined the 
whole doctrine of a representative perception. Its lower potence 
is seen in the intentional species of the schools, and in the ideas 
of Malebranche and Berkeley ; its higher in the gnostic reasons of 



190 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

the Platonists, in the pre-existing species of Avicenna and the 
Arabians, in the ideas of Descartes and Leibnitz, in the phenom- 
ena of Kant, and in the external states of Dr. Brown. It medi- 
ately determined the hierarchical gradation of faculties or souls 
of the Aristotelians, — the vehicular media of the Platonists, — 
the theories of a common intellect of Alexander, Themistins, 
Averroes, Cajetanus, and Zabarella, — the vision in the Deity of 
Malebranche, — and the Cartesian and Leibniiian doctrines of 
assistance and predetermined harmony. To no other origin is to 
be ascribed the ?'efusal of the fact of consciousness in its primitive 
duality ; and the unitarian systems of identity, materialism, ideal- 
ism, are the result. 

But however universal and omnipotent this principle may have 
been, Beid was at once too ignorant of opinions, to be much in 
clanger from authority, and too independent a thinker, to accept 
so baseless a fancy as a fact. 'Mr. Norris,' says he, 'is the 
only author I have met with who professedly puts the question, 
"Whether material things can be perceived by us immediately ? 
He has offered four arguments to show that they cannot. First, 
Material objects are without the mind, and therefore there can 
be no union between the object and the percipient. Answer — 
This argument is lame, until it is shown to be necessary, that in 
perception there should be an union between the object and the 
percipient. Second, material objects are disproportioned to the 
mind, and removed from it by the whole diameter of Being. — This 
argument I cannot answer, because I do not understand it. n [Es- 
says, I. P. p. 202.) 



1 ' This confession would, of itself, prove how superficially Eeid was versed 
in the literature of philosophy. Norris's second argument is only the state- 
ment of a principle generally assumed hy philosophers — that the relation of 
knowledge infers a correspondence of nature between the subject knowing, 
and the object known. This principle has perhaps, exerted a more exten- 
sive influence on speculation than any other ; and yet it has not been proved, 
and is incapable of proof— nay, is contradicted by the evidence of conscious- 
ness itself. To trace the influence of this assumption would be, in fact, in 
a certain sort, to write the history of philosophy ; for, though this influence 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 191 

The principle, that the relation of knowledge implies an anal- 
ogy of existence, admitted without examination in almost every 
Bchool, but which Reid, with an ignorance wiser than knowledge, 

has never yet been historically developed, it would be easy to" show that the 
belief, explicit or implicit, that what knows and what is immediately known 
must be of an analogous nature, lies at the root of almost every theory of 
cognition, from the very earliest to the very latest speculations. In the more 
ancient philosophy of Greece, three philosophers (Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, 
and Alcmason) are found, who professed the opposite doctrine — that the con- 
dition of knowledge lies in the contrariety, in the natural antithesis, of sub- 
ject and object. Aristotle, likewise, in his treatise On the Soul, expressly 
condemns the prevalent opinion, that the similar is only cognizable by the 
similar ; but, in his Nicomachiani Ethics, ho reverts to the doctrine which, 
in the former work, he had rejected. "With these exceptions, no principle, 
since the time of Empedocles, by whom it seems first to have been explicitly 
announced, has been more universally received, than this — that the relation 
of knoicUdge infers an analogy of existence. This analogy may be of two de- 
grees. Wliat knows, and ichat is knoion, may be either similar or the same / 
and, if the principle itself be admitted, the latter alternative is the more 
philosophical. Without entering on details, I may here notice some of the 
more remarkable results of this principle, in both its degrees. The general 
principle, not, indeed, exclusively, but mainly, determined the admission of 
a representative perception, by disallowing the possibility of any conscious- 
ness, or immediate knowledge of matter, by a nature so diflerent from it as 
mind ; and, in its two degrees, it determined the various hypotheses, by which 
it was attempted to explain the possibility of a representative or mediate 
perception of the external world. To this principle, in its lower potence — 
that what knows must be similar in nature to what is immediately known — 
we owe the intentional species of the Aristotelians, and the ideas of Male- 
branche and Berkeley. From this principle, in its higher potence — that what 
knows must be identical in nature with what is immediately known — there 
flow the gnostic reasons of the Platonists, the pre-existing forms, or species of 
Theophrastus and Themistius, of Adelandus and Avicenna, the (mental) 
ideas of Descartes and Arnauld, the representations, sensual ideas, &c, of 
Leibnitz and Wolf, the phenomena of Kant, the states of Brown, and 
(shall we say ?) the vacillating doctrine of perception held by Eeid him- 
self. Mediately this principle was the origin of many other famous the- 
ories :— of the hierarchical gradation of souls or faculties of the Aristote- 
lians ; of the vehicular media of the Platonists ; of the hypotheses of a 
common intellect of Alexander, Themistius, Averroes, Cajetanus, and Za- 
barella ; of the vision in the deity of Malebranche ; and of the Cartesian 
and Leibnitzian doctrines of assistance and pre-established harmony. Fi- 
nally, to this principle is to be ascribed the refusal of the evidence of con- 
sciousness to the primary fact the duality of its perception ; and the uni- 
tarian schemes of Absolute Identity, Materialism, and Idealism, are the re- 
sults.' Eeid, p. 300.— W. 



192 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

confesses he does not understand ; is nothing more than an irra- 
tional attempt to explain, what is, in itself, inexplicable. How 
the similar or the same is conscious of itself, is not a whit less 
inconceivable, than how one contrary is immediately percipient 
of another. It at best only removes our admitted ignorance by 
one step back ; and then, in place of our knowledge simply origi- 
nating from the incomprehensible, it ostentatiously departs from 
the absurd. 

The slightest criticism is sufficient to manifest the futility of 
that hypothesis of representation, which Brown would substitute 
for Reid's presentative perception ; — although this hypothesis, 
under various modifications, be almost coextensive with the his- 
tory of philosophy. In fact, it fulfils none of the conditions of a 
legitimate hypothesis. 

In the first place, it is unnecessary. — It cannot show, that the 
fact of an intuitive perception, as given in consciousness, ought 
not to be accepted ; it is unable therefore to vindicate its own 
necessity, in order to explain the possibility of our knowledge of 
external things. — That we cannot show forth, koto the mind is 
capable of knowing something different from self, is no reason to 
doubt that it is so capable. Every how (Sion) rests ultimately on 
a that (0V1) ; every demonstration is deduced from something 
given and indemonstrable ; all that is comprehensible, hangs from 
some revealed fact, which we must believe as actual, but, cannot 
construe to the reflective intellect in its possibility. In conscious- 
ness, — in the original spontaneity of intelligence (vovg, locus prin- 
cipiorum), are revealed the primordial facts of our intelligent na- 
ture. Consciousness is the fountain of all comprehensibility and 
illustration ; but as such, cannot be itself illustrated or compre- 
hended. To ask how any fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask 
how consciousness itself is possible ; and to ask how consciousness 
is possible, is to ask how a being intelligent like man is possible. 
Could we answer this, the Serpent had not tempted Eve by an 
hyperbole : — ' We should be as Gods.' But as we did not create 
ourselves, and are not even in the secret of our creation ; we 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 193 

must take our existence, our knowledge upon trust : and that 
philosophy is the only true, because in it alone can truth be real- 
ized, which does not revolt against the authority of our natural 

beliefs. 

' The voice of Nature is the voice of God. 1 

To ask, therefore, a reason for the possibility of our intuition of 
external things, above the fact of its reality, as given in our per- 
ceptive consciousness, betrays, as Aristotle has truly said, an 
imbecility of the reasoning principle itself : — ' Tourou £r\rs7v Xoyov, 
dtpivrag <nqv a'irfdyfiu, ctppcotfria <ri£ gtfn Siavoiag.'' The natural 
realist, who accepts this intuition, cannot, certainly, explain it, be- 
cause, as ultimate, it is a fact inexplicable. Yet, with Hudibras : 

' He knows what's w/iat ; and that's as high 
As metaphysic wit can fly.' 

But the hypothetical realist — the cosmothetic idealist, who rejects 
a consciousness of aught beyond the mind, cannot require of the 
natural realist an explanation of how such a consciousness is pos- 
sible, until he himself shall have explained, what is even less con- 
ceivable, the possibility of representing (i. e. of knowing) the un- 
known. Till then, each founds on the incomprehensible ; but the 
former admits the veracity, the latter postulates the falsehood of 
that principle, which can alone confer on this incomprehensible 
foundation the character of truth. The natural realist, whose 
watchword is — The facts of consciousness, the whole facts, and 
nothing but the facts, has therefore naught to fear from his antag- 
onist, so long as consciousness cannot be explained nor redargu- 
ed from without. If his system be to fall, it falls only with phi- 
losophy ; for it can only be disproved, by proving the mendacity 
of consciousness — of that faculty, 

' Quse nisi sit veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis ;' 
(' "Which unless true, aU reason turns a he.') 

This leads us to the second violation of the laws of a legitimate 
hypothesis ; — the doctrine of a representative perception annihi- 
lates itself, in subverting the universal edifice of knowledge. — 
Belying the testimony of consciousness to our immediate percep- 
12 



194 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

tion of an outer world, it belies the veracity of consciousness alto- 
gether. But the truth 1 of consciousness, is the condition of the 
possibility of all knowledge. The first act of hypothetical realism, 
is thus an act of suicide ; philosophy, thereafter, is at best but an 
enchanted corpse, awaiting only the exorcism of the skeptic, to 
relapse into its proper nothingness. — But of this we shall have 
occasion to treat at large, in exposing Brown's misprision of the 
argument from common sense. 

In the third place, it is the condition of a legitimate hypothe- 
sis, that the fact or facts for which it is excogitated to account, 
be not themselves hypothetical. — But so far is the principal fact, 
which the hypothesis of a representative perception is proposed 
to explain, from being certain ; its reality is even rendered prob- 
lematical by the proposed explanation itself. The facts, about 
which this hypothesis is conversant, are two : the fact of the 
mental modification, and the fact of the material reality. The 
problem to be solved is their connection ; and the hypothesis of 
representation is advanced, as the ratio of their correlation, in 
supposing that the former as known is vicarious of the latter as 
existing. There is, however, here a see-saw between the hypoth- 
esis and the fact : the fact is assumed as an hypothesis ; and the 
hypothesis explained as a fact ; each is established, each is ex- 
pounded, by the other. To account for the possibility of an 
unknown external world, the hypothesis of representation 'is de- 
vised ; and to account for the possibility of representation, we 
imagine the hypothesis of an external world. Nothing could be 
more easy than to demonstrate, that on this supposition, the fact 
Of the external reality is not only petitory but improbable. This, 
however, we are relieved from doing, by Dr. Brown's own admis- 
sion, that ' the skeptical argument for the non-existence of an ex- 
ternal world, as a mere play of reasoning, admits of no reply ;' 
and we shall afterwards prove, that the only ground on which he 
attempts to vindicate this existence (the ground of our natural 

1 See Part First, passim. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF .PERCEPTION. 195 

belief in its reality), is one, not competent to the hypothetical 
realist. We shall see, that if this belief be true, the hypothesis 
itself is superseded ; if false, that there is no fact for the hypothe- 
sis to explain. 

In the fourth place, a legitimate hypothesis must account for 
the phenomenon, about which it is conversant, adequately and 
without violence, in all its dependencies, relations, and peculiari- 
ties. But the hypothesis in question, only accomplishes its end, 
— nay, only vindicates its utility, by a mutilation, or, more prop- 
erly, by the destruction and re-creation, of the very phenomenon 
for the nature of which it would account. The entire phenome- 
non to be explained by the supposition of a i epresentative percep- 
tion, is the fact given in consciousness, of the immediate knowl- 
edge or intuition of an existence different from self. This simple 
phenomenon it hews down into two fragments ; into the existence 
and the intuition. The existence of external things, which is given 
only through their intuition, it admits ; the intuition itself, though 
the ratio cognoscendi, and to us therefore the ratio essendi of their 
reality, it rejects. But to annihilate what is prior and constit- 
utive in the phenomenon, is, in truth, to annihilate the phenom- 
enon altogether. The existence of an external world, which the 
hypothesis proposes to explain, is no longer even a truncated fact 
of consciousness ; for the existence given in consciousness, neces- 
sarily fell with the intuition on which it reposed. A representa- 
tive perception, is therefore, an hypothetical explanation of a 
sujjposititious fact : it creates the nature it interprets. And in 
this respect, of all the varieties of the representative hypothesis, 
the third, or that which views in the object known a modification 
of thought itself, most violently outrages the phenomenon of con- 
sciousness it would explain. And this is Brown's. The first, saves 
the phenomenon of consciousness in so far as it preserves always 
the numerical, if not always the substantial, difference between 
the object perceived and the percipient mind. The second does 
not violate at least the anthithesis of the object perceived and 
the percipient act. But in the third or simplest form of repre- 



196 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

eentation, not only is the object known, denied to be itself the 
reality existing, as consciousness attests ; this object revealed as 
not-self, is identified with the mental ego; nay, even, though 
given as permanent, with the transient energy of thought itself. 

In the fifth place, the fact, which a legitimate hypothesis is 
devised to explain, must be within the sphere of experience. The 
fact, however, for which that of a representative perception ac- 
counts (the existence of external things), transcends, ex hypothesi, 
all experience ; it is the object of no real knowledge, but a bare 
ens rationis — a mere hyperphysical chimera. 

In the sixth and last place, an hypothesis itself is probable in 
proportion as it works simply and naturally ; that is in propor- 
tion as it is dependent on no subsidiary hypothesis, and as i in- 
volves nothing, petitory, occult, supernatural, as an element of its 
explanation. In this respect, the doctrine of a representative 
perception is not less vicious than in others. To explain at all, it 
must not only postulate subsidiary hypotheses, but subsidiary 
miracles. The doctrine in question attempts to explain the knowl- 
edge of an unknown world, by the ratio of a representative per- 
ception : but it is impossible by any conceivable relation, to apply 
the ratio to the facts. The mental modification, of which, on the 
doctrine of representation, we are exclusively conscious in percep- 
tion, either represents (i. e. affords a mediate knowledge of) a real 
external world, or it does not. (We say only the reality ; to 
include all systems from Kant's, who does not predicate even an 
existence in space and time of things in themselves, to Locke's, 
who supposes the transcendent reality to resemble its idea, at least 
in the primary qualities.) Now, the latter alternative is an affir- 
mation of absolute Idealism ; we have, therefore, at present only 
to consider the former. And here, the mind either knows the 
reality of what it represents, or it does not. On the prior alter- 
native, the hypothesis under discussion would annihilate itself, in 
annihilating the ground of its utility. For as the end of repre- 
sentation is knowledge ; and as the hypothesis of a representative 
perception is only required on the supposed impossibility of that 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 197 

preservative knowledge of external things, which consciousness 
affirms : — if the mind is admitted to be cognizant of the outer 
reality in itself, previous to representation, the end towards which 
the hypothesis was devised as a mean, has been already accom- 
plished ; and the possibility of an intuitive perception, as given 
in consciousness, is allowed. Nor is the hypothesis only absurd, 
as superfluous. It is worse. For the mind would, in this case, 
be supposed to know before it knew ; or, like the crazy Pentheus, 
to see its objects double, — 

(' Et solera geminura et duplices te ostendere Thebas') ; 

and, if these absurdities be eschewed, then is the identity of mind 
and self — of consciousness and knowledge, abolished ; and my 
intellect knows, what / am not conscious of it knowing ! The 
other alternative remains : — that the mind is blindly determined 
to represent, and truly to represent, the reality which it does not 
know. And here the mind either blindly determines itself, or is 
blindly determined by an extrinsic and intelligent cause. The 
former lemma is the more philosophical, in so far as it assumes 
nothing hyperphysical ; but it is otherwise utterly irrational, in- 
asmuch as it would explain an effect, by a cause wholly inade- 
quate to its production. On this alternative, knowledge is sup- 
posed to be the effect of ignorance, — intelligence of stupidity, — 
life of death. We are necessarily ignorant, ultimately at least, of 
the mode in which causation operates ; but we know at least, that 
no effect arises without a cause — and a cause proportionate to its 
existence. The absurdity of this supposition has accordingly 
constrained the profoundest cosmothetic idealists, notwithstanding 
their rational abhorrence of a supernatural assumption, to em- 
brace the second alternative. To say nothing of less illustrious 
schemes, the systems of Divine Assistance, of a Pre-established 
Harmony, and of the Vision of all things in the Deity, are only 
so many subsidiary hypotheses, — so many attempts to bridge, by 
supernatural machinery, the chasm between the representation 
and the reality, which all human ingenuity had found, by natural 



198 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEP1ION. 

means, to be insuperable. The hypothesis of a representative 
perception, thus presupposes a miracle to let it work. Dr. Brown, 
indeed, rejects as unphilosophical, those hyperphysical subsidies. 
But he only saw less clearly than their illustrious authors, the 
necessity which required them. It is a poor philosophy that 
eschews the Deus ex machina, and yet ties the knot which is only 
soluble by his interposition. It is not unphilosophical to assume 
a miracle, if a miracle be necessary ; but it is unphilosophical to 
originate the necessity itself. And here the hypothetical realist 
cannot pretend, that the difficulty is of nature!, not of his crea- 
tion. In fact it only arises, because he has closed his eyes upon 
the light of nature, and refused the guidance of consciousness : 
but having swamped himself in following the ignis fatuus of a 
theory, he has no right to refer its private absurdities to the im- 
becility of human reason ; or to generalize his own factitious igno- 
rance, by a Quantum est quod nescimus ! The difficulty of the 
problem Dr. Brown has not perceived ; or perceiving, has not 
ventured to state, — far less attempted to remove. He has es- 
sayed, indeed, to cut the knot, which he was unable to loose ; 
but we shall find, in the sequel, that his summary postulate of the 
reality of an external world, on the ground of our belief in its 
existence, is, in his hands, of all unfortunate attempts, perhaps the 
most unsuccessful. 

The scheme of Natural Realism (which it is Reid's honor to 
have been the first, among not forgotten philosophers, virtually 
and intentionally, at least, to embrace) is thus the only system, on 
which the truth of consciousness and the possibility of knowledge 
can be vindicated ; whilst the Hypothetical Realist, in his effort 
to be ' wise above knowledge,' like the dog in the fable, loses the 
substance, in attempting to realize the shadow. ' Les homines' 
(says Leibnitz, with a truth of which he was not himself aware), — 
' les homines cherchent ce quHls savent, et ne savent pas ce qu'ils 
cherchent? 

That the doctrine of an intuitive perception is riot without its 
difficulties, we allow ; but these do not affect its possibility, and 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 199 

may in a great measure be removed by a more sedu. ous examina- 
tion of the phenomena. The distinction of perception proper 
from sensation proper ; in other words, of the objective from the 
subjective in this act, Reid, after other philosophers, has already 
turned to good account ; but his analysis would have been still 
more successful, had he discovered the law which universally 
governs their manifestation : — That Perception and Sensation, 
the objective and subjective, though both always coexistent, are 
always in the inverse ratio of each other. But on this matter we 
cannot at present eriter. 1 

Dr. Brown is not only wrong in regard to Reid's own doctrine ; 
he is wrong, even admitting his interpretation of that philosopher 
to be true, in charging him with a ' series of wonderful miscon- 
ceptions,' in regard to the opinions universally prevalent touching 
the nature of ideas. We shall not argue the case upon the higher 
ground, that Reid, as a natural realist, could not be philosophically 
out, in assailing the hypothesis of a representative perception, 
even though one of its subordinate modifications might be mis- 
taken by him for another ; but shall prove that, supposing Reid 
to have been, like Brown, a hypothetical realist, under the third 
form of a representative perception, he was not historically wrong 
in attributing to philosophers in general (at least after the decline 
of the Scholastic philosophy), the first or second variety of the 
hypothesis. Even on this lower ground, Brown is fated to be 
unsuccessful ; and if Reid be not always correct, his antagonist 
has failed in convicting him even of a single inaccuracy. 
We shall consider Brown's charge of misrepresentation in 
detail. 

Tt is always unlucky to stumble on the thresliold. The para- 
graph (Lect. xxvii.) in which Dr. Brown opens his attack on Reid. 
contains more mistakes than sentences ; and the etymological dis- 
cussion it involves supposes as true, what is not simply false, but 
diametrically opposite to the truth. Among other errors : — In 

1 See Part Second, chap, vi.— W. 



200 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

the first place, the term '■idea? was never employe I in any sys 
tern, previous to the age of Descartes, to denote ' little images 
derived from objects without.' In the second, it was never used 
in any philosophy, prior to the same period, to signify the imme- 
diate object of perception. In the third, it was not applied by 
the ' Peripatetics or Schoolmen,' to express an object of human 
thought at all.* In the fourth, ideas (taking this term for spe- 



* The history of the word idea seems completely unknown. Previous to 
the age of Descartes, as a philosophical term, it was employed exclusively 
by the Platonists — at least exclusively in a Platonic meaning; and this 
meaning was precisely the reverse of that attributed to the word by Dr. 
Brown; — the idea was not an object of perception, — -the idea was not derived 
from without. In the schools, so far from being a current psychological 
expression, as he imagines, it had no other application than a theological. 
Neither, after the revival of letters, was the term extended by the Aristo- 
telians even to the objects of intellect. Melanchthon, indeed (who was a 
kind of semi-Platonist) uses it on one occasion as a synonym for notion, or 
intelligible species (De Anima, p. 187, ed. 1555) ; but it was even to this 
solitary instance, we presume, that Julius Scaliger alludes (De Subtilitate, 
vi. 4), when he castigates such an application of the word as neoteric arid 
abusive. " Melanch.^ is on the margin. Goclenius also probably founded 
his usage on Melanchthon.— "We should have distinctly said, that previous 
to its employment by Descartes himself the expression had never been used 
as a comprehensive term for the immediate objects of thought, had we not 
in remembrance the Historia Anima Humanoz of our countryman, David 
Buchauan. This work, originally written in French, had, for some years, 
been privately circulated previous to its publication at Paris, in 1636. Here 
we find the word idea familiarly employed, in its most extensive significa- 
tion, to express the objects, not only of intellect proper, but of memory, 
imagination, sense ; and this is the earliest example of such an employment. 
For the Discourse on Method in which the term is usurped by Descartes in 
an equal latitude, was at least a year later in its publication — viz., in June, 
1637. Adopted soon after also by Gassendi, the word under such imposing 
patronage gradually won its way into general use. In England, however, 
Locke may be said to have been the first who naturalized the term in its 
Cartesian universality. Hobbes employs it, and that historically, only once 
or twice ; Henry More and Cudworth are very chary of it, even when treat- 
ing of the Cartesian philosophy ; "Willis rarely uses it ; while Lord Herbert, 
Reynolds, and the English philosophers in general, between Descartes and 
Locke, do not apply it psychologically at all. When in common language, 
employed by Milton and Dryden, after Descartes, as before him by Sidney, 
Spenser, Shakspeare, Hooker, &c, the meaning is Platonic. Our Lexi- 
cographers are ignorant of the dirfererce. 

The fortune of this word is curious, Employed by Plato to express the 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 201 

ties) were not ' in all the dark ages of the scholastic followers of 
Aristotle' regarded as ' little images derived from without ;' for 
a numerous party of the most illustrious schoolmen rejected spe- 

real forms J of the intelligible world, in lofty contrast to the unreal images of 
the sensible ; it was lowered by Descartes, who extended it to the objects of 
our consciousness in general. When, after Gassendi, the school of Condillac 
had analyzed our highest faculties into our lowest, the idea was still moro 
deeply degraded from its high original. Like a fallen angel, it was relegated 
from the sphere of Divine intelligence to the atmosphere of human sense, 
till at last Ideologic (more correctly Idealogie), a word which could only prop- 
erly suggest an a 'priori scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, 
has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of 
mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from the senses. Word and 
thing, ideas have been the crux p7iilosop7iorum, since Aristotle sent them 
packing {x al 9^ TU>aav iSiai) to the present day. 

A few notes, which we transfer from Hamilton's Eeid, will complete the 
history and definition of the word idea. — W. 

Whether Plato viewed Ideas as existences independent of the divine 
mind, is a contested point ; though, upon the whole, it appears more proba- 
ble that he did not. It is, however, admitted on all hands, to be his doc- 
trine, that Ideas were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned 
the phenomenal or ectypal world. 

It shoidd be carefully observed that the term Idea, previous to the time 
of Descartes, was used exclusively, or all but exclusively, in its Platonic sig- 
nification. By Descartes, and other contemporary philosophers, it was first 
extended to denote our representations in general. Many curious blunders 
have arisen in consequence of an ignorance of this. I may notice, by the 
way, that a confusion of ideas in the Platonic with ideas in the Cartesian 
sense has led Eeid into the error of assimilating the hypothesis of Plato and 
the hypothesis of Malebranche in regard to our vision in the divine mind. 
The Platonic theory of Perception, in fact, bears a closer analogy to the Car 
tesian and Leibnitzian doctrines than to that of Malebranche. 

Eeid, in common with our philosophers in general, had no knowledge 
of the Platonic theory of sensible perception ; and yet the gnostic forms, the 
cognitive reasons of the Platonists, held a far more proximate relation to ideas 
in the modern acceptation than the Platonic ideas themselves. 

This interpretation 2 of the meaning of Plato's comparison of the cave 
exhibits a curious mistake, in which Eeid is followed by Mr. Stewart and 
many others, 3 and which, it is remarkable, has never yet been detected. In 
the similitude in question (which will be found in the seventh book of the 
Eepublic), Plato is supposed to intend an illustration of the mode in which 



1 Whether, in the Platonic system, Ideas are or are not independent of the Deity, is, and 
always has been, a vexata guwstio.—See Hamilton's Reid, p. 370. — W. 

a The interpretation given in the text of Reid. — W. 

* Hamilton has shown in another place that Bacon has also wrested Plato's similitude of 
the cave from its genuine signification. — W. 



202 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

cies, not only in the intellect, but in the sense. In the fifth 
' phantasm] in 'the old philosophy,' was not the '■external 
cause of perception] but the internal object of imagination. In 



the shadows or vicarious images of external things are admitted into the 
mind — to typify, in short, an hypothesis of sensitive perception. On his sup- 
position, the identity of the Platonic, Pythagorean, and Peripatetic theories 
of this process is inferred. Nothing can, however, he more groundless than the 
supposition ; nothing more erroneous than the inference. By his cave, images, 
and sliadoivs, Plato meant simply to illustrate the grand principle of his philoso- 
phy — that the Sensible or Ectypal world (phenomenal, transitory, yiyvdfitvov, 
dv Kal /ifi Si>) stands to the Noetic or Archetypal (substantial, permanent, 
Svtus dv) in the same relation of comparative unreality in which the shadows 
of the images of sensible existences themselves, stand to the things of which 
they are the dim and distant adumbrations. In the language of an illus- 
trious poet — 

' An nescis, qusecunque hsec sunt, qua? hac nocte teguntur, 
Omnia res prorsus veras non esse, sed umbras, 
Aut specula, unde ad nos aliena elucet imago ? 
Terra quidem, et maria alta, atque his circumfluus aer, 
Et quse consistunt ex iis, htec omnia tenueis 
Sunt umbras, humanos quse tanquam somnia qusedam 
Pertingunt animos, fallaci et imagine ludunt, 
Nunquam eadem, fluxu semper variata perenni. 
Sol autem, Lunseque globus, fulgentiaque astra 
Csetera, sint quamvis meliori prffidita vita, 
Et donata £evo immortali, haac ipsa tamen sunt 
iEterni specula, in qme animus, qui est inde profectus, 
Inspiciens, patriae quodam quasi tactus amore, 
Ardescit. Verum quoniam heic non pcrstat et ultra 
Nescio quid sequitur secum, tacitusque requirit, 
Nosse licet circum hsec ipsum consistere verum, 
Non finem : sed enim esse aliud quid, cujus imago 
Splendet in iis, quod per se ipsum est, et principium esse 
Omnibus aeternum, ante omnem numerumque diemque ; 
In quo ahum Solem atque aliam splendescere Lunam 
Adspicias, aliosque orbes, alia astra manere, 
Terramque, fluviosque alios, atque sera, et ignem, 
Et nemora, atque aliis errare animalia silvis.' 

And as the comparison is misunderstood, so nothing can be conceived 
more adverse to the doctrine of Plato than the theory it is supposed to elu- 
cidate. Plotinus, indeed, formally refutes, as contrary to the Platonic, the 
very hypothesis thus attributed to his master. (Enn. IV., I. vi. cc. 1. 3.) 
The doctrine of the Platonists on this point has been almost wholly neglect- 
ed; and the author among them whose work contains its most articulato 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION* 203 

tlie sixth, the term ' shadoivy film] which here and elsewhere he 
constantly uses, shows that Dr. Brown confounds the matterless 



development has been so completely overlooked, both by scholars and phi- 
losophers, that his work is of the rarest ; while even his name is mentioned in 
no history of philosophy. It is here sufficient to state, that the e*8oi\a, the 
\6yoi yvws-iKol, the forms representative of external things, and corresponding 
to the species sensiles express® of the schoolmen, were not held by tlie Plato- 
nists to be derived from without. Prior to the act of perception, they have a 
latent but real existence in the soul ; and, by the impassive energy of the 
mind itself, are elicited into consciousness, on occasion of the impression 
(k(vyi<jis, -irdOog, Ijxtyacii) made on the external organ, and of the vital form, 
(Z,u)tikov elSos), in consequence thereof, sublimated in the animal life. The 
verses of Boethius, which have been so frequently misunderstood, contain 
an accurate statement of the Platonic theory of perception. After refuting 
the Stoical doctrine of the passivity of mind in this process, he proceeds : 

' Mens est efficiens magis" 
Longe causa potentior, 
Quam qua? materia? modo 
Impressas patitur notas. 
Pracedit tamen excitans 
Ac vires animi movens 
Vivo in corpore passio, 
Cum vel lux oculos ferit, 
Vel vox auribus instrepit : 
Turn mentis vigor excitus 
Quas intus species tenet, 
Ad motus similes vocans, 
Notis applicat exteris, 
Introrsumque reconditis 
Formis miscet imagines.' 

I cannot now do more than indicate the contrast of this doctrine to the 
Peripatetic (I do not say Aristotelian) theory, and its approximation to the 
Cartesian and Leibnitzian hypotheses ; which, however, both attempt to 
explain, what the Platonic did not — how the mind, ex hypothesi, above all 
physical influence, is determined, on the presence of the unknown reality 
within the sphere of sense, to call into consciousness the representation 
through which that reality is made known to us. I may add, that not 
merely the Platonists, but some of the older Peripatetics held that the soul 
virtually contained within itself representative forms, which were only 
excited by the external reality ; as Theophrastus and Themistius, to say 
nothing of the Platonizing Porphyry, Simplicius and Ammonius Hermias ; 
and the same opinion, adopted, probably from the latter, by his pupil, the 
Arabian Adelandus, subsequently became even the common doctrine of the 
Moorish Aristotelians. 



204 PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 

species of the Peripatetics with the corporeal effluxions of Democ* 
ritus and Epicurus : 

1 Qu£e, quasi membrance, suinrno do cortice rerum 
Dereptse, volitant ultro citroque per auras.' 

Dr. Brown, in short, only fails in victoriously establishing 
against Reid the various meanings in which ' the old writers' 
employed the term idea, by the petty fact — that the old writers 
did not employ the term idea at all. 

Nor does the progress of the attack belie the omen of its out- 
set. We shall consider the philosophers quoted by Brown in 
chronological order. Of three of these only (Descartes, Arnauld, 
Locke) were the opinions particularly noticed by Reid; the 
others (Hobbes, Le Clerc, Crousaz) Brown adduces as examples 
of Reid's general misrepresentation. Of the greater number of 
the philosophers specially criticised by Reid, Brown prudently 
says nothing. 

Of these, the first is Descartes ; and in regard to him, Dr. 
Brown, not content with accusing Reid of simple ignorance, con- 
tends ' that the opinions of Descartes are precisely opposite to the 
representations which he has given of them.' (Lect. xxvii. p. 
172.) — Now Reid states, in regard to Descartes, that this philos- 
opher appears to place the idea or representative object in per- 
ception, sometimes in the mind, and sometimes in the brain ; 
and he acknowledges that while these opinions seem to him con- 
tradictory, he is not prepared to pronounce which of them their 
author held, if he did not indeed hold both together. 'Des- 
cartes,' he says, ' seems to have hesitated between the two opin- 
ions, or to have passed from one to the other.' On any 
alternative, however, Reid attributes to Descartes, either the Jirst 
or the second form of representation. Now here we must recol- 
lect, that the question is not whether Reid be rigorously right, 
but whether he be inexcusably wrong. Dr. Brown accuses him 
of the most ignorant misrepresentation, — of interpreting an author, 
whose perspicuity he himself admits, in a sense ' exactly the 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 205 

reverse 1 of truth. To determine what Descartes' doctrine of per- 
ception actually is, would be difficult, perhaps even impossible ; 
but in reference to the question at issue, certainly superfluous. 
It here suffices to show, that his opinion on this point is one 
mooted among his disciples ; and that Brown, wholly unac- 
quainted with the difficulties of the question, dogmatizes on 
the basis of a single passage — nay, of a passage in itself irrele- 
vant. 

Reid is justified against Brown, if the Cartesian Idea be 
proved either a material image in the brain, or an immaterial 
representation in the mind, distinct from the precipient act. By 
those not possessed of the hey to the Cartesian theory, there are 
many passages* in the writings of its author, which, taken by 
themselves, might naturally be construed to import, that Des- 
cartes supposed the mind to be conscious of certain motions in 
the brain, to which, as well as to the modifications of the intellect 
itself he applies the terms image and idea. Reid, who did not 
understand the Cartesian philosophy as a system, was puzzled by 
these superficial ambiguities. Not aware that the cardinal point 
of that system is — that mind and body, as essentially opposed, are 
naturally to each other as zero, and that their mutual intercourse 
can only be supernaturally maintained by the concourse of the 
Deity ; f Reid attributed to Descartes the possible opinion, that 



* Ex. gr. De Pass. § 35 — a passage stronger than any of those noticed by 
De la Forge. 

t That the theory of Occasional Causes is necessarily involved in Des- 
cartes' doctrine of Assistance, and that his explanation of the connection of 
mind and body reposes on that theory, it is impossible to doubt. For while 
he rejects all physical influence in the communication and conservation of 
motion between bodies, which he refers exclusively to the ordinary concourse 
of God {Prime. P. II. AH. 36, etc.) ; consequently he deprives conflicting 
bodies of all proper efficiency, and reduces them to the mere occasional 
causes of this phenomenon. But a fortiori, he must postulate the hypothe- 
sis, which he found necessary in explaining the intercourse of things substan- 
tially the same, to account for the reciprocal action of two substances, to him, 
of so incompatible a nature as mind and body. De la Forge, Geulinx, Male- 
branche, Cordemoi, and other disciples of Descartes, only explicitly evolve 
what the writings of their master implicitly contain. We may observe, 



206 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION 

the soul is immediately cognizant of material images in the brain. 
But in the Cartesian theory, mind is only conscious of itself; the 
affections of body may, by the lata of union, be the proximate 
occasions, but can never constitute the immediate objects of knowl- 
edge. Reid, however, supposing that nothing could obtain the 
name of image which did not represent a prototype, or the name 
of idea which was not an object of thought, thus misinterpreted 
Descartes ; who applies, abusively, indeed, these terms to the 
occasion of perception (i. e. the motion in the sensorium, unknown- 
in itself and resembling nothing), at well ' as to the object of 
thought (i. e. the representation of which we are conscious in the 
mind itself). In the Leibnitio-Wolfian system, two elements, 
both also denominated ideas, are in like manner accurately to be 
contradistinguished in the process of perception. The idea in 
the brain, and the idea in the mind, are, to Descartes, precisely 
what the ' material idea 1 and the '■sensual idea) are to the 
Wolfians. In both philosophies, the two ideas are harmonic modi- 
fications, correlative and coexistent ; but in neither is the organic 
affection or material idea an object of consciousness. It is merely 
the unknown and arbitrary condition of the mental representa- 
tion ; and in the hypotheses both of Assistance and of Pre-estab- 
lished Harmony, the presence of the one idea implies the con- 
comitance of the other, only by virtue of the hyperphysical deter- 
mination. Had Reid, in fact, not limited his study of the Car- 
tesian system to the writings of its founder, the twofold applica- 
tion of the term idea, by Descartes, could never have seduced 
him into the belief that so monstrous a solecism had been com- 
mitted by that illustrious thinker. By De la Forge, the personal 
friend of Descartes, the verbal ambiguity is, indeed, not only 
noticed, but removed ; and that admirable expositor applies the 
term ' corporeal species' to the affection in the brain, and the 



though we cannot stop to prove, that Tennemann is wrong in denying De la 
Forge to be even an advocate, far less the first articulate expositor of the 
doctrine of Occasional Causes. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 207 

terms ' idea] i intellectual notion] to tile spiritual representation 
in the conscious mind. — Be V Esprit, c. 10. 

But if Reid be wrong in Ms supposition, that Descartes admit- 
ted a consciousness of ideas in the brain ;* is he on the other 
alternative wrong, and inexcusably wrong, in holding that Des- 
cartes supposed ideas in the mind not identical with their percep- 
tions? Malebranche, the most illustrious name in the school 
after its founder (and who, not certainly with less ability, may 
^be supposed to have studied the writings of his master with far 
greater attention than either Reid or Brown), ridicules as ' con- 
trary to common sense and justice 1 the supposition that Descartes 
had rejected ideas in ' the ordinary acceptation] and adopted the 
hypothesis of their being representations, not really distinct from 
their perception. And while ' he is as certain as he possibly can 
be in such matters,' that Descartes had not dissented from the 
general opinion, he taunts Arnauld with resting his paradoxical 
interpretation of that philosopher's doctrine, 'not on any passages 
of his Metaphysic contrary to the common opinion] but on his 
own arbitrary limitation of ' the ambiguous term perception? 
{Rep. cm Livre des Idtes, passim ; Arnauld, (Euv. xxxviii. pp. 
388, 389.)' That ideas are i found in the mind, not formed by 
it] and consequently, that in the act of knowledge the rej^resen- 
tation is really distinct from the cognition proper, is strenuously 
asserted as the doctrine of his master by the Cartesian Roell, in 
the controversy he maintained with the Anti-Cartesian De Vries. 
(Roelli Bispp. ; De Vries Be Ideis innatis.) — But it is idle to 
multiply proofs. Brown's charge of ignorance falls back upon 
himself; and Reid may lightly bear the reproach of 'exactly 
reversing' the notorious doctrine of Descartes, when thus borne, 
along with him, by the profoundest of that philosopher's disciples. 

Had Brown been aware, that the point at issue between him 



* Keid's error on this point is, however, surpassed by that of M. Koyer- 
Collard, who represents the idea in the Cartesian doctrine of perception as 
exclusively situate in the brain. — ((Euvres de Jieid, III. p. 334.) 



208 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

and Eeid was one agitated among the followers of Descartes 
themselves, he could hardly have dreamt of summarily determin- 
ing the question by the production of one vulgar passage from 
the writings of that philosopher. But we are sorely puzzled to 
account for his hallucination in considering this passage perti- 
nent. Its substance is fully given by Reid in his exposition of 
the Cartesian doctrine. Every iota it contains of any relevancy 
is adopted by Malebranche ; — constitutes, less precisely indeed, his 
famous distinction of perception (idie) from sensation {sentiment) : 
and Malebranche is one of the two modern philosophers, admit- 
ted by Brown to have held the hypothesis of re|)resentation in 
its first, and, as he says, its most ' erroneous" 1 form. But princi- 
ples that coalesce, even with the hypothesis of ideas distinct from 
mind, are not, a fortiori, incompatible with the hypothesis of 
ideas distinct only from the perceptive act. We cannot, however, 
enter on an articulate exposition of its irrelevancy. 

To adduce Hobbes, as an instance of Reid's misrepresentation 
of the ' common doctrine of ideas,' betrays on the part of Brown 
a total misapprehension of the conditions of the question ; — or he 
forgets that Hobbes was a materialist. — The doctrine of represen- 
tation, under all its modifications, is properly subordinate to the 
doctrine of a spiritual principle of thought ; and on the suj)posi- 
tion, all but universally admitted among philosophers, that the 
relation of knowledge implied the analogy of existence, it was 
mainly devised to explain the possibility of a knowledge by an 
immaterial subject, of an existence so disproportioned to its nature, 
as the qualities of a material object. Contending, that an imme- 
diate cognition of the accidents of matter, infers an essential iden- 
tity of matter and mind, Brown himself admits, that the hypothe- 
sis of representation belongs exclusively to the doctrine of dual- 
ism (Lect. xxv. pp. 150, 160) ; whilst Reid, assailing the hypoth- 
esis of ideas, only as subverting the reality of matter, could hardly 
regard it as parcel of that scheme, which acknowledges the real- 
ity of nothing else. — But though Hobbes cannot be adduced as 
a competent witness against Reid, he is however valid evidence 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 209 

against Brown. Hobbes, though a materialist, admitted no 
knowledge of an external world. Like bis friend Sorbiere, be 
was a kind of material idealist. According to bim, we know 
notbing of tbe qualities or existence of any outward reality. All 
that we know is tbe ' seeming] tbe ' apparition] tbe ' aspect] 
tbe '■phenomenon] tbe '■phantasm] witbin ourselves ; and tttia 
subjective object of wbicb we are conscious, and wbicb is con- 
sciousness itself, is notbing more tban tbe ' agitation 1 of our 
internal organism, determined by tbe unknown ' motions,' wbicb 
are supposed, in like manner, to constitute tbe world witbout. 
Perception be reduces to sensation. Memory and imagination 
are faculties specifically identical witb sense, differing from it 
simply in tbe degree of their vivacity ; and this difference of in- 
tensity, with Hobbes as with Hume, is the only discrimination 
between our dreaming and our waking tbougbts. — A doctrine 
of perception identical with Reid's ! 

In regard to Arnauld, the question is not, as in relation to the 
others, whether Reid conceived him to maintain a form of tbe 
ideal theory which he rejects, but whether Reid admits ArnaulcVs 
opinion on perception and his own to be identical. — ' To these 
authors,' says Dr. Brown, ' whose opinions on the subject of 
perception, Dr. Reid has misconceived, I may add one, whom 
even he himself allows to have shaken off the ideal system, and 
to have considered the idea and the perception as not distinct, 
but tbe same, a modification of the mind, and nothing more. 
I allude to the celebrated Jansenist writer, Arnauld, who main- 
tains this doctrine as expressly as Dr. Reid himself, and makes it 
the foundation of his argument in bis controversy with Male- 
brancbe.' (Lecture xxvii. p. 173.) — If this statement be not 
untrue, then is Dr. Brown's interpretation of Reid himself correct. 
A representative perception, under its third and simplest modifi- 
cation, is held by Arnauld as by Brown ; and bis exjDosition is 
so clear and articulate, that all essential misconception of his 
doctrine is precluded. In these circumstances, if Reid avow the 
identity of Arnauld's opinion and his own, this avowal is tanta- 
13 



210 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

mount to a declaration that his peculiar doctrine of perception is 
a scheme of representation ; whereas, on the contrary, if he sig- 
nalize the contrast of their two opinions, he clearly evinces the 
radical antithesis, — and his sense of the radical antithesis, — 01 
the doctrine of intuition, to every, even the simplest form of the 
hypothesis of representation. And this last he does. 

It cannot be maintained that Reid admits a philosopher to 
hold an opinion convertible with his, whom he states 'to 
profess the doctrine, universally received, that tve perceive not 
material things immediately, — that it is their ideas, which are 
the immediate objects of our thoughts, — and that it is in the idea 
of every thing that ive perceive its properties? This fundamental 
contrast being established, we may safely allow, that the radical 
misconception, which caused Reid to overlook the difference of 
our presentative and representative faculties, caused him likewise 
to believe that Arnauld had attempted to unite two contradictory 
theories of perception. Not aware, that it was possible to main- 
tain a doctrine of perception, in which the idea was not really 
distinguished from its cognition, and yet to hold that the mind 
had no immediate knowledge of external things : Reid supposes, 
in the first place, that Arnauld, in rejecting the hypothesis of 
ideas, as representative entities, really distinct from the contem- 
plative act of perception, coincided with himself in viewing the 
material reality as the immediate object of that act ; and in the 
second, that Arnauld again deserted this opinion, when, with the 
philosophers, he maintained that the idea, or act of the mind 
representing the external reality, and not the external reality 
itself, was the immediate object of perception. But Arnauld's 
theory is one and indivisible ; and, as such, no part of it is iden- 
tical with Reid's. Reid's confusion, here as elsewhere, is explained 
by the circumstance, that he had never speculatively conceived 
the possibility of the simplest modification of the representative 
hypothesis. He saw no medium between rejecting ideas as 
something different from thought, and the doctrine of an immedi- 
ate knowledge of the material object. Neither does Arnauld, as 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 211 

Eeid supposes, ever assert against Malebranche, 'that we per- 
ceive external things immediately,' that is, in themselves.* 
Maintaining that all our perceptions are modifications essentially 
representative, Arnauld everywhere avows, that he denies ideas, 
only as existences distinct from the act itself of perception.f 

* This is perfectly clear from Arnauld's own uniform statements ; and it 
is justly observed by Malebranche, in his Reply to the Treatise on True and 
False Ideas, (p. 123, orig. edit.) — that, 'ir reality, according to M. Arnauld, 1 
zee do not perceive bodies, wepe?'ceive only cursdves.'' 

t (Euvres, t. xxxviii. pp. 187, 198, 199, 889, et passim. It is to be recol- 
lected that Descartes, Malebranche, Amavld, Locke, and philosophers in 
general lefore Reid, employed the term Perception as coextensive with Con- 
sciousness. — By Leibnitz, Wolf, and their followers, it was used in a peculiar 
sense, — as equivalent to Representation or Idea proper, and as contradistin- 
guished from Apperception, or consciousness. Keid's limitation of the term, 
though the grounds on which it is defended are not of the strongest, is con- 
venient, and has been very generally admitted. 



1 On this point may be added the following (Reid, p. 296) : — ' Arnauld did not allow 
that perception and ideas are really or numerically distinguished — i. e. as one thing 
from another thing; not even that they are modally distinguished — i. e. as a thing 
from its mode. He maintained that they are really identical, and only rationally dis- 
criminated as viewed in different relations ; the indivisible mental modification being 
called a perception, by reference to the mind or thinking subject — an idea, by refer- 
ence to the mediate object or thing thought Arnauld everywhere avows that he denies 
ideas only as existences distinct .from the act itself of perception. — See (Euvres, t. 
xxxviii. pp. 18T, 19S,199, 3S9.' 

' The opinion of Arnauld in regard to the nature of ideas was by no means over- 
looked by subsequent philosophers. It is found fully detailed in almost every systema- 
tic course or compend of philosophy, which appeared for a long time after its first pro- 
mulgation, and in many of these it is the doctrine recommended as the true. ArnaulcVs 
was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian school. From this it 
passed into other schools. Leibnitz, like Arnauld, regarded Ideas, Notions, Represen- 
tations, as mere modifications of the mind (what by his disciples were called material 
ideas, like the cerebral ideas of Descartes, are out of the question), and no cruder 
opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems. 

" I don't know," says Mr. Stewart, " of any author who, prior to Dr. Reid, has ex- 
pressed himself on the subject with so much justness and precision as Father Buffier, 
in the following passage of his Treatise on ' First Truths :' 

'"If we confine ourselves to what is intelligible in our observations on ideas, we 
will say they are nothing but mere modifications of the mind as a thinking being. 
They are called ideas with regard to the object represented ; and perceptions with 
regard to the faculty representing. It is manifest that our ideas, considered in this 
sense, are not more distinguished than motion is from a body moved.'— (P. 311, English 
Translation.)"— Idem. iii. Add. to vol. i. p. 10. 

' In this passage, Buffier only repeats the doctrine of Arnauld, in Arnauld's own 
words. 

Dr. Thomas Brown, on the other hand, has endeavored to show that this doctrine 



212 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Reid was therefore wrong, and did Arnauld less than justice, 
in viewing his theory 'as a weak attempt to reconcile two' incon- 
sistent doctrines :' he was wrong, and did Arnauld more than 
justice, in supposing that one of these doctrines is not incompat- 
ible with his own. The detection, however, of this error only 
tends to manifest more clearly, how just, even when under its 
influence, was Reid's appreciation of the contrast subsisting be- 
tween his own and Arnauld's opinion, considered as a whole ; 
and exposes more glaringly Brown's general misconception of 
Reid's philosophy, and his present gross misrepresentation, in 
affirming that the doctrines of the two philosophers were identi- 
cal, and by Reid admitted to be the same. 

Nor is Dr. Brown more successful in his defence of Locke. 

Supposing always, that ideas were held tc be something 
distinct from their cognition, Reid states it, as that philosopher's 
opinion, ' that images of external objects were conveyed to the 
brain ; but whether he thought with Descartes [erratum for Dr. 
Clarke ?] and Newton, that the images in the brain are perceived 
by the mind, there present, or that they are imprinted on the 
mind itself, is not so evident.' This Dr. Brown, nor is he origi- 
nal in the assertion, pronounces a flagrant misrepresentation. 
Not only does he maintain, that Locke never conceived the idea 
to be substantially different from, the mind, as a material image 
in the brain ; but, that he never supposed it to have an existence 
apart from the mental energy of which it is the object. Locke, 
he asserts, like Arnauld, considered the idea perceived and the 
percipient act, to constitute the same indivisible modification of 
the conscious mind. We shall see. 

In his language, Locke is, of all philosophers, the most figura- 
tive, ambiguous, vascillating, various, and even contradictory; — 



(■which he identifies with Eeid's) had been long the catholic opinion ; and that Eeid, in 
his attack on the Ideal system, only refuted what had been already almost universally 
exploded. In this attempt he is, however, singularly unfortunate ; for, with the ex- 
ception of Crousaz, all the examples he adduces to evince the prevalence of Arnauld's 
doctrine are only so many mistakes, so many instances, in fact, which might be alleged 
in confirmation of the very opposite conclusion.' — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 213 

as has been noticed by Reid, and Stewart, and Brown himself, — 
indeed, we believe by every author who has had occasion to com- 
ment on this philosopher. The opinions of such a writer are not, 
therefore, to be assumed from isolated and casual expressions, 
which themselves require to be interpreted on the general analo- 
gy of his system ; and yet this is the only ground on which Dr. 
Brown attempts to establish his conclusions. Thus, on the mat- 
ter under discussion, though really distinguishing, Locke verbally 
confounds, the objects of sense and of intellect, — the operation 
and its object, — the objects immediate and mediate, — the object 
and its relations, — the images of fancy and the notions of the 
understanding. Consciousness is cor verted with Perception, — 
Perception with Idea, — Idea with Ideatum, and with Notion, 
Conception, Phantasm, Representation, Sense, Meaning, &c. Now, 
his language identifying ideas and perceptions, appears conform- 
able to a disciple of Arnauld ; and now it proclaims him a fol- 
lower of Digby, — explaining ideas by mechanical impulse, and 
the propagation of material particles from the external reality to 
the brain. The idea would seem, in one passage, an organic 
affection, — the mere occasion of a spiritual representation ; in 
another, a representative image, in the brain itself. In employ- 
ing thus indifferently the language of every hypothesis, may we 
not suspect, that he was anxious to be made responsible for 
none ? One, however, he has formally rejected ; and that is the 
very opinion attributed to him by Dr. Brown, — that the idea, or 
object of consciousness in perception, is only a modification of 
the mind itself. 

We do not deny, that Locke occasionally employs expressions, 
which, in a writer of more considerate language, would imply the 
identity of ideas with the act of knowledge ; and, under the cir- 
cumstances, we should have considered suspense more rational 
than a dogmatic confidence in any conclusion, did not the follow- 
ing passage, which has never, we believe, been noticed, appear a 
positive and explicit contradiction of Dr. Brown's interpretation. 
It is from Locke's Examination of Malebranche's Opinion, which 



214 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

as subsequent to the publication of the Essay, must be held au> 
thentic, in relation to the doctrines of that work. At the same 
time, the statement is articulate and precise, and possesses all 
the authority of one cautiously made in the course of a polemical 
discussion. Malebranche coincided with Arnauld, and conse- 
quently with Locke, as interpreted by Brown, to the extent of 
supposing, that sensation proper is nothing but a state or modifi- 
cation of the mind itself ; and Locke had thus the opportunity 
of expressing, in regard to this opinion, his agreement or dissent. 
An acquiescence in the doctrine, that the secondary qualities, ol 
which we are conscious in sensation, are merely mental states, by 
no means involves an admission that the primary qualities of 
which we are conscious in perception, are nothing more. Male- 
branche, for example, affirms the one and denies the other. But 
if Locke be found to ridicule, as he does, even the opinion which 
merely reduces the secondary qualities to mental states, a fortiori, 
and this on the principle of his oivn philosophy, he must be held 
to reject the doctrine, which would reduce not only the non- 
resembling sensations of the secondary, but even the resembling, 
and consequently extended, ideas of the primary qualities of 
matter, to modifications of the immaterial unextended mind. In 
these circumstances, the following passage is superfluously con- 
clusive against Brown, and equally so, whether we coincide or 
not in all the principles it involves : — ' But to examine their doc- 
trine of modification a little further. Different sentiments (sensa- 
tions) are different modifications of the mind. The mind, or 
soul, that perceives, is one immaterial indivisible substance. Now 
I see the white and black on this paper, I hear one singing in 
the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I sit by, and I taste 
an apple I am eating, and all this at the same time. Now, I ask, 
take modification for what you please, can the same unextended, 
indivisible substance have different, nay, inconsistent and opposite 
(as these of white and black must be) modifications at the same 
time? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible sub- 
stance, one for black, another for xohite, and another for red ideas, 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 215 

and so of the rest of those infinite sensations, which we have in 
sorts and degrees ; all which we can distinctly perceive, and so 
are distinct ideas, some whereof are opposite, as heat and cold, ivhich 
yet a man may feel at the same time ? I was ignorant before 
how sensation was performed in us : this they call an explanation 
of it ! Must I say now I understand it better ? If this be to 
cure one's ignorance, it is a very slight disease, and the charm of 
two or three insignificant words will at any time remove it ; pro- 
batum est.'' (Sec. 39.) — This passage, as we shall see, is corre- 
spondent to the doctrine held on this point by Locke's personal 
friend and philosophical follower, Le Clerc. (But, what is curi- 
ous, the suppositions which Locke here rejects, as incompatible 
with the spirituality of mind, are the very facts on which Ammo- 
nius Hermiae, Philoponus, and Condillac, among many others, 
found their proof of the immateriality of the thinking subject.) 

But if it be thus evident that Locke held neither the third 
form of representation, that lent to him by Brown, nor even the 
second ; it follows that Iieid did him any thing but injustice, in 
supposing him to maintain that ideas are objects, either in the 
brain, or in the mind itself. Even the more material of these 
alternatives has been the one generally attributed to him by his 
critics,* and the one adopted from him by his disciples.f Nor is 
this to be deemed an opinion too monstrous to be entertained by 
so enlightened a philosopher. It was, as we shall see, the com- 
mon opinion of the age ; the opinion, in particular, held by the 
most illustrious of his countrymen and contemporaries — by New- 
ton, Clarke, Willis, Hook, <fcc.J The English psychologists have 
indeed been generally very mechanical. 



* To refer only to the first and last of his regular critics : — see Solid, Phi- 
losophy asserted against the Fancies of the Ideists, hy J. S. [John Sekgeant.] 
Lond. 1697, p. 161, — a very curious book, absolutely, "we may say, unknown; 
and Cousin, Cours de Philosophic, t. ii. 1829 ; pp. 330, 357, 325, 365 — the most 
important work on Locke since the Nouveaux Essais of Leibnitz. 

t Tuokee's Light of Nature, i. pp. 15, 18, ed. 2. 

% On the opinion of Newton and Clarke, see Des Maizeaux's Eecueil, i. 
pp. 7, 8, 9, 15, 22, 75, 127, 169, &c— Genovesi notices the crudity of New- 



216 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Dr. Brown at length proceeds to consummate his imagined 
victory by ' that most decisive evidence, found not in treatises read 
only by a few, but in the popular elementary worts of science of 
the time, the general text-boohs of schools and colleges.' He 
quotes, however, only two : — the Pneumatology of Le Clerc, and 
the Logic of Crousaz. 

' Le Clerc,' says Dr. Brown, ' in his chapter on the nature of 
ideas, gives the history of the opinions of philosophers on this 
subject, and states among them the very doctrine which is most 
forcibly and accurately opposed to the ideal system of perception. 
" Alii putant ideas et perceptiones idearum easdem esse, licet rela- 
tionibus differ ant. Idea, uti censent, proprie ad objectum refer- 
tur, quod mens considerat; — perceptio, vere ad mentem ipsam 
quse percipit : sed duplex ilia relatio ad unam' modificationem 
mentis pertinet. Itaque, secundum hosce philosophos, nullae sunt, 
proprie, loquendo, idese a mente nostra distinctee." What is it, I 
may ask, which Dr. Reid considers himself as having added to 
this very philosophical view of perception ? and if he added noth- 
ing, it is surely too much to ascribe to him the merit of detect- 
ing errors, the counter statement of luhich had long formed a part 
of the elementary works of the schools. 11 

In the first place, Dr. Reid certainly ' added' nothing ' to this 



ton's doctrine, ' Mentem in cerebro prassidere atque in eo, suo scilicet senso- 
rio, rerum imagines cernere.''— On Willis, see his work Be Anima Brutorum, 
p. 64, alibi, ed. 1672. — On Hook, see his Led. on Light, §7. — We know not 
whether it has been remarked that Locke's doctrine of particles and impulse, 
is precisely that of Sir Kenelm Digby ; and if Locke adopts one part of so 
gross an hypothesis, what is there improbable in his adoption of the other? 
— that the object of perception is, a ' material participation of the bodies 
that work on the outward organs of the senses' (Digby, Treatise of Bodies, 
c. 32). As a specimen of the mechanical explanations of mental phenomena 
then considered satisfactory, we quote Sir Kenelm's theory of memory. — 
' Out of which it followeth, that the little similitudes which are in the caves 
of the brain, wheeling and swimming about, almost in such sort as you see 
in the washing of currants or rice by the winding about and circular turning 
of the cook's hand, divers sorts of bodies do go their course for a pretty 
while ; so that the most ordinary objects cannot but present themselves 
quiekly,' &c, &c. (ibidem). 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 217 

very philosophical view of perception,' but he exploded it alto- 
gether. 

In the second, it is false, either that this doctrine of perception 
' had long formed part of the elementary works of the schools,'' 
or that Le Clerc affords any countenance to this assertion. On 
the contrary, it is virtually stated by him to be the novel paradox 
of a single philosopher ; nay, to carry the blunder to hyperbole, 
it is already, as such a singular opinion, discussed and referred to 
its author by Reid himself. Had Dr. Brown proceeded from 
the tenth paragraph, which he quotes, to the fourteenth, which 
he could not have read, he would have found, that the passage 
extracted, so far from containing the statement of an old and 
familiar dogma in the schools, was neither more nor less, than 
a statement of the contemporary hypothesis of — Antony Ar- 
nauld ! and of Antony Arnauld alone ! ! 

In the third place, from the mode in which he cites Le Clerc, 
his silence to the contrary, and the general tenor of his statement, 
Dr. Brown would lead us to believe that Le Clerc himself coin- 
cides in ' this very philosophical view of perception.' So far, 
however, from coinciding with Arnauld, he pronounces his opin- 
ion to be false ; controverts it on very solid grounds ; and in 
delivering his own doctrine touching ideas, though sufficiently 
cautious in telling us what they are, he has no hesitation in 
assuring us, among other things which they cannot be, that they 
are not modifications or essential states of mind. ' Non est (idea 
sc.) modificatio aut essentia mentis : nam prgeterquani quod sen- 
timus ingens esse discrimen inter idese perceptionem et sensatio- 
nem ; quid habet mens nostra simile monti, aut innumeris ejus- 
modi ideis V — [Pneumat., sect. i. c. 5, § 10.) 

On all this no observation of ours can be either so apposite or 
authoritative, as the edifying reflections with which Dr. Brown 
himself concludes his vindication of the philosophers against 
Reid. Brown's precept is sound, but his example is instructive. 
One word we leave blank, which the reader may himself supply. 
— ' That a mind so vigorous as that of Dr. should have 



218 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

been capable of the series of misconceptions ivhich toe have traced, 
may seem wonderful, and truly is so ; and equally, or rather 
still more wonderful is the general admission of his merit in this 
respect. I trust it will impress you with one important lesson— 
to consult the opinions of authors in their own works, and not 
in the 'works of those who profess to give a faithful account 
of them. From my own experience I can most truly assure you. 
that there is scarcely an instance in which I have found the view 
I had received of them to be faithful. There is usually some- 
thing more, or something less, which modifies the general result ; 
and by the various additions and subtractions thus made, so much 
of the spirit of the original doctrine is lost, that it may, in some 
cases, be considered as having made a fortunate escape, if it be 
not at last represented as directly opposite to what it is.'' — (Lect. 
xxvii. p. 175.) 

The cause must, therefore, be unconditionally decided in favor 
of Reid, even on that testimony, which Brown triumphantly pro- 
duces in court as ' the most decisive evidence' against him : — 
here then we might close our case. To signalize, however, more 
completely the whole character of the accusation, we shall call a 
few witnesses ; to prove, in fact, nothing more than that Brown's 
own ' most decisive evidence' is not less favorable to himself, 
than any other that might be cited from the great majority of the 
learned. 

Malebranche, in his controversy with Arnauld, everywhere 
assumes the doctrine of ideas, really distinct from their percep- 
tion, to be the one ' commonly received ;' nor does his adversary 
venture to dispute the assumption. (Rep), au Livre des Idees. — 
Arnauld, (Euv. t. xxxviii. p. 388.) 

Leibnitz, on the other hand, in answer to Clarke, admits, that 
the crude theory of ideas held by this philosopher, was the com- 
mon. 'Je ne demeure point d'accord des notions vulgaires, 
comme si les Images des choses gtoient transporUes, par les 
organes, jusqifa Vame. Cette notion de la Philosophic Vulgaire 
n'est point intelligible, comme les nouveaux Cartesiens l'ont assez 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 219 

montre. L'on ne sanroit expliquer comment la substance imma- 
terielle est affectee par la mati&re : et soutenir ime chose non 
intelligible la-dessus, c'est recourir a la notion scholastique chime- 
rique de je ne sai quelles espices intentionelles inexpliquable, qui 
passent des organes dans l'ame.' {Opera, II. p. 161.) Nor does 
Clarke, in reply, disown this doctrine for himself and others. — 
(Ibid. p. 182). 

Brtjcker, in his Historia Philosophica Doctrinal de Ideis 
(1723), speaks of Arnauld's hypothesis as a '•peculiar opinion] 
rejected by '■philosophers in general (plerisque eruditis),' and 
as not less untenable than the paradox of Malebranche. — (P. 
248.) 

Dr. Brown is fond of text-books. Did we condescend to those 
of ordinary authors, we could adduce a cloud of witnesses against 
him. As a sample, we shall quote only three, but these of the 
very highest authority. 

Christian Thomasius, though a reformer of the Peripatetic 
and Cartesian systems, adopted a grosser theory of ideas than 
either. In his Introductio ad Philosophiam aulicam (1*702), he 
defines thought in general, a mental discourse ' about images, by 
the motion of external bodies, and through the organs of sense, 
stamped in the substance of the brain.'' (c. 3. § 29. See also 
his Inst. Jurispr. Div., L. i. c. 1, and Introd. in Phil, ration., 
c. 3.) 

S'Gravesande, in his Introductio ad Philosophiam (1736), 
though professing to leave undetermined, the positive question 
concerning the origin of ideas, and admitting that sensations are 
' nothing more than modifications of the mind itself;' makes no 
scruple, in determining the negative, to dismiss, as absurd, the 
hypothesis, which would reduce sensible ideas to an equal sub- 
jectivity. ' Mentem ipsam has Ideas efficere, et sibi ipsi repre- 
sentare res, quarum his solis Ideis cognitionem acguirit, nullo 
modo concipi potest. Nulla inter causam et effectum relatio dare- 
tur.' (§§ 279, 282.) 

Genovesi, in his Elementa Metaphysical (1748), lays it down 



220 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

as a fundamental position of philosophy, that ideas and the act 
cognitive of ideas are distinct (' Prop. xxx. Idea} et Perceptio- 
nes non videntur esse posse una eademque res 1 ) ; and he ably 
refutes the hypothesis of Arnauld, which he reprobates as a 
paradox, unworthy of that illustrious reasoner. (Pars II. p. 
140.) 

Voltaire's Dictionaire Philosophique may be adduced as rep- 
resenting the intelligence of the age of Eeid himself. ' Qu'esi 
ce qu'une Idee ? — C'est une Image qui se peint dans mon cerveau 
— Toutes vos pens^es sont done des images ? — Assurement,' 1 &c. 
(voce Idee.) 

Yfhat, in fine, is the doctrine of the two most numerous schools 
of modern philosophy — the Leibnitian and Kantian ?* Both 
maintain that the mind involves representations of which it is 
not, and never may be, conscious ; that is, both maintain the 
second form of the hypothesis, and one of the two that Reid 
understood and professedly assailed. [This statement requires 
qualification.] 

In Crousaz, Dr. Brown has actually succeeded in finding one 
example (he might have found twenty), of a pbilosopher, before 
Reid, holding the same theory of ideas with Arnauld and him- 
self.f 

* Leibnitz; — Opera, Dutensii, torn. ii. pp. 21, 23, 38, 214, pars ii. pp. 
137, 145, 146. (Euvres PUlos. par Baspe, pp. 66, 67, 74, 96, ets. Wolf ; 
— Psyclwl. Bat. § 10, ets. Psyclwl. Emp. § 43. Kant — Critih d. r. V. p. 
376, ed. 2. Anthropologic, § 5. With, one restriction, Leibnitz's doctriue 
is that of the lower Platonists, who maintained that the soul actually con- 
tains representations of every possible substance and event in the world 
during the revolution of the great year ; although these cognitive reasons 
are not elicited into consciousness, unless the reality, thus represented, 
be itself brought within the sphere of the sensual organs. (Plotimi-s, 
Enn. V. lib. mi. cc. 1, 2, 3.) 

+ In speaking of this author, Dr. Brown, who never loses an opportunity 
to depreciate Eeid, goes out of his way to remark, ' that precisely the same 
distinction of sensations and perceptions, on which Dr. Eeid founds so much, 
is stated and enforced in the different works of this ingenious writer,' and 
expatiates on this conformity of the two philosophers, as if he deemed its de- 
tection to be something new and curious. Mr. Stewart had already noticed 
it in his Essays. But neither he nor Brown seem to recollect, that Crousaz 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 221 

The reader is now in a condition to judge of the correctness 
of Brown's statement, ' that with the exception of Malebranche 
and Berkeley, who had peculiar and very erroneous notions on 
the subject, all the philosophers whom Dr. Reid considered him- 
self as opposing' (what ! Newton, Clarke, Hook, Norris, Portei> 
field, &c. ? — these, be it remembered, all severally attacked by 
Reid, Brown has neither ventured to defend, nor to acknowledge 
that he could not), ' would, if they had been questioned by him, 
have admitted, before they heard a single argument on his part, 
that their opinions with respect to ideas were precisely the same as 
his own.'' (Lect. xxvii. p. 174.) 

We have thus vindicated our original assertion : — Brown has 

NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVICTING ReID, EVEN OF A SINGLE ERROR. 

Brown's mistakes regarding the opinions on perception, enter- 
tained by Reid and the philosophers, are perhaps, however, even 
less astonishing, than his total misconception of the purport of 
Hume's reasoning against the existence of matter, and of the 
argument by which Reid invalidates Hume's skeptical conclusion. 
We shall endeavor to reduce the problem to its simplicity. 

Our knowledge rests ultimately on certain facts of conscious- 
ness, 1 which as primitive, and consequently incomprehensible, are 



only copies Malebranche, re et verbis, and that Eeicl had himself expressly 
assigned to that philosopher the merit of first recognizing the distinction. 
This is incorrect. But M. Eoyer-Collard (field, (Ewores, t. iii. p. 329) is still 
more inaccurate in thinking that Malebranche and Leibnitz (Leibnitz !) 
were perhaps the only philosophers before Eeid, who had discriminated per- 
ception from sensation. The distinction was established by Descartes ; and 
after Malebranche, but long before Eeid, it had become even common ; and 
so far is Leibnitz from having any merit in the matter, his criticism of Male- 
branche shows, that with all his learning he was strangely ignorant of a dis- 
crimination then familiar to philosophers in general, which may indeed be 
traced under various appellations to the most ancient times. [A contribu- 
tion 1 towards this history, and a reduction of the qualities of matter to three 
classes, under the names of Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary, is 
given in the Supplementary Dissertations appended to Eeid's "Works (p. 
825-875.)] 
1 See Part First, Philosophy of Common Sense. — W. 



2 It forms the fifth chapter of the second part of this voL— W. 



222 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 



given less in the form of cognitions than of beliefs. But if con 
sciousness in its last analysis — in other words, if our primary 
experience, be a faith ; the reality of our knowledge turns on the 
veracity of our constitutive beliefs. As ultimate, the quality of 
these beliefs cannot be inferred ; their truth, however, is in the 
first instance to be presumed. As given and possessed, they 
must stand good until refuted ; ' neganti incumbit probation It 
is not to be presumed, that intelligence gratuitously annihilates 
itself; — that Nature operates in vain ; — that the Author of na- 
ture creates onlyjto deceive. 

' $;5/K>7 8' oviTOTS -Kcifivav andWvTaL, rivriva ttcLvtes 
Aaol <prjixi£ovai' Qsou vv ti larri Kal aurJ?.' 

But though the truth of our instinctive faiths must in the first 
instance be admitted, their falsehood may subsequently be estab- 
lished : this, however, only through themselves — only on the 
ground of their reciprocal contradiction. Is this contradiction 
proved, the edifice of our knowledge is undermined ; for ' no lie 
is of the truth. 1 Consciousness is to the philosopher, what the 
Bible is to the theologian. Both are professedly revelations of 
divine truth ; both exclusively supply the constitutive principles 
of knowledge, and the regulative principles of its construction. 
To both we must resort for elements and for laws. Each may be 
disproved, but disproved only by itself. If one or other reveal 
facts, which, as mutually repugnant, cannot but be false, the 
authenticity of that revelation is invalidated ; and the criticism 
which signalizes this self-refutation, has, in either case, been able 
to convert assurance into skepticism, — ' to turn the truth of God 
into a lie,' 

' Et violare ficlem primam, et convellere tota 
Fundamenta qmbus nixatur vita salmque." 1 — Luce. 

As psychology is only a developed consciousness, that is, a 
scientific evolution of the facts of which consciousness is the guar- 
antee and revelation ; the positive philosopher has thus a primary 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 223 

presumption in favor of the elements out of which his system is 
constructed ; whilst the skeptic, or negative philosopher, must be 
content to argue back to the falsehood of these elements, from the 
impossibility which the dogmatist may experience, in combining 
them into the harmony of truth. For truth is one ; and the end 
of philosophy is the intuition of unity. Skepticism is not an ori- 
ginal or independent method ; it is the correlative and consequent 
of dogmatism ; and so far from being an enemy to truth, it arises 
only from a false philosophy, as its indication and its cure. ' Alte 
dubitat, qui altius credit? The skeptic must not himself estab- 
lish, but from the dogmatist accept, his principles ; and his con- 
clusion is only a reduction of philosophy to zero, on the hypothe- 
sis of the doctrine from which his premises are borrowed. — Are 
the principles which a particular system involves, convicted of 
contradiction ; or, are these principles proved repugnant to others, 
which, as facts of consciousness, every positive philosophy must 
admit ; there is established a relative skepticism, or the conclusion, 
that philosophy, in so far as realized in this system, is groundless. 
Again, are the principles, which, as facts of consciousness, philos- 
ophy in general must comprehend, found exclusive of each other ; 
there is established an absolute skepticism ; — the impossibility of 
all philosophy is involved in the negation of the one criterion of 
truth. Our statement may be reduced to a dilemma. Either the 
facts of consciousness can be reconciled, or they cannot. If they 
cannot, knowledge absolutely is impossible, and every system of 
philosophy therefore false. If they can, no system which supposes 
their inconsistency can pretend to truth. 

As a legitimate skeptic, Hume could not assail the foundations 
of knowledge in themselves. His reasoning is from their subse- 
quent contradiction to their original falsehood ; and his premises, 
not established by himself, are accepted only as principles univer- 
sally conceded in the previous schools of philosophy. On the 
assumption, that what was thus unanimously admitted by phi- 
losophers, must be admitted of philosophy itself, his argument 
against the certainty of knowledge was triumphant. — Philosophers 



224 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

agreed in rejecting certain primitive beliefs of consciousness as 
false, and in usurping others as true. If consciousness, however, 
were confessed to yield a lying evidence in one particular, it could 
not be adduced as a credible witness at all : — ' Falsus in uno, 
falsus in omnibus? But as the reality of our knowledge necessa- 
rily rests on the assumed veracity of consciousness, it thus rests 
on an assumption implicitly admitted by all systems of philosophy 
to be illegitimate. 

' Faciunt, nee, intelligendo, ut nihil intelligant P 

Reid (like Kant) did not dispute Hume's inference, as deduced 
from its antecedents. He allowed his skepticisms, as relative, to 
be irrefragable ; and that philosophy could not be saved from 
absolute skepticism, unless his conceded premises could be dis- 
allowed, by refuting the principles universally acknowledged by 
modern philosophers. This he applied himself to do. He sub- 
jected these principles to a neAV and rigorous criticism. If his 
analysis be correct (and it was so, at least, in spirit and intention), 
it proved them to be hypotheses, on which the credulous sequa- 
city of philosophers, — ' philosophorum credula natio ' — had 
bestowed the prescriptive authority of self-evident truths ; and 
showed, that where a genuine fact of consciousness had been sur- 
rendered, it had been surrendered in deference to some groundless 
assumption, which, in reason, it ought to have exploded. Philos- 
ophy was thus again reconciled with Nature ; consciousness was 
not a bundle of antilogies ; certainty and knowledge were not 
evicted from man. 

All this Dr. Brown completely misunderstands. He compre- 
hends neither the reasoning of skepticism, in the hands of Hume, 
nor the argument from common sense, in those of Reid. Retro- 
grading himself to the tenets of that philosophy, whose contra- 
dictions Hume had fairly developed into skepticism, he appeals 
against this conclusion to the argument of common sense ; albeit 
that argument, if true, belies his hypothesis, and if his hypothesis 
be true, is belied by it. Hume and Reid he actually represents 
as maintaining precisely the same doctrine, on precisely the same 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 225 

grounds ; and finds both concurring with himself, in advocating 
that very opinion, which the one had resolved into a negation of 
all knowledge, and the other exploded as a baseless hypothesis. 

Our discussion, at present, is limited to a single question, — to 
the truth or falsehood of consciousness in assuring us of the reality 
of a material world. In perception, consciousness gives, as an 
ultimate fact, a belief of the knowledge of the existence of something 
different from self. As ultimate, this belief cannot be reduced 
io a higher principle ; neither can it be truly analyzed into a 
double element. We only believe that this something exists, be- 
cause we believe that we know (are conscious of) this something 
as existing ; the belief of the existence is necessarily involved in 
the belief of the knowledge of the existence. Both are original, or 
neither. Does consciousness deceive us in the latter, it neces- 
sarily deludes us in the former ; and if the former, though a fact 
of consciousness, be false ; the latter, because a fact of conscious- 
ness, is not true. The beliefs contained in the two propositions : 

1°, / believe that a material world exists ; 

2°, / believe that I immediately know a material loorld existing, 
(in other words, I believe that the external reality itself is 
the object of which I am conscious in perception ) : 
though distinguished by philosophers, are thus virtually iden- 
tical. 

The belief of an external world, was too powerful, not to com- 
pel an acquiescence in its truth. But the philosophers yielded to 
nature, only in so far as to coincide in the dominant result. They 
falsely discriminated the belief in the existence, from the belief in 
the knoioledge. With a few exceptions, they held fast by the 
truth of the first ; but, on grounds to which it is not here neces- 
sary to advert, they concurred, with singular unanimity, in ab- 
juring the second. The object of which we are conscious in per- 
ception, could only, they explicitly avowed, be a representative 
image present to the mind; — an image which, they implicitly 
confessed, we are necessitated to regard as identical with the un- 
known reality itself. Man, in short, upon the common doctrine 
14 



226 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

of philosophy, was doomed by a perfidious nature to realize the 
fable of Narcissus ; he mistakes self for not-self, 

' corpus putat esse quod umbra est.' 

To carry these principles to their issue was easy ; and skepti- 
cism in the hands of Hume was the result. The absolute veracity 
of consciousness was invalidated by the falsehood of one of its 
facts ; and the belief of the hioivledge, assumed to be delusive, 
was even supposed in the belief of the existence, admitted to be 
true. The uncertainty of knowledge in general, and in particu- 
lar, the problematical existence of a material world, were thus 
legitimately established. To confute this reduction on the con- 
ventional ground of the philosophers, Reid saw to be impossible ; 
and the argument which he opposed, was, in fact, immediately 
subversive of the dogmatic principle, and only mediately of the 
skeptical conclusion. This reasoning was of very ancient appli- 
cation, and had been even long familiarly known by the name of 
the argument from Common Sense. 

To argue from common sense is nothing more than to render 
available the presumption in favor of the original facts of con- 
sciousness, — that what is by nature necessarily believed to be, 
truly is. Aristotle, in whose philosophy this presumption ob- 
tained the authority of a principle, thus enounces the argument : — 
' What appears to all, that we affirm to be ; and he who rejects 
this belief, will, assuredly, advance nothing better worthy of cred 
it.' (Eth. Nic. L. x. c. 2.) As this argument rests entirely on 
a presumption ;' the fundamental condition of its validity is, that 
this presumption be not disproved. The presumption in favor of 
the veracity of consciousness, as we have already shown, is redar- 
gued by the repugnance of the facts themselves, of which con- 
sciousness is the complement ; as the truth of all can only be 
vindicated on the truth of each. The argument from common 

1 ' There is,' says Hamilton (Eeid p. 447), ' a presumption in favor of the 
veracity of the primary data of consciousness. This can only be rebutted by 
showing that these facts are contradictory. Skepticism attempts to show 
this on the principles which the dogmatism postulates.' — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 227 

sense, therefore postulates, and founds on the assumption — 

THAT OUR ORIGINAL BELIEFS BE NOT PROVED SELF-CONTRADIC- 
TORY. 

The harmony of our primary convictions being supposed, and 
not redargued, the argument from common sense is decisive 
against every deductive inference not in unison with them. For 
as every conclusion is involved in its premises, and as these again 
must ultimately be resolved into some original belief; the conclu- 
sion, if inconsistent with the primary phenomena of consciousness, 
must, ex hypothesis be inconsistent with its premises, i. e. be logi- 
cally false. On this ground, our convictions at first hand, per- 
emptorily derogate from our convictions at second. ' If we know 
and believe,' says Aristotle, ' through certain original principles, 
we must know and believe these with paramount certainty, for the 
very reason that we know and believe all else through them ;' 
and he elsewhere observes, that our approbation is often rather 
to be accorded to what is revealed by nature as actual, than to 
what can be demonstrated by philosophy as possible : — ' n^otfs'^siv 
ou SsT Vavra roTg Sia rwv Xoywv, dXXa if ohXaxig (jtaXXov roi^fpai- 
i/ofJiivoi£.'* 

' JVovimus certissima scientia, et clamante conscientia? (to apply 
the language of Augustine, in our acceptation), is thus a proposi- 
tion, either absolutely true or absolutely false. The argument 
from common sense, if not omnipotent, is powerless : and in the 
hands of a philosopher by whom its postulate cannot be allowed, 
its employment, if not suicidal, is absurd. This condition of non- 
contradiction l is unexpressed by Reid. It might seem to him too 
evidently included in the very conception of the argument to re- 
quire enouncement. Dr. Brown has proved that he was wrong. 

* Jacobi ( Werlce, II. Vorr. p. 11, ets.) following Fries, places Aristotle at 
the head of that absurd majority of philosophers, who attempt to demonstrate 
every thing. This would not have been more sublimely false, had it been 
said of the German Plato himself. 

1 The two maxims, — whatever is, is ; and it is impossible for the same thing 
to be, and not to be, are called the principle of Identity, and the principle of 
Contradiction, or, more properly, Non- Contradiction. — W. 



228 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

Yet Reid could hardly have anticipated, that his whole philoso- 
phy, in relation to the argument of common sense, and that argu- 
ment itself, were so to be mistaken, as to be actually interpreted 
by contraries. — These principles established, we proceed to their 
application. 

Dr. Brown's error, in regard to Reid's doctrine of perception, 
involves the other, touching the relation of that doctrine to 
Hume's skeptical idealism. On the supposition, that Reid views 
in the immediate object of perception a mental modification, and 
not a material quality, Dr. Brown is fully warran'ed in asserting, 
that he left the foundations of idealism, precisely as he found 
them. Let it once be granted, that the object known in percep- 
tion, is not convertible with the reality existing; idealism re- 
poses in equal security on the hypothesis of a representative per- 
ception, — whether the representative image be a modification of 
consciousness itself, — or whether it have an existence independ- 
ent either of mind or of the act of thought. The former indeed 
as the simpler basis, would be the more secure ; and, in point of 
fact, the egoistical idealism of Fichte, resting on the third form 
of representation, is less exposed to criticism than the theologi- 
cal idealism of Berkeley, which reposes on ike, first. Did Brown 
not mistake Reid's doctrine, Reid was certainly absurd in thinking 
a refutation of idealism to be involved in his refutation of the 
common theory of perception. So far from blaming Brown, on 
this supposition, for denying to Reid the single merit which that 
philosopher thought peculiarly his own ; we only reproach him 
for leaving, to Reid and to himself, any possible mode of resist- 
ing the idealist at all. It was a monstrous error to reverse Reid's 
doctrine of perception ; but a greater still not to see that this 
reversal stultifies the argument from common sense ; and that 
so far from '■proceeding on safe ground' in an appeal to our 
original beliefs, Reid would have employed, as Brown has 
actually done, a weapon, harmless to the skeptic, but mortal to 
himself. 

The belief, says Dr. Brown, in the existence of an external 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 229 

world is irresistible, therefore it is true. On his doctrine of 
perception, which he attributes also to Reid, this inference is 
however incompetent, because on that doctrine he cannot fulfil 
the condition which the argument implies. / cannot but be- 
lieve that material things exist : — i" cannot but believe that the 
material reality is the object immediately known in perception. 
The former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Dr. Brown, in 
defending his system against the skeptic, because irresistible, is 
true. The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Dr. Brown, in 
establishing his system itself, though irresistible, is false. And 
here not only are two primitive beliefs, supposed to be 
repugnant, and consciousness therefore delusive ; the very 
belief which is assumed as true, exists in fact only through 
the other, which, ex hypothesi, is false. Both in reality ire 
one.* Kant, in whose doctrine as in Brown's the immediate 

* This reasoning can only be invalidated either, 1°, By disproving the 
belief itself of the knowledge, as a fact ; or — 2°, By disproving its attribute 
of originality. The latter is impossible ; and if possible, would also anni- 
hilate the originality of the belief of the existence, -which is supposed. The 
former alternative is ridiculous. That we are naturally determined to be- 
lieve the object known in perception, to be the external existence itself, 
and that it is only in consequence of a supposed, philosophical necessity, we 
subsequently endeavor by an artificial abstraction to discriminate these, 
is admitted even by those psychologists whose doctrine is thereby placed 
in overt contradiction to our original beliefs. Though perhaps superfluous 
to allege authorities in Bupport of such a point, we refer, however, to the 
following, which happen to occur to our recollection. — Descartes, De Pass. 
art. 26. — Malebranche, Bech. I. iii. c. 1. — Berkeley, Woi'hs, i. p. 216, 
and quoted by Eeid, E&. I. P. p. 165.— Hume, Treat. B. K i. pp. 330, 
338, 353, 358, 361, 369, orig. ed.— Essays, ii. pp. 154, 157, ed. 1788.— As 
not generally accessible, we translate the following extracts. — Schellixo 
(Ideen. zu einer Philosophic der JVatur. JEinl. p. xix. 1st ed.) — ' When (in 
perception) I represent an objeet, object and representation are one and the 
same. And simply in this our inability to discriminate tlie object from the 
representation during the act, lies the conviction which the common sense 
of mankind (gemeine Verstand) has of the reality of external things, although 
these become known to it, only through representations.' (See also p. 
xxvi.) — "We cannot recover, at the moment, a passage, to the same effect, 
in Kant ; but the ensuing is the testimony of an eminent disciple.— Ten- 
nehann (Gesch. d. Phil. II. p. 294), speaking of Plato : ' The illusion that 
tilings in themselves are cognizable, is so natural, that we need not marvel if 



230 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

object of perception constitutes only a subjective phenomenon, 
was too acute, not to discern that, on this hypothesis, philos- 
ophy could not, without contradiction, appeal to the evidence 
•of our elementary faiths. — ' Allowing idealism,' he says, ' to be 
as dangerous as it truly is, it would still remain a scandal tc 
philosophy and human reason in general, to be compelled to 
accept the existence of external things on the testimony of mere 
belief.'* 



even philosophers have not been able to emancipate themselves from the 
prejudice. The common sense of mankind (gemeine Menschenverstand) 
which remains steadfast within, the sphere of experience, recognizes no distinc- 
tion, between things in themselves [unknown reality existing] and phenomena 
[representation, object known] ; and the philosophizing reason, commences 
therewith its attempt to investigate the foundations of this knowledge, and 
to recall itself into system.' — See also Jacobi's David, Hume, passim ( WerTce, 
,ii.) and his Allwills Brief sammlung ( Wcrke, i. p. 119, ets.) Eeid has been 
already quoted. 

* Or. d. r. V. — Vorr. p. xxxix. Kant's marvellous acuteness did not how- 
ever enable him to bestow on his 'Only piossible demonstration of the reality 
of an external world -1 (ibid. p. 275, ets.), even a logical necessity; nor prevent 
his transcendental, from being apodeictically resolved (by Jacobi and Fichte 1 ) 
into absolute, idealism. In this argument, indeed, he collects more in the 
conclusion, than was contained in the antecedent ; and reaches it by a double 
saltus, overleaping the foundations both of the egoistical and mystical 
idealists. — Though Kant, in the passage quoted above and in other places, 
apparently derides the common sense of mankind, and altogether rejects it 
as a metaphysical principle of truth ; he at last, however, found it necessary 
(in order to save philosophy from the annihilating energy of his Speculative 
Season) to rest on that very principle of an ulimate belief (which he had orig- 
inally spurned as a basis even of a material reality), the reality of all the sub- 
Umest objects of our interest — God, Free Will, Immortality, &c. His Prac- 
tical Season, as far as it extends, is, in truth, only another (and not even a 



1 ' The doctrine of Kant has been rigorously proved by Jacobi and Fichte to be, in its 
legitimate issue, a doctrine of absolute Idealism ; and the demonstrations which the phi- 
losopher of Koenigsberg has given of the existence of an external -world, have been 
long admitted, even by his disciples themselves, to be inconclusive. But our Scottish 
philosophers appeal to an argument -which the German philosopher overtly rejected — the 
argument, as it is called, from common sense. In their hands, however, this argument 
is unavailing ; for, if it be good against the conclusions of the Idealist, it is good against 
the premises which they afford him. The common sense of mankind only assures us 
of the existence of an external and extended world, in assuring us that we are conscious, 
not merely of the phenomena of mind in relation to matter, but of the phenomena of 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 231 

But Eeid is not like Brown, felo de se in bis reasoning from 
our natural beliefs ; and on bis genuine doctrine of perception, 
tbe argument bas a very different tendency. Reid asserts tbat 
bis doctrine of perception is itself a confutation of tbe ideal sys- 
tem ; and so, wben its imperfections are supplied, it truly is. For 
it at once denies to tbe skeptic and idealist tbe premises of tbeir 
conclusion ; and restores to tbe realist, in its omnipotence, tbe ar- 
gument of common sense. Tbe skeptic and idealist can only found 
on tbe admission, tbat tbe object knoivn is not convertible with 
tbe reality existing ; and, at tbe same time, tbis admission, by 
placing tbe facts of consciousness in mutual contradiction, denies 
its postulate to tbe argument from our beliefs. Reid's analysis 
tberefore in its result, — that we have, as we believe we 

HAVE, AN IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATERIAL REALITY, 

accomplisbed every tbing at once.* 

Dr. Brown is not, boAvever, more erroneous it thinking tbat 
tbe argument from common sense could be employed by bim, 
tban in supposing tbat its legitimacy, as so employed, was admit- 



better) term for Common Sense. 1 — Fichte, too, escaped the admitted nihilism 
of his speculative philosophy, only by a similar inconsequence in his practical. 
— (See his Bestimmung des Men^chen.) i Naturam expellasfurca,' 1 &c. 

* [This is spoken too absolutely. Eeid I think was correct in the aim of 
his philosophy ; but in the execution of his purpose he is often at fault, 
often confused, and sometimes even contradictory. I have endeavored to 
point out and to correct these imperfections in the edition which I have not 
yet finished of his works.] 



matter in relation to mind — ' in other words tbat we are immediately percipient of ex- 
tended things. 

'Reid himself seems to have become obscurely aware of this condition ; and, thongh 
he never retracted his doctrine concerning the mere suggestion of extension, we find, 
in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," assertions in regard to the immediate per- 
ception of external things, which would tend to show that his later views were more in 
unison with the necessary conviction of mankind.' Reid, p. 129. — W. 

1 'This philosopher, in one of his controversial treatises, imprecates eternal damna- 
tion on himself not only should he retract, but should he even waver in regard to 
anyone principle of his doctrine; a doctrine, the speculative result of which left him, 
as he confesses, without even a certainty of his own existence. It is Varro who speaks 
of the credulo philosophorwn natio ; but this is to be credulous even in credulity.' — 
Reid, p. 281.— W. 



232 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

ted by Hume. So little did lie suspect the futility, in his owe 
hands, of this proof, he only regards it as superfluous, if opposed 
to that philosopher, who, he thinks, in allowing the belief in the 
existence of matter to be irresistible, allows it to be true. (Lect. 
xxviii. p. 11 Q.) Dr. Brown has committed, perhaps, more impor- 
tant mistakes than this, in regard to skepticism and to Hume ; — 
none certainly more fundamental, Hume is converted into a 
dogmatist ; the essence of skepticism is misconceived. 

On the hypothesis that our natural beliefs are fallacious, it is 
not for the Pyrrhonist to reject, but to establish their authenti- 
city ; and so far from the admission of their strength being a sur- 
render of his doubt, the very triumph of skepticism consists in 
proving them to be irresistible. By what demonstration is the 
foundation of all certainty and knowledge so effectually subverted, 
as by showing that the principles, which reason constrains us 
speculatively to admit, are contradictory of the facts, which our 
instincts compel us practically to believe ? Our intellectual na- 
ture is thus seen to be divided against itself; consciousness stands 
self-convicted of delusion. ' Surely we have eaten the fruit of 
lies !' 

This is the scope of the ' Essay on the Academical or Skeptical 
Philosophy] from which Dr. Brown quotes. In that essay, pre- 
vious to the quotation, Hume shows, on the admission of philos- 
ophers, that our belief in the knowledge of material things, as im- 
possible is false ; and on this admission, he had irresistibly estab- 
lished the speculative absurdity of our belief in the existence of 
an external world. In the passage, on the contrary, which Dr. 
Brown partially extracts, he is showing that this idealism, which 
in theory must be admitted, is in application impossible. Specu- 
lation and practice, nature and philosophy, sense and reason, be- 
lief and knowledge, thus placed in mutual antithesis, give, as their 
result, the uncertainty of every principle ; and the assertion of 
this uncertainty is — Skepticism. This result is declared even in 
the sentence, with the preliminary clause of which, Dr. Brown 
abruptly terminates his quotation. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTTON. 233 

But allowing Dr. Brown to be correct in transmuting the skep- 
tical nihilist into a dogmatic realist ; he would still be wrong (on 
the supposition that Hume admitted the truth of a belief to be 
convertible with its invincibility) in conceiving, on the one hand, 
that Hume could ever acquiesce in the same inconsequent con- 
clusion with himself; or, on the other, that he himself could, 
without an abandonment of his system, acquiesce in the legitimate 
conclusion. On this supposition, Hume could only have arrived 
at a similar result with Beid ; there is no tenable medium between 
the natural realism of the one and the skeptical nihilism of the 
other. — ' Do you follow,' says Hume in the same essay, ' the in- 
stincts and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of 
sense?' — I do, says Dr. Brown. (Lect. xxviii. p. 176, alibi.) — 
' But these,' continues Hume, ' lead you to believe that the very 
perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you dis- 
claim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion, 
that the perceptions are only representations of something exter- 
nal ? — It is the vital principle of my system, says Brown, that 
the mind knows nothing beyond its own states (Lect. passim) ; 
philosophical suicide is not my choice ; I must recall my admis- 
sion, and give the lie to this natural belief. — 'You here,' pro- 
ceeds Hume, ' depart from your natural propensities and more 
obvious sentiments ; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, 
which can never find any convincing argument from experience 
to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external 
objects.' — I allow, says Brown, that the existence of an external 
world cannot be proved by reasoning, and that the skeptical argu- 
ment admits of no logical reply. (Lect. xxviii. p. 175.) — 'But' 
(we may suppose Hume to conclude) ' as you truly maintain that 
the confutation of skepticism can be attempted only in tivo ways 
(ibid.), — either by showing that its arguments are inconclusive, 
or by opposing to them, as paramount, the evidence of our nat- 
ural beliefs, — and as you now, voluntarily or by compulsion, aban- 
don both ; you are confessedly reduced to the dilemma, either of 
acquiescing in the conclusion of the skeptic, or of refusing your 



234: PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 

assent upon no ground whatever. Pyrrhonism or absurdity ? — 
choose your horn.' 

Were the skepticism into which Dr. Brown's philosophy is thus 
analyzed, confined to the negation of matter, the result would be 
comparatively unimportant. The transcendent reality of an 
outer world, considered absolutely, is to us a matter of supreme 
indifference. It is not the idealism itself that we must deplore • 
but the mendacity of consciousness which it involves. Conscious- 
ness, once convicted of falsehood, an unconditional skepticism, in 
regard to the character of our intellectual being, is the melan- 
choly, but only rational, result. Any conclusion may now with 
impunity be drawn against the hopes and dignity of human na- 
ture. Our Personality, our Immateriality, our Moral Liberty, 
have no longer an argument for their defence. 'Man is the 
dream of a shadow ;' God is the dream of that dream. 

Dr. Brown, after the best philosophers, rests the proof of our 
personal identity, and of our mental individuality, on the ground 
of beliefs, which, as ' intuitive, universal, immediate, and irresisti- 
ble,' he not unjustly regards as ' the internal and never-ceasing 
voice of our Creator, — revelations from on high, omnipotent [and 
veracious] as their author.' To him this argument is however 
incompetent, as contradictory. 

What we know of self or person, we know, only as given in 
consciousness. In our perceptive consciousness there is revealed 
asan ultimate fact a self and a not-self ; each given as independ- 
ent — each known only in antithesis to the other. No belief is 
more '■intuitive, universal, immediate, or irresistible] than that 
this antithesis is real and known to be real; no belief is therefore 
more true. If the antithesis be illusive, self and not-self, subject 
and object, I and Thou are distinctions without a difference ; and 
consciousness, so far from being ' the internal voice of our Crea- 
tor,' is shown to be, like Satan, ' a liar from the beginning.' The 
reality of this antithesis, in different parts of his philosophy Dr. 
Brown affirms and denies. — In establishing his theory of percep- 
tion, he articulately denies, that mind is conscious of aught be* 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 235 

yond itself; virtually asserts that what is there given in con- 
sciousness as not-self, is only a phenomenal illusion, — a modifica- 
tion of self, which our consciousness determines us to believe the 
quality of something numerically and substantially different. 
Like Narcissus again, he must lament, — 

' Ele ego sum sensi, sed me mea fallit imago.'' 

After this implication in one part of his system that our belief 
in the distinction of self and not-self is nothing more than the 
deception of a lying consciousness ; it is startling to find him, in 
others, appealing to the beliefs of this same consciousness as to 
1 revelations from on high ;' — nay, in an especial manner alleg- 
ing ' as the voice of our Creator,' this very faith in the distinction 
of self and not-self, through the fallacy of which, and of which 
alone, he had elsewhere argued consciousness of falsehood. 

On the veracity of this mendacious belief, Dr. Brown establishes 
his proof of our personal identity. (Lect. xii.-xv.) Touching 
the object of perception, when its evidence is inconvenient, this 
belief is quietly passed over as incompetent to distinguish not-self 
from self ; in the question regarding our personal identity, where 
its testimony is convenient, it is clamorously cited as an inspired 
witness, exclusively competent to distinguish self from not-self 
Yet, why, if in the one case, it mistook self for not-self, it 
may not, in the other, mistake not-self for self, would appear a 
problem not of the easiest solution. 

The same belief, with the same inconsistency, is again called in 
to prove the individuality of mind. (Lect. xcvi.) But if we 
are fallaciously determined, in perception, to believe what is sup- 
posed indivisible, identical, and one, to be plural and different 
and incompatible (self = self + not-self) ; how, on the authority 
of the same treacherous conviction, dare we maintain, that the 
phenomenal unity of consciousness affords a guarantee of the real 
simplicity of the thinking principle ? The materialist may now 
contend, without fear of contradiction, that self is only an illusive 
phenomenon ; that our consecutive identity is that of the Delphic 



236 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

ship, and our present unity merely that of a system of co-ordinate 
activities. To explain the phenomenon, he has only to suppose, 
as certain theorists have lately done, an organ to tell the lie of 
our personality ; and to quote as authority for the lie itself, the 
perfidy of consciousness, on which the theory of a representative 
perception is founded. 

On the hypothesis of a representative perception, there is, in 
fact, no salvation from materialism, on the one side, short of 
idealism — skepticism — nihilism, on the other. Our knowledge of 
mind and matter, as substances, is merely relative : they are 
known to us only in their qualities ; and we can justify the pos- 
tulation of hvo different substances, exclusively on the supposition 
of the incompatibility of the double series of phenomena to coin- 
here in one. Is this sujjposition disproved ?-— the presumption 
against dualism is again decisive. ' Entities are not to be multi- 
plied -without necessity'' — *• A plurality of principles is not to be 
assumed where the phenomena can be explained by one.'' In Brown's 
theory of perception he abolishes the incompatibility of the two 
series ; and yet his argument, as a dualist, for an immaterial prin- 
ciple of thought, proceeds on the ground, that this incompatibility 
subsists. (Lect. xcvi. pp. 646, 647.) This philosopher denies us 
an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the accidents of mind. 
The accidents which we refer to body, as known to us, are only 
states or modifications of the percipient subject itself ; in other 
words, the qualities we call material, are known by us to exist, 
only as they are known by us to inhere in the same substance as 
the qualities we denominate mental. There is an apparent anti- 
thesis, but a real identity. On this doctrine, the hypothesis of a 
double principle losing its necessity, becomes philosophically ab- 
surd ; and on the law of parsimony, a psychological unitarianism, 
at best, is established. To the argument, that the qualities 
of the object are so repugnant to the qualities of the sub- 
ject of perception, that they cannot be supposed the accidents 
of the same substance ; the unitarian — whether materialist, ideal- 
ist, or absolutist — has only to reply : that so far from the attri- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 237 

butes of the object being exclusive of the attributes of the subject 
in this act ; the hypothetical dualist himself establishes, as the 
fundamental axiom of his philosophy of mind, that the object 
known is universally identical with the subject knowing. The ma- 
terialist may now derive the subject from the object, the idealist 
derive the object from the subject, the absolutist sublimate both 
into indifference, nay, the nihilist subvert the substantial reality 
of either ; — the hypothetical realist so far from being able to re- 
sist the conclusion of any, in fact accords their assumptive premi- 
ses to all. 

The same contradiction would, in like manner, invalidate every 
presumption in favor of our Liberty of Will. But as Dr. 
Brown throughout his scheme of Ethics advances no argument 
in support of this condition of our moral being, which his philos- 
ophy otherwise tends to render impossible, we shall say nothing 
of this consequence of hypothetical realism. 

So much for the system, which its author fondly imagines, ' al- 
lows to the skeptic no resting-place for his foot, — no fulcrum for 
the instrument he uses ;' so much for the doctrine which Brown 
would substitute for Reid's ; — nay, which he even suj^poses Reid 
himself to have maintained. 

' Scilicet, hoc totum falsa ratione receptum est I'* 



* [In this criticism I have spoken only of Dr. Brown's mistakes, and of 
those only with reference to his attack on Keicl. On his appropriating to 
himself the observations of others, and in particular those of Destutt 
Tracy, I have said nothing, though an enumeration of these would be 
necessary to place Brown upon his proper level. That, however, would 
require a separate discussion.] 



CHAPTER II. 

EEPEESENTATIVE AND PEESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE. 1 

§ I. — The distinction of Presentative, Intuitive or Imme- 
diate, and of Representative or Mediate cognition; 
with the various significations of the term Object, 
ITS conjugates and correlatives. 

The correlative terms, Immediate and Mediate, as attributes of 
knoioledge and its modifications, are employed in more than a sin- 
gle relation. In order, therefore, to obviate misapprehension, it is 
necessary, in the first place, to determine in what signification it 
is, that we are at present to employ them. 

In apprehending an individual thing, either itself through 
sense, or its representation in the phantasy, we have, in a 'certain 
sort, an absolute or irrespective cognition, which is justly denom- 
inated immediate, by constrast to the more relative and mediate 
knowledge, which, subsequently, we compass of the same object, 
when, by a comparative act of the understanding we refer it to a 
class, that is, think or recognize it, by relation to other things 
under a certain notion or general term. With this distinction we 
have nothing now to do. The discrimination of immediate and 
mediate knowledge, with which we are at present concerned, lies 
within and subdivides what constitutes, in the foregoing division, 
the branch of immediate cognition ; for we are only here to deal 
with the knowledge of individual objects absolutely considered, 
and not viewed in relation to aught beyond themselves. 

This distinction of immediate and mediate cognition it is of the 

1 Hamilton's second Supplementary Dissertation on Eeid constitutes this 
chapter. — TV. • 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 239 

highest importance to establish ; for it is one without which the 
whole philosophy of knowledge must remain involved in ambi- 
guities. What, for example, can be more various, vacillating, 
and contradictory, than the employment of the all-important terms 
object and objective, in contrast to subject and subjective, in the 
writings of Kant ? — though the same is true of those of other re- 
cent philosophers. This arose from the want of a preliminary 
determination of the various, and even opposite meanings, of 
which these terms are susceptible, — a selection of the one proper 
meaning, — and a rigorous adherence to the meaning thus pre- 
ferred. But, in particular, the doctrine of Natural Realism can- 
not, without this distinction, be adequately understood, developed, 
and discriminated. Reid, accordingly, in consequence of the want 
of it, has not only failed in giving to his philosophy its precise 
and appropriate expression, he has failed even in withdrawing it 
from equivocation and confusion, — insomuch, that it even re- 
mains a question, whether his doctrine be one of Natural Realism 
at all. — The following is a more articulate development of this 
important distinction than that which I gave some ten years ago ;' 
and since, by more than one philosopher adopted. 

For the sake of distinctness, I shall state the different momenta 
of the distinction in separate Propositions ; and these for more 
convenient reference I shall number. • 

1. — A thing is known immediately or proximately, when we 
cognize it in itself ; mediately or remotely, when we cognize it 
in or through something numerically different from itself Imme- 
diate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves 
the fact of its existence ; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge 
of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the 
possibility of its existence. 

2. — An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known 
is itself presented to observation, may be called a presentative ; 
and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by 

J See previous chapter, p. 178. — W. 



240 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

the mind face to face, may be called an intuitive* cognition. — A 
mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up or 
mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be called 
a representative f cognition. 

3. — A thing known is called an object of knowledge. 

4. — In a presentative or immediate cognition there is one sole 
object ; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing 
being one and the same. — In a representative or mediate cogni- 
tion there may be discriminated two objects ; the thing (imme- 
diately) known, and the thing existing being numerically different. 

5. — A thing known in itself is the (sole) presentative or intui- 
tive object of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a presentative or 
intuitive knowledge. — A thing known in and through something 
else is the primary, mediate, remote,^ real,§ existent, or represent- 



* On the application of the term Intuitive, in this sense, see in the sequel 
of this Excursus, p. 256, a. b. 

t The term Representation I employ always strictly, as in contrast to Pre- 
sentation, and, therefore, with exclusive reference to individual objects, and 
not in the vague generality of Representatio or Vbrstellung in the Leibnitz- 
ian and subsequent philosophies of Germany, where it is used for any cogni- 
tive act, considered, not in relation to what knows, but to what is known ; 
that is, as the gemis including under it Intuitions, Perceptions, Sensations, 
Conceptions, Notions, Thoughts proper, &c, as species. 

% The distinction of proximate and remote object is sometimes applied to 
perception in a different manner. Thus Color (the White of the Wall for 
instance), is said to be the proximate object of vision, because it is seen im- 
mediately ; the colored thing (the Wall itself for instance) is said to be the 
remote object of vision, because it is seen only through the mediation of 
the color. This however is inaccurate. For the Wall, that in which the 
color inheres, however mediately knoivn, is never mediately seen. It is not 
indeed an object of perception at all ; it is only the subject of such an object, 
and is reached by a cognitive process, different from the merely percep- 
tive. 

§ On the term Real. — The term Real (realis), though always importing 
the existent, is used in various significations and oppositions. The following 
occur to me : 

1. As denoting existence, in contrast to the nomenclature of existence, — 
the thing, as contradistinguished from its name. Thus we have definitions 
and divisions real, and definitions and divisions nominal or verbal. 

2. As expressing the existent opposed to the non-existent, — a something io 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 241 

cd, object of (mediate) knowledge, — objectum quod ; and a thing 
tarough which something else is known is the secondary, imme- 



contrast to a nothing. In this sense the diminutions of existence, to which 
reality, in the ollowmg significations, is counterposed, are all real. 

3. As denoting material or external, in contrast to mental, spiritual, or inter- 
nal, existeuce. This meaning is improper ; so, therefore, is the term Realism, 
zs equivalent to Materialism, in the nomenclature of some recent philoso- 
phers. 

4. As synonymous "with actual ; and this (a. as opposed to potential, b.) as 
opposed to possible existence. 

5. As denoting absolute or irrespective, in opposition to phenomenal or rela- 
tive, existence; in other words, as denoting things in themselves and out of 
relation to all else, in contrast to things in relation to, and as known by, in- 
telligences, like men, who know only under the conditions of plurality and 
difference. In this sense, which is rarely employed and may be neglected, 
the Eeal is only another term for the Unconditioned or Absolute, — rb SvtusSv. 

6. As indicating existence considered as a subsistence in natwe (ens extra 
animam, ens natures), it stands counter to an existence considered as a 
representation in thought. In this sense, reale, in the language of the older 
philosophy (Scholastic, Cartesian, Gassendian), as applied to esse or ens, is 
opposed to intentionale, notionale,conceptibile, imaginarium, rationis,cognitionis, 
in anima, in intellectu, prout cognitwm, ideale, &c. ; and corresponds with a 
parte rei, as opposed to a parte intellectus, with subjectivum, as opposed to objec- 
twum (see p. 240 b. sq. note), with proprium, principale, and fundamentale, 
as opposed to mcarium, with materiale, as opposed to formale, and with/w- 
male in seipso, and entitativum, as opposed to representativum, &c. Under 
this head, in the vascillating language of our more recent philosophy, real 
approximates to, but is hardly convertible with objective, in contrast to sub- 
jective in the signification there prevalent. 

7. In close connection with the sixth meaning, real, in the last place, de- 
dotes an identity or difference founded on the conditions of the existence of 
a thing in itself, in contrast to an identity or difference founded only on the 
relation or point of view in which the thing may be regarded by the think- 
ing subject. In this sense it is opposed to logical or rational, the terms being 
here employed in a peculiar meaning. Thus a thing which really (?'<?) or in 
itself is one and indivisible may logically (ratione) by the mind be considered 
as diverse and plural, and vice versa, what are really diverse and plural may 
logically be viewed, as one and indivisible. As an example of the former ; — 
the sides and angles of a triangle (or trilateral), as mutually correlative — as 
together making up the same simple figure — and as, without destruction of 
that figure, actually inseparable from it, and from each other, are really one ; 
but inasmuch as they have peculiar relations which may, in thought be con- 
sidered severally and for themselves, they are logically twofold. In like man- 
ner take apprehension and judgment. These are really one, as each involves 
the other (for we apprehend only as we judge something to be, and we judge 
only, as we apprehend the existence of the terms compared), and as together 

15 



242 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

diate, proximate, ideal* vicarious or representative, object of 
(mediate) knowledge, — objectum quo, or per quod. The former 
may likewise be styled objectum entitativum. 

6. — The Ego as the subject of thought and knowledge is now 
commonly styled by philosophers simply The Subject ; and Sub- 
jective is a familiar expression for what pertains to the mind or 
thinking principle. In contrast and correlation to these, the terms 
Object and Objective are, in like manner now in general use to 
denote the Non-ego, its affections and properties, — and in general 
the Really existent as opposed to the Ideally known. These 
expressions, more especially Object and Objective, are ambiguous ; 
for though the Non-ego may be the more frequent and obtrusive 
object of cognition, still a mode of mind constitutes an object of 
thought and knowledge, no less than a mode of matter. Without, 
therefore, disturbing the preceding nomenclature, which is not 
only ratified but convenient, I would propose that, when we wish 
to be precise, or where any ambiguity is to be dreaded, we should 
employ on the one hand, either the terms subject-object or subject- 
ive object (and this we could again distinguish as absolute or as 
relative) — on the other, either object-object, or objective object.\ 



they constitute a single indivisible act of cognition ; but they are logically 
double, inasmuch as, by mental abstraction, they may be viewed each for 
itself, and as a distinguishable element of thought. As an example of the 
latter ; individual things, as John, James, Eichard, &c, are really (numer- 
ically) different, as coexisting in nature only under the condition of plu- 
rality ; but, as resembling objects constituting a single class or notion 
(man) they are logically considered (generically or specifically) identical 
and one. 

* I eschew, in general, the employment of the words Idea and Ideal — they 
are so vague and various in meaning. But they cannot always be avoided, 
as the conjugates of the indispensable term Idealism. Nor is there, as I use 
them, any danger from their ambiguity ; for I always manifestly employ 
them simply for subjective — (what is in or of the mind), in contrast to objec- 
tive — (what is out of, or external to, the mind). 

t The terms Subject and Subjective, Object and Objective. — I have already had 
occasion to show, that, in the hands of recent philosophers, the principal 
terms of philosophy have not only been frequently changed from their orig- 
inal meanings and correlations, but those meanings and correlations some- 
times even simply reversed. I have again to do this in reference to the cor- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 243 

7. — If the representative object be supposed (according to one 
theory) a mode of the conscious mind or self, it may be distin- 

relatives subjective and objective, as employed to denote what Aristotle vaguely 
expressed by the terms t& fiylv and to. <p{icrei — the things in us, and the things in 
nature. 

The terms subject and object were, for a long time, not sufficiently discrim- 
inated from each other. — Even in the writings of Aristotle rd h-KOKdjuvov is 
used ambiguously for id in quo, the subject proper, and id circa quod, the object 
proper ; — and this latter meaning is unknown to Plate. The Greek language 
never, in fact, possessed any one term of equal universality, and of the same 
definite signification, as object. Eor the term avriKtijitvov, which comes the 
nearest, Aristotle uses, like Plato, in the plural, to designate, in general, the 
various kinds of opposites ; and there is, I believe, only a single passage to be 
found in his writings (De An. ii. c. 4), in which this word can be adequately 
translated by object. The reason of this, at first sight, apparent deficiency 
may have been that as no language, except the Greek, could express, not by 
a periphrasis, but by a special word, the object of every several faculty or 
application of mind (as aia0r]T6v, tyavTaardv , vot]t6v, yvuardv, iiuaTriTdv, 6ov\tit6v, 
6peKT6v, Sov\cvri' , T.ivtiv, &c, &c), so the Greek philosophers alone found 
little want of a term precisely to express the abstract notion of objectivity in 
its indeterminate universality, which they could apply, as they required it, 
in any determinate relation. The schoolmen distinguished the subjectum. 
occupationis, from the subjectum inhczsionis, prazdicatwnis, <&c, limiting the 
term objectum (which in classical Latinity had never been naturalized as an 
absolute term, even by the philosophers) to the former ; and it would have 
been well had the term subjectum, in that sense, been, at the same time, 
wholly renounced. This was not, however, done. Even to the pi'esent day, 
the word subject is employed, in most of the vernacular languages, for the 
materia circa quam, in which signification the term object ought to be exclu- 
sively applied. But a still more intolerable abuse has recently crept in ; ob- 
ject has, in French and English, been for above a century vulgarly employed 
for end, motive, jinal cause. But to speak of these terms more in detail. 

The term object (objectum, id quod objicitur cognitioni, &c.) involves a. 
two-fold element of meaning. 1°, it expresses something absolute, some- 
thing in itself that is ; for before a thing can be presented to cognition, it 
must be supposed to exist. 2°, It expresses something relative ; for in so 
far as it is presented to cognition, it is supposed to be only as it is known to 
exist. Now if the equipoise be not preserved, if either of these elements be 
allowed to preponderate, the word will assume a meaning precisely opposite 
to that which it would obtain from the preponderance of the other. If the 
first element prevail, object and objective will denote that which exists of its 
own nature, in contrast to that which exists only under the conditions of our 
faculties ; — the real in opposition to the ideal. If the second element prevail, 
object and objective will denote what exists only as it exists in thought ; — tho 
ideal in contrast to the real. 

Now both of these counter meanings of the terms object and objective have 
obtained in the nomenclature of different times and different philosophies, — 



241- PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

guished as Egoistical ; if it be supposed (according to another) 
something numerically different from the conscious mind or self, 



nay in the nomenclature of the same time and even the same philosophy. 
Hence great confusion and ambiguity. 

In the scholastic philosophy in which, as already said, object and objective, 
subject and subjective, were first employed in their high abstraction, and as 
absolute terms, and, among the systems immediately subsequent, in the Car- 
tesian and Gassendian schools, the latter meaning was the one exclusively 
prevalent. In these older philosophies, objectivum, as applied to ens or esse, 
was opposed tofortnale and subjectivum ; and corresponded with intentionale, 
vicarium, representativum, rationale or rationis, intellectuals or in intellectu, 
prout cognitum, ideate, ,&c, as opposed to reale, proprium, principale, funda- 
mentals, prout in seipso, &c. 

In these schools the esse subjectivum, in contrast to the esse objectivum, de- 
noted a thing considered as inhering in its subject, whether that subject were 
mind or matter, as contradistinguished from a thing considered as present to 
the mind only as an accidental object of thought. Thus the faculty of im- 
agination, for example, and its acts, were said to have a subjective existence 
in the mind ; while its several images or representations had, qua images or 
objects of consciousness, only an objective. Again, a material thing, say a 
horse, qua existing, was said to have a subjective being out of the mind ; qua 
conceived or known, it was said to have an objective being in the miud. 
Every thought has thus a subjective and an objective phasis ; — of which more 
particularly as follows : 

1. The esse subjectivum, formate, or proprium of a notion, concept, species, 
idea, &c, denoted it as considered absolutely for itself, and as distinguished 
from the thing, the real object, of which it is the notion, species, &c. ; that is, 
simply as a mode inherent in the mind as a subject, or as an operation exert- 
ed by the mind as a cause. In this relation, the esse reale of a notion, species, 
&c, was opposed to the following. 

2. The esse objectivum, vicarium, intentionale, ideate, representativum of a 
notion, concept, species, idea, &c, denoted it, not as considered absolutely for 
itself, and as distinguished from its object, but simply as vicarious or repre- 
sentative of the thing thought. In this relation the esse reale of a notion, 
&c, was opposed to the mere negation of existence — only distinguished 
it from a simple nothing. 

Hitherto we have seen the application of the term objective determined by 
the preponderance of the second of the two counter elements of meaning ; 
we have now to regard it in its subsequent change of sense as determined by 
the first. 

The cause of this change I trace to the more modern Schoolmen, in the 
distinction they took of conceptus (as also of notio and intentio) into formalii 
and objectivus, — a distinction both in itself and in its nomenclature, inconsist- 
ent and untenable. — A formal concept or notion they defined — ' the immedi- 
ate and actual representation of the thing thought ;' an objective concept or 
notion they defined — 'the thing itself which is represented or thought.'— 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 245 

it may be distinguished as Non-Egoistical} The former theory- 
supposes two things numerically different : 1°, the object repre- 



Now, in the first place, the second of these, is, either not a concept or notion 
at all, or it is indistinguishable from the first. (A similar absurdity is commit- 
ted by Locke in his employment of Idea for its object — the reality represent- 
ed by it — the Ideatum.) — In the second place, the terms formal and objective 
are here used in senses precisely opposite to what they were when the same 
philosophers spoke of the esse formale and esse objectivum of a notion. 

This distinction and the terms in which it was expressed came however 
to be universally admitted. Hence, though proceeding from an error, I 
would account in part, but in part only, for the general commutation latterly 
effected in the application of the term objective. This change began, I am 
inclined to think, about the middle of the seventeenth century — and in the 
German schools. Thus Calovius — ' Quicquid objective fundamentaliter in 
natura existit,' &c. (ScriptaPhilosophica, 1651, p. 72.) In the same sense it is 
used by Leibnitz; e. g. N. Essais, p. 187; and subsequently to him by the 
Leibnitio-Wolfians and other German philosophers in general. This appli- 
cation of the term, it is therefore seen, became prevalent among his country- 
men long before the time of Kant ; in the ' Logica ' of whose master Knutzen, 
I may notice, objective and subjective, in their modern meaning are em- 
ployed in almost every page. The English philosophers, at the commence- 
ment of the last century, are found sometimes using the term objective in the 
old sense, — as Berkeley in his ' Siris,' § 292 ; sometimes in the new, — as Nor- 
risinhis 'Eeason and Faith' (ch. 1), andOldfield in his 'Essay towards the 
improvement of Eeason' (Part ii. c. 19), who both likewise oppose it to sub- 
jective, taken also in its present acceptation. 

But the cause, why the general terms subject and subjective, object and ob- 
jective, came, in philosophy, to be simply applied to a certain special distinc- 
tion ; and why, in that distinction, they came to be opposed as contraries — 
this is not to be traced alone to the inconsistencies which I have noticed ; for 
that inconsistency itself must be accounted for. It lies deeper. It is to be 
found in the constituent elements of all knowledge itself; and the nomen- 
clature in question is only an elliptical abbreviation, and restricted applica- 
tion of the scholastic expressions by which these elements have for many 
ages been expressed. 

All knowledge is a relation — a relation between that which knows (in scho- 
lastic language, the subject in which knowledge inheres), and that which is 
known (in scholastic language, the object about which knowledge is conver- 
sant) ; and the contents of every act of knowledge are made up of elements, 
and regulated by laws, proceeding partly from its object and partly from its 
subject. Now philosophy proper is principally and primarily the science of 
knowledge ; its first and most important problem being to determine — What 
can we know t that is, what are the conditions of our knowing, whether 



' See the next chapter. — W. 



246 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

sented, — 2°, the representing and cognizant mind : — the latter, 
three; 1°, the object represented, — 2°, the object representing, — 
3°, the cognizant mind. Compared merely with each other, the 
former, as simpler, may, by contrast to the latter, be considered, 

these lie in the nature of the object, or in the nature of the subject, of knowl- 
edge? 

But Philosophy being the Science of Knowledge ; and the science of knowl- 
edge supposing, in its most fundamental and thorough-going analysis, the 
distinction of the subject and object of knowledge ; it is evident, that, to philos- 
ophy the subject of knowledge would be, by pre-eminence, The Subject, and 
the object of knowledge by pre-eminence, The Object. It was therefore natu- 
ral that the object and the objective, the subject and the subjective should be 
employed by philosophers as simple terms, compendiously to denote the 
grand discrimination, about which philosophy was constantly employed, and 
which no others could be found so precisely and promptly to express. In 
fact, had it not been for the special meaning given to objective in the Schools, 
their employment in this their natural relation would probably have been of 
a much earlier date ; not however that they are void of ambiguity, and have 
not been often abusively employed. TMs arises from the following circum- 
stance : — The subject of knowledge is exclusively the Ego or conscious mind. 
Subject and subjective, considered in themselves, are therefore little liable to 
equivocation. But, on the other hand, the object of knowledge is not neces- 
sarily a phenomenon of the Non-ego ; for the phenomena of the Ego itself 
constitute as veritable, though not so various and prominent, objects of cog- 
nition, as the phenomena of the Non-ego. 

Subjective and objective do not, therefore, thoroughly and adequately dis- 
criminate that which belongs to mind, and even that which belongs to matter; 
they do not even competently distinguish what is dependent, from what is 
independent, on the conditions of the mental self. But in these significations 
they are and must be frequently employed. Without therefore discarding 
this nomenclature, which, as far as it goes, expresses, in general, a distinction 
of the highest importance, in the most apposite terms ; these terms may by 
qualification easily be rendered adequate to those subordinate discrimina- 
tions, which it is often requisite to signalize, but which they cannot simply 
and of themselves denote. 

Subject and subjective, without any qualifying attribute, I would therefore 
employ, as has hitherto been done, to mark out what inheres in, pertains 
to, or depends on, the knowing mind whether of man in general, or of this 
or that individual man in particular ; and this in contrast to object and ob- 
jective, as expressing what does not so inhere, pertain, and depend. Thus, 
for example, an art or science is said to be objective, when considered simply 
as a system of speculative truths or practical rules, but without respect of 
any actual possessor ; subjective when considered as a habit of knowledge or 
a dexterity, inherent in tho mind, either vaguely of any, or precisely of this 
or that, possessor. 

But, as has been stated, an object of knowledge may be a mode ofmind, oi 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 247 

but still inaccurately, as an immediate cognition.' The latter of 
these as limited in its application to certain faculties, and now in 
fact wholly exploded, may be thrown out of account. 

8. — External Perception or Perception simply, is the faculty 
presentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the Non-Ego or 
Matter — if there be any intuitive apprehension allowed of the Non- 
Ego at all. Internal Perception or Self- Consciousness is the fac- 
ulty presentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the Ego or mind. 

9. — Imagination or Phantasy? in its most extensive meaning, 
is the faculty representative of the phenomena both of the exter- 
nal and internal worlds. 

10. — A representation considered as an object is logically, not 
really, different from a representation considered as an act. Here 
object and act are merely the same indivisible mode of mind 
viewed in two different relations. Considered by reference to a 
(mediate) object represented, it is a representative object ; con- 



it may be something different from mind ; and it is frequently of import- 
ance to indicate precisely under which of these classes that object comes. 
In this case by an internal development of the nomenclature itself, we might 
employ, on the former alternative, the term subject-object ; on the latter, the 
term object-object. 

But the subject-object may be either a mode of mind, of which we are con- 
scious as absolute and for itself alone, — as, for example, a pain or pleasure ; 
or a mode of mind, of which we are conscious, as relative to, and represen- 
tative of something else, — as, for instance, the imagination of something 
past or possible. Of these we might distinguish, when necessary, the one, 
as the absolute or the real subject-object, the other, as the relative or the ideal 
or the representative subject-object. 

Finally, it may be required to mark whether the object-object and the sub- 
ject-object be immediately known as present, or only as represented. In 
this case we must resort, on the former alternative, to the epithet presentati ve 
or intuitive ; on the latter, to those of represented, mediate, remote, primary, 
principal, &c. 

1 This observation has reference to Eeid. See sequel of this chapter, § ii. 
and the following chapter, § ii. A, 4. — W. 

2 ' The Latin Jmaginatio, with its modifications in the vulgar languages, 
was employed both in ancient and modern times to express what the Greeks 
denominated ^avraata. Phantasy, of which Phansy or Fancy is a corruption, 
and now employed in a more limited sense, was a common name for Imagi- 
nation with the old English writers.' — Eeid, p. 379. — W. 



248 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

sidered by reference to the mind representing and contemplating 
the representation, it is a representative act. A representative 
object being viewed as posterior in the order of nature, but not of 
time, to the representative act, is viewed as a product ; and the 
representative act being viewed as prior in the order of nature, 
though not of time, to the representative object, is viewed as a 
producing process. The same may be said of Image and Imagi 
nation. (Prop. 21, and p. 259, a b, and note.) 

11. — A thing to be known in itself must be known as actually 
existing (Pr. 1), and it cannot be known as actually existing 
unless it be known as existing in its When and its Where. But 
the When and Where of an object are immediately cognizable 
by the subject, only if the When be now (i. e. at the same 
moment 1 with the cognitive act), and the Where be here (i. e. 
within the sphere of the cognitive faculty) ; therefore a presenta- 
tive or intuitive knowledge is only competent of an object present 
to the mind, both in time and in space. 

12. — E con verso — whatever is known, but not as actually 
existing now and here, is known not in itself, as the presentative 



J Time is cognizable and conceivable only as an indefinite past, present, or 
future. An absolute minimum we cannot fix — an infinite division we can- 
not carry out. "We can conceive Time only as a relative. The Present, so 
far as construable to thought, has no reality. (See p. 488.) Will Sir William 
then explain to its what he means by the phrase — at the same moment with t 
In Extensive Quantity he wisely does not demand an absolute ' present,' for 
in that case the Eleatic Zeno's demonstration would hold him motionless. 
He does seem to demand an absolute present in Extensive Quantity. Abso- 
lute present, has no place in thought. Perception must take place in time, 
i. e. in an indefinite present. Add that Memory, as Hobbes, Descartes, and 
Aristotle call Imagination, is a dying sense ; and what hinders us from say- 
ing, with Eeid, that Memory is an immediate (=non-mediate) knowledge of 
the past ? It seems to us that Hamilton is here crossing a shadow of the 
Absolute, and that the question may in part be redargued from his own 
•rround of Relativity. We do not mean that Sir William is wrong in making 
a distinction between Presentative and Representative knowledge, but that 
the line of demarkation might be shifted. We here speak briefly, and only 
to the initiated ; and regret that these sheets are passing so rapidly through 
the press that we cannot discuss the question at some length, for it is one of 
the most important in philosophy. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION, 249 

object of an intuitive, but only as the remote object of a repre- 
sentative cognition. 

13. — A representative object, considered irrespectively of what 
it represents, and simply as a mode of the conscious subject, is 
an intuitive or presentative object. For it is known in itself, as 
a mental mode, actually existing now and here.* 



* Propositions 10-13 may illustrate a passage in Aristotle's treatise on 
Memory and Eeminiscence (c. 1), which has been often curiously misunder- 
stood by his expositors ; and as it, in return, serves to illustrate the doctrine 
here stated, I translate it : 

' Of what part of the soul memory is a function, is manifest ; — of that, to 
wit, of which imagination or phantasy is a function. [And imagination had 
been already shown to be a function of the common sense.] 

' And here a doubt may be started — Whether the affection [or mental 
modification] being present, the reality absent, that what is not present can 
be remembered [or, in general, known]. For it is manifest that we must 
conceive the affection, determined in the soul or its proximate bodily organ, 
through sense, to be, as it were, a sort of portrait, of which we say that 
memory is the habit [or retention]. For the movement excited [to employ 
the simile of Plato] stamps, as it were, a kind of impression of the total pro- 
cess of perception-)- [on the soul or its organ], after the manner of one who 
applies a signet to wax. . . . 

' But if such be the circumstances of memory — Is remembrance [a cogni- 
tion] of this affection, or of that from which it is produced? For, if of the 
latter, we can have no remembrance [or cognition] of things absent ; if of the 
former, how, as percipient [or conscious of this present affection], can we 
have a remembrance [or cognition] of that of which we are not percipient 
[or conscious] — the absent [reality] ? Again, J supposing there to be a resem- 
bling something, such as an impression or picture, in the mind ; the percep- 
tion [or consciousness] of this — Why should it be the remembrance [or cog- 
nition] of another thing, and not of this something itself? — for in the act of 
remembrance we contemplate this mental affection, and of this [alone] are 
we percipient [or conscious]. In these circumstances, how is a remembrance 
[or cognition] possible of what is_not present ? For if so, it would seem that 
what is not present might, in like manner, be seen and heard. 

' Or is this possible, and what actually occurs ? And thus : — As in a por- 
trait the thing painted is an animal, and a representation {ehuv) [of an ani- 
mal], one and the same being, at once, both (for, though in reality both are 
not the s.ame, in thought we can view the painting, either [absolutely] as 
animal, or [relatively] as representation [of an animal]) ; in like manner, the 
phantasm in us, we must consider, both absolutely, as a phenomenon (0e«5- 



t AiaOi'maTos : — this comprehends both the objective presentation— ai<j8rjT6v, and 
the subjective energy — aiodriais. 
\ I read In & n. Themistius has en tlvs 



250 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

14.— Consciousness is a knowledge solely of what is now and 
here present to the mind. It is therefore only intuitive, and 
its objects exclusively presentative. Again, Consciousness is a 
knowledge of all that is now and here present to the mind : 
every immediate object of cognition is thus an object of conscious- 
ness, and every intuitive cognition itself, simply a special form 
of consciousness. 

15. — Consciousness comprehends every cognitive act ; in other 
words, whatever we are not conscious of, that we do not know. 
But consciousness is an immediate cognition. Therefore all our 
mediate cognitions are contained in our immediate. 

16. — The actual modifications — the present acts and affections 
of the Ego, are objects of immediate cognition, as themselves 
objects of consciousness. (Pr. 14.) The past and possible modi- 
fications of the Ego are objects of mediate cognition, as repre- 
sented to consciousness in a present or actual modification. 

1*7. — The Primary Qualities 1 of matter or body, now and here, 
that is in proximate relation to our organs, are objects of imme- 
diate cognition to the Natural Realists, 2 of mediate, to the Cos- 
mothetic Idealists : 2 the former, on the testimony of consciousness, 
asserting to mind the capability of intuitively perceiving what is 
not itself; the latter denying this capability, but asserting to the 

(.tttia) in itself, and relatively, as a phantasm [or representation] of something 
different from itself. Considered absolutely, it is a [mere] phenomenon or 
[irrespective] phantasm ; considered relatively, it is a representation or recol- 
lective image. So that when a movement [or mental modification] is in 
present act ; — if the soul perceive [or apprehend] it as absolute and for itself. 
a kind of [irrespective] concept or phantasm seems the result; whereas, if 
as relative to what is different from itself, it views it (as in the picture) for a 
representation, and a rej>resentation of Coriscus, even although Coriscus has 
not himself been seen. And here we are differently affected in this mode of 
viewing [the movement, as painted representation], from what we are when 
viewing it. as painted animal ; the mental phenomenon, in the one case is, 
so to say, a mere [irrelative] concept ; while in the other, what is remem- 
bered is here [in the mind], as there [in the picture], a representation.' 

1 On the distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter — 
its history and completion, see below, chap. v. — W. 

a On these Designations, see above, Part I. and the chapter following this. 
-W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 251 

mind the power of representing, and truly representing, what it 
does not know. To the Absolute Idealists' matter has no exist- 
ence as an object of cognition, either immediate or mediate. 

18. — The Secondary Qualities* of body now and here, as only 
present affections of the conscious subject, determined by an 
unknown external cause, are, on every theory, now allowed to be 
objects of immediate cognition. (Pr. 16.) 

19. — As not now present in time, 3 an immediate knowledge of 
the 'past is impossible. The past is only mediately cognizable in 
and through a present modification relative to, and representative 
of it as having been. To speak of an immediate knowledge of 
the past involves a contradiction in acljecto. For to know the 
past immediately, it must be known in itself; — and to be known 
in itself it must be known as now existing. But the past is just 
a negation of the now existent : its very notion, therefore, excludes 
the possibility of its being immediately known. So much for 
Memory, or Recollective Imagination. 

20. — In like manner, supposing that a knowledge of the future 
were competent, this can only be conceived possible, in and 
through a now present representation ; that is, only as a mediate 
cognition. For, as not yet existent, the future cannot be known 
in itself, or as actually existent. As not here present, an imme- 
diate knowledge of an object distant in space is likewise impossi- 
ble. 3 For, as beyond the sphere of our organs and faculties, it 
cannot be known by them in itself; it can only, therefore, if 
known at all, be known through something different from itself 
that is mediately, in a reproductive or a constructive act of imagi- 
nation. 

21. — A possible object — an ens rationis — is a mere fabrication 
of the mind itself; it exists only ideally in and through an act of 

1 On these Designations see above, Part I. and the chapter following this. 
— W. 

2 On the assertions of Eeid, Stewart, &c, that the mind is immediately 
percipient of distant objects, see § ii. of this chapter, and § ii. of the next 
chapter. — W. 

* See note 1, p. 248.— W. 



252 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

imagination, and has only a logical existence, apart from that act 
with which it is really identical. (Pr. 10, and p. 259, a b, with 
note.) It is therefore an intuitive object m itself; but in so far, 
as not involving a contradiction, it is conceived as prefiguring 
something which may possibly exist some- where and some-when — 
this something, too, being constructed out of elements which had 
been previously given in Presentation — it is Representative. 1 



Compared together, these two ' cognitions afford the following 
similarities and differences. 

A. Compared by reference to their simplicity or complexity, as 
Acts. 

22. — Though both as really considered (re, non rati one), are 
equally one and indivisible ; still as logically considered (ratione, 
non re), an Intuitive cognition is simple, being merely intuitive ; 
a Representative, complex, as both representative and intuitive of 
the representation. 

B. Compared by reference to the number of their Objects. 

23. — In a Presentative knowledge there can only be a single 
object, and the term object is here therefore univocal. In a Rep- 
resentative knowledge two different things are viewed as objects, 
and the term object, therefore, becomes equivocal ; the secondary 
object within, being numerically different from the primary ob- 
ject without, the sphere of consciousness, which it represents. 

C. Compared by reference to the relativity of their Objects, 
known in consciousness. 

24. — In a presentative cognition, the object known in con- 
sciousness, being relative only to the conscious subject, may, by 
contrast, be considered as absolute or irrespective. In a repre- 
sentative cognition, the objeet known in consciousness, being, be- 
sides the necessary reference to the subject, relative to, as vicari- 
ous of, an object unknown to consciousness, must, in every point 

1 See the next chapter, §5. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 253 

of view, be viewed as relative or respective. Thus, it is on all 
hands admitted, that in Self-consciousness the object is subjective 
and absolute ; and, that in Imagination, under every form, it is 
subjective and relative. In regard to external Perception, opin- 
ions differ. For on the doctrine of the Natural Eealists, it is 
objective and absolute ; on the doctrine of the Absolute Idealists 
subjective and absolute ; on the doctrine of the Cosmothetic Ideal- 
ists, subjective and relative. 1 

D. Compared by reference to the character of the existential 
Judgments they involve. 

25. — The judgment involved in an Intuitive apprehension is as- 
sertory ; for the fact of the intuition being dependent on the fact 
of the present existence of the object, the existence of the object 
is unconditionally enounced as actual. The judgment involved in 
a Representative apprehension is problematic ; for here the fact 
of the representation not being dependent on the present exist- 
ence of the object represented, the existence of that object can be 
only modally affirmed as possible. 

E. Compared by reference to their character as Cognit'x- . 
26. — Representative knowledge is admitted on all hands to be 

exclusively subjective or ideal ; for its proximate object is, on 
every theory, in or of the mind, while its remote object, in itself, 
and except in and through the proximate object, is unknown. — 
Presentative knowledge is, on the doctrine of the Natural Realists, 
partly subjective and ideal, partly objective and real ; inasmuch 
as its sole object may be a phenomenon either of self or of not- 
self: while, on the doctrine of the Idealists (whether Absolute 
or Cosmothetic) it is always subjective or ideal ; consciousness, 
on their hypothesis, being cognizant only of mind and its con- 
tents. 

F. Compared in respect of their Self-sufficiency or Dependence. 
27. — a. — In one respect, Representative knowledge is not self- 
sufficient, inasmuch as every representative cognition of an object 

1 See the next chapter, § i. — W. 



254 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

supposes a previous preservative apprehension of that same ob- 
ject This is even true of the representation of an imaginary 01 
merely possible object; for though the object, of which we are 
conscious in such an act, be a mere figment of the phantasy, and, 
as a now represented whole, was never previously presented to 
our observation ; still that whole is nothing but an assemblage of 
parts, of which, in different combinations, we have had an intui- 
tive cognition. Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is, in 
this respect, self-sufficient, being wholly independent on Repre- 
sentative for its objects. 

28. — b. — Representative knowledge, in another respect, is not 
self-sufficient. For inasmuch as all representation is only the 
repetition, simple or modified, of what was once intuitively appre- 
hended ; Representative is dependent on Presentative knowledge, 
as (with the mind) the concause and condition of its possibility. 
Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is in this respect inde- 
pendent of Representative ; for with our intuitive cognitions com- 
mences all our knowledge. 

29. — c. — In a third respect Representative knowledge is not 
self-sufficient ; for it is only deserving of the name of knowledge 
. in so far as it is conformable with the intuitions which it repre- 
sents. — Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is, in this re- 
spect, all-sufficient ; for in the last resort it is the sole vehicle, the 
exclusive criterion and guarantee of truth. 

30. — d. — In a fourth respect, Representative knowledge is not 
self-sufficient, being wholly dependent upon Intuitive ; for the 
object represented is only known through an intuition of the sub- 
ject representing. Representative knowledge always, therefore, in- 
volves presentative, as its condition. — Intuitive knowledge, on the 
contrary, is, in this respect, all-sufficient, being wholly independ- 
ent of representative, which it, consequently, excludes. Thus in 
different points of view Representative knowledge contains and 
is contained in, Presentative (Pr. 15). 

G. — Compared in reference to their intrinsic Completeness and 
Perfection. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 255 

31. — a. — In one respect Intuitive knowledge is complete and 
perfect, as irrespective of aught beyond the sphere of conscious- 
ness ; while Representative knowledge is incomplete and imperfect, 
as relative to what transcends that sphere. 

32. — b. — In another respect, Intuitive knowledge is complete 
and perfect, as affording the highest certainty of the highest de- 
termination of existence — the Actual — the Here and Now exist- 
ent ; — Representative, incomplete and imperfect, as affording only 
an inferior assurance of certain inferior determinations of exist- 
ence^ — the Past, the Future, the Possible — the not Here and not 
Now existent. 

33. — c. — In a third respect, Intuitive knowledge is complete 
and perfect, its object known being at once real, and knoAvn as 
real ; — Representative knowledge, incomplete and imperfect, its 
known object being unreal, its real object unknown. 



The precise distinction between Presentative and Representative 
knowledge, and the different meanings of the term Object, — the 
want of which has involved our modern philosophy in great con- 
fusion, — I had long ago evolved from my own reflection, and be- 
fore I was aware that a parallel distinction had been taken by the 
Schoolmen, under the name Intuitive and Abstract knowledge 
{cognitio Intuitiva et Abstractiva, or Visionis et Simplicis Intel- 
ligmtice). Of these, the former they defined — the knowledge of 
a thing present as it is present (cognitio rei prcesentis ut prcBsens 
est) ; the latter — the knoioledge of a thing not as it is present 
{cognitio rei non tit prmens est). This distinction remounts, 
among the Latin Schoolmen, to at least the middle of the eleventh 
century ; for I find that both St. Anselm and Hugo a Sancto 
Victore notice it. It was certainly not borrowed from the Ara- 
bians ; for Averroes, at the end of the following century, seems 
unaware of it. In fact, it bears upon its front the indication of a 
Christian origin ; for, as Scotus and Ariminensis notice, the term 



256 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Intuitive was probably suggested by St. Paul's expression, ' facie 
adfaciem,' 1 as the Vulgate bas it (1 Corintb. xiii. 12). For intu- 
itive, in tbis sense, tbe Lower Greeks sometimes employed tbe 
terms eiroirnxog, and avroifrixos — a sense unknown to the Lexi- 
cographers ; — but they do not appear to have taken the counter 
distinction. The term abstract or abstractive was less fortunately 
chosen than its correlative ; for besides the signification in ques- 
tion, as opposed to intuitive, in which case we look away from 
the existence of a concrete object ; it was likewise employed in 
opposition to concrete, and, though improperly, as a synonym of 
universal, in which case we look away from each and every indi- 
vidual subject of inhesion. As this last is the meaning in which 
abstract as it was originally, is now exclusively, emj)loyed, and as 
representative is, otherwise, a far preferable expression, it would 
manifestly be worse than idle to attempt its resuscitation in the 
former sense. 

The propriety and importance of the distinction is unquestion- 
able ; but the Schoolmen — at least the great majority who held 
the doctrine of intentional species — wholly spoiled it in applica- 
tion ; by calling the representative perception they allowed of ex- 
ternal things, by the name of an intuitive cognition, to say noth- 
ing of the idle thesis which many of them defended — that by a 
miracle we could have an intuitive apprehension of a distant, nay 
even of a non-existent, object. This error, I may notice, is the 
corollary of another of which I am soon to speak — the holding 
that external things, though known only through species, are im- 
mediately known in themselves. 



§ II. — The errors of Reid and other philosophers, in ref- 
erence to the distinction of Presentative or Immedi- 
ate and Representative or Mediate knowledge, and 
of Object Proximate and Remote. 

The preceding distinction is one which, for the Natural Real- 
ist, it is necessary to establish, in order to discriminate his own 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 257 

peculiar doctrine of perception from those of the Idealists, Cos- 
mothetic and Absolute, in their various modifications. This, 
however, Reid unfortunately did not do ; and the consequence 
has been the following imperfections, inaccuracies, and errors. 

A. In the first place, he has, at least in words, abolished the 
distinction of presentative and representative cognition. 

1°, He asserts, in general, that every object of thought must 
be an immediate object (I. P. 427 b). 

2°, He affirms, in particular, not only of the faculties whose ob- 
jects are, but of those whose objects are not, actually present to 
the mind, — that they are all and each of them immediate knowl- 
edges. Thus he frequently defines memory (in the sense of rec- 
ollective imagination) ' an immediate knowledge of things past' 
(I. P. 339 a, 351 b. 357 a); he speaks of an immediate knowl- 
edge of things future (I. P. 340 b) ; and maintains that the 
immediate object in our conception (imagination) of a distant 
reality, is that reality itself (I. P. 374 b). See above, Propp. 10, 
11, 12, 19, 20, 21. 

Now the cause why Reid not only did not establish, but even 
thought to abolish, the distinction of mediate cognition with its 
objects proximate and remote, was, 1°, his error, which we are 
elsewhere to consider, 1 in supposing that philosophers in the prox- 
imate object of knowledge, had in view, always, a tertium quid 
different both from the reality represented and the conscious mind 
(Inq. 106 a, I. P. 226 b, 369 ab) ; and 2°, his failing to observe 
that the rejection of this complex hypothesis of non-egoistical rep- 
resentation, by no means involved either the subversion of repre- 
sentative knowledge in general, or the establishment of presenta 
tive perception in particular. (See Prop. 7. a ) 

But Reid's doctrine in this respect is perhaps imperfectly de- 
veloped, rather than deliberately wrong ; and I am confident that 
had it been proposed to him, he would at once have acquiesced in 
the distinction of presentative and representative knowledge, above 
stated, not only as true in itself, but as necessary to lay a solid 

1 See next chapter, § ii. — W. 2 See nest chapter, § i. — W, 

16 



258 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

foundation for a theory of intuitive perception, in conformity with 
the common sense of mankind. 

B. In the second place, Eeid maintains that in our cognitions 
there must be an object {real or imaginary) distinct from the op- 
eration, of the mind conversant about it ; for the act is one thing 
and the object of the act another. (I. P. 292 b, 305 a, also 298 
b, 373 a, 374 b.) 

This is erroneous — at least it is erroneously expressed. Take 
an imaginary object, and Reid's own instance — a centaur. Here 
he says, ' The sole object of conception (imagination) is an ani- 
mal which I believe never existed.' It 'never existed ;' that is 
never really, never in nature, never externally, existed. But it is 
' an object of imagination.' It is not therefore a mere non-exist- 
ence ; for if it had no kind of existence, it could not possibly be 
the positive object of any kind of thought. For were it an abso- 
lute nothing, it could have no qualities (non-entis nulla sunt attri- 
butd) ; but the object we are conscious of, as a Centaur, has qual- 
ities, — qualities which constitute it a determinate something, and 
distinguish it from every other entity whatsoever. We must, 
therefore, per force, allow it some sort of imaginary, ideal, repre- 
sentative, or (in the older meaning of the term) objective, existence 
in the mind. Now this existence can only be one or other of two 
sorts ; for such object in the mind, either is, or is not, a mode of 
mind. Of these alternatives the latter cannot be supposed ; for 
this would be an affirmation of the crudest kind of non-egoisticai 
representation — the very hypothesis against which Reid so strenu- 
ously contends. The former alternative remains — that it is a 
mode of the imagining mind, — that it is in fact the plastic act o* 
imagination 1 considered as representing to itself a certain possible 
form — a Centaur. But then Reid's assertion — that there is 
always an object distinct from the operation of the mind convers- 

1 The elements, thus to speak, of the possible form which the imagination 
in its plastic act, represents to itself, have an objective existence. The form 
itself, is only a combination of real forms ; the combining of these is the only 
purely subjective act. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 259 

ant about it, the act being one tiling, the object of the act ano- 
ther — must be surrendered. For the object and the act are here 
only one and the same thing in two several relations. — (Prop. 21.) 
Reid's error consists in mistaking a logical for a metaphysical 
difference — a distinction of relation for a distinction of entity. 
Or is the error only from the vagueness and ambiguity of ex- 
pression ?* 

C. In the third place, to this head we may refer Reid's inac- 
curacy in regard to the precise object of perception. This object is 
not, as he seems frequently to assert, any distant reality (Inq. 
104 b, 158 b, 159 ab, 160 a, 186 b.— I. P. 299 a, 302 a, 303 a, 
304 a, et alibi) ; for we are percipient of nothing but what is in 



* In what manner many of the acutest of the later Schoolmen puzzled 
themselves likewise, with this, apparently, very simple matter, may be seen 
in their discussions touching the nature of Entia Rationis. I may mention in 
general, Eonseca, Suarez, Mendoza, Euvius, Murcia, Oviedo, Arriaga, Carle- 
ton, &c, on the one hand; and Biel, Mirandulanus, Jandunus, Valesius, 
El-ice, &c, on the other. I may here insert, though only at present, for the 
latter paragraph in which Eeid's difficulty is solved, the following passage 
from Biel. It contains important observations to which I must subsequently 
refer : 

'Ad secundum de figmentis dicitur, quod (intelligendo illam siniilituclinem 
quam anima fingit, i. e. abstrahit a rebus) sic figmenta sunt actus inteUigen- 
di, qui habent esse verum et subjectivum (v. p. 243 a b, note) in anima. 
Sunt enim qualitates animce inluerentes ; et hi actus sunt naturales similitu- 
dines rerum a quibus formantur, qute sunt objecta eorum ; nee oportet po- 
nere aliquod objectum medium inter cognitionem intellectivam actiis, et reale 
ejus objectum. 

'Dicuntur autem hujusmodi actus figmenta, quia tales sunt in reprcesen- 
tando rem, quales sunt res reprsesentatse. Non autem talia in existendo, i. e. 
in qualitatibus realibus ; quia sunt qualitates spirituales, objecta vero frequen- 
ter res materiales ; sunt autem naturaliter similes in reprcesentando, quia re- 
prsesentant res distincte cum suis habitudinibus sicut sunt realiter ; non au- 
tem sunt similes in essendo, i. e. quod actus [actu] haberent esse reale ejusdem 
speciei cum suis objectis. 

' Quod additur de Chimera ; patet quod aliter chimeera dicitur figmentum, 
et aliter cognitio rei possibilis. Verum eonceptus chimserse, id est actus 
cognoscendi correspondens huic voci " Chimcsrce," est vera qualitas inmente ; 
tamen illud quod significat nihil est.' In i. Sent. Dist. ii. Qu. 8. 

The author of the preceding passage, it must be remembered, allowed nc 
intentional species, that is, no representative entities different from the oper- 
ations of the mind itself. 



260 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

proximate contact, in immediate relation, with our organs oi 
sense. Distant realities we reach, not by perception, but by a 
subsequent process of inference founded thereon : and so far, as he 
somewhere says (I. P. 284 b), from all men who look upon the 
sun perceiving the same object, in reality, every individual, in this 
instance, perceives a different object, nay, a different object in each 
several eye. The doctrine of Natural Realism requires no such 
untenable assumption for its basis. It is sufficient to establish the 
simple fact, that we are competent, as consciousness assures us, 
immediately to apprehend through sense the non-ego in certain 
limited relations ; and it is of no consequence whatever, either to 
our certainty of the reality of a material world, or to our ultimate 
knowledge of its properties, whether by this primary apprehen- 
sion we lay hold, in the first instance, on a larger or a lesser por- 
tion of its contents. 

Mr. Stewart also (Elem. vol. i. ch. i. sect. 2, p. 79 sq. 6 ed.), in 
arguing against the counter doctrine in one of its accidental forms, 
maintains, in general, that we may be percipient of distant objects. 
But his observations do not contemplate, therefore do not meet 
the cardinal questions ; — Is perception a presentative cognition of 
the non-ego, or only a representative cognition of it, in and 
through the ego ? — and if the former, — Can we apprehend a 
thing immediately and not know it in itself? — Can we appre- 
hend it as actually existing ? — and, Can we apprehend it as ac- 
tually existing, and not apprehend it in the When and "Where of 
its existence, that is, only as present ? 

A misapprehension analogous to that of Reid and Stewart, and 
of a still more obtrusive character, was made by a majority of 
those schoolmen, who, as non-egoistical representationists, main- 
tained the hypothesis of intentional species, as media of sensitive 
perception, imagination, &c. They, in general, held, that the spe- 
cies is not itself perceived, but the reality through the species, — 
and on the following as the principal grounds : — The present ob- 
jects we perceive by sense, or the absent objects we imagine, are 
extended, figured, colored, &c. ; but the species are not themselves 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 261 

extended, figured, colored, &c, they are only representative of 
these qualities in external objects ; the species are not, therefore, 
themselves objects of knowledge, or, as they otherwise expressed 
it, do not themselves terminate the cognition.* See, instar om- 
nium, De Raconis, Physica, Disp. iii. de An. Sens. App. sect. ii. 
qu. 4, art. 3. — Irenaeus, De Anima, c. 2, sect. 3, § 3. 

The error of this doctrine did not, however, escape the observa- 
tion of the acuter even of those who supported the theory of inten- 
tional species. It is exposed by Scaliger the father ; and his ex- 
position is advanced as a' very subtle ' speculation. Addressing 
Cardan, whose work ' De Subtilitate' he is controverting, he 
says : 

' Cum tarn praeclare de visu sentires, maximam omisisti subti- 
litatem. Doce me prius sodes — Quid est id quod video ? Dices, 
" Puerilem esse interrogationem — Rem enim esse, quae videatur." 
At doce quaeso nos pueros per salebras hasce Naturae perreptantes. 
Si sensio est receptio ; nee recipitur Res ; demonstrabitur certis- 
sima demonstratione sic ; — ergo non sentitur Res. Aiunt — " Rem 
videri per Speciem." Intelligo ; et concludo : — Species ergo senti- 
tur. Rem ipsam haud percipit sensus. Species ipsa non est ea 
res, cujus est species. Isti vero ausi sunt ita dicere ; — " Non vide- 
ri speciem, sed Rem per Speciem. Speciem vero esse videndi ra- 
tionem." Audio verba ; rem haud intelligo. Non enim est spe- 
cies ratio videndi, ut Lux. Quid igitur ? — " Per speciem (inquiunt) 
vides rem ; non potes autem videre speciem, quia necesse esset ut, 
per speciem, videres." Quae sententia est omnium absurdissima. 
Dico enim jam ; — Rem non videri, sed Speciem. Sensus ergo, 
recipit speciem ; quam rei similem judicat Intellectus, atque sic 
rem cognoscit per reflexionem.' (De Subtilitate, Ex. ccxeviii. 
§ 14.) 

* This doctrine, his recent and very able biographer (M. Huet) finds 
maintained by the great Henry of Ghent, and he adduces it as both an ori- 
ginal opinion of the Doctor Solennis, and an anticipation of one of the truths 
established by the Scottish school. There was, however, nothing new in the 
opinion ; and if an anticipation, it was only the anticipation of an error. — 
Eecherches, &c, pp. 130, 119. 



262 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

But in correcting one inconsistency Scaliger here falls into 
another. For how can the reflective intellect judge the species 
to resemble, that is, correctly to represent the external reality, 
when, ex hypothesi, the reality itself is unknown ; unknown in 
its qualities, unknown even in its existence ? This consideration 
ouo-ht to have led ' the Master of Subtilties' to doubt concerning 
the doctrine of perception by species altogether. 

But long before Scaliger, the error in question had been refu- 
ted by certain of those Schoolmen who rejected the whole doc- 
trine of intentional species. I was surprised to find the distinc- 
tion between an immediate and a mediate object, in our acts 
cognitive of things not actually present to apprehension, advanced 
by Gregory of Rimini, in a disputation maintained by him 
against a certain ' Joannes Scotus' — not the Subtle Doctor, who 
was already gone, but — a Scotchman, who appears to have been 
a fellow Regent with Gregory in the University of Paris. This 
doctrine did not, however, obtain the acceptation which it merited ; 
and when noticed at all, it was in general noticed only to be re- 
dargued — even by his brother Nominalists. Biel rejects the par- 
adox, without naming its author. But John Major, the-last ol 
the regular Schoolmen, openly maintains on this point, against 
the Authentic Doctor, the thesis of his earlier countryman, Joan- 
nes — a thesis also identical with the doctrine of his later coun- 
tryman, Reid. ' Dico (he says, writing in Paris), quod notitiam 
abstractivam quam habeo pinnaculi Sanctse Genovefes in Scotia, 
in Sancto Andrea, ad pinnaculum immediate tcrminatur ; verum, 
ob notitiae imperfectionem et naturam, nescio certitudinaliter an 
sit dirutum exustumve, sicut olim tonitruo conflagravit.' * In 
Sent. L. i. dist. 3, qu. 2. 

I have omitted however to notice, that the vulgar doctrine of 



* The existence of a Pinnacle of St. Genevieve in St. Andrew's is now 
unknown to our Scottish Antiquaries ; and this, I may notice, is one of a 
thousand curious anecdotes relative to this country, scattered throughout 
Major's writings, and upon matters to which allusions from a Doctor of the 
Sorbonne, in a Commentary on the Sentences, were least to be expected. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 263 

the Schools in regard to the immediate cognition of real objects, 
through their species or representations, was refuted, in anticipa- 
tion, by Plotinus, who observes — 'That if we receive the im- 
pressed forms (ruirovg) of objects perceived, it cannot be that we 
really perceive the things which we are said to perceive, but only 
their images or shadows ; so that the things existing are one dis- 
tinct order of beings, the objects perceived by us, another. 
(Ennead. v. L. vi. c. 1.) His own doctrine of perception is 
however equally subjective as that which he assails ; it is 
substantially the same with the Cartesian and Leibnitzian 
hypotheses. 

Representationists are not however always so reluctant to 
see and to confess, that their doctrine involves a surrender of 
all immediate and real knowledge of an external world. This 
too is admitted by even those who, equally with Reid, had 
renounced ideas as representative entities, different either from 
the substance of mind, or from the act of cognition itself. Ar- 
nauld frankly acknowledges this of his own theory of perception ; 
which he justly contends to be identical with that of Descartes. 1 
Other Cartesians, and of a doctrine equally pure, have been no 
less explicit. ' Nota vero (says Flender, whose verbosity I some- 
what abridge), men tern nostram percipere vel cognoscere imme- 
diate tantum seipsam suasque facilitates, per intimam sui consci- 
entiam ; sed alias res a se distinctas, non nisi mediate, scilicet per 
ideas. . . Nota porro, quod perceptio seu idea rei spectari clupli- 
citur : vel in se ipsa, prout est modus cogitandi cujus mens est 
conscia, — quo modo a mente ut causa efficiente fluit ; vel relata 



1 ' I am convinced that in this interpretation of Descartes' doctrine, Ar- 
nauld is right ; for Descartes defines mental ideas — those, to wit, of which 
we are conscious — to he " Gogitatwnes prout sunt tanquam imagines — that is, 
thoughts considered in their representative capacity ; nor is there any pas- 
sage to be found in the writings of this philosopher, which if properly un- 
derstood, warrants the conclusion, that, by ideas in the mi?id,h.e meant aught 
distinct from the cognitive act. The double use of the term idea by Des- 
cartes has, however, led Eeid and others into a misconception on this point.' 
Eeid, p. 296.— W. 



264 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

ad objection quod per earn representatur, prout est cogitatio intel ■ 
lectus hanc vel illani rem representans, — quo modo forma seu 
essentia ideae consistit in rejwesentatione rei, sive in eo quod sit 
representamen vel imago ejus rei quam concipimus.' (Phosph. 
Philos. § 5.) 



CHAPTER III. 

VAEIOUS THEOKIES OF EXTEENAL PEECEPTION. 1 

§ 1. — Systematic Schemes, from different points of view, 
of the various theories of the relation of external 
Perception to its Object, and of the various sys- 
tems of Philosophy founded thereon.* 

Scheme I. — Table of distribution, General and Special. — In 
the perception of the external world, the object of which we are 
conscious may be considered — either, (I.) as absolute and total — 
or, (II.) as relative and partial, i. e., vicarious or representative 
of another and principal object, beyond the sphere of conscious- 
ness. Those who hold the former of these doctrines may b6 
called Presentationists or Intuitionists : those who hold the lat- 
ter, Representationists.\ Of these in their order. 

I. — The Presentationists or Intuitionists constitute the object, 
of which we are conscious, in perception, into a sole, absolute, or 
total, object ; in other words, reduce perception to an act of im- 
mediate or intuitive cognition ; and this — either (A) by abolish- 
ing any immediate, ideal, subjective object, representing ; — or, 
(B) by abolishing any mediate, real, objective object, represented. 

A. — The former of these, viewing the one total object of per- 
ceptive consciousness as real, as existing, and therefore, in this 
case, as material, extended, external, are Realists, and may dis- 



1 This chapter is Hamilton's third Supplementary Dissertation on Eeid. 
— W. 

* Compare the more comprehensive evolution of Philosophical Systems 
from the total fact of Consciousness in perception, given ahove, p. 28 a, sq. 
An acquaintance with that distribution is here supposed. 

t On the terms Intuition and Representation, and on the distinction of 
immediate and mediate, of ideal and real, object, see previous chapter, § 1. 



266 PHILOSOPHY OP PERCEPTION. 

tinctively be called Intuitional or Presentative Realists, and Rea. 
Presentationists or Intuitionists ; while, as founding their doc- 
trine on the datum of the natural consciousness, or common sense, 
of mankind, they deserve the names of Natural Realists or Nat- 
ural Dualists. Of this scheme there are no subordinate varie- 
ties : except in so far as a difference of opinion may arise, in 
regard to — what qualities are to be referred to the object per- 
ceived, or non-ego, — what qualities to the percipient subject, or 
ego. Presentative Kealism is thus divided (i.) into a philosophi- 
cal or developed form — that, to wit, in which the Primary Qual- 
ities of body, the Common Sensibles, 1 constitute the objective 
object of perception ; and (ii.) into a vulgar or undeveloped form 
— that, to wit, in which not only the primary qualities (as Ex- 
tension and Figure), but also the secondary (as Color, Savor, 
<fec), are, as known to us, regarded equally to appertain to the 
non-ego. 

B. — The latter of these, viewing the object of consciousness in 
perception as ideal (as a phenomenon in or of mind), are Ideal- 
ists ; and as denying that this ideal object has any external pro- 
totype, they may be styled Absolute Idealists, or Idealist Unita- 
rians. — They are to be again divided into two subaltern classes, 
as the Idea — (i.) is, — or (ii.) is not, considered a modification of 
the percipient mind. 

i. — If the Idea be regarded as a mode of the human mind 
itself, we have a scheme of Egoistical Idealism ; and this again 
admits of a twofold distinction, according as the idea is viewed — 
(a) as having no existence out of the momentary act of presenta- 
tive consciousness, with which it is, in fact, identical ; — or (b) as 
having an (unknown) existence, independent of the present act 
of consciousness by which it is called up, contemplated, but not 
created. Finally, as in each of these the mind may be deter- 
mined to present the object either — (1.) by its own natural laws, 
— or (2.) by supernatural agencies, each may be subdivided into 
a Natural and Supernatural variety. 

1 See chapter v.— TF. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 267 

ii. — If, on the other hand, the Idea be viewed not as a mode 
of the human mind, there is given the scheme of Non-Egoistical 
Idealism, which, in all its forms, is necessarily hyperphysical. It 
admits, in the first place, of a twofold distinction, according as 
the ideal object is supposed — (a) to be, — or (b) not to be, in the 
perceiving mind itself. 

a. — Of these the former may again be subdivided according 
as the ideas are supposed — (1.) to be connate with the mind and 
existent in it out of consciousness ; — or (2.) infused into it at the 
moment of consciousness, — (a) immediately by God, — (§) by 
some lower supernatural agency. 

b. — The latter supposes that the human mind is conscious of 
the idea, in some higher intelligence, to which it is intimately 
present; and this higher mind may either be — (1.) that of the 
Deity, or (2.) that of some inferior supernatural existence. 

All these modifications of Non-Egoistical Idealism admit, how- 
ever, in common, of certain subordinate divisions, according as 
the qualities (primary and secondary) and the phenomena of the 
several senses may be variously considered either as objective and 
ideal or as subjective and sensational* 

II. — The Hepresentationists, as denying to consciousness the 
cognizance of aught beyond a merely subjective phenomenon, 

* The general approximation of thorough-going Eealism and thorough- 
going Idealism, here given, may, at first sight, be startling. On reflection, how- 
ever, their radical affinity will prove well grounded. Both build upon the 
same fundamental fact — that the extended object immediately perceived is 
identical with the extended object actually existing ; — for the truth of this fact, 
both can appeal to the common sense of mankind ; — and to the common 
sense of mankind Berkeley did appeal not less confidently, and perhaps 
more logically, than Beid. Natural Bealisra and Absolute Idealism are the 
only systems worthy of a philosopher; for, as they alone have any founda- 
tion in consciousness, so they alone have any consistency in themselves. The 
scheme of Hypothetical Bealism or Cosmothetic Idealism, which supposes 
that behind the non-existent world perceived, there lurks a correspondent 
but unknown world existing, is not only repugnant to our natural beliefs, 
but in manifold contradiction with itself. The scheme of Natural Eealism 
may be ultimately difficult — for, like all other truths, it ends in the incon- 
ceivable ; but Hypothetical Bealism— in its origin — in its development — in 
its result, although the favorite scheme of philosophers, is philosophically 
absurd. 



268 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

are likewise Idealists ; yet as positing the reality of an external 
world, they must be distinguished as Cosmothetic Idealists. But, 
as affirming an external world, they are also Realists, or Dualists. 
Since, however, they do not, like the Natural Realists, accept the 
existence of an external world directly on the natural testimony 
of consciousness, as something known, but endeavor to establish 
its unknown existence by a principal and sundry subsidiary hy- 
potheses ; they must, under that character, be discriminated as 
Hypothetical Realists or Hypothetical Dualists, ^his Hypoth- 
esis of a Representative perception has been maintained under 
one or other of two principal forms, — a finer and a cruder, — ac- 
cording as the representation — either (A) is, — or (B) is not, sup- 
posed to be a mode of the percipient subject itself. (And, be it 
observed, this distinction, in reference to Reid's philosophy, ought 
to be carefully borne in mind.) 

A. — If the immediate, known, or representative, object be re- 
garded as a modification of the mind or self, we have one va- 
riety of representationism (the simpler and more refined), which 
may be characterized as the Egoistical Representationism. This 
finer form is, however, itself again subdivided into a finer and a 
cruder ; according as the subjective object — (i.) is — or (ii.) is not, 
identified with the percipient act. 

i. — In the former case, the immediate or ideal object is re- 
garded as only logically distinguished from the perceptive act ; 
being simply the perceptive act itself, considered in one of its re- 
lations, — its relation, to wit (not to the subject perceiving, in 
which case it is properly called & perception, but) to the mediate 
object, the reality represented, and which, in and through that 
representation alone, is objectified to consciousness and per- 
ceived. 

ii. — In the latter case, the immediate object is regarded, as a 
mode of mind, existent out of the act of perceptive conscious- 
ness, and, though contemplated in, not really identical with, that 
act. This cruder form of egoistical representationism substan- 
tially coincides with that finer form of the non-egoistical, which 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 269 

views the vicarious object as spiritual (II. B, i. b.) I have there- 
fore found it requisite to consider these as identical ; and accord- 
ingly, in speaking of the finer form of representation, be it ob- 
served, I exclusively have in view the form of which I have last 
spoken (II. A, i.) 

This form, in both its degrees, is divided into certain subaltern 
genera and species, according as the mind is supposed to be de- 
termined to represent by causes — either (a) natural, physical, — 
or (b) supernatural, hyperphysical. 

a. — Of these, the natural determination to represent, is — 
either (1.) one foreign and external (by the action of the mate- 
rial reality on the passive mind, through sense) ; — or (2.) one 
native and internal (a self-determination of the impassive mind, 
on occasion of the presentation of the material object to sense) ; 
— or finally (3.) one partly both (the mind being at once acted 
on, and itself reacting). 

b. — The hypcrphysical determination, again, may be main- 
tained — either to be (1.) immediate and special ; whether this 
be realized — (a) by the direct operation or concourse of God (as 
in a scheme of Occasional Causes) — or (§) by the influence of in- 
ferior supernatural agencies : — or (2.) mediate and general (as 
by the predetermined ordination of God, in a theory of Pre- 
established Harmony). 

B. — If the representative object be viewed as something in 
but not a mere mode of, mind ; — in other words, if it be viewed 
as a tertium quid numerically different both from the subject 
knowing and the object represented ; we have a second form of 
Kepresentationism (the more complex and cruder) which may be 
distinguished as the Non-egoistical. This also falls into certain 
inferior species : for the ideal or vicarious object has been held 
(i.) by some to be spiritual ; — (ii.) by others to be corporeal ; — 
while (iii.) others, to carry hypothesis to absurdity, have regarded 
it, as neither spiritual nor corporeal, but of an inconceivable na- 
ture, intermediate between, or different from, both. 

i. — Spiritual. Here the vicarious object may be supposed — 



270 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

either (a) to be some supernatural intelligence, to which the hu- 
man mind is present ; and this — either (1.) the divine, — or (2.) 
not the divine : — or (b) in the human mind ; and if so — either 
(1.) connate and inexistent, being elicited into consciousness, on 
occasion of the impression of the external object on the sensual 
organ ; — or (2.) infused on such occasions, and this — either (a) 
by God, — or (§) by other supernatural intelligences, — and of 
these different theorists have supposed different kinds. 

ii. — Corporeal, in the common sensory (whether brain or heart). 
This — either (a) as a propagation from the external reality — 
(1.) of a grosser ; — (2.) of a more attenuated nature : — or (b) «, 
modification determined in the sensory itself — (1.) as a configu- 
ration ; — (2.) as a motion (and this last — either (a) as a flow of 
spirits — or (§) as a vibration of fibres — or (y) as both a flow and 
a vibration) ; — or (3.) as both a configuration and a motion. 

iii. — Neither spiritual nor corporeal. This might admit, in 
part, of similar modifications with B, i. and B, ii. 

All these species of Representationism may be, and almost all 
of them have been, actually held. Under certain varying restric- 
tions, however, inasmuch as a representative object may be pos- 
tulated in perception for all, or only for some of the senses, for 
all or only for some of the qualities made knoAvn to us in the 
perceptive act. And this latter alternative, which has been most 
generally adopted, again admits of various subdivisions, accord- 
ing to the particular senses in which, and the particular qualities 
of which, a vicarious object is allowed. 

Scheme II. — Table of General Distribution ; ivith references 
for details to Scheme I. 

The object of Consciousness in Perception is a quality, mode, 
or phenomenon — either (I.) of an external reality, in immediate 
relation to our organs ; — or (II.) not of an external reality, but 
either of the mind itself, or of something in the mind, which in- 
ternal object, let us on either alternative, here call Idea. 

I. The former opinion is the doctrine of real presentative per- 
ception. (I. A.) 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 271 

II. The latter is the doctrine of ideal perception ; which either — 

A — supposes that the Idea is an original and absolute present- 
ment, and thus constitutes the doctrine of ideal presentative per- 
ception (I. B) ; or 

B — supposes that the Idea only represents the quality of a real 
object ; and thus constitutes the doctrine of ideal representative 
perception (II.) 

Scheme III. — Merely General Table. 

In relation to our perception of an external world, philosopher* 
are (I.) Realists ; (II.) Idealists. 

I. The Realists are (A) Natural ; (B) Hypothetical (= Cos- 
mothetic Idealists). 

II. The Idealists are (A) Absolute or Presentative ; (B) Cos- 
mothetic or Representative (= Hypothetical Realists). See above, 
p. 266, b, and 30 a. 



Such is a conspectus in different points of view of all the the- 
ories touching perception and its object ; and of the different sys- 
tems of philosophy founded thereon, which, as far as they occur to 
me, have been promulgated during the progress of philosophy. 
But it is at present only requisite for the student of philosophy to 
bear in mind the more general principles and heads of distribution. 
To enumerate the individual philosophers by whom these several 
theories were originated or maintained, would require a fai 
greater amplitude of detail than can be now afforded ; and, 
though of some historical interest, this is not required for the 
purposes which I am here exclusively desirous of accomplishing. 
Similar tables might be also given of the opinions of philoso- 
phers, touching the object of Imagination and of Intellect. But 
the relation of these faculties to their object does not, in like 
manner, afford the fundamental principles of difference, and there- 
fore a common starting point, to the great philosophical systems ; 
while a scheme of the hypotheses in regard to them, would, at 



272 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

least in the details, be little more than an uninteresting repetition 
of the foregoing distribution. There is therefore little induce- 
ment to annex such tables ; were they not, in other respects, here 
completely out of place. I have only, at present, two ends in 
view. Of these the primary, is to display, to discriminate, and 
to lay down a nomenclature of, the various theories of Perception, 
actual and possible. This is accomplished. The secondary, is to 
determine under which of these theories the doctrine of Reid is 
to be classed. And to this inquiry I now address myself. 

§ II. — Of what character, in the preceding respect, is 
Reid's doctrine of Perception ? 

As in this part of his philosophy, in particular, Mr. Stewart 
closely follows the footsteps of his predecessor, and seems even to 
have deemed all further speculation on the subject superfluous ; 
the question here propounded must be viewed as common to both 
philosophers. 

Now, there are only two of the preceding theories of percep- 
tion, with one or other of which Reid's doctrine can possibly be 
identified. He is a Dualist ; — and the only doubt is — whether he 
be Natural Realist (I. A), or a Hypothetical Realist, under the 
finer form of Egoistical Representationism (II. A, i.) 

The cause why Reid left the character of his doctrine ambigu- 
ous on this the very cardinal point of his philosophy, is to be 
found in the following circumstances. 

1°, That, in general (although the same may be said of all 
other philosophers), he never discriminated either speculatively or 
historically the three theories of Real Presentationism, of Egois- 
tical, and of Non-Egoistical, Representationism. 

2°, That, in particular, he never clearly distinguished the first 
and second of these, as not only different, but contrasted, theo- 
ries; though on one occasion (I. P. p. 29 7 a b) he does seem to 
have been obscurely aware that they were not identical. 

3°, That, while right in regarding philosophers, in general, as 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 273 

Cosmothetic Idealists, he erroneously supposed that they were all, 
or nearly all, Non-Egoistical Eepresentationists. And — 

4°, That he viewed the theory of Non-Egoistical Representa- 
tionism as that form alone of Cosmothetic Idealism which when 
carried to its legitimate issue ended in Absolute Idealism ; whereas 
the other form of Cosmothetic Idealism, the theory of Egoistical 
Representatiomsru, whether speculatively or historically considered, 
is, with at least equal rigor, to be developed into the same result. 

Dr. Thomas Brown considers Reid to be, like himself, a Cos- 
mothetic Idealist, under the finer form of egoistical representa- 
tionism ; but without assigning any reason for this belief, except 
one which, as I have elsewhere shown, is altogether nugatory.* 
For my own part, I am decidedly of opinion, that, as the great 
end — the governing principle of Reid's doctrine was to reconcile 
philosophy with the necessary convictions of mankind, that he 
intended a doctrine of natural, consequently a doctrine of present- 
ative, realism ; and that he would have at once surrendered, as 
erroneous, every statement which was found at variance with such 
a doctrine. But that the reader should be enabled to form his 
own opinion on the point, which I admit not to be without diffi- 
culty ; and that the ambiguities and inconsistencies of Reid, on 
this the most important part of his philosophy, should, by an artic- 
ulate exposition, be deprived of their evil influence : I shall now 
enumerate — (A) the statements, which may, on the one hand, be 
adduced to prove that his doctrine of percerjtion is one of medi- 
ate cognition under the form of egoistical representationism ; — 



* Edinb. Eev., 1 vol. iii. p. 173-175 ; — also in Cross and Peisse. In saying, 
however, on that occasion, that Dr. Brown was guilty of ' a reversal of the 
real and even unambiguous import' of Eeid r s doctrine of perception, I feel 
called upon to admit, that the latter epithet is too strong ; — for on grounds, 
totally different from the untenable one of Brown, I am now about to show, 
that Eeid's doctrine, on this point, is doubtful. This admission does not, 
however, imply that Brown is not, from first to last, — is not in one and all of 
his strictures on Beid's doctrine of perception, as there shown, wholly in 
error. 

l See above, p. 188.— W. 

17 



274: PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

and (B) those which may, on the other hand, be alleged to show, 
that it is one of immediate cognition, under the form of real pre- 
sentationism. But as these counter statements are only of import, 
inasmuch as they severally imply the conditions of mediate or of 
immediate cognition ; it is necessary that the reader should bear 
in mind the exposition which has been given of these conditions. 1 

A. — Statements conformable to the doctrine of a mediate per- 
ception, under the form of an egoistical representation, and incon- 
sistent toith that of immediate perception, under the form of a real 
presentation, of material objects. 

1. On the testimony of consciousness, and in the doctrine of 
an intuitive perception, the mind, when a material existence is 
brought into relation with its organ of sense, obtains two con- 
comitant, and immediate, cognitions. Of these, the one is the 
consciousness (sensation) of certain subjective modifications in us, 
which we refer, as effects, to certain unknown powers, as causes, 
in the external reality ; the secondary qualities of body : the other 
is the consciousness (perception) of certain objective attributes in 
the external reality itself, as, or as in relation to our sensible organ- 
ism ; — the primary qualities of body. Of these cognitions, the 
former is admitted, on all hands, to be subjective and ideal : the 
latter, the Natural Realist maintains, against the Cosmothetic 
Idealist, to be objective and real. But it is only objective and 
real, in so far as it is immediate ; and immediate it cannot be, 
if — either, 1°, dependent on the former, as its cause or its occa- 
sion — or, 2°, consequent on it, as on a necessary antecedent. But 
both these conditions of a presentative perception Reid and Stew- 
art are seen to violate ; and therefore they may be held, virtually 
to confess, that their doctrine is one only of representative per- 
ception. 2 

Touching the former condition : Reid states, that the primary 
qualities of material existences, Extension, Figure, &c, are sug- 
gested to us through the secondary ; which, though not the sufficient 

1 See previous chapter, § 1. — W. 

2 See below, chapter v. § i. No. 23. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 275 

causes of our conception, are the signs* on occasion of which, 
we are made to 'conceive' the primary. (Inq. 188 a, 122 a, 
123 b, 128 b note.) The secondary qualities, as mere sensations, 
mere consciousness of certain subjective affections, afford us no 
immediate knowledge of aught different from self. If, therefore, 
the primary qualities be only ' suggestions] only ''conceptions' 
(Inq. 183 a, I. P. 318 a b), which are, as it were, 'conjured up 
by a kind of natural magic' (Inq. 122 a), or 'inspired by means 
unknown' (Inq. 188 a); these conceptions are only representa- 
tions, which the mind is, in some inconceivable manner, blindly 
determined to form of what it does not know ; and as percep- 
tion is only a consciousness of these conceptions, perception is, 
like sensation, only an immediate cognition of certain modes 
of self. Our knowledge of the external world, on this footing, is 
wholly subjective or ideal ; and if such be Reid's doctrine, it is 
wholly conformable to that enounced in the following statement 
of the Cartesian representationism by Silvain Regis : — ' We may 
thus, he says, affirm, that the cognition we have of any individ- 
ual body which strikes the sense is composed of two parts, — of a 
sensation (sentiment), and of an imagination; an imagination, 
which represents the extension of this body under a determinate 
size ; and a sensation of color and light, which renders this exten- 
sion visible.' (Metaph. L. ii. P. i. ch. 5. Cours, t. i. p. 162, ed. 
1691.) The statement may stand equally for an enouncement of 
the Kantian doctrine of perception ; and it is, perhaps, worth no- 
ticing, that Regis anticipated Kant, in holding the imagination 
of space to be the a priori form or subjective condition of per- 
ception. ' L'idee de l'Entendus (he says) est nee avec l'ame,' &c. 
(ibid. c. 9, p. lYl et alibi). — This theory of Suggestion, so ex- 
explicitly maintained in the 'Inquiry,' is not repeated in the 'Es- 



* This application of the term sign suits the Cosmothetie Idealist, as the 
Cartesian Bossuet (Connaissance de Dieu, &c., ch. 3, § 8), or the Absolute 
Idealist, as Berkeley (passim), but not the Natural Bealist. In this doctrine 
of natural signs, I see Eeid was, in a manner, also preceded by Hutchesoii 
•Syn. Met., P. ii. c. 1— Syst. of Mor., B. i. ch. 1, p. 5). 



276 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 



says on the Intellectual Powers.' Reid, therefore, as I have 
already observed, may seem to have become doubtful of the ten- 
dency of the doctrine advanced in his earlier work ; and we ought 
not, at all events, to hold him rigorously accountable for the con- 
sequences of what, if he did not formally retract in his later writ- 
ings, he did not continue to profess. 

Touching the latter condition : — Reid in stating, that ' if sen- 
sation be produced, the corresponding perception follows even 
when there is no object' (I. P. 320 b.) — and Stewart in stating, 
that 'sensations are the constant antecedents of our perceptions'. 
(L. i. c. 1, p. 93, ed. 6), manifestly advance a doctrine, which 
if rigidly interpreted, is incompatible with the requisites of an 
intuitive perception. 

2. It is the condition of an intuitive perception, that a sensa- 
tion is actually felt there, where it is felt to be. To suppose that 
a pain, for instance, in the toe, is felt really in the brain, is con- 
formable only to a theory of representationism. For if the mind 
cannot be conscious of the secondary qualities, except at the cen- 
tre of the nervous organism, it cannot be conscious of the prima- 
ry, in their relation to its periphery ; and this involves the admis- 
sion that- it is incompetent to more than a subjective or ideal or 
representative cognition of external things. But such is the doc- 
trine which Reid manifestly holds. (1. P. 319 b, 320 a b.) 

3. On the doctrine of Natural Realism, that the ego has an 
intuitive perception of the non-ego in proximate relation to its 
organs, a knowledge and a belief of the existence of the external 
world, is clearly given in the fact of such intuitive perception. In 
this case, therefore, we are not called upon to explain such knowl- 
edge and belief by the hypothesis, or, at least, the analogy, of an 
inspired notion and infused faith. On the doctrine of Cosmo- 
thetic Idealism, on the contrary, which supposes that the mind is 
determined to represent to itself the external world, which, ex 
hypothesi, it does not know ; the fact of such representation can 
only be conceived possible, through some hyperphysical agency ; 
and therefore Reid's rationale of perception, by an inspiration or 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 277 

kind of magical conjuration, as given in the Inquiry (122 a, 188 
a ; Stewart, El. i. 64, 93), may seem to favor the construction, 
that his doctnne is a representationism. In the Essays on the 
Intellectual Powers he is, however, more cautious ; and the note 1 
I have appended in that work at p. 257 a, is to be viewed in 
more especial reference to the doctrine of the Inquiry ; though 
in the relative passage ' the will of God' may, certainly, seem 
called as a Deus ex machiua, to solve a knot which the doctrine 
of intuitive perception does not tie. 

4. The terms notion and conception are, in propriety, only 
applicable to our mediate and representative cognitions. — When 



1 The following is the note referred to : 

' The doctrine of Eeid and Stewart, in regard to our perception of external 
things, bears a close analogy to the Cartesian scheme of divine assistance, or of 
occasional causes. It seems, however, to coincide most completely with the 
opinion of Euardus Andala, a Dutch Cartesian, who attempted to reconcile 
the theory of assistance with that of physical influence. "Statuo," he says, 
" nos clarissimam et distinctissimam hujus operationis et wikrnis posse habere 
ideam, si modo, quod omnino facere oportet, ad Deum, caussam ejus pri- 
mam et liberam ascendamus, et ab ejus beneplacito admirandum hunc effec- 
tum derivemus. Nos possumus huic vel illi motui e. gr. campanse, sic er, 
hedera? suspensa? Uteris scriptis, verbis quibuscunque pronunciatis, aliisque 
signis, varias ideas alligare, ita, ut per visum, vel auditum in mente exciten- 
tur varia? idea?, perceptiones et sensationes : annon hinc clare et facile intel- 
ligimus, Deum creatorem mentis et corporis potuisse instituere et ordinare, 
ut per varios in corpore motus varia? in mente excitentur idea? et perceptiones ; 
et vicissim, ut per varias mentis volitiones, varii in corpore excitentur et pro- 
ducantur motus ? Hinc et pro varia alterutrius partis dispositione altera 
pars variis modis affici potest. Hoc autem a Deo ita ordinatum et effectum 
esse, a posteriori, continua, certissima et clarissima experientia docet. Testes 
irrefragabiles omnique exceptione majores reciproci hujus commercii, opera- 
tionis mentis in corpus, et corporis in mentem, nee non communionis status, 
sunt sensus omnes turn extemi, turn interni ; ut et omnes et singula? et con- 
tinua? actiones mentis in corpus, de quibus modo fuit actum. Si quis 
vero a propridatibus mentis ad proprietates corporis progredi velit, aut ex 
natura diversissimarum harum substantiarum deducere motum in corpora, 
& perceptiones in mente, aut hos effectus ut neeessario connexos spectare ; 
na? is frustra erit, nihil intelliget, perversissime philosophabitur nullamque 
hujus rei ideam habere poterit. Si vero ad Deum Creatorem adscendamus, 
eumque vere agnoscamus, nihil hie erit obscuri, hunc effectum clarissime 
intelligemus, et quidem per caussam ejus primam ; qua? perfectissima de- 
mum est scientia.' — W. 



278 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

Reid, therefore, says that ' the perception of an object consists of, 
or implies, a conception or notion of it' (Inq. 183 a, 188 a, I. P. 
258 a, b, 318 b, 319 a, et alibi) ; there is here, either an impro- 
priety of language, or perception is, in his view, a mediate and 
representative knowledge. The former alternative is, however, 
at least equally probable as the latter ; for Consciousness, which 
on all hands, is admitted to be a knowledge immediate and intui- 
tive, he defines (I. P. 327 a) ' an immediate conception of the 
operation of our own minds,' &c. Conception and Notion, Reid 
seems, therefore, to employ, at least sometimes, for cognition in 
general: 

5. In calling imagination of the past, the distant, &c, an im- 
mediate knowledge, Reid, it may be said, could only mean by 
immediate, a knowledge effected not through the supposed inter- 
mediation of a vicarious object, numerically different from the 
object existing and the mind knowing, but through a representa- 
tion of the past, or real, object, in and by the mind itself; in 
other words, that by mediate knowledge he denoted a non-egois- 
tical, by immediate knowledge an egoistical, representation. 1 This 
being established, it may be further argued — 1°, that in calling 
Perception an immediate knowledge, he, on the same analogy, 
must be supposed to deny, in reference to this faculty, only the 
doctrine of non-egoistical representation. This is confirmed — 2°. 
by his not taking the distinction between perception as a pre- 
sentative, and Memory, for instance (i. e. recollective imagina- 
tion), as a representative, cognition ; which he ought to have 
done, had he contemplated, in the former, more than a faculty, 
through which the ego represents to itself the non-ego, of which 
it has no consciousness — no true objective and immediate appre- 
hension. This, however, only proves that Reid's Perception may 
be representative, not that it actually is so. 

6. The doctrine maintained by Reid (I. P. 199 a, 298 b, 299 
a, 302 e, 305 b) and by Stewart (Elem. vol. i. c. I. sect. 2) that 

1 See previous chapter, §1, Pr. 7, p. 241. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 279 

perception is possible of distant objects, is, when sifted, found 
necessarily to imply that perception is not, in that case, an ap- 
prehension of the object in its place in space — in its Where ; 
and this again necessarily implies, that it is not an apprehen- 
sion of the object, as existing, or in itself. But if not known 
as existing, or in itself, a thing is, either not known at all, or 
known only in and through something different from itself. 
Perception, therefore, is, on this doctrine, at best a mediate or 
representative cognition ; of the simpler form of representation, 
the egoistical, it may be, but still only vicarious and subjective. 1 

7. In some places our author would seem to hold that Percep- 
tion is the result of an inference, and that what is said to be per- 
ceived is the remote cause, and therefore not the immediate object 
of Perception. If this be so, Perception is not a presentative 
knowledge. (Inq. 125 a, I. P. 310 a b, 319 a.) In other pas- 
sages, that perception is the result of inference or reasoning, is 
expressly denied. (I. P. 259 b, 260 a b, 309 b, 326 a, 328 b, 
&c.) 

8. On the supposition, that we have an immediate cognition or 
consciousness of the non-ego, we must have, at the same time, 
involved as part and parcel of that cognition, a belief of its exist- 
ence. To view, therefore, our belief of the existence of the exter- 
nal world, as any thing apart from our knowledge of that world, 
— to refer it to instinct — to view it as unaccountable — to consid- 
er it as an ultimate law of our constitution, &c, as Eeid does 
(Inq. 188 a b, I. P. 258 b, 309 b, 326 a, 327 a, et alibi), is, to 
say the least of it, suspicious ; appearing to imply, that our cog- 
nition of the material world, as only mediate and subjective, 
does not at once and of itself, necessitate a belief of the existence 
of external things. 

B. Counter statements, conformable to the doctrine of a real 
presentation of material objects, and inconsistent with that of a 
representative perception. 

1 See the previous chapter. — W. 



280 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

1. Knowledge and existence only infer each other when a 
reality is known in itself or as existing ; for only in that case can 
we say of it, — on the one hand, it is knoion, because it exists, — 
on the other, it exists, since it is known. In propriety of lan- 
guage, this constitutes, exclusively, an immediate, intuitive, or 
real, cognition. This is at once the doctrine of philosophers in 
general, and of Reid in particular. ' It seems,' he says, ' admit- 
ted as a first principle, by the learned and the unlearned, that 
what is really perceived must exist, and that to perceive what 
does not exist is impossible. So far the unlearned man and the 
philosopher agree.' (I. P. p. 274 b.) This principle will find 
an articulate illustration in the three proximately following state- 
ments, in all of which it is implied. 

2. The idea or representative object, all philosophers, of what- 
ever doctrine, concur in holding to be in the strictest sense of the 
expression, itself immediately apprehended ; and that, as thus 
apprehended, it necessarily exists. That Reid fully understands 
their doctrine, is shown by his introducing a Cosmothetic Ideal- 
ist thus speaking : — ' I perceive an image, or form, or idea, in my 
own mind, or in my brain. I am certain of the existence of the 
idea ; because I immediately perceive it.' (Roid.) Now then, if 
Reid be found to assert — that, on his doctrine, we perceive mate- 
rial objects not less immediately, than, on the common doctrine 
->f philosophers, we perceive ideal objects ; and that therefore his 
theory of perception affords an equal certainty of the existence 
of the external reality, as that of the Cosmothetic Idealist does of 
the existence of its internal representation ; if Reid, I say, do 
this, he unambiguously enounces a doctrine of presentative, and 
not of representative, perception. And this he does. Having 
repeated, for the hundredth time, the deliverance of common 
sense, that we perceive material things immediately, and not 
their ideal representations, he proceeds : — ' I shall only here 
observe that if external objects be perceived immediately, we 
have the same reason to believe their existence as philosophers 
have to believe the existence of ideas, while they hold them to 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 281 

be the immediate objects of perception.' (I. P. 446 a b. See 
also 263 b, 272 b.) 

3. Philosophers — even Skeptics and Idealists — concur in ac- 
knowledging that mankind at large believe that the external 
reality is itself the immediate and only object in perception. 
Tteid is of course no exception. After stating the principle pre- 
viously quoted (B, st. 1 ), ' that what is really perceived must 
exist,' he adds ; — ' the unlearned man says, I perceive the external 
object, and I perceive it to exist. Nothing can be more absurd 
than to doubt it.' (I. P. 274 b.) Again: — 'The vulgar un- 
doubtedly believe, that it is the external object which we imme- 
diately perceive, and not a representative image of it only. It w 
for this reason, that they look upon it as perfect lunacy to call in 
question the existence of external objects.' (Ibid.) Again: — 
' The vulgar are firmly persuaded that the very identical objects 
which they perceive continue to exist when they do not perceive 
them ; and are no less firmly persuaded that when ten men look 
at the sun or the moon they all see the same individual object.'* 
(I. P. 284 b.) Again, speaking of Berkeley: — 'The vulgar 
opinion he reduces to this — that the very things which we per- 
ceive by our senses do really exist. This he grants.' (I. P. 284 
a.) Finally, speaking of Hume : — ' It is therefore acknowledged 
by this philosopher to be a natural instinct or prepossession, an 
universal and primary opinion of all men, that the objects which 
we immediately perceive by our senses, are not images in our 
minds, but external objects, and that their existence is independent 
of us and our perception.' (I. P. 299 b; see also 275 a, 298 b, 
299 a b, 302 a b.) 

It is thus evinced that Reid, like other philosophers, attributes 
to men in general the belief of an intuitive perception. If, then, 
he declare that his own opinion coincides with that of the vulgar, 
he will, consequently, declare himself a Presentative Realist. 

* The inaccuracy of this statement 1 does not affect the argument. 
»Seep. 250— W. 



282 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

And he does this, emphatically too. Speaking of the Perception 
of the external world : ' We have here a remarkable conflict 
between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are 
engaged. On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unprac- 
tised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted 
primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand all the 
philosophers, ancient and modern ; every man, without excep- 
tion, who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I 
find myself classed with the vulgar? (I. P. 302 b.) 

4. All philosophers agree that self-consciousness is an imme- 
diate knowledge, and therefore affords an absolute and direct cer- 
tainty of the existence of its objects. Reid (with whom conscious- 
ness is equivalent to self-consciousness) of course maintains this ; 
but he also maintains, not only that perception affords a sufficient 
proof, but as valid an assurance of the reality of material phe- 
nomena, as consciousness does of the reality of mental. (I. P. 
263 b, 269 a, 373, et alibi.) In this last assertion I have shown 
that Eeid (and Stewart along with him) is wrong ; for the phe- 
nomena of self-consciousness cannot possibly be doubted or 
denied ;' but the statement at least tends to prove that his per- 
ception is truly immediate — is, under a different name, a con- 
sciousness of the non-ego. 

5. Arnauld's doctrine of external perception is a purely ego- 
istical representationism ; and he has stated its conditions and 
consequences with the utmost accuracy and precision. (I. P. 
295-298.) Reid expresses both his content and discontent Avith 
Arnauld's theory of perception, which he erroneously views as 
inconsistent with itself (297 a b). This plainly shows that he 
had not realized to himself a clear conception of the two doctrines 
of Presentationism and Egoistical Representationism, in them- 
selves and in their contrasts. But it also proves that when the 
conditions and consequences of the latter scheme, even in its 
purest form, were explicitly enounced, that he was then suffi- 

1 See Part First— W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 283 

ciently aware of their incompatibility with the doctrine which he 
himself maintained — a doctrine, therefore, it may be fairly con- 
tended (though not in his hands clearly understood, far less 
articulately developed), substantially one of Natural Realism.* 



To Eeid's inadequate discrimination — common to him with 
other philosophers — of the different theories of Perception, either 
as possible in theory, or as actually held, is, as I have already 
noticed, to be ascribed the ambiguities and virtual contradictions 
which we have now been considering. 

In the first place (what was of little importance to the Hypo- 
thetical, but indispensably necessary for the Natural Realist), he 
did not establish the fact of the two cognitions, the presentative 
and representative ; — signalize their contents ; evolve their sev- 
eral conditions ; — consider what faculties in general were to be 
referred to each ; — and, in particular, which of these was the 
kind of condition competent, in our Perception of the external 
world. 

In the second place, he did not take note, that representation 
is possible under two forms — the egoistical and non-egoistical ; 
each, if Perception be reduced to a representative faculty, afford- 
ing premises of equal cogency to the absolute idealist and skep- 
tic. On the contrary, he seems to have overlooked the egoistical 
form of representationism altogether (compare Inq. 106 a, 128 a 
b, 130 b, 210 a, I. P. 226 a b, 256 a b, 257 a b, 269 a, 274 a, 



* It will be observed that I do not found any argument on Eeid's frequent 
assertion, that perception aifords an immediate Icnoicledge and immediate belie/ 
of external things (e. g. I. P. 259 b, 260 a b, 267 a, 809 b, 326 b). For if he 
call memory an immediate knowledge of the past — meaning thereby, in ref- 
erence to it, only a negation of the doctrine of non-egoistical representation, 
he may also call Perception an immediate knowledge of the outward reality, 
and still not deny that it is representative cognition, in and by the mind 
itself. 



284 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

277 b, 278 a b, 293 b, 299 a, 318 b, 427 a b) ; and confounded 
it either with the non-egoistical form, or with the counter doc- 
trine of real presentationism. In consequence of this, he has 
been betrayed into sundry errors, of less or greater account. On 
the one hand ; — to the confusion of Presentationism and Non-ego- 
istical representationism, we must attribute the inconsistencies we 
have just signalized, in the exposition of his own doctrine. These 
are of principal account. On the other hand ; to the. confusion of 
Egoistical and Non-egoistical representationism, we must refer 
the less important errors ; — 1°, of viewing many philosophers 
who held the former doctrine, as holding the latter ; and 2°, of 
considering the refutation of the non-egoistical form of represen- 
tation, as a subversion of the only ground on which the skeptic 
and absolute idealist established, or could establish their conclu- 
sions. 



CHAPTER IV.' 

DOCTRINE OF PEECEPTION MAINTAINED BY THE ABSOLUTE 
IDEALISTS.— DISCUSSION ON THE SCHEME OF AETHUE COL- 
LIEE. 

"We deem it our duty to call attention to these publications : 2 
for in themselves they are eminently deserving of the notice of 
the few who in this country take an interest in those higher spec- 
ulations to which, in other countries, the name of Philosophy is 
exclusively conceded ; and, at the same time, they have not been 
ushered into the world with those adventitious recommendations 
which might secure their intrinsic merit against neglect. 

The fortune of the first is curious. — It is known to those who 
have made an active study of philosophy and its history, that 
there are many philosophical treatises written by English authors 
— in whole or in part of great value, but, at the same time, of 
extreme rarity. Of these, the rarest are, in fact, frequently the 
most original : for precisely in proportion as an author is in ad- 
vance of his age, is it likely that his works will be neglected ; and 
the neglect of contemporaries in general consigns a book, — espe- 
cially a small book, — if not protected by accidental concomitants, 

1 This was first published in the Edinburgh Eeview, for April, 18S9, and 
has recently been published in the ' Discussions,' under the title of Idealism. 
That portion of it which shows that Catholicism is inconsistent with Ideal- 
ism is a new, and very important, contribution to the history of philosophy. 
It also does justice to the name of an almost forgotten idealist, who was 
scarcely inferior to Berkeley himself. — W. 

2 The following are the titles of the books reviewed : 

1. Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century. 
Prepared for the Press by the late Eev. Sam. Parr, D. D. 8vo. London. 1837. 

2. Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Rev. Arthur Collier, M. A., 
Hector of Langford Magna, in the County of Wilts. From A. D. 1704 to A. J). 
1732. With some Account of Ms Family. By Robert Benson, M. A. 8vo. 
London. 1837.— IF". 



286 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

at once to the tobacconist or tallow-chandler. This is more par- 
ticularly the case with pamphlets, philosophical, and at the same 
time polemical. Of these we are acquainted with some, extant 
perhaps only in one or two copies, which display a metaphysical 
talent unappreciated in a former age, but which would command 
the admiration of the present. Nay, even of English philoso- 
phers of the very highest note (strange to say !) there are now 
actually lying unknown to their editors, biographers, and fellow- 
metaphysicians, published treatises, of the highest interest and 
importance : [as of Cudworth, Berkeley, Collins, &c] 

We have often, therefore, thought that, were there with us a 
public disposed to indemnify the cost of such a publication, a 
collection, partly of treatises, partly of extracts from treatises, by 
English metaphysical writers, of rarity and merit, would be one 
of no inconsiderable importance. In any other country than 
Britain, such a publication would be of no risk or difficulty. Al 
most every nation of Europe, except our own, has, in fact, at 
present similar collections in progress — only incomparably more 
ambitious. Among others, there are in Germany the Corpus 
Philosophorum, by Gfroerer ; in France, the Bibliotheque Philo- 
sophique des Temps Modernes, by Bouillet and Gamier ; and in 
Italy, the Collezione dd Classici Metafisici, &c. Nay, in this 
country itself, we have publishing societies for every department 
of forgotten literature — except Philosophy. 

But in Britain, which does not even possess an annotated edi- 
tion of Locke, — in England, 1 where the universities teach the 
little philosophy they still nominally attempt, like the catechism, 
by rote, what encouragement could such an enterprise obtain ? 
It did not, therefore, surprise us, when we learnt that the pub- 
lisher of the two works under review, — when he essayed what, 
in the language of ' the trade] is called ' to subscribe 1 The Meta- 
physical Tracts, found his brother booksellers indisposed to ven- 
ture even on a single copy. — Now, what was the work which 

1 As much might be said of philosophy in America. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 287 

our literary purveyors thus eschewed as wormwood to British 
taste ? 

The late Dr. Parr, whose erudition w~as as unexclusive as pro- 
found, had, many years previous to his death, formed the plan of 
reprinting- a series of the rarer metaphysical treatises, of English 
authorship, which his remarkable library contained. With this 
view, he had actually thrown off a small impression of five such 
tracts, with an abridgment of a sixth ; but as these probably 
formed only a part of his intended collection, which, at the same 
time, it is known he meant to have prefaced by an introduction, 
containing, among other matters, an historical disquisition on 
Idealism, with special reference to the philosophy of Collier, the 
publication was from time to time delayed, until its completion 
was finally frustrated by his death. When his library was subse- 
quently sold, the impression of the six treatises was purchased by 
Mr. Lumley, a respectable London bookseller ; and by him has 
recently been published under the title which stands as Number 
First at the head of this article. 

The treatises reprinted in this collection are the following : 

'1. Clavis Universalis; or a new Inquiry after Truth: being a demonstra- 
ion of the non-existence or impossibility of an external world. By Arthur Col- 
lier, Eector of Langford Magna, near Sarum. London : 1713. 

' 2. A specimen of True Philosophy ; in a discourse on Genesis, the first 
chapter and- the first verse. By Arthur Collier, Eector of Langford Magna, 
near Sarum, Wilts. Not improper to be bound up with his Clavis Universa- 
lis. Sarum: 1730. 

' 3. (An Abridgment, by Dr. Parr, of the doctrines maintained by Collier 
in his) logology, or Treatise on the Logos, in seven sermons on John i. verses 
1 , 2, 3, 14, together with an Appendix on the same subject. 1732. 

' 4. Conjectures qucedam de Sensu, Motu, et Idearum generatione. (This was 
first published by David Hartley as an appendix to his Epistolary Disserta- 
tion, De Lithontriptico a J. Stephens nuper invento (Leyden, 1741, Bath, 
1746) ; and contains the principles of that psychological theory which he af- 
terwards so fully developed in his observations on Man.) 

' 5. An Inquiry ivlo the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections, show- 
ing how each arises from Association, with an account of the entrance of Moral 
Evil into the ivorld. To which are added some remarks on the independent 
scheme which deduces all obligation on God's part and man's from certain 
abstract relations, truth, etc. Written for the use of the young gentlemen 
at the universities. Lincoln : 1747. (The author is yet unknown.) 



28S PHILOSOPHY OF FEKCEPTION. 

' 6. Man in quest of himself ; or a defence of the Individuality of the Human 
Mind, or Self. Occasioned by some remarks in the Monthly Review for 
July, 1763, on a note in Search's Freewill. By Cuthbert Comment, Gent. 
London : 1763. (The author of this is Search himself, that is, Mr. Abraham 
Tucker.)' 

These tracts are undoubtedly well worthy of notice ; but to the 
first — the Clavis Universalis of Collier — as by far the most in- 
teresting and important, we shall at present confine the few ob- 
servations which we can afford space to make.* 

This treatise is in fact one not a little remarkable in the his- 
tory of philosophy ; for to Collier along with Berkeley is due 
the honor of having first explicitly maintained a theory of Abso- 
lute Idealism ; and the Clavis is the work in which that theory 
is developed. The fortune of this treatise, especially in its own 
country, has been very different from its deserts. Though the 
negation of an external world had been incidentally advanced by 
Berkeley in his Principles of Human Knoioledge some three 
years prior to the appearance of the Clavis Universalis, with 
which the publication of his Dialogues betiveen Hylas and Philo- 
nous was simultaneous ; it is certain that Collier was not only 
wholly unacquainted with Berkeley's speculations, but had de- 
layed promulgating his opinion till after a ten years' meditation. 
Both philosophers are thus equally original. They are also nearly 
on a level in scientific talent ; for, comparing the treatise of 
Collier with the writings of Berkeley, we find it little inferior in 
metaphysical acuteness or force of reasoning, however deficient it 
may be in the graces of composition, and the variety of illustra- 
tion, by which the Avorks of his more accomplished rival are dis- 
tinguished. But how disproportion ed to their relative merits has 
been the reputation of the two philosophers ! While Berkeley's 
became a name memorable throughout Europe, that of Collier 
was utterly forgotten, — it appears in no British biography ; and is 
not found even on the list of local authors in the elaborate history 

* [It never rains hut it pours. Collier's Clavis was si\bsequently reprinted, 
in a very handsome form, by a literary association in Edinburgh. "Would 
that the books wanting reimpression were first dealt with !] 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTTON. 289 

of the county where he was born, and of the parish where he was 
hereditary Rector ! Indeed, but for the notice of the Clavis by 
Dr. Beid (who appears to have stumbled on it in the College 
Library of Glasgow), it is probable that the name of Collier would 
have remained in his own country absolutely unknown — until, 
perhaps, our attention might have been called to his remarkable 
writings, by the consideration they had by accident obtained from 
the philosophers of other countries. In England the Clavis Uni- 
versalis was printed, but there it can hardly be said to have been 
published ; for it there never attracted the slightest observa- 
tion ; and of the copies now known to be extant of the original 
edition, 



'numerus vise est totidem, quot 



Thebarum portiz vel divitis ostia MlV 

The public libraries of Oxford and Cambridge, as Mr. Benson 
observes, do not j>ossess a single copy. There are, however, 
two in Edinburgh ; and in Glasgow, as we have noticed, there is 
another. 

The only country in which the Clavis can truly be said to have 
been hitherto published, is Germany. 

In the sixth supplemental volume of the Acta Eruditorum 
(17 17) there is a copious and able abstract of its contents. 
Through this abridgment the speculations of Collier became 
known — particularly to the German philosophers ; and we rec- 
ollect to have seen them quoted, among others, by Wolf and 
Bilfinger. 

In 1756, the work was, however, translated, without retrench- 
ment, into German, by Professor Eschenbach of Rostock, along 
with Berkeley's Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. These 
two treatises constitute his ' Collection of the most distinguished 
Writers who deny the reality of their own body and of the whole 
corporeal world,' — treatises which he accompanied with ' Counter 
observations, and an Appendix, in which the existence of matter 
is demonstrated :' These are of considerable value. [I have 
spoken of them, in Stewart's Dissertation, Note SS.] Speaking 
18 



290 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

of Collier's treatise, tlie translator tells us : — ' If any book ever 
cost me trouble to obtain it, the Clavis is tbat book. Every ex- 
ertion was fruitless. At length, an esteemed friend, Mr. J. Selk, 
candidate of theology in Dantzic, sent me the work, after I had 

abandoned all hope of ever being able to procure it 

The preface is wanting in the copy thus obtained — a proof that it 
was rummaged, with difficulty, out of some old book magazine. 
It has not, therefore, been in my power to present it to the curi- 
ous reader, but I trust the loss may not be of any great import- 
ance.' — In regard to the preface, Dr. Eschenbach is, however, 
mistaken ; the original has none. 

By this translation, which has now itself become rare, the work 
was rendered fully accessible in Germany ; and the philosophers 
of that country did not fail to accord to its author the honor due 
to his metaphysical talent and originality. The best comparative 
view of the kindred doctrines of Collier and Berkeley is indeed 
given by Tennemann (xi. 399, sq.) ; whose meritorious History 
of Philosophy, we may observe, does justice to more than one 
English thinker, whose works, and even whose name, are in his 
own country as if they had never been ! 

Dr. Reid's notice of the Clavis attracted the attention of Mr. 
Dugald Stewart and of Dr. Parr to the work ; and to the nom- 
inal celebrity which, through them, its author has thus tardily 
attained, even in Britain, are we indebted for Mr. Benson's inter- 
esting Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Arthur Collier : 
forming the second of the two publications prefixed to this article. 
"What was his inducement, and what his means for the execution 
of this task, the biographer thus informs us. 

****** 

Arthur Collier was born in 1680. He was the son of Arthur 
Collier, Rector of Langford-Magna, in the neighborhood of 
Salisbury — a living, the advowson of which bad for about a cen- 
tury been in possession of the family, and of which his great- 
grandfather, grandfather, father, and himself, were successively 
incumbents. With his younger brother, William, who was also 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 291 

destined for the Church, and who obtained an adjoining benefice 
he received his earlier education in the grammar-school of Salis- 
bury. In 1697 he was entered of Pembroke College, Oxford ; 
but in the following year, when his brother joined him at the 
University, they both became members of Balliol. His father 
having died in 1697, the family living was held by a substitute 
until 1704, when Arthur having taken priest's orders, was induct- 
ed into the Rectory, on the presentation of his mother. In 1 70 7 
he married a niece of Sir Stephen Fox ; and died in 1732, leav- 
ing his wife, with two sons and two daughters, in embarrassed 
circumstances. Of the sons : — Arthur became a civilian of some 
note at the Commons ; and Charles rose in the army to the rank 
of Colonel. Of the daughters : — Jane was the clever authoress 
of The Art of Ingeniously Tormenting ; and Mary obtained 
some celebrity from having accompanied Fielding, as his wife's 
friend, in the voyage which he made in quest of health to Lis- 
bon. Collier's family is now believed to be extinct. 

Besides the Clavis Universalis (1713), The Specimen of True 
Philosophy (1730), and the Logology (1732), Collier was the 
author of two published Sermons on controversial points, which 
have not been recovered. Of his manuscript works the remains 
are still considerable, but it is probable that the greater propor- 
tion has perished. Our author was hardly less independent in 
his religious, than in his philosophical, speculations. In the lat- 
ter he was an Idealist ; in the former, an Arian (like Clarke), — 
an Apollinarian, — and a High Churchman, on grounds which 
high churchmen could not understand. Of Collier as a parish 
priest and a theologian, Mr. Benson supplies us with much inter- 
esting information. But it is only as a metaphysician that we at 
present consider him ; and in this respect the Memoirs form a 
valuable supplement to the Clavis. Besides a series of letters in 
exposition of his philosophical system, they afford us, what is 
even more important, an insight into the course of study by 
which Collier was led to his conclusion. With philosophical lite- 
rature he does not appear to have been at all extensively conver- 



292 PHILOSOPHY OF PEEOEPTION. 

sant. His writings betray no intimate acquaintance with the 
works of the great thinkers of antiquity ; and the compends of 
the German Scheiblerus and of the Scottish Baronius, apparently 
supplied him with all that he knew of the Metaphysic of the 
Schools. Locke is never once alluded to. Descartes and Male- 
branche, and his neighbor Mr. Norris, were the philosophers 
whom he seems principally to have studied ; and their works, 
taken by themselves, were precisely those best adapted to conduct 
an untrammelled mind of originality and boldness to the result 
at which he actually arrived. 

Without entering on any general consideration of the doctrine 
of Idealism, or attempting a regular analysis of the argument of 
Collier, we hazard a few remarks on that theory, — simply with 
the view of calling attention to some of the peculiar merits of 
our author. 

Mankind in general believe that an external world exists, only 
because they believe that they immediately Jcnoiv it as existent. 
As they believe that they themselves exist because conscious of a 
self or ego ; so they believe that something different from them- 
selves exists, because they believe that they are also conscious of 
this not-self, or non-ego. 

In the first place, then, it is self-evident, that the existence of 
the external world cannot be doubted, if we admit that we do, 
as we naturally believe we do, — know it immediately as ex- 
istent. If the fact of the knowledge be allowed, the fact of the 
existence cannot be gainsaid. The former involves the latter. 

But, in the second place, it is hardly less manifest, that if our 
natural belief in the knowledge of the existence of an external 
world be disallowed as false, that our natural belief in the exist- 
ence of such a world can no longer be founded on as true. Yet, 
marvellous to say, this has been very generally done. 

For reasons to which we cannot at present advert, it has been 
almost universally denied by philosophers, that in sensitive per- 
ception we are conscious of any external reality. On the con- 
trary, they have maintained, with singular unanimity, that what 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 293 

we are immediately cognitive of in that act, is only an ideal object 
in the mind itself. In so far as they agree in holding this opinion, 
philosophers may be called Idealists in contrast to mankind in 
general, and a few stray speculators who may be called Real- 
ists — Natural Realists. 

In regard to the relation or import of this ideal object, philos- 
ophers are divided ; and this division constitutes two great and 
opposing opinions in philosophy. On the one hand, the major- 
ity have maintained that the ideal object of which the mind is 
conscious, is vicarious or representative of a real object, unknown 
immediately or as existing, and known only mediately through 
this its ideal substitute. These philosophers, thus holding the 
existence of an external world — a world, however, unknown in 
itself, and therefore asserted only as an hypothesis, may be ap- 
propriately styled Cosmothetic Idealists — Hypothetical or As- 
sumptive Realists. On the other hand, a minority maintain, 
that the ideal object has no external prototype ; and they accord- 
dingly deny the existence of any external world. These may be 
denominated the Absolute Idealists. 

Each of these great genera of Idealists is, however, divided and 
subdivided into various subordinate species. 

The Cosmothetic Idealists fall primarily into two classes, inas- 
much as some view the ideal or representative object to be a 
tertium quid different from the percipient mind as from the rep- 
resented object ; while others regard it as only a modification of 
the mind itself, — as only the percipient act considered as repre- 
sentative of, or relative to, the supposed external reality. The 
former of these classes is again variously subdivided, according 
as theories may differ in regard to the nature and origin of the 
vicarious object; as whether it be material or immaterial, — 
whether it come from without or rise from within, — whether it 
emanate from the external reality or from a higher source, — 
whether it be infused by God or other hyperphysical intelligences, 
or whether it be a representation in the Deity himself, — whether 
it be innate, or whether it be produced by the mind, on occasion 



294 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

of the presence of the material object within the sphere of sense. 

Of Absolute Idealism ' only two principal species are possible ; 

1 ' If idealism supposed the existence of ideas as Urtia qvcedam, distinct at 
once from the material object and the immaterial subject, these intermediate 
entities being likewise held to originate immediately or mediately in sense — 
if this hypothesis, I say, were requisite to Idealism, then would Keid's criti- 
cism of that doctrine be a complete and final confutation. But as this criti- 
cism did not contemplate, so it does not confute that simpler and more 
refined Idealism which views in ideas only modifications of the mind itself; 
and which, in place of sensualizing intellect, inteUectualizes sense. On the 
contrary, Eeid (and herein ho is followed by Mr. Stewart), in the doctrine 
now maintained, asserts the very positions on which this scheme of Ideal- 
ism establishes its conclusions. An Egoistical Idealism is established, on 
the doctrine that all our knowledge is merely subjective, or of the mind 
itself; that the Ego has no immediate cognizance of a Non-Ego as exist- 
ing, but that the Non-Ego is only represented to us in a modification of the 
self-conscious Ego. This doctrine being admitted, the Idealist has only to 
show that the supposition of a Non-Ego, or external world really existent, is 
a groundless and unnecessary assumption ; for, while the law of parcimo- 
ny prohibits the multiplication of substances or causes beyond what the 
phenomena require, we have manifestly no right to postulate for the Non- 
Ego the dignity of an independent substance beyond the Ego, seeing that 
this Non-Ego is, ex Tiypothesi, known to us, consequently exists for us only as 
a phenomenon of the Ego. — Now, the doctrine of our Scottish philosophers 
is, in fact, the very groundwork on which the Egoistical Idealism reposes. 
That doctrine not only maintains our sensations of the secondary qualities to 
be the mere effects of certain unknown causes, of which we are consequently 
entitled to affirm nothing, but that we have no direct and immediate perceij- 
tion of extension and the other primary qualities of matter. To limit our- 
selves to extension (or space), which figure and motion (the two other quali- 
ties proposed by Eeid for the experiment) suppose, it is evident that if ex- 
tension be not immediately perceived as externally existing, extended objects 
cannot be immediately perceived as realities out, and independent of, the 
percipient subject ; for, if we were capable of such a perception of such 
objects, we should necessarily be also capable of a perception of this, the one 
essential attribute of their existence. But, on the doctrine of our Scottish 
philosophers, Extension is a notion suggested on occasion of sensations sup- 
posed to be determined by certain unknown causes ; which unknown causes 
are again supposed to be existences independent of the mind, and extended 
— their complement, in fact, constituting the external world. All our knowl- 
edge of the Non-Ego is thus merely ideal and mediate ; we have no knowl- 
edge of any really objective reality, except through a subjective representa- 
tion or notion ; in other words, we are only immediately cognizant of cer- 
tain modes of our own minds, and, in and through them, mediately warned 
of the phenomena of the material universe. In all essential respects, this 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 295 

at least, only two have been actually manifested in the history 
of philosophy ;— the Theistic and the Egoistic. The former sup- 
poses that the Deity presents to the mind the appearances which 
we are determined to mistake for an external world ; the latter 
supposes that these appearances are manifested to consciousness, 
in conformity to certain unknown laws by the mind itself. The 
Theistic Idealism is again subdivided into three ; according as 
God is supposed to exhibit the phenomena in question in his 
own substance, — to infuse into the percipient mind representative 
entities different from its own modification, — or to determine the 
ego itself to an illusive representation of the non-ego} 

Now it is easily shown, that if the doctrine of Natural Realism 
be abandoned, — if it be admitted, or proved, that we are deceived 
in our belief of an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the 
mind ; then Absolute Idealism is a conclusion philosophically 
inevitable, the assumption of an external world being now an 
assumption which no necessity legitimates, and which is therefore 
philosophically inadmissible. On the law of parsimony it must 
be presumed null. 

It is, however, historically true, that Natural Realism had been 
long abandoned by philosophers for Cosmothetic Idealism, before 
the grounds on which this latter doctrine rests were shown to be 
unsound. These grounds are principally the following : 

1.) — In ilae first place, the natural belief in the existence of an 
external world was allowed to operate even when the natural 
belief of our immediate knowledge of such a world was argued to 
be false. It might be thought that philosophers, when they 
maintained that one original belief was illusive, would not con- 
tend that another was veracious, — still less that they woui.j 
assume, as true, a belief which existed only as the result of a 

doctrine of Eeid and Stewart is identical with. Kant's ; except that the Ger- 
man philosopher, in holding space to he a necessary form of our conceptions 
of external things, prudently declined asserting that these unknown things 
are in themselves extended.' — Eeid, p. 128. — W. 

1 For a more detailed view of these distinctions, see the previous chapter. 
— W. 



296 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

belief which, they assumed to be false. But this they did. The 
Cosmothetic Idealists all deny the validity of our natural belief 
in our knowledge of the existence of external things ; but we 
find the majority of them, at the same time, maintaining that 
such existence must be admitted on the authority of our natural 
belief of its reality. And yet the latter belief exists only in and 
through the former ; and if the former be held false, it is there- 
fore, of all absurdities the greatest to view the latter as true. 
Thus Descartes, after arguing that mankind are universally de- 
luded in their conviction that they have any immediate knowl- 
edge of aught beyond the modifications of their own minds ; 
again argues that the existence of an external world must be 
admitted, — because if it do not exist, God deceives, in impressing 
on us a belief in its reality ; but God is no deceiver ; therefore, 
&c. This reasoning is either good for nothing, or good for more 
than Descartes intended. For, on the one hand, if God be no 
deceiver, he did not deceive us in our natural belief that we 
know something more than the mere modes of self; but then 
the fundamental position of the Cartesian philosophy is disproved : 
and if, on the other hand, this position be admitted, God is there- 
by confessed to be a deceiver, who, having deluded us in the 
belief on which our belief of an external world is founded, cannot 
be consistently supposed not to delude us in this belief itself. 
Such melancholy reasoning is, however, from Descartes to Dr. 
Brown, the favorite logic by which the Cosmothetic Idealists in 
general attempt to resist the conclusion of the Absolute Idealists. 
But on this ground there is no tenable medium between Natural 
Realism and Absolute Idealism. 

It is curious to notice the different views which Berkeley and 
Collier, our two Absolute Idealists, and which Dr. Samuel 
Clarke, the acutest of the Hypothetical Realists with whom they 
both came in contact, took of this principle. 

Clarke was, apparently, too sagacious a metaphysician riot to 
see that the proof of the reality of an external world reposed 
mainly on our natural belief of its reality ; and at the same time 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTTOjST. 297 

that this natural belief could not be pleaded in favor of his 
hypothesis by the Cosmothetic Idealist. He was himself con- 
scious, that his philosophy afforded him no arms against the 
reasoning of the Absolute Idealists ; whose inference he was, 
however, inclined neither to admit, nor able to show why it 
should not. Whiston, in his Memoirs, speaking of Berkeley and 
his Idealism, says : — ' He was pleased to send Dr. Clarke and 
myself, each of us a book. After we had both perused it, I went 
to Dr. Clarke and discoursed with him about it to this effect : — 
That I, being not a metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr. 
Berkeley's subtile premises, though I did not at all believe his 
absurd conclusion. I, therefore, desired that he, who was deep 
in such subtilties, but did not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley's 
conclusions, would answer him ; tvhich task he declined? Many 
years after this, as we are told in the Life of Bishop Berkeley, 
prefixed to his works : — ' There was, at Mr. Addison's instance, a 
meeting of Drs. Clarke and Berkeley to discuss this speculative 
point ; and great hopes were entertained from the conference. 
The parties, however, separated without being able to come to 
any agreement. Dr. Berkeley declared himself not well satisfied 
with the conduct of his antagonist on the occasion, who, though 
he could not answer, had not candor enough to own himself con- 
vinced? 

Mr. Benson affords us a curious anecdote to the same effect in 
a letter of Collier to Clarke. From it we learn, — that when 
Collier originally presented his Clavis to the Doctor, through a 
friend, on reading the title, Clarke good-humoredly said : — ' Poor 
gentleman ! I pity him. He would be a philosopher, but has 
chosen a strange task ; for he can neither prove his point him- 
self, nor can the contrary be proved against him.' 

In regard to the two Idealists themselves, each dealt with this 
ground of argument in a very different way ; and it must be 
confessed that in this respect Collier is favorably contrasted with 
Berkeley. — Berkeley attempts to enlist the natural belief of man- 
kind in his favor against the Hvoothetical Realism of the philos- 



298 PHILOSOPHY OP PERCEPTION. 

ophers. It is true, that natural belief is opposed to scientific 
opinion. Mankind are not, however, as Berkeley reports, Ideal- 
ists. In this he even contradicts himself; for, if they be, in 
truth, of bis opinion, why does he dispute so anxiously, so learn- 
edly against them? — Collier, on the contrary, consistently rejects 
all appeal to the common sense of mankind. The motto of his 
work, from Malebranche, is the watchword of his philosophy : — 
' Vulgi aasensus et approbatio circa materiam difficilem, est cer- 
ium argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui assentitur.'' And 
in his answer to the Cartesian argument for the reality of matter, 
from ' that strong and natural inclination which all men have to 
believe in an external world ;' he shrewdly remarks on the incon- 
sistency of such a reasoning at such hands : — ' Strange ! That 
a person of Mr. Descartes' sagacity should be found in so plain 
and palpable an oversight ; and that the late ingenious Mr. Nor- 
ris should be found treading in the same track, and that too upon 
a solemn and particular disquisition of this matter. That whilst 
on the one hand, they contend against the common inclination 
or prejudice of mankind, that the visible world is not external, 
they should yet appeal to the same common inclination for the 
truth or being of an external world, which on their principles 
must be said to be invisible ; and for which, therefore (they must 
needs have known if they had considered it), there neither is, nor 
can be, any kind of inclination.' (P. 81.) 

2.) — In the second place it was very generally assumed in 
antiquity, and during the middle ages, that an external world 
was a supposition necessary to render possible the fact of our 
sensitive cognition. The philosophers who held, that the imme- 
diate object of perception was an emanation from an outer real- 
ity, and that the hypothesis of the latter was requisite to account 
for the phenomenon of the former, — their theory involved the 
existence of an external world as its condition. But from the 
moment that the necessity of this condition was abandoned, and 
this was don 3 by many even of the scholastic philosophers ; — from 
the moment that sensible species or the vicarious objects in per- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 299 

ception were admitted to be derivable from otber sources tban 
the external objects themselves, as from God, or from tbe mind 
itself; from that moment we must look for otber reasons tban 
tbe preceding, to account for tbe remarkable fact, that it was not 
until after tbe commencement of tbe eigbteentb century tbat a 
doctrine of Absolute Idealism was, without communication, con- 
temporaneously promulgated by Berkeley and Collier. 

3.) — In explanation of this fact, we must refer to a third 
ground, wbicb has been wholly overlooked by tbe historians of 
philosophy ; but which it is necessary to take into account, 
would we explain bow so obvious a conclusion as the negation of 
the existence of an outer world, on tbe negation of our immediate 
knowledge of its existence, should not bave been drawn by so 
acute a race of speculators as tbe philosophers of the middle 
ages, to say nothing of the great philosophers of a more recent 
epoch. This ground is : — That the doctrine of Idealism is in- 
compatible with the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist. It is a 
very erroneous statement of Reid, in which, however be errs 
only in common with other philosophers, that '■during the 
reign of the Peripatetic doctrine, we find no appearance of skepti- 
cism about the existence of matter? On tbe contrary, during the 
dominance of the scholastic philosophy, we find that tbe possibil- 
ity of the non-existence of matter was contemplated ; nay, that 
the reasons in support of this supposition were expounded, in all 
their cogency. We do not, however, find the conclusion founded 
on these reasons formally professed. And why ? Because this 
conclusion, though philosophically proved, was theologically dis- 
proved ; and such disproof was during the middle ages sufficient 
to prevent the overt recognition of any speculative doctrine ; foi 
with all its ingenuity and boldness, philosophy during these ages 
was confessedly in the service of the church, — it was always Phi- 
losophia ancillans Theologian. And this because the service was 
voluntary ; — a thraldom indeed of love. Now, if the reality of 
matter were denied, there would, in general, be denied the reality 
of Christ's incarnation ; and in particular the transubstantiation 



300 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

into his body of the elements of bread and wine. There were other 
theological reasons indeed, and these not without their weight ; 
but this was, perhaps, the only one insuperable to a Catholic. 

We find the influence of this reason at work in very ancient 
times. It was employed by the earlier Fathers, and more espe- 
cially in opposition to Marcion's doctrine of the merely phenome- 
nal incarnation of our Saviour. — ' Non licet' (says Tertullian in 
his book Be Anima, speaking of the evidence of sense) — ' non 
licet nobis in dubium sensus istus revocare, ne et in Christo de 
fide eorum deliberetur : ne forte dicatur, quod falso Satanam 
prospectant de caslo praecipitatum ; aut falso vocem Patris audi- 
erit de ipso testificatam ; aut deceptus sit cum Petri sccrum 
tetegit. .... Sic et Mareion phantasma eum maluit credere, 
totius corporis in illo dedignatus veritatem.' (Cap. xvii.) And 
in his book, Adversus Marcionem : — ' Ideo Christus non erat 
quod videbatur, et quod erat mentiebatur ; caro, nee caro ; homo, 
nee homo : proinde Deus Christus, nee Deus ; cur enim non 
etiam Dei phantasma portaverit ? An credam ei de interiore 
substantia, qui sit de exteriore frustratus ? Quomodo verax habe- 
bitur in occulto, tarn fallax repertus in aperto ? . . . Jam nunc 
quum mendacium deprehenditur Christus caro ; sequitur ut om- 
nia quae per carnem Christi gesta sunt, mendacio gesta sint, — 
congressus, contactus, convictus, ipsae quoque virtutes. Si enim 
tangendo aliquem, liberavit a vitio, non potest vere actum credi, 
sine corporis ipsius veritate. Nihil solidum ab inani, nihil ple- 
num a vacuo perfici licet. Putativus habitus, putativus actus ; 
imaginarius operator, imaginariae operae.' (Lib. iii. c."8.) — In 
like manner, St. Augustin, among many other passages : — • Si 
phantasma fuit corpus Christi, fefellit Christus ; et si fefellit, Veri- 
tas non est. Est autem Veritas Christus ; non igitur phantasma 
fuit corpus ejus.' [Liber De Ixxxiii. Qucestionibus, qu. 14.) — 
And so many others. 

The repugnancy of the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation 
with the surrender of a substantial prototype of the species pre- 
sented to our sensible perceptions, was, however, more fully and 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 301 

precisely signalized by the Schoolmen ; as may be seen in the 
polemic waged principally on the great arena of scholastic sub- 
tilty — the commentaries on the four books of the Sentences of 
Peter Lombard. In their commentaries on the first book, espe- 
cially, will be found abundant speculation of an idealistic tend- 
ency. The question is almost regularly mooted : — May not 
God preserve the species (the ideas of a more modern philosophy) 
before the mind, the external reality represented being destroyed? 
— May not God, in fact, object to the sense the species represent- 
ing an external world, that world, in reality, not existing? To 
these questions the answer is, always in the first instance, affirm- 
ative. Why then, the possibility, the probability even, being ad- 
mitted, was the fact denied ? Philosophically orthodox, it was 
theologically heretical ; and their principal argument for the 
rejection is, that on such hypothesis, the doctrine of a transub- 
stantiated eucharist becomes untenable. A change is not, — can- 
not be, — (spiritually) real. 

Such was the sjtecial reason, why many of the acuter School- 
men did not follow out their general argument, to the express 
negation of matter ; and such also was the only reason, to say 
nothing of other Cartesians, why Malebranche deformed the sim- 
plicity of his peculiar theory with such an assumptive hors d J ceuvre, 
as an unknown and otiose universe of matter. It is, indeed, but 
justice to that great philosopher to say, — that if the incumbrance 
with which, as a Catholic, he was obliged to burden it, be thrown 
off his theory, that theory becomes one of Absolute Idealism ; 
and that, in fact, all the principal arguments in support of such 
a scheme are found fully developed in his immortal Inquiry after 
Truth. This Malebranche well knew ; and knowing it, we can 
easily understand, how Berkeley's interview with him ended as 
it did* 



* [I cannot, however, concur in the praise of novelty and invention, which 
has always been conceded to the central theory of Malebranche. His ' Vision 
of all things in the Deity] is, as it appears to me, simply a transference to 
man in the flesh, to the Viator, of that mode of cognition, maintained by 



302 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Malebranche thus left little for his Protestant successors to do. 
They had only to omit the Catholic 1 excrescence ; the reasons 
vindicating this omission they found collected and marshalled to 
their hand. That Idealism was the legitimate issue of the Male- 
branchian doctrine, was at once seen by those competent to meta- 
physical reasoning. This was signalized, in general, by Bayle, 
and, what has not been hitherto noticed, by Locke.* It was, 

many of the older Catholic divines, jn explanation of how the saints, as dis- 
embodied spirits, can be aware of human invocations, and, in general, of 
what passes upon earth. '■They perceive 1 it is said, 'all things in God. 1 
So that, in truth, the philosophical theory of Malebranche is nothing but the 
extension of a theological hypothesis, long common in the schools ; and with 
scholastic speculations, Malebranche was even intimately acquainted. This 
nypothesis I had once occasion to express : 

' Quidquid, in his tenebris vitce, came latebat, 
Nunc legis in magno cuncta, beate, DeoJ 1 ] 

1 ' They (the Catholics) admit that physically the bread and wine are bread 
and wine ; and only contend that hyperphysically in a spiritual, mysterious, 
and inconceivable sense, they are really flesh and blood. Those, therefore, 
who think of disproving the doctrine of transubstantiation, by proving that 
in the eucharist bread and wine remain physically bread and wine, are guilty 
of the idle sophism called mutatio elenchi." 1 — Eeid, p. 518. — W. 

* Compare Locke's Examination of P. Malebranche 's Opinion (§ 20). 

When on this subject, we may clear up a point connected therewith, of 
some interest, in relation to Locke and Newton, and which has engaged the 
attention of Dr. Eeid and Mr. Dugald Stewart. 

Beid, who has overlooked the passage of Locke just referred to, says, in 
deducing the history of the Berkeleian Idealism, and after speaking of Male- 
branche's opinion : — ' It may seem strange that Locke, who wrote so much 
about ideas, should not see those consequences which Berkeley thought so 
obviously deducible from that doctrine. . . . There is, indeed a single 
passage in Locke's essay, which may lead one to conjecture that he had a 
glimpse of that system which Berkeley afterwards advanced, but thought 
proper to suppress it within his own breast. The passage is in Book IV. c. 
10, where, having proved the existence of an eternal, intelligent mind, he 
comes to answer those who conceive that matter also must be eternal, 
because we cannot conceive how it could be made out of nothing ; and, 
having observed that the creation of mind requires no less power than the 
creation of matter, he adds what follows : — " Nay, possibly, if we could 
emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as 
they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to 
aim at some dim and seeming conception, how matter might at first be made 
and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being ; but to give 
beginning and being to a spirit, woidd be found a more inconceivable effect 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 303 

therefore, but little creditable to the acnteness of Norris, that he, 
a Protestant, should have adopted the Malebranchian hypothe- 
sis, without rejecting its Catholic incumbrance. The honor of 



of omnipotent power. But this being what would, perhaps, lead us too far 
from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built, it would 
not be pardonable to deviate so far from them, or to inquire, so far as gram- 
mar itself would authorize, if the common settled opinion oppose it ; espe- 
cially in this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough to our 
present purpose." ' Eeid then goes on at considerable length to show that 
' every particular Mr. Locke has hinted with regard to that system which he 
had in his mind, but thought it prudent to suppress, tallies exactly with the 
system of Berkeley.' (Intellectual Powers, Ess. II. ch. 10.) 

Stewart does not coincide with Eeid. In quoting the same passage of 
Locke, he says of it, that ' when considered in connection with some others 
in his writings, it would almost tempt one to think that a theory concerning 
matter, somewhat analogous to that of Boscovich, had occasionally passed 
through his mind ;' and then adduces various reasons in support of this 
opinion, and in opposition to Eeid's. (Philosophical Essays, Ess. II. ch, 1, 
p. 63.) 

The whole arcanum in the passage in question is, however, revealed by 
M. Coste, the French translator of the Essay, and of several other of the 
works of Locke, with lolwm the philosopher lived in the same family, and on 
the most intimate terms, for the last seven years of his life ; and who, though 
he has never been consulted, affords often the most important information in 
regard to Lockers opinions. To this passage there is in the fourth edition of 
Coste's translation, a very curious note appended, of which the following is 
an abstract. ' Here Mr. Locke excites our curiosity without being inclined 
to satisfy it. Many persons having imagined that he had communicated to 
me this mode of explaining the creation of matter, requested, when my trans- 
lation first appeared, that I would inform them what it was ; but I was 
obliged to confess, that Mr. Locke had not made even me a partner in the 
secret. At length, long after his death, Sir Isaac Neivton, to whom I was 
accidentally speaking of this part of Mr. Locke's book, discovered to me the 
whole mystery. He told me, smiling, that it was he himself who had imagined 
this manner of explaining the creation of matter, and that the thought had 
struck him, one day, when this question chanced to tarn up in a conversa- 
tion between himself, Mr. Locke, and the late Earl of Pembroke. The fol- 
lowing is the way in which he explained to them his thought : — " We may be 
enabled' 1 '' (he said) " to form some rude conception of the creation of matter, if 
we suppose that God by his power had prevented the entrance of any thing into 
a certain portion of pure' space, which is of its nature penetrable, eternal, neces- 
sary, infinite ; for henceforward this portion of space icould be endoived with 
impenetrability ; one of the essential qualities of matter ; and as pure space is 
absolutely uniform, ive have only again to suppose that God communicated the 
same impenetrability to another portion of space, and we should tlien obtain in 
a certain sort the notion of the mobility of matter, another quality which is also 



304 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

first promulgating an articulate scheme of absolute idealism was 
thus left to Berkeley and Collier ; and though both are indebted 
to Malebranche for the principal arguments they adduce, each is 
also entitled to the credit of having applied them with an inge- 
nuity peculiar to himself. 

It is likewise to the credit of Collier's sagacity, that he has 
noticed (and he is the only modern philosopher, we have found, 
to have anticipated our observation) the incompatibility of the 
Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist with the non-existence of mat- 
ter. In the concluding chapter of his work, in which he speaks 
' of the use and consequences of the foregoing treatise,' he enu- 
merates as one ' particular usefulness with respect to religion,' the 
refutation it affords of ' the real presence of Christ's body in the 
Eucharist in which the Papists have grafted the doctrine of tran- 
substantiation.' He says : 

' Now nothing can be more evident, than that both the sound and ex- 
plication of this important doctrine are founded altogether on the suppo- 
sition of external matter ; so that, if this be removed, there is not any 
thing left whereon to build so much as the appearance of a question. — 
For if, after this, it be inquired whether the substance of the tread in this sac- 
rament, ie not changed into the substance of the body of Christ, the accidents 
or sensible appearances remaining as before ; or suppose this should be 
affirmed to be the fact, or at least possible, it may indeed be shown to 
be untrue or impossible, on the supposition of an external world, from 
certain consequential absurdities which attend it ; but to remove an external 
world, is to prick it in itspunctum saliens, or quench its very vital flame. For 
if there is no external matter, the very distinction is lost between the 
substance and accidents, or sensible species of bodies, and these last will 
become the sole essence of material objects. So that, if these are supposed 
to remain as before, there is no possible room for the supposal of any 
change, in that the thing supposed to be changed, is here shown to be nothing 
at all.' (P. 95.) 



very essential to it." Thus, then, we are relieved of the embarrassment of 
endeavoring to discover what it was that Mr. Locke had deemed it advisable 
to conceal from his readers : for the above is all that gave him occasion to 
tell us — " if we would raise our thoughts as far as they could reach, we might 
be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how matter might at 
first be made," ' &c. — This suffices to show what was the general purport of 
Locke's expressions, and that Mr. Stewart's conjecture is at least nearer to 
the truth than Dr. Eeid's. 



PHILOSOPHY Oh- PERCEPTION. 305 

But we must conclude. — What has now been said in reference 
to a part of its contents, may perhaps contribute to attract the 
attention of those interested in the higher philosophy, to this very 
curious volume. We need hardly add, that Mr Benson's Memoirs 
of Collier should be bound up along with it. 



CHAPTER V. 

DISTINCTION OP THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 
OF BODY. 1 

The developed doctrine of Real Presentationism, the basis of 
Natural Realism, asserts the consciousness or immediate perception 
of certain essential attributes of matter objectively existing ; while 
it admits that other properties of body are unknown in them- 
selves, and only inferred as causes to account for certain subject- 
ive affections of which we are cognizant in ourselves. This dis- 
crimination, which to other systems is contingent, superficial, ex- 
traneous, but to Natural Realism necessary, radical, intrinsic, co- 
incides with what, since the time of Locke, has been generally 
known as the distinction of the Qualities of Matter or Body, using 
these terms as convertible into Primary and Secondary. 

Of this celebrated analysis, I shall here, in the first place, at- 
tempt an historical survey ; and in the second, endeavor to place 
it on its proper footing by a critical analysis ; without however 
in either respect proposing more than a contribution towards a 
more full and regular discussion of it in both. 

§ I. — Distinction of the Primary and Secondary Quali- 
ties of Body considered Historically. 

In regard to its History 2 — this, as hitherto attempted, is at 
once extremely erroneous, if History may be called the incidental 



1 This is the fourth supplementary Dissertation in Hamilton's Reid. — W. 

2 Sir William is exploring a new tract in the history of philosophy. No 
one has preceded him in this research, and if he has not completed the his- 
tory of the distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body, he 
has given us, with accurate criticism, the opinions of those most worthy of 
being consulted. No one, from Brucker to the present time, has traced the 
history of particular opinions with such affluent and unerring erudition, as 
that of Hamilton. In this respect, he stands unrivalled and alone. We 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 307 

notices in regard to it of an historical import, which are occasion- 
ally to he met with in philosophical treatises. — Among the most 
important of these, are those furnished by Reid himself, and hy 
M. Royer-Collard. 

The distinction of the real and the apparent, of the absolute 
and the relative, or of the objective and the subjective qualities of 
perceived bodies is of so obtrusive a character, that it was taken 
almost at the origin of speculation, and can be shown to have 
commanded the assent even of those philosophers by whom it is 
now commonly believed to have been again formally rejected. 
For in this, as in many other cases, it will be found that while 
philosophers appear to differ, they are, in reality, at one. 

1. — Leucippus and Democritus are the first on record by 
whom the observation was enounced, that the Sweet, the Bitter, 
the Cold, the Hot, the Colored, &c, are wholly different, in their 
absolute nature, from the character in which they come manifested 
to us. In the latter case, these qualities have no real or inde- 
pendent existence (ou xara akrideiav). The only existence they 
can pretend to, is merely one phenomenal in us ; and this in vir- 
tue of a law or relation (vojxw), established between the existing 
body and the percipient mind ; while all that can be denomina- 
ted Quality in the external reality, is only some modification of 
Quantity, some particular configuration, position, or co-arrange- 
ment of Atoms, in conjunction with the Inane. (Aristoteles, Me- 
taph., L. i. c. 4 — Phys. Ausc, L. i. c. 5 — De Anima, L. hi. c. 1 — 
De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4 — De Gen. et Corr., L. i. cc. 2, 7, 8 ; — 
Theojjhrastus, De Sensu, §§ 63, 65, 67, 69, 73, ed. Schneid. ; — 
Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math., vii. § 135 — Hypot. i. § 213 ; — 
Galenus, De Elem., L. i. c. 2, ; — Laertius, L. ix. seg. 44 ; — Plu- 
tarchus, adv. Colot., p. 1110, ed. Xyl. ; — Simplicius, in Phys. 



hope that many will follow his example, who, each working in a separate 
field, will at length complete the history — not of philosophers, not of men, 
not of systems even, hut of the human mind itself, in the various forms of 
its manifestation. — W. 



308 PHILOSOPHY OP PERCEPTION. 

Ausc, ff. 1, 10, 106, 119, ed. Aid.; — Philoponus, De Gen. et 
Corr., f. 32, ed Aid.) 

2, 3. — This observation was not lost on Protagobas or on 
Plato. The former on this ground endeavored to establish the 
absolute relativity of all human knowledge ; the latter the abso- 
lute relativity of our sensible perceptions. (Thesetetus, passim.) 

4. — By the Cvren^ean philosophers the distinction was 
likewise adopted and applied. (Cic. Qu. Acad., iv. c. 24.) 

5. — With other doctrines of the older Atomists it was trans- 
planted into his system by Epicurus. (Epist. ad Herod, apud 
Laert., L. x. seg. 54 ; Lucret, L. ii. v. 729 — 1021.) 

6. — In regard to Aristotle, it is requisite to be somewhat 
more explicit. This philosopher might seem, at first sight, to 
have rejected the distinction (De Anima, L. iii. c. i.) ; and among 
many others, Reid has asserted that Aristotle again ignored the 
discrimination, which had been thus recognized by his predeces- 
sors. (Inq., 123 a, I. P. 313 b.) Nothing, however, can be more 
erroneous than the accredited doctrine upon this point. Aris- 
totle does not abolish the distinction ;- — nay, I am confident of 
showing, that to whatever merit modern philosophers may pre- 
tend in this analysis, all and each of their observations are to be 
found, clearly stated, in the writings of the Stagirite. 

In the first place, no philosopher has discriminated with 
greater, perhaps none with equal, precision, the difference of cor- 
poreal qualities considered objectively and subjectively. These re- 
lations he has not only contrasted, but has assigned to them dis- 
tinctive appellations. In his Categories (c. viii. § 10, Pachian 
division., by which, as that usually adopted, I uniformly quote), 
speaking of Quality, he says : — ' A third kind of Quality [Such- 
ness] is made up of the Affective Qualities and Affections (<ira8r,ri- 
xai tfoioV7]<r££, i(aby\). Of this class are Sweetness, Bitterness, 
Sourness, and the like, also Heat and Cold, Whiteness and Black- 
ness, &c. That these are qualities [suchnesses] is manifest. For 
the subjects in which they are received, are said to be such and 
such by relation to them. Thus honey is called sweet, as recipi- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 309 

ent of sweetness, body, white, as recipient of whiteness, and so of 
the rest. They are called affective [i. e. causing passion or affec- 
tion*] not because the things to which these qualities belong, 
have been themselves affected in any way (for it is not because 
honey, or the like, has been somehow affected that it is called 
sweet, and in like manner heat and cold are not called affective 
qualities because the bodies in which they inhere have undergone 
any affection) ; but they are called affective, because each of the 



* The activo-potential term nadr/TiKis, primarily and properly denotes that 
which can in itself suffer or be affected ; it is here employed in a secondary 
and abusive sense (for itdcxu is intransitive), but which subseqiiently became 
the more prevalent — to signify that which can cause suffering or affection, in 
something else. The counter passivo-potential form, vaQr]T6{, is not, I venture 
to assert, ever used by Aristotle, though quoted from him, and from this 
very treatise, by all the principal lexicographers for the last three centuries ; 
nay, I make further bold to say, there is no authority for it (Menander's is 
naught), until iong subsequently to the age of the Stagirite. [The error, I 
suspect, originated thus : — Tusanus, in his Lexicon (1552), says, under the 
word — ' Vide Fabrurn Stapulensem apud Aristotelem in Prsedicamentis ;' 
meaning, it is probable (for I have not the book at hand), to send us to 
Faber's Introduction to the Categories, for some observations on the term. 
The Lexicon Septemvirale (1563), copying Tusanus, omits Faber, and simply 
refers ' Aristoteli, in Praxlicamentis,' as to an authority for the word ; and 
this error, propagated through Stephanus, Constantine, Scapula, and subse- 
quent compilers, stands uncorrected to the present day.] But this term, 
even were it of Aristotelic usage, could not, without violence, have been 
twisted to denote, in conjunction with Ttoidrris , what the philosopher less 
equivocally, if less symmetrically, expresses by irdOos, affection. Patibilis, 
like most Latin verbals of its class, indiscriminately renders the two poten- 
tials, active and passive, which the Greek tongue alone so admirably contra- 
distinguishes. But, in any way, the word is incompetent to Aristotle's 
meaning, in the sense of affective. For it only signifies either that which 
can suffer, or that which can be suffered ; and there is not, I am confident, a 
single ancient authority to be found for it, in the sense of that which can 
cwuse to suffer, — the sense to which it is contorted by the modern Latin Aris- 
totelians. But they had their excuse — necessity; for the terms passivus, 
used in the ' Categorise Decern' attributed to St. Augustine, and j'assibilis, 
employed by Boethius in his version of the present passage, are even worse. 
The words affective and affection render the Greek adjective and substantive 
tolerably well. 

This distinction by Aristotle is very commonly misunderstood. It is even 
reversed by Gassendi ; but with him, of course, only from inadvertence. 
Phys. Sect. i. Lib. vi. c. 1. 



310 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

foresaid qualities lias the power of causing an affection in the 
sense. For sweetness determines a certain affection in tasting, 
heat in touching, and in like manner the others.' 

Nothing can be juster than this distinction, and it is only to be 
regretted that he should have detracted from the precision of the 
language in which it is expressed by not restricting the correlative 
terms, Affective Qualities and Affections, to the discrimination in 
question alone. In this particular observation, it is proper to 
notice, Aristotle had in view the secondary qualities of our mod- 
ern philosophy exclusively. It suffices, however, to show that no 
philosopher had a clearer insight into the contrast of such quali- 
ties, as they are, and as they are perceived ; and, were other proof 
awanting, it might also of itself exonerate him from any share in 
the perversion made by the later Peripatetics of his philosophy, 
in their doctrine of Substantial Forms ; — a doctrine which, as 
Reid (I. P. 316) rightly observes, is inconsistent with the distinc- 
tion in question as taken by the Atomic'philosophers, but which 
in truth is not less inconsistent with that here established by Aris- 
totle himself.* It may be here likewise observed that Andronicus, 



* The theory of what are called Substantial Forms, that is, qualities 
viewed as entities conjoined with, and not as mere dispositions or modifica- 
tions of matter, was devised by the perverse ingenuity of the Arabian phi- 
losophers and physicians. Adopted from them, it was long a prevalent doc- 
trine in the "Western schools, among the followers of Aristotle and Galen ; 
to either of whom it is a gross injustice to attribute this opinion. It was. the 
ambiguity of the word ohcia, by which the Greeks express what is denoted 
(to say nothing of Arabic) by both the Latin terms essentia and substantia, 
that allowed of, and principally occasioned the misinterpretation. 

I may likewise notice, by the way, that Aristotle's doctrine of the assimi- 
lation, in the sensitive process, of that which perceives with that which is 
perceived, may reasonably be explained to mean, that the object and subject 
are then so brought into mutual relation, as, by their coefficient energy, to 
constitute an act of cognition one and indivisible, and in which the reality is 
to us as we perceive it to be. This is a far easier, and a far more consistent 
interpretation of his words than the monstrous doctrine of intentional form.' 
or species ; — a doctrine founded on one or two vague or metaphorical expres- 
sions, and for which the general analogy of his philosophy required a very 
different meaning. For example, when Aristotle (De Anima, iii. 1), in 
showing that an objection was incompetent, even on its own hypothesis, 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 311 

as quoted by Simplicius (Categ. f. 55 ed. Velsii), explicitly states, 
that the Affective Qualities are, in strict propriety, not qualities 
but powers (ou tfoia. dKha ^oi^rwa.). Aristotle himself, indeed, 
accords to these apart from perception, only a potential existence ; 
and the Peripatetics in general held them to be, in their language 
not ira6/]rixu>g, formally, subjectively, but evsgyrinxug, virtually, 
eminently, in the external object. Locke has thus no title what- 
ever to the honor generally accorded to him of first promulgating 
the observation, that the secondary qualities, as in the object, arc 
not so much qualities as powers. This observation was, however, 
only borrowed by Locke from the Cartesians. But of this here* 
after. 

In the second place, Aristotle likewise notices the ambiguity 
which arises from languages not always affording different terms 
by which to distinguish the potential from the actual, and the 
objective from the subjective phases, in our perception by the dif- 
ferent senses. Thus, he observes (De Anima, L. iii. c. 1) that, 
' Though the actuality or energy of the object of sense and of the 
sense itself be one and indivisible, the nature, the essence, of the 
energy is, however, not the same in each ; as, for example, sound 
in energy, and hearing in energy. For it may happen, that what 
has the power of hearing does not now hear, and that what has 
the poAver of sounding does not always sound. But when what 
has the faculty of hearing, on the one hand, operates, and what 



dialectically admits — ' that what sees color is, in a certain sort, itself colored ;' 
— is this more than a qualified statement of what modern philosophers have 
bo often, far less guardedly, asserted — that color is not to he considered 
merely as an attribute of body, since, in a certain respect, it is an affection of 
mind? And when he immediately subjoins the reason — 'for each organ of 
sense is receptive of its appropriate object,' or, as he elsewhere expresses it, 
' receptive of the form without the matter ;' what is this but to say- — that our 
organs of sense stand in relation to certain qualities of body, and that each 
organ is susceptible of an affection from its appropriate quality ; such qual- 
ity, however, not being received by the sense in a material efllux from the 
object, as was held by Democritus and many previous philosophers? Yet 
this is the principal text on which the common doctrine of Intentional Spe- 
cies is attributed to Aristotle. 



312 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

has the faculty of sounding, on the other, sounds, then the actual 
hearing and the actual sounding take place conjunctly ; and of 
these the one may be called Audition, the other Sanation ; — the 
subjective term, hearing, and the objective term, sound, as he 
afterwards states, being twofold in meaning, each denoting ambig- 
uously both the actual and the potential. — ' The same analogy,' 
he adds, ' holds good in regard to the other senses and their re- 
spective objects. For as affection and passion are realized in the 
patient, and not in the efficient, so the energy of the object of 
sense (a;V$r,<rov), and the energy of the faculty of sense (ajtf^rixov) 
are both in the latter ; — but whilst in certain of the senses they 
have obtained distinct names, (as Sonation and Audition), in the 
rest, the one or the other is left anonymous. For Vision denotes 
the energy of the visual faculty, whereas the energy of color, its 
object, is without a name ; and while Gustation expresses the act 
of what is able to taste, the act* of that capable of being tasted 
is nameless. But seeing that of the object, and of the faculty, of 
sense the energy is one and the same, though their nature be dif- 
ferent, it is necessary, that hearing and sound, as actual (and the 
same is the case in the other senses), should subsist and perish 
together ; whereas this is not necessary, in so far as these are con- 
sidered as potentially existing.' 

He then goes on to rectify, in its statement, the doctrine of the 
older physical philosophers ; in whom Philoponus (or Ammonius) 
contemplates Protagoras and his followers, but Simplicius, on bet- 
ter grounds, the Democriteans. ' But the earlier speculators on 
nature were not correct in saying, that there is nothing white or 



* In English, and in most other languages, there are not distinct words 
to express as well the objective as the subjective, coefficient in the senses, 
more particularly of Tasting and Smelling ; and we are therefore obliged 
ambiguously to apply the terms taste and smell (which are rather subjective 
in signification) in an objective sense, and the terras savor, flavor, &e. (which 
have perhaps now more of an objective meaning), in a subjective significa- 
tion. In reference to the sense of touch, the same word is often equivocally 
used to denote, objectively, a primary quality, and subjectively, a secondary. 
As hardness, roughness, &c. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 313 

black, apart from sight, and nothing sapid apart from taste. This 
doctrine is, in certain respects, right, in certain respects, wrong. 
For sense and the object of sense having each a two-fold significa- 
tion, inasmuch as they may severally mean either what is poten- 
tially, or what is actually, existent ; in the latter case, what is 
here asserted, takes place, but not so in the former. These spec- 
ulators were therefore at fault, in stating absolutely what is only 
true under conditions.' (De Anima, hi. c. 1.) 

This criticism, it is evident, so far from involving a rej ection of 
the distinction taken by Leucippus and Democritus, is only an 
accommodation of it to the form of his own philosophy ; in 
which the distinction of the Potential and Actual obtain as 
great, perhaps an exaggerated importance. And it is sufficiently 
manifest that the older philosophers exclusively contemplated the 
latter. 

But, in the third place, not only did Aristotle clearly establish 
the difference between qualities considered absolutely, as in the 
existing object, and qualities considered relatively, as in the sen- 
tient subject ; and not only did he signalize the ambiguity which 
arises from the poverty of language, employing only a single 
word to denote these indifferently : — he likewise anticipated Des- 
cartes, Locke, and other modern philosophers, in establishing, and 
marking out by appropriate terms, a distinction precisely analo- 
gous with that taken by them of the Primary and Secondary 
Qualities of Matter. The Aristotelic distinction which, in its re- 
lation to the other, has been wholly overlooked, is found in the 
discrimination of the Common and Proper Percepts, Sensibles, or 
objects of Sense (aiV^ra xoiva xai 'ifiict). It is given in the two 
principal psychological treatises of the philosopher ; and to the 
following purport. 

Aristotle (De Anima, L. ii. c. 2, L. iii. c. 1, and De Sensu et 
Sensili, c. 1) enumerates five percepts common to all or to a plu- 
rality of the senses, — viz, Magnitude (Extension), Figure, Motion, 
Rest, Number. To these in one place (De Anima, iii. 1) he adds 
Unity ; and in another (De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4), he states, as 



314 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTTON. 

common, at least to sight and touch, besides Magnitude and 
Figure, the Rough and the Smooth, the Acute and the Obtuse. 
Unity however he comprises under Number ; and the Rough and 
Smooth, the Acute and Obtuse, under Figure. Nay, of the five 
common sensibles or percepts, he gives us (De Anima, iii. 1) a 
further reduction, resolving Figure into Magnitude ; while both 
of these, he says, as well as Rest and Number, are known through 
Motion ; which last, as he frequently repeats, necessarily involves 
the notion of Time ; for motion exists only as in Time. (Com- 
pare Phys. Ausc. L. iv. passim.) His words are — ' All these we 
perceive by Motion.* Thus Magnitude (Extension) is apprehended 
by motion, wherefore also Figure, for figure is a kind of magni- 
tude ; what is at Rest by not being moved ; Number, by a nega- 
tion of the continuous,! even in the sensations proper to the sev- 



* This doctrine of Aristotle is rejected by Thcophrastus, as we learn from 
the fragments concerning Sense preserved in the rare and neglected treatise 
of Priscianus Lydus, p. 285. Many modern philosophers when they 
attempted to explain the origin of our notion of extension from motion, and, 
in particular, the motion of the hand, were not aware that they had the 
Stagirite at their head. It is to be remembered, however, that Aristotle 
does not attempt, like them, to explain by motion our necessary concept of 
space, but merely our contingent perception of the relative extension of this 
or that particular object. 

This, however, takes it for granted, that by motion (kivvcis), Aristotle 
intends local motion. But motion is with him a generic term, comprising 
four, or six species ; and, in point of fact, by motion Aristotle may here, as 
in many, if not most, other places of his psychological writings, mean a sub- 
jective mutation (dAAoiWij) or modification of the percipient. This, too, is 
the interpretation given to the passage by the great majority, if not the 
whole of the ancient expositors — by Plutarchus of Athens, Ammonias or 
Philoponus, Simplicius, and Priscianus Lydus ; Themistius alone is silent. 
I say nothing of the sequacious cloud of modern commentators. It is there- 
fore remarkable that Dr. Trendelenburg, in his late valuable edition of the 
De Anima, should have apparently contemplated the interpretation by local 
motion, as the only one proposed or possible. This may, however, adduce 
in its favor the authority of Theophrastus, among the ancients — among the 
moderns, of the subtle Scaliger. From both interpretations, however, a 
defensible meaning can be elicited. 

t This explicitly shows that by Number, Aristotle means only the neces- 
sary attribution of either unity or plurality to the object of sense. Divisibil- 
ity (in extension, intension, pretension) is thus contained unjer Num- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 315 

eral senses, for each of these is itself percipient of what is one.' — 
This attempt at simplification was followed out by his disciples. 
Thus St. Thomas (Summa Theologian, P. i. Qu. 78, art. 3), in 
showing that the common sensibles do not primarily, and of them- 
selves, act upon and affect the sense, carries them all up into 
modifications of Quantity (Quantitatis) ; — and in another book 
(De Sensu et Sensibili, Lect. ii.) by a variation of the expression 
(for in both cases he contemplates only the Extended) into species 
of the Continuous. To quote the latter : — ' Sensibilia communia 
omnia pertinent aliquo modo ad Continuum ; vel secundum men- 
suram ejus, ut Magnitudo ; vel secundum divisionem, ut Nu- 
merus ; vel secundum terminationem, ut Figura ; vel secundum 
clistantiam et propinquitatem, ut Motus? 

Aristotle indeed (De Anima, L. ii. c. 6) virtually admits, that 
the common are abusively termed sensibles at all : for he says, 
'the proper alone are accurately, or pre-eminently, objects of 
sense' (<r<x 'iShx, xvgiug ldr\ ai<i&r\<ra) ; and the same seems also to 
be involved in his doctrine, that the common percepts (which in 
one place he even says are only apprehended per accidens) 
are, in fact, within the domain of sense, merely as being the 
concomitants or consequents (axoXou^ouvra, erfopeva) of the 
proper.* (Ibid. L. iii. cc. 1, 4.) See also Alexander on the Soul. 
(A. ff. 130 b, 134 a b— B. ff. 152, 153, ed. Aid.) 



ber. Number in the abstract is, of course, a merely intellectual concept, as 
Aristotle once and again notices. See PMloponus on 63 text of second 
book De Anima, Sign. i. 8 ed. Trine. 1535. Of this again under Locke, No. 
19 ; and Royer-Collard, No. 25. 
* I have already noticed that Hutcheson, 1 in saying that ' Extension, Fig- 



1 ' It is not easy,' says Hutcheson, ' to divide distinctly our several sensations into 
classes. The division of our External Senses into the five common classes, seems very 
imperfect. Some sensations, received without any previous idea, can cither be reduced 
to none of them — such as the sensations of Hunger, Thirst, Weariness, Sickness ; or if 
we reduce them to the sense of Feeling, they are perceptions as different from the other 
ideas of Touch — such as Cold, Heat, Hardness, Softness — as the ideas of taste or smell. 
Others have hinted at an external sense, different from all these. 1 [This allusion has 
puzzled the Scottish psychologists. Hutcheson evidently refers to the sixth sense, or 
sense of venereal titillation, proposed by the elder Scaliger, and approved of by Bacon, 
Buffon, Voltaire, &c] 'The following general account may possibly be useful. (I )—- 



316 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

The more modern Schoolmen (followed sometimes unwittingly 
by very recent philosophers) have indeed contended, that on the 
principles of Aristotle the several common sensibles are in reality 
apprehended by other and higher energies than those of sense. 
Their argument is as follows : — Motion cannot be perceived with- 

ure, Motion, and Best, seem to be more properly ideas accompanying the 
sensations of Sight and Touch than the sensations of either of these senses' 
cnly, mediately or immediately, repeats Aristotle ; to whom is therefore due 
all the praise which has been lavished on the originality and importance of 
the observation. [I might have added, however, that Hutcheson does not 
claim it as his own. 1 For in his System of Moral Philosophy (which is to be 



That certain motions raised in our bodies are, by a general law, constituted the occasion 
of perceptions in the mind. (2°) These perceptions never come entirely alone, but 
have some other perception joined with them. Tims every sensation is accompanied 
with the idea of Duration, and yet duration is not a sensible idea, since it also 
accompanies ideas of internal consciousness or reflection : so the idea of Number 
may accompany any sensible ideas, and yet may also accompany any other ideas, as 
well as external sensations. Brutes, when several objects are before them, have probably 
all the proper ideas of sight which we have, without the idea of number. (3°) Some 
ideas are found accompjanying the most different sensations, which yet are not to be 
perceived separately from some sensible quality. Such are Extension, Figure, Motion 
and Rest, which accompany the ideas of Sight or Colors, and yet may be perceived 
without them, as in the ideas of Touch, at least if we move our organs along the parts 
of the body touched. Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, seem therefore to be more 
properly called ideas accompanying the sensations of Sight and Touch, titan the 
sensations of either of these senses; since they can be received sometimes without the 
ideas of Color, and sometimes without those of Touching, though never without the one 
or the other. The perceptions which are purely sensible, received each by its proper 
sense, are Tastes, Smells, Colors, Sound, Cold, Heat, &c. The universal concomitant 
ideas which may attend any idea whatsoever, are Duration and Number. The ideas 
which accompany the most different sensations, are Extension, Figure, Motion, and Eest. 
These all arise without any previous ideas assembled or compared — the concomitant 
ideas are reputed images of something externaVSect. I., Art. 1. The reader may, 
likewise consult the same author's ' Synopsis Metaphysicas,' Part II., cap. i., § 3. — W. 

1 Hamilton says, refering to the passage from Hutcheson: 'But here I may observe, 
in the first place, that the statement made in the preceding quotation (and still more 
articulately in the "Synopsis"), that Duration or Time is the inseparable concomitant 
both of sense and reflection, had been also made by Aristotle and many other philoso- 
phers; and it is indeed curious how long philosophers were on the verge of enunciating 
the great doctrine first proclaimed by Kant— that Time is a fundamental condition, 
form, or category of thought. In the second place, I may notice that Hutcheson is not 
entitled to the praise accorded him by Stewart and Eoyer-Collard for his originality in 
" the fine and important observation that Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest, are 
rather ideas accompanying the perceptions of touch and vision, than perceptions of these 
senses, properly so called." In this, he seems only to have, with others, repeated Aris- 
totle, who, in his treatise on the Soul (Book II., Ch. 6, Text 64, and Book III., Ch. 1, 
Text 135), calls Motion and Rest, Magnitude (Extension), Figure, and Number 
(Hutcheson's very list), the common concomitants (aKo\oudnvra icai koivo) of sight and 
touch, and expressly denies them to be impressions of sense — the sense having no passive 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 317 

out the collation of past and present time, without acts of mem- 
ory and comparison. Rest, says Aristotle, is known as a priva- 
tion, but sense is only of the positive; let it, however, be consid- 
ed as a state, and as opposed to motion, still this supposes com- 
parison. Number in like manner as a negation, a negation of 
the continuous, is beyond the domain of sense ; and while Aris- 
totle in one treatise (Phys. iv. 14) attributes the faculty of nu- 
meration to intelligence ; in another (Problem, sect. 30, §5, if 
this work be his), he virtually denies it to sense, in denying it to 
the brutes. Magnitude (extension), if considered as comparative, 
is likewise manifestly beyond the province of mere sense ; Aris- 
totle, indeed, admits that its apprehension, in general, presup- 
poses Motion. Finally, Figure, as the cognition of extension 
terminated in a certain manner, still more manifestly involves an 
act of comparison. [Scaliger, De Subtilitate, Ex. lxvi. and 
ccxcviii. § 15. — Toletus, in lib. de Anima, L. ii. c. 6. — Conim- 
bricences, ibid. — Irenceus, De An. p. 40. — Compare Gassendi, 
Phys. Sect. iii. Memb. Post. L. vi. c. 2. — Du Samel, Philos. Ve- 
tus et Nova, Phys. P. iii. c. 4. — and Roger- Collar d, in (Euvres 
de Eeid, t. iii. p. 428 sq. — to be quoted in the sequel, No. 25.) 



annexed to the other references) he speaks of ' what some call the Concomi- 
tant ideas of Sensation.' (B. i. c. 1, p. 6)]. Dr. Price extols it as 'a very 
just observation of Hutcheson.' (Eev. p. 56, ed. 1.) Mr. Stewart calls it 'a 
remark of singular acuteness' — ' a very ingenious and original remark' — and 
1 a sentence which, considering the period at which the author (Hutcheson) 
wrote, reflects the highest honor on his metaphysical acuteness.' (Essays 
pp. SI, 46, 551, 4° ed.) M. Boyer-Collard says — 'Hutcheson est le premier 
des philosophes modernes qui ait fait cette observation aussi fine que juste 
que,' &c. ((Euvres de Eeid, t. iii. p. 431.) 

I may here observe that Philippson ("YAj; avOpumvt;, p. 335) is misled by an 
ambiguous expression of Aristotle in stating that he assigned the common 
sensibles as objects to the Common, Sense. See the Commentaries of Philopo- 
nus and Simplicius on the 134 common text of third book De Anima. But 
compare also Alexander, in his treatise on the Soul, first Book, in the chap- 
ter on the Common Sense, f. 134, ed. Aid. 



»ffection from these qualities. To these five common concomitants, some of the school- 
men added also (but out of Aristotle), Place, Distance, Position, and Continuity.' 1 — 
Eeid, p. 124.— W. 



318 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

The common sensibles thus came, in fact, to be considered, bj 
many of the acutest Aristotelians, as not so much perceptions of 
sense (in so far as sensible perception depends on corporeal affec- 
tion) as concomitant cognitions to which the impression on the 
organ by the proper sensible only afforded the occasion. ' Sensi- 
bile Commune dicitur (says Compton Carleton) quod vel percipi- 
tur pluribus sensibus, vel ad quod cognoscendum, ab intellectu 
vel imaginatione desumitur occasio ex variis sensibus ; ut sunt 
Figura, Motus, Ubicatio, Duratio, Magnitudo, Distantia, hume- 
rus,' &c. (Philosophia Universa, De Anima Disp. xvi. Sect. 2, 

§i'0 

But before leaving Aristotle, I should state, that he himself 
clearly contemplated, in his distinction of Common and Proper 
Sensibles, a classification correspondent to that of the Primary 
and Secondary Qualities of bodies, as established by the ancient 
Atomists. This is expressly shown in a passage wherein he 
notices that ' Democritus, among others, reduced the proper sen- 
sibles to the common, in explaining, for example, the differences of 
color by differences of roughness and smoothness in bodies, and 
the varieties of savor by a variety in the configuration of atoms.' 
(De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4.) 

Of a division by Aristotle, in a physical point of view, of the 
Qualities of body into Primary and Secondary, I shall speak in 
the sequel, when considering this nomenclature, as adopted, and 
■transferred to the psychological point of view, by Locke, No. 19. 

V. — Galen, whose works are now hardly more deserving of 
study by the physician than by the philosopher, affords me' some 
scattered observations which merit notice, not merely in reference 
to the present subject. Sensitive perception, he well observes, 
consists not in the passive affection of the organ, but in the dis- 
criminative recognition — the dijudication of that affection by the 
active mind. "Etfri §s uitf&rjcfig oux aXkoiutfig, dXka ^locyvwtfi? 
aXXoiudsug. This function of diagnostic apprehension he accords 
to the dominant principle (to ^ys.uovixo'v) that is, the imaginative, 
recollective, and ratiocinative mind. (De Placit. Hipp, et Plat. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 319 

L. vii. cc. 14, 16, 17:)* — Again: — 'The objects in propriety 
called Sensible, are such as require for tbeir discriminative recog- 
nition no other faculty but that of sensitive perception itself: 
whereas those objects are improperly called sensible, "whose rec- 
ognition, besides a plurality of the senses, involves memory and 
what is called the compositive and collective (generalizing) rea 
son. [I read tfuvdsnjcS and xspaXaiwnxw.] Thus Color is an 
object proper of sense, and Savor and Odor and Sound ; so like- 
wise are Hardness and Softness, Heat and Cold, and, in a word, 
all the Tactile qualities.' Then, after stating that no concrete 
object of sense — an apple for instance — is fully cognizable by 
sense alone, but, as Plato has it, by opinion with the aid of 
sense ; and having well shown how this frequently becomes a 
source of illusion, — in all which he is closely followed by Neme- 
sius, — he goes on : — ' But to carry sense into effect in all its 
various applications, is impossible without the co-operation of 
memory and connumeration (tfuva£i'$|X7)tf<£), and this, which like- 
wise obtains the name of summation (tfuyxspaXcuWiir, conceiving, 
thinking under a class), is an act neither of sense nor of memory, 
but of the discursive or dianoetic faculty of thought. (Com. i. in 
Hipp. Lib. De Medici Officina, text. 3.) — In another work we 
have the same doctrine applied to solve the question — By what 
faculty is Motion apprehended ? and it affords the result, — ' That 
all motion is manifestly recognized, not by a mere act of sensi- 
tive perception, not even by sense with the aid of memory, but 
principally by a compositive act of thought' (jfuXXoyKfjxCi). This 
is a fourth synonym for the three other convertible terms which 
occur in the previous passage. They are Platonic. (De Digno- 
scendis Pulsibus, L. iii. c. 1.) 

8. — A remarkable but neglected passage relative to the pres- 
ent subject is to be found in the Saggiatore of Galileo, a work 
first published in 1623. Mamiani della Eovere is the only phi- 

* The annotators of Nemesius have not observed that this philosopher is 
indebted to Galen, really and verbally, for the whole of his remarkable doc- 
trine of sense. See his treatise De Nat. Horn. c. 6-11, ed. Matthiae. 



320 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

losopher, as far as I am aware, who lias ever alluded to it. Gali- 
leo there precedes Descartes in the distinction, and anticipates 
Locke in its nomenclature. The following is an abstract of his 
doctrine, which coincides with that of the ancient Atomists, in 
some respects, and with that of Kant, in others. 

In conceiving matter or corporeal substance we cannot but 
think that it is somehow terminated, and therefore of such and 
such a figure ; that in relation to other bodies it is large or small ; 
that it exists in this or that place ; in this or that time ; that it 
is in motion or at rest ; that it does or does not touch another 
body ; that it is single or composed of parts ; and these parts 
either few or many. These are conditions from which the mind 
cannot in thought emancipate the object. But that it is white or 
red, bitter or sweet, sonorous or noiseless, of a grateful or ungrateful 
odor ; — with such conditions there is no necessity for conceiving 
it accompanied.* Hence Tastes, Odors, Colors, &c, considered 
as qualities inherent in external objects, are merely names ; they 
reside exclusively in the sentient subject. Annihilate the animal 
percipient of such qualities, and you annihilate such qualities 
themselves ; and it is only because we have bestowed on them 
particular names different from those by which we designate the 
other primary and real affections of matter (primi e reali acci- 
denti), that Ave are disposed to believe that the former are in 
objects truly and really different from the latter. 

Having illustrated this doctrine at considerable length in rela- 
tion to the senses of Touch, Taste, Smell, and Hearing ; and, in 
imitation of Aristotle, shown the analogy which these severally 
hold to the elements of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air, he adds : — 
' Ma che ne' corpi esterni per eccitare in noi i sapori, gli odori, e i 

* But, as Aristotle has observed, we cannot imagine body without all color, 
though we can imagine it without any one. In like manner where the qual- 
ities are mutual contradictories, we cannot positively represent to ourselves 
an object without a determination by one or other of these opposites. Thus 
we cannot conceive a body which is not either sapid or tasteless, either sono- 
rous or noiseless, and so forth. This observation applies likewise to the first 
class. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 321 

suoni, si richiegga altro, que grandezze, figure, moltitudini, e mo- 
virnenti tardi o veloci, io non lo credo. Io stimo, die tolti via gli 
orecchi, le lingue, e i nasi, restino bene le figure, i numeri, e i 
moti, ma non gia gli odori, ne i sapori, ne i suoni, li quali fuor 
dell' animal vivente, non credo che sieno altro che nomi, come 
appunto altro che nome non e il solletico, e la titillazione, rimosse 
1' ascelle,e la pelle in torno al naso ; e come a i quattro sensi con- 
siderati lianno relazione i quattro elementi, cosi credo, che per la 
vista, senso sopra tutti- gli altri eminentissimo, abbia relazione la 
luce, ma non quella proporzione d' eccellenza, qual' e tra '1 finito, 
e 1' infinite, tra '1 temporaneo, e 1' instantaneo, tra '1 quanto, e 
1' indivisible, tra la luce, e le tenebre.' 

He then applies this doctrine to the case of Heat, and says, — 
' Ma che oltre alia figura, moltitudine, moto, penetrazione, e toc- 
camento, sia nel fuoco altra qualita, e che questa sia caldo, io non 
lo credo altrimenti, e stimo, che questo sia talmente nostro, che 
rimosso il corpo animato, e sensitivo, il calore non resti altro che 
un semplice vocabolo.' (Opere, t. ii. p. 340 sq. ed. Padov. 1744.) 

9. — Descartes is always adduced as the philosopher by whom 
the distinction in question was principally developed ; and by 
whom, if not first established, it was, at least in modern times, 
first restored. In truth, however, Descartes originated nothing. 
He left the distinction as he found it. His only merit is that of 
signalizing more emphatically than had previously been done, the 
different character of the knowledge we are conscious of in refer- 
ence to the two contrasted classes ; although this difference is not, 
as he thinks, to be explained by a mere gradation in the clearness 
of our perceptions. But neither of the one nor of the other is his 
enumeration of the contents exhaustive ; nor did he bestow dis- 
tinctive appellations on the counter classes themselves. — His ' Me- 
ditationes' were first published in 1641, his 'Principia' in 1644; 
and in these works his doctrine upon this matter is contained. 

In the latter, he observes — ' Nos longe alio modo cognoscere 
quidnam sit in viso corpore Magnitudo, vel Figura, vel Motus 
(saltern iocalis, philosophi enim alios quosdam motus a locali 
20 



322 PHILOSOPHY OP PERCEPTION. 

diversos affingendo, naturam ejus sibi minus intelligibilem reddi. 
derunt), vel Situs, vel Duratio, vel Numerus, et similia, quae in 
corporibus clare percipi jam dictum est; quam quid in eodem cor- 
pore sit Color, vel Dolor, vel Odor, vel Sapor, vel quid aliud ex 
iis, quae ad sensus dixi esse referenda. Quamvis enim videntes 
aliquod corpus, non magis certi simus illud existere, quatenus ap- 
paret figuratum, quam quatenus apparet coloratum ; longe tamen 
evidentius agnoscimus, quid sit in eo esse figuratum, quam quid 
sit esse coloratum.' (Princ. i. § 69.) 

Of tbe former class we find enumerated by a collation of differ- 
ent passages, Magnitude (or Extension in length, breadth, and 
thickness), Figure, Locomotion, Position, Duration, Number, Sub- 
stance, and the like ; — all (with the exception of Substance, which 
is erroneously and only once enumerated) corresponding with the 
Common Sensibles of the Peripatetics. Of the latter class, he 
instances Colors, Sounds, Odors, Savors, the Tactile qualities* in 
general, specially enumerating, as examples, Heat, Cold, Pain, 
Titillation, and (N. B.) Hardness, Weight ; — all conformable to 
the Proper Sensibles of Aristotle. — In the one class we have an 
idea of the property, such as it exists, or may exist (' ut sunt, aut 
saltern esse possunt'), in the external body ; in the other, we have 
only an obscure and confused conception of a something in that 
body which occasions the sensation of which we are distinctly 
conscious in ourselves, but which sensation does not represent to 
us aught external — does not afford us a real knowledge of any 
thing beyond the states of the percipient mind itself. (Princ. P. 
i. §§ 70, 71, P. iv. §§ 191, 197, 199.— Medit. iii. p. 22, vi. pp. 
43, 47, 48.— Resp. ad. Med. vi. p. 194, ed. 1658.) Of these 
two classes, the attributes included under the latter, in so far as 



* I am not aware that Descartes, anywhere, gives a full and formal list ol 
the Tactile qualities. In his treatise De Homine, under the special doctrine 
of Touch (§§ 29, 30) we have Pain, Titillation, Smoothness, Eoughness, Heat, 
Cold, Humidity, Dryness, Weight, ' and ilie like." 1 He probably acquiesced 
in the Aristotelic list, the one in general acceptation, — viz., the Hot and Cold, 
Dry and Moist, Heavy and Light, Hard and Soft, Viscid and Friable, Bough 
and Smooth, Thick and Thin. De Gen. et Corr. ii. 2. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 323 

they are considered as residing in the objects themselves of our 
sensations, Descartes, like Democritus and Galileo, held to be only 
modifications of those contained under the former. ' Exceptis 
Magnitudine, Figura et Motu, quae qualia sint in unoquoque cor- 
pore explicui, nihil extra nos positum sentitur nisi Lumen, Color, 
Odor, Sapor, Sonus, et Tactiles qualitates ; quae nihil aliud esse in 
objectis, quam dispositiones quasdam in Magnitudine, Figura et 
Motu consistentes, hactenus est demonstratum. (Princ. P. iv. 
§ 199. — Med. Resp. vi. p. 194.) This distinction, by their mas- 
ter, of the two classes of quality, was, as we shall see, associated 
by the Cartesians with another, taken by themselves, — between 
Idea and Sensation. 

I have previously shown, that Aristotle expressly recognizes the 
coincidence of his own distinction of the proper and common sen- 
sibles with the Democritean distinction of the apparent and real 
properties of body. I have now to state that Descartes was also 
manifestly aware of the conformity of his distinction with those 
of Aristotle and Democritus. Sufficient evidence, I think, will be 
found — of the former, in the Principia, P. iv. § 200, and De Ho- 
mine, § 42; — of the latter, in the Principia, P. iv. § 200- 
203. All this enhances the marvel, that the identity of these 
famous classifications should have hitherto been entirely over- 
looked. 

10.— The doctrine of Derodon — an acute and independent 
thinker, who died in 1664 — coincides with that of Aristotle and 
his genuine school ; it is very distinctly and correctly expressed. 
Sensible qualities, he says, may be considered in two aspects ; as 
they are in the sensible object, and as they are in the sentient ani- 
mal. As in the latter, they exist actually and formally, consti- 
tuting certain affections agreeable or disagreeable, in a word, sen- 
sations of such or such a character. The feeling of Heat is an 
example. As in the former, they exist only virtually or poten- 
tially ; for, correctly speaking, the fire does not contain heat, and 
is, therefore, not hot, but only capable of heating. ' Ignis itaque, 
proprie loquendo, non habere calorem, atque adeo non esse calidum 



324 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

sed calorificum ;* nisi vocabalum caloris suraatur pro virtute pro- 
ducendi calorem in animali. Sed philosophi (he refers to the scho- 
lastic Aristotelians with their substantial Forms, and Intention- 
al Species, though among them were exceptions) — sed philosophi 
sunt prorsus inexcusabiles, qui volunt calorem, sumptum pro vir- 
tute calefaciendi, quae est in igne, aut potius identificatur cum ipso 
igne, et calorem productum in animali, esse ejusdem speciei, na- 
ture et essentia ; nam calor moderatus productus in animali con- 
sistit in aliqua passione et quasi titillatione grata quae sentitur ab 
animali, quae passio non potest esse in igne.' And so forth in re- 
gard to the other senses. (Philos. Contr. Phys., p. 190.) 

11. — I may adduce to the same purport Glanville, who, in his 
'Vanity of Dogmatizing' (1661, p. 88 sq.), and in his 'Scepsis 
Scientifica' (1665, p. 65 sq.), though a professed, and not over- 
scrupulous antagonist of Aristotle, acknowledges, in reference to 
the present question, that ' the Peripatetic philosophy teaches us, 
that Heat is not in the body of the sun, as formally considered, 
but only virtually, and as in its cause? I do not know whether 
Glanville had Aquinas specially in view ; but the same general 
statement and particular example are to be found in the Summa 
contra Gentes, L. i. cc. 29, 31, of the Angelic Doctor. 

12. — It is remarkable that Mr. Boyle's speculations in regard 
to the classification of corporeal Qualities should have been wholly 
overlooked in reference to the present subject ; and this not only 
on account of their intrinsic importance, but because they proba- 
bly suggested to Locke the nomenclature which he has adopted, 
but, in adopting, has deformed. 

In his treatise entitled ' The origin of Forms and Qualities,' 
published at Oxford in 1666, Boyle denominates ' Matter and Mo- 
tion' ' the most Catholic Principles of bodies.' (P. 8.) ' Magni- 
tude (Size, Bulk, or Bigness), Shape (Figure), Motion or Rest,' to 



* The chemists have called Caloric what they ought to have called Calo- 
rific. The Lavoiserian nomenclature, whatever it merits in other respects, 
is a system of philological monstrosities, in which it is fortunate when the 
analogies of language are only violated, and not reversed. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 325 

which he afterwards adds ' Texture,' he styles ' the Primitive 
Moods or Primary Affections of bodies, to distinguish them from 
those less simple Qualities (as Colors, Tastes, Odors, and the like) 
that belong to bodies upon their account' (p. 10). The former 
of these, he likewise designates ' the Primitive or more Catholic 
Affections of Matter 1 (pp. 43, 44) ; and in another work (Tracts 
1671, p. 18), Hhe Primary and most Simple Affections of Mat- 
ter! 1 To the latter he gives the name of ' Secondary Qualities, 
if (he says) I may so call them' (p. 44). 

In reference to the difficulty, ' That whereas we explicate colors, 
odors, and the like sensible qualities, by a relation to our senses, 
it seems evident that they have an absolute being irrelative to us ; 
for snow (for instance) would be white, and a glowing coal would 
be hot, though there were no man or any other animal in the 
world' (p. 42). And again (p. 49) : — ' So if there were no sen- 
sitive Beings, those bodies that are now the objects of our senses, 
would be so dispositively, if I may so speak, endowed with Colors, 
Tastes, and the like, but actually only with those more catholic 
affections of bodies, Figure, Motion, Texture, &c.' Is this intend- 
ed for an Aristotelic qualification of the Democritean paradox of 
Galileo ? 

In his Tracts, published at Oxford, 1671 — in that entitled ' His- 
tory of particular Qualities,' he says : — ' I shall not inquire into 
the several significations of the word Quality, which is used in 
such various senses, as to make it ambiguous enough. But thus 
much I think it not amiss to intimate, that there are some things 
that have been looked upon as Qualities, which ought rather to 
be looked on as States of Matter or complexions of particular 
Qualities ; as animal, manimal, <fec, Health, Beauty. And there 
are some other attributes — namely, Size, Shape, Motion, Rest, that 
are wont to be reckoned among Qualities, which may more con- 
veniently be esteemed the Primary Modes of the parts of Matter, 
since from these Simple Attributes or Primordial Affections, all 
the Qualities are derived' (p. 3). This is accurate ; and it is to 
be regretted that Locke did not profit by the caution. 



326 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

13. — De la Forge, whose able treatise ' De l'Esprit de l'Homme 
was first published in 1666, contributes little of importance to the 
observation of Descartes, of whose psychology he there exhibits a 
systematic view. To the ideas of the primary attributes, enumer- 
ated by Descartes, he inconsistently adds those of Solidity and 
Fluidity ; and among the secondary he mentions the sensations of 
the Dry and the Humid (ch. 10). In showing that our sensations 
of the secondary qualities afford us no knowledge of what these 
are, as in the external object ; and in explanation of the theories 
of Aristotle and Descartes, he says : — ' Mais sans examiner ici le- 
quel a le mieux rencontre, je ne pense pas qu'aucun des sectateurs 
de l'un ni de l'autre fassent difficulte, d'avoiier que le Sentiment 
qu'excitent en lui les corps chauds ou froids, et VIcUe qu'il en a ne 
lui represente rien de tout cela.' He thus correctly places the 
Aristotelians and Cartesians on a level, in admitting that both 
equally confess our ignorance of what the secondary qualities are 
in themselves, — an ignorance which is commonly regarded as a 
notable discovery of Descartes alone. 

14. — Geulinx, a Cartesian not less distinguished than De la 
Forge, and who with him first explicitly proclaimed the doctrine 
of Occasional Causes, died in 1669 ; but his ' Annotata' and ' Dic- 
tata' on the 'Principia' of Descartes were only published in 1690 
and 1691. In these works, like most other Cartesians, he uses 
the term Idea, in reference to body, exclusively to denote the rep- 
resentations of its primary qualities ; but he adopts the scholas- 
tic term Species, instead of Sensatio (sensation, sentiment) as em- 
ployed by them, to express our consciousness of the secondary. — 
(Sjyecies, De la Forge had made a better use of, in relieving an 
ambiguity in the philosophical language of Descartes, who had 
sometimes abusively usurped the word idea for the organic mo- 
tion in the brain, to which the idea proper — the intellectual repre- 
sentation in the mind itself, was by the law of union attached.) 
Geulinx is the Cartesian who, from the occasional paradox of his 
expression, has afforded the most valid foundation for the charge 
so frequently, but so erroneously, preferred against the sect, of 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION, 327 

denying all objective reality to the secondary qualities of 
matter. 

15. — Rohattlt, another illustrious Cartesian, whose 'Physique' 
was first published in 1671 (and which continued until about the 
middle of last century to be a College text-book of philosophy in 
the University of Newton), may be adduced in disproof of this 
accusation — an accusation which will be further refuted in the se- 
quel by the testimonies of Malebranche and Sylvain Eegis. — 
Speaking of Heat and Cold, he says, — ' Ces deux mots ont chacun 
deux significations. Car, premierement, par la Chaleur et par la 
Froideur on entend deux sentimens particuliers qui sont en nous, 
et qui resemblent en quelque facon a ceux qu'on nomme douleur 
et chatouillement, tels que les sentimens qu'on a quand on ap- 
proche du feu, ou quand on touche de la glace. Secondement, 
par la Chaleur et par la Froideur on entend le pouvoir que cer- 
tains corps ont de causer en nous ces deux sentimens dont je viens 
de parler.' He employs likewise the same distinction in treating 
of Savors (ch. 24)— of Odors (ch. 25)— of Sound (ch. 26)— of 
Light and Colors (ch. 27). 

16. — Duhamel. — I quote the following passage without the 
comment, which some of its statements might invite, from the 
treatise ' De Corpora Animate,' 1673, of this learned and ingeni- 
ous philosopher. It contains the most explicit (though still a 
very inadequate) recognition of the merits of Aristotle, in refer- 
ence to our present subject, with which I am acquainted. — ' Quo- 
circa, ut id, quod sentio, paucis aperiam. Corpus omne sensibile 
vim habet in se, qua sensum moveat ; sed forma ipsa, qua perci- 
pimus, vel est motus, vel effluvium, vel quidam substantise modus, 
quem possumus qualitatem appellare. Nee sensibile solius quali- 
tatis prasdicamento continetur, sed per omnia fere vagatur genera. 
Corporum enim Figurse, Dimensiones, Motus, et varise Positiones 
sensum impellunt. Itaque Humor Siccitas, Durities, Figura, at- 
que alii modi, tales sunt, quales a nobis percipiuntur. Eotunditas 
enim circuli, vel terras siccitas a sensuum cognitione non pendet. 
Idem fortassis erit de Colore, Luce, atque aliis activis qualitatibus 



328 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

judicium. Sonus vero nihil est quain percussio oigani ex motionc 
aeris, aut conflictu corporuni orta. Sapor item et Odor positi 
sunt in sola sensus impressione. Tolle animalia, riullus erit sapor, 
nullus odor. Quanquam, ut mihi videtur, rem totam optime dis- 
tinguit Aristoteles, cum Patibilem Qualitatem vocat id quod in 
objecto est sensibili, Passionem vero eandem vocat qualitatem, ut a 
nobis per cipitur? (Lib. i. c. 3, § 11.) 

17. — In the following year (1674), was first published the cel- 
ebrated ' Recherche de la Verite' of Malebranche. The admis- 
sions already quoted of his immediate predecessor might have 
guarded him, at least on the point under consideration, from the 
signal injustice of his attack on Aristotle, the philosophers, and 
mankind in general as confounding our subjective sensations with 
the objective qualities of matter ; and it is only by a not unmerit- 
ed retribution, that he likewise has been made the object of a 
counter accusation, equally unfounded, by authorities hardly infe- 
rior to himself. Buffier,* Reid,f Royer-Collard,J and many be- 
sides, reproach Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and others, with 
advancing it, without qualification, as a new and an important 
truth, that the sensible or secondary qualities have no existence in 
external objects, their only existence being as modes of the percipient 
mind. The charge by Malebranche in the following passage, has 
been already annihilated, through what has been previously ad- 
duced ; and the passage itself sufficiently disproves the charge 
against Malebranche. — ' As regards the terms expressive of Sen- 
sible ideas, there is hardly any one who recognizes that they are 
equivocal. On this Aristotle and the ancient philosophers have 
not even bestowed a thought. [!] What I state will be admitted 
by all who will turn to any of their works, and who are distinctly 
cognizant of the reason why these terms are equivocal. For there 
is nothing more evident, than that philosophers have believed on 
this subject quite the contrary of what they ought to have be- 
lieved. [! !] 

* Logique, § 222, Cours, p. 819. t P. 131. 

% (Euvres de Keid, t. iii. pp. 386, 447. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 329 

' F.or example, when the philosophers say that fire is hot, the 
grass green, the sugar sweet, <fcc, they mean, as children and the 
vulgar do, that the fire contains what they feel when they warm 
themselves ; that the grass has on it the colors which they be- 
lieve to be there ; that the sugar contains the sweetness which 
they taste in eating it ; and thus of all the objects of the different 
senses. It is impossible to doubt of it in reading their writings. 
They speak of sensible qualities as of sensations ; they mistake 
motions for heat ; and they thus confound, by reason of the am- 
biguity of these terms, the modes in which bodies with the modes 
in which minds, exist. [! ! !] 

' It is only since the time of Descartes that those confused and 
indeterminate questions whether fire be hot, grass green, sugar 
sweet, &c, have been answered by distinguishing the ambiguity 
of the terms in which they are expressed. If by heat, color, sa- 
vor, you understand such a motion of the insensible parts, then 
fire is hot, grass green, and sugar sweet. But if by heat and 
the other sensible qualities, you mean what I feel when near the 
fire, what I see when I look at the grass, &c, in that case the 
fire is not hot, nor the grass green, &c. ; for the heat I feel and 
the color I see are only in the soul.' (Recherche, liv. vi. P. ii. 
c. 2.) 

Malebranche contributed to a more precise discrimination be- 
tween the objective or primary, and the subjective or secondary 
qualities, by restricting the term Idea to the former, and the term 
Sensation to the latter. For though the other Cartesians soon 
distinguished, more accurately than Descartes himself, Idea from 
Sensation, and coincided with Malebranche, in their application 
of the second ; yet in allowing Ideas of the modes, both of ex- 
tension and of thought, they did not so precisely oppose it to 
sensation as Malebranche, who only allowed ideas of extension and 
its modes. (See Recherche, L. iii. P. ii. cc. 6, 7, and relative 
Eclaircissement). It has not, I believe, been observed that Locke 
and Leibnitz, in their counter-criticisms of Malebranche's theory, 
have both marvellously overlooked this his peculiar distinction, 



330 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

and its bearing on his scheme ; and the former has moreover, 
in consequence of neglecting the Cartesian opposition of Idea and 
Sensation altogether, been guilty of an egregious mutatio elenchi 
in his strictures on the Cartesian doctrine of Extension, as the 
essential attribute of body. (Essay, B. ii. c. 13, § 25.) 

18. — The ' Systeme de Philosophic' of the celebrated Cartesian 
Stlvain Regis appeared in 1690. The following, among other 
passages of a similar import deserve quotation from the precision 
with which the whole ambiguity of the terms expressive of the 
secondary qualities in their subjective and objective relations, is 
explained and rectified. 

' It is evident that savors, taken formally, are nothing else than 
certain sensations (sentimens) or certain perceptions of the soul, 
which are in the soul itself; and that savors, taken for \ho, 'physi- 
cal cause of formal savors, consist in the particles themselves of 
the savory bodies, which according as they differ in size, in figure, 
and in motion, diversely affect the nerves of the tongue, and there- 
by cause the sensation of different savors in the soul in virtue of 
its union with the body.' This doctrine, as the author admits, 
is conformable to that of Aristotle, though not to that of his 
scholastic followers, ' who maintain that savor in the savory body 
is something similar to the sensation which we have of it.' 
(Phys. L. viii. P. ii. eh. 4.) 

The same, mutatis mutandis, is repeated in regard to Odors 
(ch. 5), and to Sounds (ch. 1) ; and so far, the distinction with 
its expression of formal as opposed to virtual is wholly borrowed 
from the Aristotelians. 

But a more minute analysis and nomenclature are given in 
regard to Light and to Color. 

' The word Light is not less equivocal than those of Savor, 
Smell, and Sound ; for it is employed sometimes to express the 
peculiar sensation which the soul receives from the impression 
made by luminous bodies on the eye, and sometimes to denote 
ivhat there is in those bodies by which they cause in the soul this 
peculiar sensation. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 331 

' Moreover, as luminous bodies are not applied immediately to 
the eye, and as they act by the intervention of certain interme- 
diate bodies, as air, water, glass, &c, whatsoever that may be 
which they impress on these media is also called Light, but light 
Secondary and Derived, to distinguish it from that which is in 
the luminous body, which last is styled Primitive or Radical 
Light.' (ch. 9.) 

' "We call the Sensation of Color, Formal color ; the quality in 
bodies causing this Sensation, Radical color ; and what these 
bodies impress on the medium, Derivative color.' (ch. 17.) 

But this acute subdivision of objective Light and Color into 
primitive or radical, and into secondary or derivative, is not ori- 
ginal with Regis, nor indeed with any Cartesian at all. It is 
evidently borrowed from the following passage of Gassendi : — 
' Lumen, ut Simplicius ait, est quasi baculus qui uno sui extremo 
a sole motus, alio extremo oculum moveat : sicque motio in ipso 
sole (hon movit quippe nisi moveatur) est ipsa radicalis et quasi 
fontana lux ; — motio vero perspicui per omnia spatia a sole ad 
terrain extensa, est lux diffusa derivataque ; — et motio in oculo 
est perceptio conspectiove ipsius lucis.' (Animadv. in x. lib. Diog. 
Laertii, p. 851.) Though apparently the whole sentence is here 
given as a quotation from Simplicius (or, as I suspect, Priscianus) 
in his commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle ; the compari- 
son of the staff (or more correctly of the lever) is alone his ; and 
therefore the merit of the distinction in question would belong 
to Gassendi, were it not that the term radical was an expression 
common in the Schools as a synonym of fundamental, and as 
opposed to actual or formal. The distinction is thus substan- 
tially Aristotelian. 

19. — The Essay of Locke on the Human Understanding was 
published in the same year with the Systeme de Philosophie of 
Regis, — in 1690. His doctrine in regard to the attributes of 
bodies, in so far as these have power to produce sensations, or 
perceptions, or simple ideas in us, contains absolutely nothing 
new ; and it is only in consequence of the prevalent ignorance in 



332 PHILOSOPHY 01? PERCEPTION. 

regard to the relative observations of previous philosophers, that 
so much importance has been attached to Locke's speculations 
on this matter. The distinction is, however, far more correctly 
given by him than by many of those who subsequently em- 
ployed it. 

Neglecting what Locke calls qualities mediately perceivable, 
but which lie altogether beyond the sphere of sense, being in re- 
ality powers, which, from the phenomena manifested in certain 
bodies, we infer to exist in other bodies of producing these phe- 
nomena as their effects — neglecting these, the following is an ab- 
stract of the doctrine given, at great length, and with much repe- 
tition, in the eighth chapter of the second book of the Essay. 

a.— -Locke discriminates the attributes of sensible objects into 
the same two classes which had been established by all his prede- 
cessors. 

b. — To the one of these he gives the name of Primary, to 
the other that of Secondary, Qualities ;* calling likewise the for- 
mer Real or Original, the latter Imputed, Qualities. 

Remark. — In this nomenclature, of which Locke is universally 
regarded as the author, there is nothing new. Primary or Ori- 
ginal and Secondary or Derived Qualities had been terms applied 
by Aristotle and the Peripatetics to mark a distinction in the at- 
tributes of matter ; — a distinction, however, not analogous to that 
of Locke, for Aristotle's Primary and Secondary qualities are 
exclusive of Locke's Primary .f But Galileo had bestowed the 

* The term Quality ought to have been restricted to the attributes of the 
second class ; for these are the properties of body as such or such body (cor- 
poris ut tale corpus), whereas the others are the properties of body as body 
(corporis ut corpus) ; a propriety of language which Locke was among the 
first to violate. 

t Corporeal qualities, in a physical point of view, were according to Aris- 
totle (De Gen. et Corr. L. ii. and Meteor. L. iv.) — and the distinction became 
one classical in the Schools— divided into Primary and Secondary ; the for- 
mer being original, the latter derived. 

The Primary are four in number, and all tactile — Hot and Cold, Humid 
(Liquid) and Dry ; and are subdivided into two classes — the two former being 
active, the two latter passive. 

The Secondary are either less or more properly secondary. The former arc 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 333 

names of Primary or Real on the same class of attributes with 
Locke, leaving, of course, the correlative appellations of Seconda- 
ry, Intentional, Ideal, &c, to be given to the other ; while Boyle 
had even anticipated him in formally imposing the names of Pri- 
mary and Secondary on the counter- classes. It is indeed wholly 
impossible to doubt, from many remarkable coincidences of 
thought and expression, that Locke had at least the relative trea- 
tises of his countryman, friend, 'and correspondent under his eye ; 
and it is far more probable, that by Boyle, than by either Aris- 
totle or Galileo, were the names suggested, under which Locke 
has had the honor of baptizing this classical distinction. 

c. — To the first class belong Extension (or Bulk), Solidity (or 
Impenetrability), Figure, Motion and Rest, (or Mobility), Num- 
ber ;* and to these five (or six) which he once and again formally 
enumerates, he afterwards, without comment, throws in Situation 
and Texture. 

common 'to elementary arid to mixed bodies; and are all potentially objects 
of touch. Of these Aristotle enumerates fourteen — the Heavy and Light, the 
Dense and Eare, the Thick and Thin (Concrescent and Fluid), the Hard and 
Soft, the Viscid and Friable, the Kough and Smooth, the Tenacious and 
Slippery. — The latter are Color, Savor, Odor [to which ought to be added 
Sound] — the potential objects of the senses of Sight, Taste, Smell [and 
Hearing]. 

This whole distinction of Qualities, Primary and Secondary, is exclusive 
of Locke's class of Primary. To these, Aristotle would not indeed have 
applied the term Quality at all. 

Cicero also may have given the hint. ' Qualitatum alia? principes (velpri- 
mce), alia? ex iis ortae,' &c. The former are the corporeal elements, the latter 
the bodies constituted by them. (Acad. i. 7.) 

* Locke borrowed Number (i. e. Unity or Plurality) from the Cartesians 
— Descartes from Aristotle. It corresponds in a sort with Divisibility, for 
which it has latterly been exchanged. See Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Locke 
is not therefore primarily liable to Mr. Stewart's censure for the introduction 
of Number among the Primary Qualities, were that censure in itself correct. 
But it is not ; for Mr. Stewart (with M. Eoyer-Collard, No. 25) has misap- 
prehended the import of the expression. (Essays p. 95 4° ed.) For Num- 
ber is not used only for the measure of discrete quantity, but likewise for 
the continuation (unity) or discontinuation (plurality) of a percept. The 
former is an abstract notion ; the latter is a recognition through sense. 1 



1 See above, p. 314, note t, and below, chapter vi. § i. — W. 



334 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Remark. — In all this there is nothing original. To take the 
last first : — Situation (relative Position or Ubication) was one of 
the Common Sensibles current in the Schools. Texture is by- 
Boyle, in like manner, incidentally enumerated, though neither 
formally recognized as a co-ordinate quality, nor noticed as redu- 
cible to any other. Solidity or Impenetrability is, to go no higher, 
borrowed from Gassendi ; De la Forge's Solidity is only the con- 
trast of Fluidity. But Solidity and Extension ought not thus to 
be contradistinguished, being attributes of body only, as consti- 
tuting its one total property — that of occupying space.* The 
other attributes are those of Aristotle, Descartes, and the philoso- 



* The term Solidity (to artpcdv, solidum), as denoting an attribute of body, 
is a word of various significations ; and the non-determination and non-dis- 
tinction of these have given rise to manifold error and confusion. 

First Meaning/. — In its most unexclusive signification, the Solid is that 
which fills or occupies space (to iiri^ov t6ttov). In this meaning it is simply 
convertible with Body ; and is opposed, 1°, to the unextended in all or in 
any of the three dimensions of space, and 2°, to mere extension or empty 
space itself. This we may call Solidity simply. 

But the filling of space may be viewed in different phases. The conditions it 
involves, though all equally essential and inseparable, as all involving each 
other, may, however, in thought, be considered apart ; from different points 
of view, the one or the other may even be regarded as the primary ; and to 
these parts or partial aspects, the name of the unexclusive whole may be 
conceded. The occupation 'of space supposes two necessary conditions ; — 
and each of these has obtained the common name of Solidity, thus constitu- 
ting a second and a third meaning. 

Second Meaning. — What is conceived as occupying space, is necessarily 
conceived as extended in the three dimensions of space (tS rpixn iiaaTardv). 
This is the phasis of Solidity which the Geometer exclusively contemplates. 
Trinal extension has accordingly, by mathematicians, been emphatically 
called the Solid ; and this first partial Solidity we may therefore distinguish 
as the Mathematical, or rather the Geometrical. 

Third Meaning. — On the other hand, what is conceived as occupying 
space, is necessarily conceived as what cannot be eliminated from space. 
But this supposes a power of resisting such elimination. This is the 
phasis of solidity considered exclusively from the physical point of view. 
Accordingly, by the men of natural science the impossibility of com- 
pressing a body from an extended to an unextended has been emphati- 
cally styled Solidity ; and this second partial solidity we may therefore dis- 
tinguish as the Physical. The resisting force here involved has been called 
the Impenetrability of matter ; but most improperly and most ambiguously, 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 335 

phers in general ; — their legitimacy will be considered in the 
sequel. 

d. — The principle which constitutes the preceding qualities into 

It might more appropriately be termed its Ultimate or Absolute Incompressi- 
lility. 1 

In each of these its two partial significations, Solidity denotes an essential 
attribute of body ; and which soever of these attributes be sisted as the 
prior, the other follows, as a necessary consequent. In regard to their pri- 
ority, opinions are divided. Precedence is accorded to trinal extension by 
Descartes, at the head of one body of philosophers ; to impenetrability by 
Leibnitz, at the head of another. Both parties are right, and both are 
wrong. Each is right as looking from its peculiar point of view ; each is 
wrong in not considering that its peculiar is only a partial point of view, and 
neither the one sole, nor even the one absolutely preferable. From the psy- 
chological point of view, Descartes is triumphant ; for extension is first in the 
order of thought. From the physical point of view, Leibnitz is victorious ; 
for impenetrability is the more distinctive attribute of body. The two 
properties, the two points of view, ought not, in truth, to be disjoined; and 
the definitions of body by the ancients are, as least exclusive, still the most 
philosophical that have been given ; — to cttcxov t6wov, and t& Tpixn Siao-Tarcv 
jut' avTiTwias, and Syxos clvtitvitos baov 1^' iavrS. 

Locke is therefore wrong, really and verbally. Really he is wrong, in dis- 
tinguishing trinal extension and impenetrability (or ultimate incompressibil- 
ity) as two primary and separate attributes, instead of regarding them only 
as one-sided aspects of the same primary and total attribute — the occu- 
pying of space. Each supposes the other. The notion of a thing trinally 
extended, eo ipso, excludes the negation of such extension. It therefore 
includes the negation of that negation. But this is just the assertion of its 
ultimate incompressibility. Again, the notion of a thing as ultimately 
incompressible, is only possible under the notion of its trinal extension. 
For body being, ex hypothesi, conceived or conceivable only as that which 
occupies space ; the final compression of it into what occupies no space, goes 
to reduce it, either from an entity to a non-entity, or from an extended, to an 
unextended entity. But neither alternative can be realized in thought. Not 
the former ; for anniliilation, not as a mere change in an effect, not as a mere 
resumption of creative power in a cause, but as a taking out from the sum 
total of existence, is positively and in itself incogitable. Not the latter; for 
the conception of matter, as an unextended entity, is both in itself inconceiv- 
able, and ex hypothesi absurd. Verbally, Locke is wrong, in bestowing the 
name of solidity, without a qualification, exclusively on the latter of these 
two phases ; each being equally entitled to it with the other, and neither so 
well entitled to it, without a difference, as the total attribute of which they 
are the partial expressions. — But these inaccuracies of Locke are not so 
important as the errors of subsequent philosophers, to which, however, they 



1 See below, p. 356.— W. 



336 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

a separate class, is that the mind finds it impossible to think any 
particle of matter, as divested of such attributes. 

Remark. — In this criterion Locke was preceded by Galileo. 

seem to have afforded the occasion. For under the term Solidity, and on 
the authority of Locke, there have been introduced as primary, certain 
qualities of body to which in common language the epithet Solid is applied, 
bat which have no title whatever to the rank in question. Against this 
abuse, it must be acknowledged, Locke not only guarded himself, but even 
to a certain extent, cautioned others ; for he articulately states that Solidity, 
in his sense, is not to be confounded with Hardness. (B. ii. c. 4, § 4.) It 
must, however, also be confessed, that in other passages he seems to iden- 
tify Solidity and Cohesion; while on Solidity he, at the same time, makes 
' the mutual impulse, resistance and protrusion of bodies to depend.' (Ibid. 
§ 5.) But I am anticipating. 

In a psychological point of view — and this is that of Locke and 
metaphysicians in general — no attribute of body is primary which is 
not necessary in thought; that is, which is not necessarily evolved 
out of, as necessarily implied in, the very notion of body. And such is 
Solidity in the one total and the two partial significations heretofore enu- 
merated. But in its physical application, this term is not always limited to 
denote the ultimate incompressibility of matter. Besides that necessary 
attribute, it is extended, in common language, to express other powers of 
resistance in bodies of a character merely contingent in reference to thought. 
(See § ii.) These may be reduced to the five following : 

Fourth Meaning. — The term Solid is very commonly employed to denote 
not merely the absolutely, but also the relatively incompressible, the Dense, 
in contrast to the relatively compressible, the Bare, or Hollow. (In Latin, 
moreover, Solidus was not only employed, in this sense, to denote that a 
thing fully occupied the space comprehended within its circumference ; but 
likewise to indicate, 1°, its entireness in quantity — that it was whole or com- 
plete ; and, 2°, its entireness in quality — that it was pure, iiniform, homoge- 
neous. This arose from the original identity of the Latin Solidum with the 
Oscan solium or solum, and the Greek SXov. See Festus or Verrius Flaccus, 
w. Solitaurilia and Sollo / also J. C. Scaliger, De Subtilitate, ex. 76.) 

Fifth Meaning. — Under the Vis Inertia, a body is said to be Solid, *. e. 
Inert, Stable, Immovable, in proportion as it, whether in motion or at 
rest, resists, in general, a removal from the place it would otherwise occupy 
in space. 

Sixth Meaning. — Under Gravity, a body is said to be Solid, i. e. Heavy, in 
proportion as it resists, in particular, a displacement by being lifted up. 

The two following meanings fall under Cohesion, the force with which 
matter resists the distraction of its parts ; for a body is said in a 

Seventh Meaning, to be Solid, i. e. Hard, in contrast to Soft ; and in an 

Eighth Meaning, to be Solid, i. e. Concrete, in opposition to Fluid. 

The term Solidity thus denotes besides the absolute and necessary prop- 
erty of occupying space, simply and in its two phases of Extension and Im- 
penetrability, also the relative and contingent qualities of the Dense, the 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 337 

But it does not, alone, suffice to discriminate the primary from 
the secondary qualities. For, as already noticed, of two contra- 
dictory qualities, one or other must, on the logical principle of ex- 
cluded 1 middle, be attributed to every object. Thus, odorous or 
inodorous, sapid or tasteless, &c, though not primary qualities, 
cannot both be abstracted in thought from any material object ; 
and, to take a stronger example, color, which, psychologically 
speaking, contains within itself such contradictions (for light and 
darkness, white and black, are, in this relation, all equally colors) 
is thus a necessary concomitant of every perception, and even 
every imagination, of extended substance ; as has been observed 
by the Pythagoreans, Aristotle, Themistius, and many others. 

e.— These attributes really exist in the objects, as they are 
ideally represented to our minds. 

Remark. — In this statement Locke followed Descartes ; but 
without the important qualification, necessary to its accuracy, 
under which Descartes advances it. On the doctrine of both phi- 
losophers, we know nothing of material existence in itself; we 
know it only as represented or in idea. When Locke, therefore, 
is asked, how he became aware that the known idea truly repre- 
sents the unknown reality ; he can make no answer. On the 
first principles of his philosophy, he is wholly and necessarily 
ignorant, whether the idea does, or does not, represent to his 
mind the attributes of matter, as they exist in nature. His as- 
sertion is, therefore, confessedly without a warrant ; it transcends, 



Inert, the Heavy, the Hard, the Concrete ; and the introduction of these lat- 
ter, with their correlative opposites, into the list of Primary Qualities was 
facilitated, if not prepared, hy Locke's vacillating employment of the vague 
expression Solid; in partial designation of the former. By Karnes, accord- 
ingly, Gravity and Inertia were elevated to this rank ; while Cohesion, in its 
various modifications and degrees, was, hy Karnes, Keid, Fergusson, Stew- 
art, Koyer-Collard, and many others, not only recognized as Primary, hut 
expressly so recognized as in conformity with the doctrine of Locke. See 
the sequel of this § and § ii. 

1 It is an axiom in Logic, that of two contradictory propositions, if one be 
false, the other must he true. This is called the principle of Excluded Mid- 
dle ; i. e. between two contradictories. — W. 
21 



338 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

ex hypothesi, the sphere of possible knowledge. Descartes is 
more cautious. He only says, that our ideas of the qualities in 
question represent those qualities as they are, or as they may ex- 
ist ; — ' ut sunt, vel saltern esse possunt.' The Cosmothetic Ideal- 
ist can only assert to them a problematical reality. 

f. — To the second class belong those qualities which, as in ob- 
jects themselves, are nothing but various occult modifications of 
the qualities of the former class ; these modifications possessing, 
however, the power of determining certain manifest sensations or 
ideas in us. Such, for example, are colors, sounds, tastes, smells, 
&c, — all, in a word, commonly known by the name of Sensible 
Qualities. These qualities, as in the reality, are properly only 
powers ; powers to produce certain sensations in us. As in us, 
they are only sensations, and cannot, therefore, be considered as 
attributes of external things. 

Remark. — All this had, long before Locke, become mere philo- 
sophical commonplace. "With the exception of the dogmatical 
assertion of the hypothetical fact, that the subjective sensations 
of the secondary depend exclusively on the objective modifica- 
tions of the primary qualities, this whole doctrine is maintained 
by Aristotle ; while that hypothetical assertion itself had been ad- 
vanced by the ancient Atomists and their followers the Epicure- 
ans, by Galileo, by Descartes and his school, by Boyle, and by 
modern philosophers in general. That the secondary qualities, 
as in objects, are only powers of producing sensations in us — -this, 
as we have seen, has been explicitly stated, after Aristotle, by al- 
most every theorist on the subject. But it was probably borrow- 
ed by Locke from the Cartesians. 

It is not to be forgotten, that Locke did not observe the pro- 
priety of language introduced by the Cartesians, of employing 
the term Idea, in relation to the primary, the term Sensation, in 
relation to the secondary, qualities. Indeed Locke's whole philo- 
sophical language is beyond measure vague, vacillating, and am- 
biguous ; in this respect, he has afforded the worst of precedents, 
and has found only too many among us to follow his example. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 339 

20. — Purchot's doctrine on this subject deserves to be no- 
ticed — which it never has been. It struck me from its corres- 
pondence, in certain respects, with that which I had myself pre- 
viously thought out. The first edition of his Institutiones Philo- 
sophise did not appear at Paris until a year or two after the pub- 
lication of Locke's Essay, — the second was in 1698 ; but the 
French cursualist does not appear to have been aware of the spec- 
ulations of the English philosopher, nor does he refer to Boyle. 
His doctrine — which is not fully stated in any single place of his 
work — is as follows : 

a. — The one Primary Affection or Attribute of Body is Exten- 
sion. Without this, matter cannot be conceived. But in the 
notion of Extension as an attribute is immediately involved that 
of Solidity or Impenetrability, i. e. the capacity of filling space to 
the exclusion of another body. 

b. — But extended substance (eo ipso, solid or impenetrable) — 

1°, Necessarily exists under some particular mode of Extension, 
in other words, it has a certain magnitude ; and is Divisible into 
parts ; 

2°, Is necessarily thought as capable of Motion and Rest ; 

3°, Necessarily supposes a certain Figure ; and in relation to 
other bodies a certain Position ; 

These five, 1, Magnitude or measure of extension, involving 
Divisibility ; 2, Motion ; 3, Rest ; 4, Figure ; 5, Position or 
Situation, he styles the simple and secondary attributes, affections, 
or qualities which flow immediately from the nature of Body, i. e. 
Extension. 

c. — Out of these Primary Affections of Body there are educed, 
and as it were compounded, other affections to which the name 
of Quality in a more emphatic and appropriate sense belongs ; 
such among others are Light, Colors, Sounds, Odors, Tastes, 
and the Tactile qualities, Heat, Cold, Moisture, Dryness, &c. 
These he denominates the secondary and composite qualities or 
affections of Body. (Instit. Philos. t. ii. Phys. Sectt. i. iv. v. pp. 
87, 205, 396, ed. 4.) 



340 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

21. — Le Clerc does not borrow his doctrine on this head from 
his friend Locke ; and his point of view is not purely pschycologi- 
cal. The five properties common to all bodies — Extension — Di- 
visibility — Solidity (Impenetrability) — Figure — Mobility — he 
very properly does not denominate Qualities, but reserves that 
name for what serves to distinguish bodies from each other. Un- 
der this restriction, he divides Qualities into Primitive and Deriv- 
ative. By Primitive he designates those occult qualities in body 
which are known to us only in their effects ; as, for example, the 
cause of Solidity. The Derivative, he says, are those which flow 
from the Primitive and affect our senses, as color, savor, odor, 
&c. His doctrine is, however, neither fully evolved nor unambig- 
uously expressed. (Clerici Opera Philos. Phys., L. v. cc. 1, 6.) 

22. — Lord Kames, in the first edition of his ' Essays on the 
principles of Morality and Natural Religion,' (1751), touches only 
incidentally on the present subject. He enumerates Softness, 
Hardness, Smoothness, Roughness, among the Primary Qualities 
(p. 248) ; and he was, I am confident, the only philosopher be- 
fore Reid, by whom this amplification was sanctioned, although 
Mr. Stewart has asserted that herein Reid only followed the clas- 
sification of most of his immediate predecessors.* (Essays, 
p. 91.) The second edition I have not at hand. In the third 
and last (1779), there is introduced a chapter expressly on 
the distinction, which is treated of in detail. He does not here 
repeat his previous enumeration ; but to Size, Figure, Solidity 
(which he does not define), and Divisibility, he adds, as primary 
qualities, Gravity, the Vis Inertia?, and the Vis Incita ; the two 
last being the Vis Incita or Vis Inertiee of Kepler and Newton 
divided into a double power. See Reid's Correspondence, pp. 55, 
56. Kames unwittingly mixes the psychological and physical 



* Mr. Stewart also says that Berkeley ' employs the word Soliditity as 
synonymous with Hardness and Eesistance.' This is not correct. Berkeley 
does not consider hardness and resistance as convertible; and these he 
mentions as two only out of three significations in which, he thinks, the 
term Solidity is used. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 34:1 

points of view ; and otherwise, his classification in so far as origi- 
nal, is open to manifold objections. See the foot-note * at p. 334 
c. and § ii. 

23. — Reid. — We have seen that Descartes and Locke, to say 
nothing of other metaphysicians, admitted a fundamental differ- 
ence between the primary and the secondary qualities: the one 
problematically, the other assertorily, maintaining, that the pri- 
mary qualities, as known, correspond with the primary qualities, 
as existent : whereas that the secondary qualities, as sensations in 
us, bear no analogy to these qua.ities as inherent in matter. On 
the general doctrine, however, of these philosophers, both classes of 
qualities, as known, are confessedly only states of our own minds ; 
and, while we have no right from a subjective affection to infer 
the existence, far less the corresponding character of the existence, 
of any objective reality, it is evident that their doctrine, if fairly 
evolved, would result in a dogmatic, or in a skeptical, negation of 
the primary, no less than of the secondary qualities of body, as 
more than appearances in and for us. This evolution was ac- 
cordingly soon accomplished; and Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, 
Condillac, Kant, Fichte, and others, found no difficulty in demon- 
strating, on the principles of Descartes, and Locke, and modern 
Representationists in general, that our notions of Space or Exten- 
sion, with its subordinate forms of Figure, Motion, &c, has no 
higher title to be recognized as objectively valid, than our sensa- 
tions of Color, of Savor, of Odor ; and were thus enabled tri- 
umphantly to establish their several schemes of formal or virtual 
idealism. Hence may we explain the fact that this celebrated 
distinction is overlooked or superseded in the speculation, not of 
some merely, but of all the more modern German Schools. 

It is therefore manifest that the fundamental position of a con- 
sistent theory of dualistic realism is — that our cognitions of Ex- 
tension and its modes are not wholly ideal ; — that although Space 
be a native, necessary, a priori, form of imagination, and so far, 
therefore, a mere subjective state, that there is, at the same time, 
competent to us, in an immediate perception of external things, 



342 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

the consciousness of a really existent, of a really objective ex- 
tended world. To demonstrate this was therefore prescribed, as 
its primary problem to a philosophy which, like that of Reid, 
proposed to re-establish the philosophy of natural realism — of 
common sense, on a refutation of every idealism overt or implied. 
Such is the problem. It remains for us to see how it was dealt 
with. 

Reid's doctrine, in regard to the Primary and Secondary Qual- 
ities, is to be found in the Inquiry, ch. 5, sect. 4-6, p. 123-126, 
and in the Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. ch. 17, p. 313-318. 

In his enumeration of the Primary qualities Reid is not invari 
able; for the list in the Inquiry is not identical with that in the 
Essays. In the former, without professing-to furnish an exhaust- 
ive catalogue, he enumerates Extension, Figure, Motion, Hard 
ness and Softness, Roughness and Smoothness. The four last are,' 
as we have seen, to be found, for the first time, in the earliest edi- 
tion of Lord Karnes's Essays on Morality, which preceded Reid's 
Inquiry by thirteen years. In the latter he gives another list, 
which he does not state to be an altered edition of his own, but 
which he apparently proposes as an enumeration identical with 
Locke's. ' Every one,' he says, ' knows that Extension, Divisibil- 
ity, Figure, Motion, Solidity, Hardness, Softness, and Fluidity, 
were by Locke called primary qualities of body.' In reference to 
himself — this second catalogue omits Roughness and Smoothness, 
which were contained in his first : and introduces, what were 
omitted in the first, Divisibility (which Karnes had also latterly 
added), Solidity, and Fluidity, In reference to Locke — this and 
the former list are both very different from his. For, allowing 
Divisibility to replace Number, and say nothing in regard, either 
to the verbal inaccuracy of making Motion stand for Mobility, or 
to the real inaccuracy of omitting Rest as the alternative of Mo- 
tion ; we find in both lists a series of qualities unrecognized as 
primary by Locke ; or, as far as I know, by any other philosopher 
previous to Lord Karnes and himself. These are Roughness and 
Smoothness in the Inquiry ; Fluidity in the Essays ; and Hard' 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 343 

ness and Softness in both. But these five qualities are not only 
not to be ascribed to the list of primary qualities by Locke ; they 
ought not to be viewed as co-ordinate with Extension, Solidity 
(which Reid more rigorously than Locke limits to the ultimate in- 
compressibility of matter), Figure, Mobility, and Divisibility, i. e. 
not as primary qualities at all. Of these five qualities, the last 
three, as he himself states (p. 314 a), are only different degrees 
of Cohesion ; and the first two are only modifications of Figure 
and Cohesion combined. But Cohesion, as will be shown (§ ii.), 
is not a character necessarily involved in our notion of body ; for 
though Cohesion (and we may say the same of Inertia), in all its 
modes, necessarily supposes the occupation of space, the occupa- 
tion of space while it implies a continuity does not necessarily 
imply a cohesion of the elements (whatever they may be) of that 
which occupies space. At the same time, the various resistances 
of cohesion and of inertia cannot be reduced to the class of Sec- 
ondary qualities. It behooves us therefore, neither with Locke 
and others, to overlook them ; nor to throw them in without 
qualification or remark, either with Descartes among the Second- 
ary, or with Reid among the Primary, qualities. But of this 
again. 

Independently of these minor differences, and laying also out 
of account Reid's strictures on the cruder forms of the represen- 
tative hypothesis, as held by Descartes and Locke, but which 
there is no sufficient ground to suppose that Descartes, at least, 
adopted; Reid's doctrine touching the present distinction cor- 
responds, in all essential respects, with that maintained by these 
two philosophers. He does not adopt, and even omits to notice, 
the erroneous criterion of inseparability in thought, by which 
Locke attempts to discriminate the primary qualities from the 
secondary. Like Descartes, he holds that our notions of the pri- 
mary qualities are clear and distinct ; of the secondary, obscure 
and confused ; and, like both philosophers, he considers that the 
former afford us a knowledge of what the corresponding qualities 
are (or, as Descartes cautiously interpolates, may be) in themselves, 



3M PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

while the latter only point to the unknown cause or occasion of 
sensations of which we are conscious ourselves. Reid therefore 
calls the notion we have of the primary qualities, direct ; of the 
secondary, relative. (I. P. 313 b.) On this subject there is, thus, 
no important difference of opinion between the three philoso- 
phers. For if we modify the obnoxious language of Descartes 
and Locke ; and, instead of saying that the ideas or notions of 
the primary qualities resemble, merely assert that they truly rep- 
resent, their objects, that is, afford us such a knowledge of their 
nature as we should have were an immediate intuition of the ex- 
tended reality in itself competent to man, — and this is certainly 
all that one, probably all that either philosopher, intended, — Reid's 
doctrine and theirs would be found in perfect unison. The whole 
difficulty and dispute on this point is solved on the old distinction 
of similarity in existences and similarity in representation, which 
Reid and our more modern philosophers have overlooked. Touch- 
ing this, see, as stated above, the doctrine of those Schoolmen 
who held the hypothesis of species (p. 257 a b) ; and of those 
others who, equally with Reid, rejected all representative entities 
different from the act itself of cognition (p. 257 b. note). 

But much more than this was called for at Reid's hands. His 
philosophy, if that of Natural Realism, founded in the common 
sense of mankind, made it incumbent on him to show, that we 
have not merely a notion, a conception, an imagination, a sub- 
jective representation — of Extension, for example, ' called up or 
suggested] in some incomprehensible manner to the mind, on oc- 
casion of an extended object being presented to the sense ; but 
that in the perception of such an object, we really have, as by 
nature we believe we have, an immediate knowledge or conscious- 
ness of that external object, as extended. In a word, that in sen- 
sitive perception the extension, as known, and the extension, as 
existing, are convertible ; known, because existing, and existing, 
since known. 

Reid, however, unfortunately, did not accomplish — did not at- 
tempt this. He makes no articulate statement, even, that in per- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 345 

ception we have an immediate knowledge — an objective conscious- 
ness, of an extended non-ego, actually existing ; as in imagina- 
tion we have a subjective consciousness of a mode of the ego, rep- 
resenting such an extended non-ego, and thereby affording us a 
mediate knowledge of it as possibly existing. On the contrary 
were we to interpret his expressions rigidly, and not in liberal con- 
formity with the general analogy of his philosophy, we might, as 
repeatedly noticed, found on the terms in which he states his doc- 
trine of the primary qualities, and, in particular, his doctrine con- 
cerning our cognition of extension, a plausible argument that his 
own theory of perception is as purely subjective, and therefore as 
easily reducible to an absolute Idealism, as that of any of the 
philosophers whom he controverts. 

Thus when Reid, for example (Inq. 123 b), states 'that Exten- 
sion ' is a quality suggested to us by certain sensations,' i. e. by 
certain merely subjective affections ; and when (324 b) he says 
' that Space [Extension] whether tangible or visible, is not so 
properly an object of sense as a necessary concomitant 2 of the 
objects both of sight and touch ;' he apparently denies us all im- 
mediate perception of any extended reality. But if we are not 
percipient of any extended reality, we are not percipient of body 
as existing ; for body exists, and can only be known immediately 
and in itself, as extended. The material world, on this supposi- 
tion, sinks into something unknown and problematical ; and its 
existence, if not denied, can, at best, be only precariously affirmed, 
as the occult cause, or incomprehensible occasion, of certain sub- 
jective affections we experience in the form, either of a sensation 
of the secondary quality, or of a perception of the primary. 



1 'According to Reid, Extension (Space) is a notion a posteriori, the result 
of experience. According to Kant, it is a priori ) experience only affording 
the occasions required by the mind to exert the facts, of which the intuition 
of space is a condition. To the former it is thus a contingent : to the latter, 
a necessary mental possession.' — W. 

2 ' It seemingly requires but little to rise to Kant's view of the conception 
of space as an a priori or native form of thought.' — W. 



346 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Thus interpreted, what is there to distinguish the doctrine of Reid 
from the undeveloped idealism of Descartes or of Kant ? ' 

Having noticed the manifest incongruity of Reid's doctrine on 
this point with the grand aim of his philosophy, — an incongruity 
which I am surprised has not been long ago adverted to either 
by friend or foe, — I may take this opportunity of modifying a 
former statement (p. 123 b, note*), 2 — that, according to Reid, 
Space is a notion a posteriori, the result of experience. On re- 
considering more carefully his different statements on this subject 
(Inq. 123 sq. I. P. 324 sq.), I am now inclined to think that his 
language implies no more than the chronological posteriority of 
this notion ; and that he really held it to be a native, necessary, a 
priori form of thought, requiring only certain prerequisite condi- 
tions to call it from virtual into manifest existence. I am con- 
firmed in this view by finding it is also that of M. Royer-Collard. 
Mr. Stewart is however less defensible, when he says, in opposi- 
tion to Kant's doctrine of Space — ' I rather lean to the common 
theory which suj>poses our first ideas of Space or Extension to be 
formed by other qualities of matter.' (Dissertation, &c. -p. 281, 
2d ed.) 

Passing over the less important observations of several inter- 
mediate philosophers in the wake of Reid, I proceed to the most 
distinguished of his disciples. 

24. — Stewart, while he agrees with his master in regard to 
the contrast of Primary and Secondary Qualities, proposes the 
following subdivision, and change of nomenclature in reference to 
the former. ' I distinguish,' he says, ' Extension and Figure by 
the title of mathematical affections of matter; restricting the 
phrase primary qualities to Hardness and Softness, Roughness 
and Smoothness, and other properties of the same description. 
The line which I would draw between primary and secondary 
qualities is this ; that the former necessarily involve the notion of 



1 See above, chapter iii. § ii. p. 270, sq. — W. 
9 See note 1, on the preceding page. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 347 

extension, and consequently of externality or outness ; whereas 
the latter are only conceived as the unknown causes of known 
sensations ; and when first apprehended by the mind do not im- 
ply the existence of any thing locally distinct from the subjects of 
its own self-consciousness.' (Essays, p. 94.) 

The more radical defects of this ingenious reduction are, as they 
appear to me, the following : 

1°. That it does not depart from the central notion of body — 
from Solidity Absolute, the occupying of space. (See p. 334 c, 
note *.) In logical propriety Extension and Figure are not prox- 
imately attributes of body but of space ; and belong to body only 
as filling space. Body supposes them ; they do not suppose 
body ; and the inquiry is wholly different in regard to the nature 
of extension and figure as space, and of the extended and figured 
as body. 

2°. This original defect in the order of evolution, has led, how- 
ever, to more important consequences. Had Mr. Stewart looked 
at Extension (Solidity Mathematical), as a property of body, in 
virtue of body filling space, he would not only not have omitted, 
but not have omitted as an attribute co-ordinate with extension, 
the Ultimate Incompressibility or Impenetrability of body (Sol- 
idity Physical). 

3°. But while omitting this essential property, the primary 
qualities which, after Reid, he enumerates (Hardness, Softness, 
Roughness, Smoothness), are, as already noticed, and to be here- 
after shown, not primary, not being involved in the necessary 
notion of body. For these are all degrees or modifications of 
Cohesion ; but a Cohesion of its ultimate elements it is not ne- 
cessary to- think as a condition or attribute of matter at all. See 
§ ii. Moreover, Roughness and Smoothness, as more than the 
causes of certain sensations in us, therefore only secondary quali- 
ties, are modifications, not only of Cohesion, but of Figure, and 
would, therefore, on Mr. Stewart's distribution, fall under the cat- 
egory of the Mathematical Affections of Body. 

As regards the great problem of Natural Realism, — to prove 



348 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

that we have an immediate perception of the primary qualities of 
body, — this was left by Mr. Stewart where it was left by Reid. 

25. — The last philosopher to be adduced is the illustrious 
founder of the Scoto-Gallican School, M. Royer-Collard. The 
sum of his doctrine touching the Primary Qualities is given in 
the following passage, which I translate from the Fragments of 
his Lectures, published by M. Jouffroy as Appendices to his ver- 
sion of the Works of Reid (Vol. iii. p. 429 sq.) ; — Fragments 
which, with M. Jouffroy's general Preface, I have reason to hope 
will be soon given to the British public by a translator eminently 
qualified for the task. My observations I find it most convenient 
to subjoin in the form of notes ; and admiring as I do both the 
attempt itself and the ability of its author, I regret to differ here 
so widely, not only from the doctrines which M. Royer-Collard 
holds in common with other philosophers, but from those which 
are peculiar to himself. On the former, however, in so far as, 
with his more immediate predecessors, he confounds in one class 
qualities which I think ought to be discriminated into two, I 
deem it unnecessary to make any special comment ; as this mat- 
ter, which has been already once and again adverted to, is to be 
more fully considered in the sequel. (§ ii.) As to the latter, it 
will be seen that the more important differences arise from the 
exclusive point of view from which M. Royer-Collard has chosen 
to consider the Qualities in question. 

' Among the Primary Qualities, that of Number is peculiar to 
Locke.* It is evident that Number, far from being a quality of 
matter, is only an abstract notion, the work of intellect and not 
of sense.f 



* Number is, with Locke, common to Aristotle and the Aristotelians, 
Galileo, Descartes, and the Cartesians, &c. 

t Numher, as an abstract notion, is certainly not an object of sense. But 
it was not as an abstract notion intended by the philosophers to denote an 
attribute of Eody. This misprision was expressly guarded against by the 
Aristotelians. Sec Toletus in Aristotelem De Anima, L. ii. c. 6. qu. 15. 
Number may be said to correspond to Divisibility ; see p. 315 a, and p. 834 
a. If it cannot be said that sense is percipient of objects as many, it can- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 349 

' Divisibility is proper to ReicL* On this quality and Mobility 
I will observe, that neither ought to have been placed among the 
qualities manifested through sense ; and yet this is what Reid un- 
derstands by the Primary Qualities, for he distinguishes them 
from the Secondary by this — that we have of the former a direct 
notion.f Divisibility is known to us by division ; and a body 
divided is known to us, as such, by memory. For did we not 
recollect that it had previously been one, we should not know that 
it is at present two ; we should be unable to compare its present 
with its past state ; and it is by this comparison alone that we 
become aware of the fact of division. Is it said that the notion 
of Divisibility is not acquired by the fact of division, but that it 
presents itself immediately to the mind prior to experience ? In 
this case it is still more certain that it is not a cognition proper to 
sense.J 

not be said to be percipient of an object as one. Perception, moreover, is a 
consciousness, and consciousness is only realized under the condition of plu- 
rality and difference. Again, if we deny that through sense we perceive a 
plurality of colors, we must deny that through sense we perceive a figure or 
even a line. And if three bodies are not an object of sense, neither is a tri- 
angle. Sense and intellect cannot thus be distinguished. 

* Sundry philosophers preceded Eeid in making Divisibility (which cor- 
responds also to Number) one of the Primary Qualities. See Nos. 20, 21, 22. 

t M. Eoyer-Collard not only takes his point of view exclusively from 
Sense ; but sense he so limits, that, if rigorously carried out, no sensible 
perception, as no consciousness, could be brought to bear. The reason he 
gives why Eeid must be held as of the same opinion, I do not understand. 
Psychologically speaking, an attribute would not be •primary if it could be 
thought away from body ; and the notion of body being supposed given, 
every primary quality is to be evolved out of that notion, as necessarily in- 
volved in it, independently altogether of any experience of sense. In this 
respect, such quality is an object of intellect. At the same time, a primary 
quality would not be an attribute of body, if it could not, contingently, to 
some extent, at least, be apprehended as an actual phenomenon of sense. In 
this respect, such quality is an object of perception and experience. 

% I am afraid that this, likewise, is a misapprehension of the meaning of 
the philosophers. Divisibility, in their view, has nothing to do with the pro- 
cess of dividing. It denotes either the alternative attribute, applicable to all 
body, of unity or plurality ; or the possibility that every single body may, as 
extended, be sundered into a multitude of extended parts. Every material 
object being thus, though actually one, always potentially many, it is thus 
convertible with Number ; see foot-note t. 



350 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

' As to the notion of Mobility it is evidently posterior to that 
of motion ;* that of motion supposes not less evidently the exer- 
cise of memory and the idea of time ; it is thus not derived exclu- 
sively from sense.f As Divisibility also supposes motion, this 
again is an additional proof that the notion of divisibility is not 
immediate. 

' Figure is a modification of Extension. 

1 Solidity, Impenetrability, Resistance, are one and the same 
thing ;% Hardness, Softness, Fluidity, are modifications of Solid- 
ity and its different degrees ; while the Roughness and Smooth- 
ness of surfaces express only sensations attached to certain per- 
ceptions of Solidity. 

' The Primary Qualities may be thus generalized, if I may so 
express myself, into Extension and Solidity? 



The distinction of these different classes of material qualities 
has, as already noticed, no real importance, no real foundation, 
on the hypothesis of Idealism, whether absolute or cosmothetic, 
— in no philosophy, indeed, but that of Natural Realism ; and 
its recognition, in the systems of Descartes and Locke, is, therefore, 
with them a superficial observation, if not a hors d'ceuvre. It 
was, accordingly, with justice formally superseded, because virtu- 
ally null, in the philosophy of Leibnitz, the complement of the 
Cartesian, and in the philosophy of Condillac, the complement 



* Mobility, as applied in this relation, is merely a compendious expression 
for the alternative .attributions of motion or rest ; and both of these, as possi- 
ble attributes, are involved in the notion of body. See § ii. of this Excursus. 

t Compare above pp. 312-314. But Perception can no more be separated 
from all memory than from all judgment ; for consciousness involves both. 

% This is only correct from M. Eoyer-Collard's exclusive point of view— 
from sense alone. On the various meanings of the term Solidity, see p. 334, 
note *. The confusion also resulting from the ambiguity of the word Impen- 
etrability as denoting both a resistance absolute and insuperable, and a resist- 
ance relative and superable, both what is necessary, and what is contingent 
to body, is here shown, either in the reduction to a single category of quali- 
ties of a wholly heterogeneous character, or in the silent elimination of the 
nigher. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTKXST. 351 

of the Lockian. The Kantian system, again, is built on its pos- 
itive negation, or rather its positive reversal. For Kant's tran- 
scendental Idealism not only contains a general assertion of the 
subjectivity of all our perceptions ; its distinctive peculiarity is, 
in fact, its special demonstration of the absolute subjectivity of 
Space or Extension, and in general of the primary attributes of 
matter ; these constituting what he calls the Form, as the Second- 
ary constitutes what he calls the Matter, of our Sensible intuitions. 
(See, in particular, Proleg., § 13, Anm. 2.) This, I repeat, may 
enable us to explain why the discrimination in question has, both 
in the intellectualism of Germany and in the sensualism of 
France, been so generally overlooked ; and why, where in rela- 
tion to those philosophers by whom the distinction has been 
taken, any observations on the point have been occasionally 
hazarded (as by Tetens with special reference to Reid), that these 
are of too perfunctory a character to merit any special commem- 
oration.'* 

Such, then, are the forms under which the distinction of the 



* To this also are we to attribute it, that the most elaborate of the recent 
histories of philosophy among the Germans, slur over, if they do not positive- 
ly misconceive, the distinction in question. In the valuable expositions of 
the Cartesian doctrine by the two distinguished Hegelians, Feuerbach and 
Erdmann, it obtains from the one no adequate consideration, from the 
other no consideration at all. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy 
by their illustrious master, a work in which the erudition is often hardly less 
remarkable than the force of thought, almost every statement in reference to 
the subject is, to say the least of it, inaccurate. Hegel, as he himself em- 
ploys, apparently makes Aristotle and Descartes employ, the term Solidity 
simply for Hardness. This, however, neither one nor other ever does ; while 
by Locke, the terms are even expressly distinguished. (Vol. iii. pp. 860, 
431.) He confounds Descartes' distinction (baptized by Locke that) of the 
Primary and Secondary qualities, with Descartes' distinction of the Primi- 
tive and Derivative attributes of body ; distinctions not coincident, though 
not opposed. Figure, for example, in the one is primary, but not in the 
other primitive. In regard to his criticism of Locke (p. 431), suffice it to 
say, that Locke, so far from opposing, in fact follows Descartes in making 
'Figure and so forth' primary qualities; nor does Descartes denominate 
any class of qualities ' secondary.' — (pp. 359, 430.) Finally Aristotle's dis- 
tinction of ' external qualities' into primary and secondary, if this be re- 
ferred to, corresponds with that so styled by Locke only in the name. 



352 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Primary and Secondary Qualities of the Body has been pre- 
sented, from its earliest promulgation to its latest development, 
In this historical survey, I have to acknowledge no assistance 
from the researches of preceding inquirers ; for what I found 
already done in this respect was scanty and superficial, even 
when not positively erroneous. Every thing had thus anew to 
be explored and excavated. The few who make a study of philos- 
ophy in its sources, can appreciate the labor of such a research ; 
and from them, at least, I am sure of indulgence for the imper- 
fections of what I offer not as a history, but as a hasty collection 
of some historical materials. 

§ II. — Distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities 
of Body critically considered. 

From what has been said in the foregoing section, it will be 
seen that I am by no means satisfied with the previous reduction 
of the Qualities of Body to two classes of Primary and Secondary. 
Without preamble, I now go on to state what I deem their true 
and complete classification ; limiting the statement, however, to 
little more than an enouncement of the distribution and its princi- 
ples, not allowing myself to enter on an exposition of the correla- 
tive doctrine of perception, and refraining, in general, from much 
that I might be tempted to add, by way of illustration and 
support. 

The Qualities of body I divide into three classes. 

Adopting and adapting, as far as possible, the previous nomen- 
clature — the first of these I would denominate the class of Pri- 
mary, or Objective, Qualities ; the second, the class of Secundo- 
Primary, or Subjectivo- Objective, Qualities ; the third, the class 
of Secondary, or Subjective, Qualities. 

The general point of view from which the Qualities of Matter 
are here considered is not the Physical, but the Psychological. 
But, under this, the ground of principle on which these qualities 
are divided and designated is, again, two-fold. There are, in 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 353 

fact, within the psychological, two special points of view ; that of 
Sense, and that of Understanding. Both of these ought to be 
taken, but taken separately, into account in a classification like 
the present ; and not, as has been often done, either one only 
adopted, or both fortuitously combined. Differing, however, as 
these widely do from each other, they will be found harmonious- 
ly to conspire in establishing the three-fold distribution and no- 
menclature of the qualities in question which I have ventured to 
propose. 

The point of view chronologically prior, or first to us, is that 
of Sense. The principle of division is here the different circum- 
stances under which the qualities are originally and immediately 
apprehended. On this ground, as apprehensions or immediate 
cognitions through Sense, the Primary are distinguished as 
objective, not subjective,* as percepts proper, not sensations 
proper ; the Secundo-primary, as objective and subjective, as per- 
cepts proper and sensations proper ; the Secondary, as subjective, 
not objective, cognitions, as sensations proper, not percepts 
proper. 

The other point of view chronologically posterior, but first in 
nature, is that of Understanding. The principle of division is 
here the different character under which the qualities, already 
apprehended, are conceived or construed to the mind in thought. 
On this ground, the Primary, being thought as essential to the 
notion of Body, are distinguished from the Secundo-primary and 
Secondary, as accidental ; while the Primary and Secundo-pri- 
mary, being thought as manifest or conceivable in their own 
nature, are distinguished from the Secondary, as in their own 



* All knowledge, in one respect, is subjective; for all knowledge is an 
energy of the Ego. Bat when I perceive a quality of the Non-Ego, of the 
object-object, as in immediate relation to my mind, I am said to have of it 
an objective knowledge ; in contrast to the subjective knowledge, I am said tc 
have of it when supposing it only as the hypothetical or occult cause of an 
affection of which I am conscious, or thinking it only mediately through a 
subject-object or representation in, and of, the mind. But see below, in 
foot-note to Par. 15, and first foot-note to Par. 18. 
22 



354 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

nature occult and inconceivable. For the notion of Matter having 
been once acquired, by reference to that notion, the Primary 
Qualities are recognized as its a priori or necessary constituents ; 
and we clearly conceive how they must exist in bodies in know- 
ing what they are objectively in themselves ; the Secundo-primary 
Qualities, again, are recognized as a posteriori or contingent 
modifications of the Primary, and we clearly conceive how they 
do exist in bodies in knowing what they are objectively in their 
conditions ; finally, the Secondary Qualities are recognized as a 
posteriori or contingent accidents of matter, but we obscurely 
surmise how they may exist in bodies only as knowing what they 
are subjectively in their effects. 

It is thus apparent that the primary qualities may be deduced 
a priori, the bare notion of matter being given ; they being, in 
fact, only evolutions of the conditions which that notion neces- 
sarily implies : whereas the Secundo-primary and Secondary 
must be induced a posteriori ; both being attributes contingent- 
ly superadded to the naked notion of matter. The Primary 
Qualities thus fall more under the point of view of understand- 
ing, the Secundo-primary and Secondary more under tho point 
of view of Sense. 

Deduction of the Primary Qualities. — Space or extension is a 
necessary form of thought. We cannot think it as non-existent ; 
we cannot but think it as existent. But we are not so necessi- 
tated to imagine the reality of aught occupying space ; for while 
unable to conceive as null the space in which the material uni- 
verse exists, the material universe itself we can, without difficulty, 
annihilate in thought. All that exists in, all that occupies space, 
becomes, therefore, known to us by experience : we acquire, we 
construct, its notion. The notion of space is thus native, or a 
priori ; the notion of what space contains, adventitious, or a pos- 
teriori. Of this latter class is that of Body or Matter. 

But on the hypothesis, always, that body has been empirically 
apprehended, that its notion has been acquired ; — What are the 
a priori characters in and through which we must conceive that 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 355 

notion, if conceived it be at all, in contrast to the a posteriori 
characters under which we may, and probably do, conceive it, but 
under which, if we conceive it not, still the notion itself stands 
un annihilated ? In other words, what are the necessary or essen- 
tial, in contrast to the contingent or accidental properties of 
Body, as apprehended and conceived by us ? The answer to this 
question affords the class of Primary, as contradistinguished from 
the two classes of Secundo-primary and Secondaiy Qualities. 

Whatever answer may be accorded to the question — How do 
we come by our knowledge of Space or trinal extension ? it will 
be admitted on all hands, that whether given solely a priori as a 
native possession of the mind, whether acquired solely a posteri- 
ori as a generalization from the experience of sense, or whether, 
as I would maintain, we at once must think Space as a necessary 
notion, and do perceive the extended in space as an actual fact ; 
still, on any of these suppositions, it will be admitted, that we are 
only able to conceive Body as that which (I.) occupies space, and 
(II.) is contained in space. 

But these catholic conditions of body, though really simple, are 
logically complex. We may view them in different aspects or 
relations, which, though like the sides and angles of a triangle, 
incapable of separation, even in thought, supposing as they do 
each other, may still, in a certain sort, be considered for them- 
selves, and distinguished by different appellations. 

I. — The property of filling space (Solidity in its unexclusive 
signification, Solidity Simple) implies two correlative conditions : 
(A) the necessity of trinal extension, in length, breadth, and thick- 
ness (Solidity geometrical) ; and (B) the corresponding impossi- 
bility of being reduced from what is to what is not thus extended 
(Solidity Physical, Impenetrability). 

A. — Out of the absolute attribute of Trinal Extension may be 
again explicated three attributes, under the form of necessary re 
lations : — (i.) Number or Divisibility ; (ii.) Size, Bulk, or Mag- 
nitude ; (iii.) Shape or Figure. 

i. — Body necessarily exists, and is necessarily known, either as 



356 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

one body or as many bodies. Number, i. e. the alternative attri- 
bution of unity or plurality, is thus, in a first respect, a primary 
attribute of matter. But again, every single body is also, in dif- 
ferent points of view, at the same time one and many. Consid- 
ered as a whole, it is, and is apprehended, as actually one ; con- 
sidered as an extended whole, it is, and is conceived, potentially 
many. Body being thus necessarily known, if not as already 
divided, still as always capable of division, Divisibility or Num- 
ber is thus likewise, in a second respect, a primary attribute of 
matter. (Seep. 314 a.) 

ii. — Body (multo majus this or that body) is not infinitely ex 
tended. Each body must therefore have a certain finite exten- 
sion, which by comparison with that of other bodies must be less, 
or greater, or equal ; in other words, it must by relation have a 
certain Size, Bulk, or Magnitude ; and this, again, as estimated 
both (a) by the quantity of space occupied, and (b) by the quan- 
tity of matter occupying, affords likewise the relative attributes 
of Dense and Hare. 

iii. — Finally, bodies, as not infinitely extended, have, conse- 
quently, their extension bounded. But bounded extension is ne- 
cessarily of a certain Shape or Figure. 

B. — The negative notion — the impossibility of conceiving the 
compression of body from an extended to an unextended, its elim- 
ination out of space — affords the positive notion of an insupera- 
ble power in body of resisting such compression or elimination. 
This force, which, as absolute, is a conception of the understand- 
ing, not an apprehension through sense, has received no precise 
and unambiguous name ; for Solidity, even with the epithet 
Physical, and Impenetrability and Extreity are vague and equiv- 
ocal. — (See p. 334 c, note *.) We might call it, as I have said, 
Ultimate or Absolute Incompressibility. It would be better, 
however, to have a positive expression to denote a positive no- 
tion, and we might accordingly adopt, as a technical term, Autan- 
titypy. This is preferable to Antitypy (avriTwia), a word in 
Greek applied not only to this absolute and essential resistance 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 357 

of matter, qua matter, but also to the relative and accidental re- 
sistances from cohesion, inertia, and gravity. 

II. — The other most general attribute of matter — that of being 
contained in space — in like manner affords, by explication, an 
absolute and a relative attribute : viz. (A) the Mobility, that is, 
the possible motion, and, consequently, the possible rest, of a 
body ; and (B) the Situation, Position, Ubication, that is, the 
local correlation of bodies in space. For 

A. — Space being conceived as infinite (or rather being incon- 
ceivable as not infinite), and the place occupied by body as finite, 
body in general, and, of course, each body in particular, is con- 
ceived capable either of remaining in the place it now holds, or 
of being translated from that to any then unoccupied part of space. 
And 

B. — As every part of space, i. e. every potential place, holds a 
certain position relative to every other, so, consequently, must 
bodies, in so far as they are all contained in space, and as each 
occupies, at one time, one determinate place. 

To recapitulate : — The necessary constituents of our notion of 
Matter, the Primary Qualities of Body, are thus all evolved from 
the two catholic conditions of matter — (I.) the occupying space, 
and (II.) the being contained in space. Of these the former af- 
fords (A) Trinal Extension, explicated again into (i.) Divisibility, 
(ii.) Size, containing under it Density or Rarity, (iii.) Figure ; 
and (B) Ultimate Incompressibility : while the latter gives (A) 
Mobility; and (B) Situation. Neglecting subordination, we 
have thus eight proximate attributes ; 1, Extension ; 2, Divisi- 
bility ; 3, Size ; 4, Density, or Rarity ; 5, Figure ; 6, Incompres- 
sibility absolute ; 7, Mobility ; 8, Situation. 

The primary qualities of matter thus develop themselves with 
rigid necessity out of the simple datum of — substance occupying 
spiace. In a certain sort, and by contrast to the others, they are, 
therefore, notions a priori, and to be viewed, pro tanto, as prod- 
ucts of the understanding. The others, on the contrary, it is 
manifestly impossible to deduce, i. e. to evolve out of such a given 



358 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

notion. They must be induced, i. e. generalized from expe- 
rience ; are, therefore, in strict propriety, notions a posteriori, 
and, in the last resort, mere products of sense. The following 
may be given as consummative results of such induction in the 
establishment of the two classes of the Secundo-primarv and Sec- 
ondary Qualities. 

Induction of the Class of Secundo-primary Qualities. — This 
terminates in the following conclusions. — These qualities are mod- 
ifications, but contingent modifications, of the Primary. They 
suppose the Primary ; the Primary do not suppose them. They 
have all relation to space, and motion in space ; and are all con- 
tained under the category of Resistance or Pressure. For they 
are all only various forms of a relative or superable resistance to 
displacement, which, we learn by experience, bodies oppose to 
other bodies, and, among these, to our organism moving through 
space ; — a resistance similar in kind (and therefore clearly con- 
ceived) to that absolute or insuperable resistance, which we are 
compelled, independently of experience, to think that every part 
of matter would oppose to any attempt to deprive it of its space, 
by compressing it into an inextended. 

In so far, therefore, as they suppose the primary, which are 
necessary, while they themselves are only accidental, they exhibit, 
on the one side, what may be called a quasi primary quality ; 
and, in this respect, they are to be recognized as percepts, not 
sensations, as objective affections of things, and not as subjective 
affections of us. But, on the other side, this objective element is 
always found accompanied by a secondary quality or sensorial 
passion. The Secundo-primary qualities have thus always two 
phases, both immediately apprehended. On their primary or 
objective phasis they manifest themselves as degrees of resistance 
opposed to our locomotive energy ; on their secondary or sub- 
jective phasis, as modes of resistance or pressure affecting our 
sentient organism. Thus standing between, and, in a certain 
sort, made up of the two classes of Primary and Secondary qual- 
ities, to neither of which, however, can they be reduced ; this 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 359 

their partly common, partly peculiar nature, vindicates to them 
the dignity of a class apart from both the others, and this unde? 
the appropriate appellation of the Secundo-primary qualities. 

They admit of a classification from two different points of view 
They may be physically, they may be psychologically, distrib 
uted. — Considered physically, or in an objective relation, thej 
are to be reduced to classes corresponding to the different sources 
in external nature from which the resistance or pressure springs. 
And these sources are, in all, three : — (I.) that of Co-attraction ; 
(II.) that of Repulsion ; (III.) that of Inertia. 

I. — Of the resistance of Co-attraction there may be distin- 
guished, on the same objective principle, two subaltern genera ; 
to wit (A) that of Gravity, or the co-attraction of the particles of 
body in general ; and (B) that of Cohesion, or the co-attraction 
of the particles of this and that body in particular. 

A. — The resistance of Gravity or "Weight according to its de- 
gree (which, again, is in proportion to the Bulk and Density of 
ponderable matter) affords, under it, the relative qualities of 
Heavy and Light (absolute and specific). 

B. — The resistance of Cohesion (using that term in its most 
unexclusive universality) contains many species and counter- 
species. "Without proposing an exhaustive, or accurately subor- 
dinated, list ; — of these there may be enumerated (i.) the Hard 
and Soft ; (ii.) the Firm (Fixed, Stable, Concrete, Solid), and 
Fluid (Liquid), the Fluid being again subdivided into the Thick 
and Thin ; (iii.) the Viscid and Friable ; with (iv.) the Tough 
and Brittle (Irruptile and Euptile) ; (v.) the Rigid and Flexible ; 
(vi.) the Fissile and Infissile ; (vii.) the Ductile and Inductile 
(Extensible and Inextensible) ; (viii.) the Rectractile and Irretrac- 
tile (Elastic and Inelastic) ; (ix.) (combined with Figure) the 
Rough and Smooth ; (x.) the Slippery and Tenacious. 

II. — The resistance from Repulsion is divided into the counter 
qualities of (A) the (relatively) Compressible and Incompressible ; 
(B) the Resilient and Irresilient (Elastic and Inelastic). 

III. — The resistance from Imrtia (combined with Bulk and 



360 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Cohesion) comprises the counter qualities of the (relatively) 
Movable and Immovable. 

There are thus, at least, fifteen pairs of counter attributes 
which we may refer to the Secundo-primary Qualities of Body ; 
— all obtained by the division and subdivision of the resisting 
forces of matter, considered in an objective or physical point of 
view. [Compare Aristotle, Meteor. L. iv. c. 8.] 

Considered psychologically, or in a subjective relation, they are 
to be discriminated, under the genus of the Relatively resisting, 
[I.] according to the degree in which the resisting force might 
counteract our locomotive faculty or muscular force ; and, [IT.] 
according to the mode in which it might affect our capacity of 
feeling or sentient organism. Of these species, the former would 
contain under it the gradations of the quasi-primary quality, the 
latter the varieties of the secondary quality — these constituting 
the two elements of which, in combination, every Secundo-primary 
quality is made up. As, however, language does not afford us 
ierms by which these divisions and subdivisions can be unambig- 
uously marked, I shall not attempt to carry out the distribution, 
which is otherwise sufficiently obvious, in detail. — So much for 
the induction of the Secundo-primary qualities. 

But it has sometimes been said of the Secundo-primary quali- 
ties as of the Primary, that they are necessary characters in our 
notion of body ; and this has more particularly been asserted of 
Gravity, Cohesion, and Inertia. This doctrine, though never 
brought to proof, and never, I believe, even deliberately main- 
tained, it is, however, necessary to show, is wholly destitute of 
foundation. 

That Gravity, Cohesion, Inertia, and Repulsion, in their various 
modifications, are not conceived by us as necessary properties of 
matter, and that the resistances through which they are mani- 
fested do not therefore, psychologically, constitute any primary 
quality of body: this is evident, 1°, from the historical fact of 
the wavering and confliction of philosophical opinion, in regard 
to the nature of these properties ; and, 2°, from the response 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 361 

afforded to the question by our individual consciousness. These 
in their order : 

1. — The vascillation of philosophical opinion may be shown 
under two heads ; to wit, from the Psychological, and from the 
Physical, point of view. 

As to the Psychological point of view, the ambiguous, and at 
the same time the unessential, character of these qualities, is 
shown by the variation of philosophers in regard to which of the 
two classes of Primary or Secondary they would refer them ; for 
the opinion, that philosophers are in this at one, is an error aris- 
ing from the perfunctory manner in which this whole subject has 
hitherto been treated. Many philosophers in their schemes of 
classification, as Galileo, Boyle, Le Clerc, overlook, or at least 
omit to enumerate these qualities. In point of fact, however, 
they undoubtedly regarded them as Sensible, and therefore, as we 
shall see, as Secondary, qualities. The great majority of philos- 
ophers avowedly consider them as secondary. This is done, im- 
plicitly or explicitly, by Aristotle and the Aristotelians, by Galen, 
by Descartes* and his school, by Locke,f by Purchot, &c. ; for 
these philosophers refer Hardness, Softness, Roughness, Smooth- 
ness, and the like, to the Tactile qualities — the sensible qualities 
of Touch ; while they identify the sensible qualities in general, 
that is, the sensations proper of the several senses, with the class 
of Secondary, the percepts common to more than a single sense, 
with the class of Primary, qualities. In this Aristotle, indeed, is 



* See, besides what is said under Descartes, No. 9, Eegis, Phys. L. viii. 
P. ii. en. 2. Spinosa, Princ. Philos. Cartes. P. ii. Lem. 2, pr. 1. 

+ Compare Essay, B. ii. c. 3, § 1, and c. 4, § 4, and c. 8, §§ 14, 23; 
with Lee's Notes, B. ii. c. 8, § 4, p. 56. Looking superficially at certain 
casual ambiguities of Locke's language, we may, with Karnes, Beid, and 
philosophers in general, suppose him to have referred the qualities in 
question to the class of Primary. Looking more closely, we may hold 
him to have omitted them altogether, as inadvertently stated at p. 341 b. 
But looking critically to the whole analogy of the places now Quoted, and, 
in particular, considering the import of the term ' sensible qualities,' as 
then in ordinary use, we can have no doubt that, like the Peripatetics 
and Descartes, he viewed them as pertaining to the class of Secondary. 



362 PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 

found not always in unison with himself ; or rather, at different 
times he views as proximate the different phases presented by the 
qualities in question. . For though in general he regards the 
Rough and the Smooth as sensations proper to Touch (De Gen. 
et Corr. ii. 2, et alibi), on one occasion he reduces these to the 
class of common percepts, as modifications of Figure (De Sensu 
et Sensili, c. 4). Recently, however, without suspecting their con- 
fliction with the older authorities, nay, even in professed confor- 
mity with the doctrine of Descartes and Locke, psychologists 
have, with singular unanimity, concurred in considering the qual- 
ities in question as Primary. For to say nothing of the anom- 
alous and earlier statements of De La Forge and Du Hamel 
(Nos. 13, 14), and passing over, as hardly of psychological import, 
the opinion of Cotes (Prarf. ad Newtoni Princ. ed. 2), this has 
been done by Karnes, Reid, Fergusson, Stewart, and Royer-Col- 
lard — philosophers who may be regarded as the authors or prin- 
cipal representatives of the doctrine now prevalent among those 
by whom the distinction is admitted. 

Looking, therefore, under the surface at the state of psychologi 
cal opinion, no presumption, assuredly, can be drawn from the 
harmony of philosophers against the establishment of a class of 
qualities different from those of Primary and Secondary. On the 
contrary, the discrepancy of metaphysicians, not only with each 
other, but of the greatest even with themselves, as to which of 
these two classes the qualities 1 call Secundo-primary should be 
referred, does, in fact, afford a strong preliminary probability that 
these qualities can with propriety be reduced to neither ; them- 
selves, in fact, constituting a peculiar class, distinct from each, 
though intermediate between both. 

As to the Physical point of view, I shall exhibit in detail the 
variation of opinion in relation to the several classes of those qual- 
ities which this point of view affords. 

a. — Gravity. In regard to weight, this, so far from being uni 
versally admitted, from the necessity of its conception, to be an 
essential attribute of body, philosophers, ancient and modern,. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

veiy generally disallow all matter to be heavy ; and many Lave 
even dogmatically asserted to certain kinds of matter a positive 
levity. This last was done by Aristotle, and his Greek, Arabian, 
and Latin followers ; i. e. by the philosophic . world in general for 
nearly two thousand years. At a recent period, the same doctrine 
was maintained, as actually true, by Gren and other advocates of 
the hypothesis of Phlogiston, among many more who allowed its 
truth as possible ; and Newton had previously found it necessary 
to clothe his universal ether with a quality of negative gravity 
(or positive lightness), in order to enable him hypothetically to 
account for the phenomenon of positive gravity in other matter. 

Of Gravity, some, indeed, have held the cause to be internal 
and essential to matter. Of these we have the ancient Atomists 
(Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus, <fec), with Plato and a few in- 
dividual Aristotelians, as Strato and Themistius ; and in modern 
times a section of the Newtonians, as Cotes, Freind, Keill, with 
Boscovich, Kant, Karnes, Schelling, and Hegel. But though 
holding (physically) weight to be, de facto, an essential property 
of matter, these philosophers were far from holding (psychologi- 
cally) the character of weight to be an essential constituent of the 
notion of mattter. Kant, for example, when speaking psychologi- 
cally, asserts that weight is only a synthetic predicate which ex- 
perience enables us to add on to our prior notion of body (Cr. d. 
r. Vern. p. 12, ed. 2 — Proleg. § 2, p. 25, ed. 1.) ; whereas, when 
speaking physically, he contends that weight is a universal attri- 
bute of matter, as a necessary condition of its existence (Met. 
Anfangsgr. d. Naturwiss. p. 71, ed. 2). 

But the latter opinion — that weight is only, in reality, as in 
thought, an accident of body — is that adopted by the immense 
majority, not only of philosophers, but of natural philosophers. 
Under various modifications, however ; some, for example, hold- 
ing the external cause of gravity to be physical, others to be hy- 
perphysical. Neglecting subordinate distinctions, to this class 
belong Anaxagoras, Democritus, Melissus, Diogenes of Apollonia, 
Aristotle and his school, Algazel, Avicembron, Copernicus, Bruno, 



364 PHILOSOPHY OP PERCEPTION. 

Kepler, Gilbert, Berigardus, Digby, Torricelli, Descartes, Gas- 
sendi, Lana, Kircber, Andala, Malebrancbe, Rohault, De Guer- 
icke, Perrault, H. Moore,Cudwortb, Du Hamel, Huygens, Sturmius, 
Hooke, Is. Vossius, Newton, S. Clarke, Halley, Leibnitz, Sanrin, 
Wolf, Mueller, Bilfinger, tbe Bernoullis James and Jobn, Canz, 
Harnberger, Varignon, Villemot, Fatio, Euler, Baxter, Colclen, 
Saussure, Le Sage, L'Huillier, Prevost, De Luc, Monboddo, Hors- 
ley, Drummond, Playfair, Blair, &c. In , particular tbis doctrine 
is often and anxiously inculcated by Newton — wbo seems, indeed, 
to bave sometimes inclined even to an immaterial cause ; but tbis 
more especially after bis follower, Cotes, bad ventured to announce 
an adbesion to tbe counter tbeory, in bis preface to tbe second 
edition of tbe ' Principia,' wbicb he procured in 1713. See New- 
ton's letter to Boyle, 1678 — Letters, second and third, to Bentley, 
1693 ; — Principia, L. i. c. 5. L. iii. reg. 3, alibi ; — in particular, 
Optics, ed. 1717, B. iii. Qu. 21. 

b. — Cohesion, comprehending under that term not only Cohe- 
sion proper, but all the specific forces (Adhesion, Capillarity, 
Chemical Affinity, &c), by which the particles of individual bod- 
ies tend to approach, and to maintain themselves in union — Co- 
hesion is even less than Gravity, than the force by which matter 
in general attracts matter, a character essential to our notion of 
body. Upon Gravity, indeed, a majority of the earlier Newto- 
nians maintained Cohesion, in some inexplicable manner, to de- 
pend ; and the other hypotheses of an external agency, all pro- 
ceed upon the supposition that it is merely an accident of matter. 
Cohesion, the cause of which Locke wisely regarded as inconceiv- 
able, Descartes attempted to explain by the quiescence of the ad- 
joining molecules ; Malebranche (as an occasional cause), by the 
agitation of a pervading invisible matter ; Stair, by the pressure 
(whence, he does not state) of the physical points, his supposed 
constituents of body, to a common centre ; and James Bernoulli, 
by the pressure of a circumambient fluid — an hypothesis to which 
Newton likewise seems to have inclined : while a host of others, 
following Algazel and Avicembron, Biel and D'Ailly, spurned all 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 365 

mechanical media, these being themselves equally inexplicable as 
the phenomenon in question, and resorted to the immediate 
agency of an immaterial principle. The psychologists, therefore, 
who (probably from confounding hardness with solidity, solidity 
with impenetrability) have carried up the resistance of cohesion 
into the class of primary qualities, find but little countenance for 
their procedure, even among the crude precedents of physical 
speculation. 

c. — Vis Inertice. But if, on the ground of philosophical agree- 
ment, Gravity and Cohesion are not to be regarded as primary 
qualities of matter ; this dignity is even less to be accorded to 
that force by which bodies resist any change of state, whether that 
be one of quiescence or of motion. This, variously known under 
the names of Vis Inertias, Inertia, Vis Insita Resistentiae, Resisten 
tia Passiva, &c, was, indeed, if not first noticed, only first gener 
alized at a comparatively recent period — to wit, by Kepler; 
while the subsequent controversies in regard to its nature and 
comprehension, equally concur in showing that there is no neces- 
sity for thinking it as an essential attribute of matter. The Car- 
tesians, among others, viewed it as a quality not only derivative, 
but contingent ; and even those Newtonians, who, in opposition 
to Newton, raised Gravity to the rank of a primary quality, did 
not, however, venture to include inertia under the same category. 
(See Cotes's Preface to the second edition of the Principia.) 
Leibnitz, followed, among others, by Wolf, divided this force into 
two ; — discriminating the vis activa or motrix, from the vis pas- 
siva or inertia;. The former they held not to be naturally inher- 
ent in, but only supernaturally impressed on, matter. Without 
reference to Leibnitz, a similar distinction was taken by D'Alem- 
bert, in which he is followed by Destutt de Tracy ; a distinction, 
as we have seen, which also found favor with Lord Karnes, who 
in this, however, stands alone among metaphysicians, that he 
places both his vis inertia; and vis incita among the primary qual- 
ities of body. 

Finally, Physical speculators, in general, distinguish Inertia and 



366 PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTTON. 

Weight, as powers, though proportional, still distinct. Many, 
however, following Wiedeburg, view the former as only a modifi- 
cation or phasis of the latter. 

d. — Repulsion, meaning by that term more than the resist- 
ance of impenetrability, gravity, cohesion, or inertia, has, least 
of all, authority to plead in favor of its pretension to the 
dignity of a primary quality. The dynamical theories of mat- 
ter, indeed, view Attraction and Repulsion not merely as fun- 
damental qualities, but even as its generic forces ; but the 
ground of this is the necessity of the hypothesis, not the neces- 
sity of thought. 

2. — But the voice of our individual consciousness is a more di- 
rect and cogent evidence than the history of foreign opinion ; — 
and this is still less favorable to the claim in question. The only 
resistance which we think as necessary to the conception of body, 
is a resistance to the occupation of a body's space — the resistance 
of ultimate incompressibility. The others, with their causes, we 
think only as contingent, because, one and all of them we can 
easily annihilate in thought. 

Repulsion (to take them backwards) — a resistance to the 
approximation and contact of other matter — we come only by a 
late and learned experience to view as an attribute of body, and 
of the elements of body ; nay, so far is it from being a character 
essential in our notion of matter, it remains, as apparently an ac- 
tio in distans, even when forced upon us as a fact, still inconceiv- 
able as a possibility. Accordingly, by no philosopher has the re- 
sistance of Repulsion been psychologically regarded as among the 
primary qualities. 

Nor has Inertia a greatly higher claim to this distinction. 
There is no impossibility, there is little difficulty, in imagining a 
thing, occupying space, and therefore a body ; and yet, without 
attraction or repulsion for any other body, and wholly indifferent, 
to this or that position, in space, to motion and to rest ; opposing, 
therefore, no resistance to any displacing power. Such imagina- 
tion is opposed to experience, and consequently to our acquired 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 367 

habitudes of conceiving body ; but it is not opposed to the neces- 
sary conditions of that concept itself. 

It was on this psychological ground that Descartes reduced in- 
ertia to a mere accident of extension. Physically reasoning, Des- 
cartes may not perhaps be right ; but Karnes is certainly, as he 
is singularly wrong, in psychologically recognizing Inertia as a 
primary attribute of body. 

Of the two attractions, Cohesion is not constituent of the notion 
of what occupies, or is trinally extended in space. This notion 
involves only the supposition of parts out of parts ; and although 
what fills an uninterrupted portion of space, is, pro tanto, consider- 
ed by us as one thing ; the unity which the parts of this obtain in 
thought, is not the internal unity of cohesion, but the external 
unity of continuity or juxtaposition. Under the notion of reple- 
tion of space, a rock has not in thought a higher unity than a pile 
of sand. Cohesion, consequently, is not, in a psychological view, 
an essential attribute of body. [In saying this, I may notice pa- 
renthetically, that I speak of cohesion only as between the ulti- 
mate elements of body, ivhatever these maybe ; and fortunately 
our present discussion does not require us to go higher, that is, to 
regard cohesion in reference to our conception of these considered 
in themselves. In forming to ourselves such concept, two counter 
inconceivabilities present themselves, — inconceivabilities from the 
one or other of which, as speculators have recoiled, they have em- 
braced one or other of the counter theories of Atomism and Dy- 
namism.] But if cohesion be not thought as an essential attribute 
of body, Karnes, Eeid, Fergusson, Stewart, Eoyer-Collard, and 
other recent philosophers, were wrong to introduce the degrees of 
cohesive resistance among the primary qualities ; either avowedly 
under the explicit titles of the Hard, the Soft, &c, or covertly, 
under the ambiguous head of Solidity. But though Locke did 
not, as they believe, precede them in this doctrine, his language, 
to say the least of it, is unguarded and inaccurate. For he em- 
ploys cohesion and continuity as convertible terms ; and states, 
without the requisite qualification, that ' upon the solidity [to him 



368 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

the impenetrability or ultimate ineompressibility] of bodies de- 
pend their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion.' (ii. 4, 5.) 

As to Weight, — we have from our earliest experience been ac- 
customed to find all tangible bodies in a state of gravitation ; and 
by the providence of nature, the child has, even anteriorly to 
experience, an instinctive anticipation of this law in relation to 
his own. This has given weight an advantage over the other 
qualities of the same class ; and it is probably through these influ- 
ences, that certain philosophers have been disposed to regard 
gravity, as, physically and psychologically, a primary quality of 
matter. But instinct and consuetude notwithstanding, we find 
no difficulty in imagining the general co-attraction of matter to 
be annihilated ; nay, not only annihilated, but reversed. For as 
attraction and repulsion seem equally actiones in distans, it is not 
more difficult to realize to ourselves the notion of the one, than 
the notion of the other. 

In reference to both Cohesion and Gravity, I may notice, that 
though it is only by experience we come to attribute an internal 
unity to aught continuously extended, that is, consider it as a sys- 
tem or constituted whole ; still, in so far as we do so consider it, 
we think the parts as held together by a certain force, and the 
whole, therefore, as endowed with a power of resisting their 
distraction. It is, indeed, only by finding that a material conti- 
nuity resists distraction, that we view it as more than a fortuitous 
aggregation of many bodies, that is, as a single body. The mate- 
rial universe, for example, though not de facto continuously ex- 
tended, we consider as one system, in so far, but only in so far, as 
we find all bodies tending together by reciprocal attraction. But 
here I may add, that though a love of unity may bias us, there is 
no necessity for supposing this co-attraction to be the effect of any 
single force. It may be the result of any plurality of forces, pro- 
vided that these co-operate in due subordination. Thus we are 
not constrained to view the universe of matter as held together by 
the power of gravity alone. For though gravity be recognized as 
the prime, proximate, and most pervading principle of co-attrac- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 369 

tion, still, until the fact be proved, we are not required to view it 
as the sole. We may suppose that a certain complement of 
parts are endowed with weight ; and that the others, immediate- 
ly and in themselves indifferent to gravitation, are mediately 
drawn within its sphere, through some special affinity or attrac- 
tion subsisting between them and the bodies immediately subject- 
ed to its influence. Let the letters A, B, C, x, y, z, represent in 
general the universe of matter ; the capital letters representing, in 
particular, the kinds of matter possessed of, the minor letters re- 
presenting the kinds of matter destitute of weight. Of themselves, 
A., B, C will, therefore, gravitate ; x, y, z will not. But if x have 
a peculiar affinity for A, y for B, and z for C ; x, y, z, though in 
themselves weightless, will, through their correlation to A, B, C, 
come mediately under the influence of gravitation, and enter along 
with their relatives, as parts, into the whole of which gravity is 
the proximate bond of unity. To prove, therefore, a priori, or on 
any general principle whatever, that no matter is destitute of 
weight, is manifestly impossible. All matter may possibly be 
heavy : but until experiment can decide, by showing, in detail, 
that what are now generally regarded as imponderable fluids, are 
either in truth ponderable substances, or not substances at all, we 
have no data on which to infer more than a conjectural affirma- 
tive of little probability. On the dynamical theories of matter, 
the attempts made from Boscovich to Hegel, to demonstrate that 
weight is a catholic property, as a fundamental condition of mat- 
ter, are all founded on petitory premises. This is justly ac 
knowledged by Hegel himself of the Kantian deduction (Werke, 
vol. vii. p. i. § 262) ;, and, were the proof of psychological con- 
cernment, the same might no less justly be demonstrated of his 
own.* 

* Since -writing the above, I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. WheweU 
for his 'Demonstration that all Matter is Heavy,' published in the Transac- 
tions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, Vol. vii. Part ii. ; — an author 
whose energy and talent all must admire, even while convinced the least by 
the cogency of his reasoning. As this demonstration proceeds not on a 
mere physical ground, but on the ground of a certain logical or psychologi- 
23 



370 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Induction of the Secondary Qualities. — Its results are the fol- 
lowing. — The Secondary as manifested to us, are not, in propriety, 
qualities of Body at all. As apprehended, they are only sub- 

<;al law, and as it is otherwise diametrically opposed to the whole tenor of 
the doctrine previously maintained, I shaU briefly consider it in its general 
bearing; — which Mr. Whewell thus states, afterwards illustrating it in 
detail : 

' The question then occurs, whether wo can, by any steps of reasoning, 
point out an inconsistency in the conception of matter without weight. This 
I conceive we may do, and this I shall attempt to show. The general mode 
of stating the argument is this : — The quantity of matter is measured by 
those sensible properties of matter [Weight and Inertia] which undergo 
quantitative addition, subtraction, and division, as the matter is added, sub- 
tracted, and divided. The quantity of matter cannot be known in any other 
way. But this mode of measuring the quantity of matter, in order to be 
true at all, must be universally true. If it were only partially true, the 
limits within which it is to be applied would be arbitrary ; and, therefore, the 
whole procedure would be arbitrary, and, as a method of obtaining philo- 
sophical truth, altogether futile.' [But this is not to be admitted. ' We 
must suppose the rule to be universal. If any bodies have weight, all bod- 
ies must have weight.'] 

1°. This reasoning assumes in chief that we cannot but have it in our 
power, by some means or other, to ascertain the quantity of matter as a 
physical truth. But gratuitously. For why may not the quantity of matter 
be one of that multitude of problems, placed beyond the reach, not of human 
curiosity, but of human determination ? 

2°. But, subordinate to the assumption that some measure we must have, 
the reasoning further supposes that a measure of the weight (and inertia) is 
the only measure we can have of the quantity of matter. But is even this 
correct ? We may, certainly, attempt to estimate the quantity of matter by 
the quantity of two, at least, of the properties of matter ; to wit — a) by the 
quantity of space of which it is found to resist the occupation ; and — b) by 
the quantity of weight (and inertia), which it manifests. We need not 
inquire whether, were these measures harmonious in result, they would, in 
combination, supply a competent criterion ; for they are at variance ; and, 
if either, one must be exclusively selected. Of the two, the former, indeed, 
at first sight, recommends itself as the alone authentic. For the quantity of 
matter is, on all hands, admitted to be in proportion to the quantity of space 
it fills, extension being necessarily thought as the essential property of body ; 
whereas it is not universally admitted that the quantity of matter is in pro- 
portion to its amount of weight and inertia ; these being, on the contrary, 
conceivable and generally conceived as adventitious accidents, and not, 
therefore, as necessary concomitants of matter. But then it may be compe^ 
tently objected, — The cubical extension of compressed bodies cannot be 
taken as an authentic measure of the quantity of space they fill, because we 
are not assured that the degree of compressing force which we can actually 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEFLTON. 371 

jective affections, and belong only to bodies in so far as these are 
supposed furnished with the powers capable of specifically deter- 
mining the various parts of our nervous apparatus to the peculiar 
action, or rather passion, of which they are susceptible ; which 
determined action or passion is the quality of which alone we are 
immediately cognizant, the external concause of that internal 
effect remaining to perception altogether unknown. Thus, the 
Secondary qualities (and the same is to be said, mutatis mutan- 
dis, of the Secun do-primary) are, considered subjectively, and 
considered objectively, affections or qualities of things diamet- 
rically opposed in nature — of the organic and inorganic, of the 
sentient and insentient, of mind and matter : and though, as mu- 
tually correlative, and their several pairs rarely obtaining in com- 
mon language more than a single name, they cannot well be con- 
sidered, except in conjuction, under the same category or general 
class ; still their essential contrast of character must be ever care- 
fully borne in mind. And in speaking of these qualities, as we 
are here chiefly concerned with them on their subjective side, I 



apply is an accurate index of what their cubical extension would be in a 
state of ultimate or closest compression. But though this objection must be 
admitted to invalidate the certainty of the more direct and probable crite- 
rion, it does not, however, leave the problem to be determined by the other , 
against which, indeed, it falls to be no less effectually retorted. For as lit- 
le, at least, can we be assured that there is not (either separately, or in com- 
bination with gravitating matter) substance occupying space, and, therefore, 
material, but which, being destitute of weight, is, on the standard of pon- 
derability, precisely as if it did not exist. This supposition, be it observed, 
the experiments of Newton and Bessel do not exclude. Nay, more ; there 
are, in fact, obtruded on our observation a series of apparent fluids (as 
Light, or its vehicle, the Calorific., Electro-galvanic, and Magnetic agents), 
which, in our present state of knowledge, we can neither, on the one hand, 
denude of the character of substance, nor, on the other, close with the attri- 
bute of weight. 

3». This argument finally supposes, as a logical canon, that a presumption 
from analogy affords a criterion of truth, subjectively necessary, and objec- 
tively certain. But not the former ; for however inclined, we are never 
necessitated, a posteriori, to think, that because some are, therefore ail the 
constituents of a class must he, the subjects of a predicate a priori contingent. 
Not the latter; for though a useful stimulus and guide to investigation, 
analogy is, by itself, a very doubtful guarantee of truth. 



372 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

request it may be observed, that I shall employ the expression 
Secondary qualities to denote those phenomenal affections deter- 
mined in our sentient organism by the agency of external bodies, 
and not, unless when otherwise stated, the occult powers them- 
selves from which that agency proceeds. 

Of the Secondary qualities, in this relation, there are various 
kinds ; the variety principally depending on the differences of the 
different parts of our nervous apparatus. Such are the proper 
sensibles, the idiopathic affections of our several organs of sense, 
as Color, Sound, Flavor, Savor, and Tactual sensation ; such are 
the feelings from Heat, Electricity, Galvanism, &c. ; nor need it 
be added, such are the muscular and cutaneous sensations which 
accompany the perception of the Secundo-primary qualities. 
Such, though less directly the result of foreign causes, are Titil- 
lation, Sneezing, Horripilation, Shuddering, the feeling of what is 
called Setting-the-teeth-on-edge, &c, &c. ; such, in fine, are all 
the various sensations of bodily pleasure and pain determined by 
the action of external stimuli. — So much for the induction of the 
Secondary Qualities in a subjective relation. 

It is here, however, requisite to add some words of illustration. 
— What are denominated the secondary qualities of body, are, I 
have said, as apprehended, not qualities of body at all ; being 
mly idiopathic affections of the different portions of our nervous 
organism — affections which, however uniform and similar in us, 
may be determined by the most dissimilar and multiform causes 
in external things. This is manifest from the physiology of our 
senses and their appropriate nerves. Without entering on details, 
it is sufficient to observe, that we are endowed with various as- 
sortments of nerves ; each of these being astricted to certain defi- 
nite functions; and each exclusively discharging the function 
which specially belongs to it. Thus there are nerves of feeling 
(comprehending under that term the sensations of cutaneous 
touch and feeling proper, of the muscular sense, and of the vital 
sense, or sensus vagus, in all its modifications), of seeing, of hear- 
ing, of smelling, of tasting, &c. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 373 

The nerves of feeling afford us sensations to which, in opposite 
extremes, we emphatically, if not exclusively, attribute the qual- 
ities of pain and pleasure. Acute pain — pain from laceration — 
may, indeed, be said to belong exclusively to these ; for the 
nerves appropriated to the other and more determinate senses, 
are, like the brain, in this respect altogether insensible ; and it is 
even probable that the pain we experience from their over-excite- 
ment is dependent on the nerves of feeling with which they are 
accompanied. Now pain and pleasure no one has ever attributed 
as qualities to external things : feeling has always been regarded 
as purely subjective, and it has been universally admitted that its 
affections, indicating only certain conscious states of the sentient 
animal, afforded no inference even to definite causes of its produc- 
tion in external nature. So far there is no dispute. 

The case may, at first sight, seem different with regard to the 
sensations proper to the more determinate senses ; but a slight 
consideration may suffice to satisfy us that these are no less sub- 
jective than the others ; — as is indeed indicated in the history al- 
ready given of the distinction of Primary and Secondary quali- 
ties. As, however, of a more definite character, it is generally, I 
believe, supposed that these senses, though they may not pre- 
cisely convey material qualities from external existence to internal 
knowledge, still enable us at least to infer the possession by 
bodies of certain specific powers, each capable exclusively of exci- 
ting a certain correlative manifestation in us. But even this is 
according greatly too large a share in the total sensitive effect to 
the objective concause. The sensations proper to the several 
senses depend, for the distinctive character of their manifestation, 
on the peculiar character of the action of their several nerves ; and 
not, as is commonly supposed, on the exclusive susceptibility of 
these nerves for certain specific stimuli. In fact every the most 
different stimulus (and there are many such, both extra and in- 
tra-organic, besides the one viewed as proper to the sense), which 
can be brought to bear on each several nerve of sense, determines 
that nerve only to its one peculiar sensation. Thus the stimulus 



374. PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

by the external agent exclusively denominated Light, though the 
more common, is not the only stimulus which excites in the vis- 
ual apparatus the subjective affection of light and colors. Sensa- 
tions of light and colors, are determined among other causes, from 
within, by a sanguineous congestion in the capillary vessels of 
the optic nerve, or by various chemical agents which affect it 
through the medium of the blood ; from, without, by the applica- 
tion to the same nerve of a mechanical force, as a blow, a com- 
pression, a wound, or of an imponderable influence, as electricity 
or galvanism. In fact' the whole actual phenomena of vision 
might be realized to us by the substitution of an electro-galvanic 
stimulus, were this radiated in sufficient intensity from bodies, 
and in conformity with optical laws. The blind from birth are 
thus rarely without all experience of light, color, and visual ex- 
tension, from stimulation of the interior organism. — The same is 
the case with the other senses. Apply the aforementioned or 
other extraordinary stimuli to their several nerves ; each sense 
will be excited to its appropriate sensation, and its appropriate 
sensation alone. The passion manifested (however heterogeneous 
its external or internal cause) is always — of the auditory nerves, 
a sound, of the olfactory, a smell, of the gustatory, a taste. But 
of the various common agencies which thus excite these several 
organs to their idiopathic affection, we are manifestly no more 
entitled to predicate the individual color, sound, odor, or savor of 
which, in each case, we have a sensation, than we are to attrib- 
ute the pain we feel to the pin by which we are pricked. But if 
this must per force be admitted of the extraordinary external 
causes of these sensations, it is impossible to deny it of the ordi- 
nary. 

In this respect Aristotle (and the same may also be said of 
Theophrastus) was far in advance of many of our modern philos- 
ophers. In his treatise on Dreams, to prove that sensation is 
not a purely objective cognition, but much more a subjective 
modification or passion of the organ, he shows, and with a detail 
very unusual to him, that this sensible affection does not cease 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 375 

with the presence, and, therefore, does not manifest the quality, 
of the external object. ' This (he says) is apparent so often as we 
have the sensation of a thing for a certain continuance. For then, 
divert as we may the sense from one object to another, still the 
affection from the first accompanies the second ; as (for example) 
when we pass from sunshine into shade. In this case we at first 
see nothing, because of the movement in the eyes still subsisting, 
which had been determined by the light. In like manner if we 
gaze for a while ujton a single color, say white or green, whatev- 
er we may now turn our sight on will appear of that tint. And 
if, after looting at the sun or other dazzling object, we close our 
eyelids, we shall find, if we observe, that, in the line of vision, 
there first of all appears a color such as we had previously beheld, 
which then changes to red, then to purple, until at last the affec- 
tion vanishes in black;' — with more to the same effect. (C. 2.) 
And in the same chapter he anticipates modern psychologists in 
the observation — that ' Sometimes, when suddenly awoke, we 
discover, from their not incontinently vanishing, that the images 
which had appeared to us when asleep are really movements in 
the organs of sense ; and to young persons it not unfrequently 
happens, even when wide awake, and withdrawn from the excite- 
ment of light, that moving images present themselves so vividly, 
that for fear they are wont to hide themselves under the bed- 
clothes.' (C 2.) See also Ockham, in Sent., L. ii. qq. 17, 18. — 
Biel, in Sent., L. ii. Dist. iii. q. 2. — Berigardus, Circulus Pisa- 
nus, P. vi. Circ. 12, ed. 2. — Holbes, Human Nature, ch. ii. § 7- 
10. — Boerhaave, Praelectiones in proprias Institutiones, §§ 284, 
579. — Sprengel, Semiotik, § 770-773 ; Pathologie, vol. ii. § 719. 
— Gruithuisen, Anthropologic, § 449. — Sir Charles Bell, An 
Idea, &c. (in Shaw's Narrative, p. 35, sq.); The Hand, <fec, p. 
175, sq. — Plateau, Essai d'une Theorie, &c, p. . — J. Mueller, 
Physiology, Book v.. Preliminary Considerations, p. 1059, sq., 
Engl. Transl. 

Such being the purely subjective character of the secondary 
qualities, as apprehended or immediately known by us, we must 



376 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

reject as untenable the doctrine on this point, however ingenious- 
ly supported, of the celebrated Neapolitan philosopher, Baron 
Galluppi ; who, while, justly I think, dissatisfied with the opinion 
of Reid, that the perception of the primary qualities is a concep- 
tion instinctively suggested on occasion of our sensation of the 
secondary, errs on the opposite extreme, in his attempt to show 
that this sensation itself affords us what is wanted, — an immedi- 
ate cognition, an objective apprehension, of external things. The 
result of his doctrine he thus himself states : — ' Sensation is of 
its very nature objective ; in other words, objectivity is essential 
to every sensation. 11 Elementi di Filosofia, vol. i. c. 10, ed. 4, 
Florence, 1837. The matter is more amply treated in his Criti- 
ca della Conoscenza, L. ii. c. 6, and L. iv. — a work which I have 
not yet seen. Compare Bonelli, Institutiones Logico-Metaphysi- 
ca3, t. i. pp. 184, 222, ed. 2, 1837. 

Such is the general view .of the grounds on which the psycho- 
logical distinction of the Qualities of Bodies, into the three classes 
of Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary is established. It 
now remains to exhibit their mutual differences and similarities 
more in detail. In attempting this, the following order will be 
pursued. — I shall state of the three relative classes, — (A) What 
they are, considered in general ; then, (B) What they are, consid- 
ered in particular. And under this latter head I shall view 
them, (1°) as in Bodies: (2°) as in Cognition; and this (a) as 
in Sensitive Apprehension ; (b) as in Thought ; (c) as in both. 
— For the conveniency of reference the paragraphs will be num- 
bered. 

A. — What they are in general. 

1 . The Primary are less properly denominated Qualities (Such- 
r_ 3sses), and deserve the name only as we conceive them to dis- 
tinguish body from not-body, — corporeal from incorporeal sub- 
stance. They are thus merely the attributes of body as body, — 
corporis ut corpus. The Secundo-primary and Secondary, on 
the contrary, are in strict propriety denominated Qualities, for 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 377 

they discriminate body from body. They are the attributes of 
body as this or that kind of body, — coporis ut tale corpus.* 

2. The Primary rise from the universal relations of body to 
itself; the Secundo-primary from the general relations of this 
body to that; the Secondary from the special relations of this 
hind of body to this kind of animated or sentient organism. 

3. The Primary determine the possibility of matter absolutely ; 
the Secundo-primary, the possibility of the material universe as 
actually constituted ; the Secondary, the possibility of our rela- 
tion as sentient existences to that universe. 

4. Under the Primary we apprehend modes of the Non-ego ; 
under the Secundo-primary we apprehend modes both of the Ego 
and of the Non-ego ; under the Secondary we apprehend modes 
of the Ego, and infer modes of the Non-ego. (See par. 15.) 

5. The Primary are apprehended as they are in bodies ; the 
Secondary, as they are in us ; the Secundo-primary, as they are 
in bodies, and as they are in us. (See par. 15.) 

6. The term quality in general, and the names of the several 
qualities in particular, are — in the case of the primary, univocal, 
one designation unambiguously marking out one quality ;f — in the 
case of the Secundo-primary and Secondary, equivocal, a single 
term being ambiguously applied to denote two qualities, distinct 
though correlative — that, to wit, which is a mode of existence in 
bodies, and that which is a mode of affection in our organising 
(See par. 24.) 

* Thus in the Aristotelic and other philosophies, the title Quality would 
not he allowed to those fundamental conditions on which the very possibility 
of matter depends, hut which modern philosophers have denominated its 
Primary Qualities. 

t For example, there is no subjective Sensation of Magnitude, Figure, 
Number, &c, but only an objective Perception. (See par. 15-19.) 

% Thus, in the Secundo-primary the term Hardness, for instance, denotes 
both a certain resistance, of which we are conscious, to our motive energy, 
and a certain feeling from pressure on our nerves. The former, a Perception, 
is wholly different from the latter, a Sensation ; and we can easily imagine 
that we might have been so constituted, as to apprehend Eesistance as we do 
Magnitude, Figure, &c, without a corresponding organic passion. (See par. 
18.) — In the Secondary the term Heat, for example, denotes ambiguously both 



378 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

7. The Primary, and also the Secundo-priruary qualities, are 
definite in number and exhaustive ; for all conceivable relations 
of body to itself, or of body to body merely, are few, and all these 
found actually existent. The Secondary, on. the contrary, are in 
number indefinite ; and the actual hold no proportion to the pos- 
sible. For we can suppose, in an animal organism, any number of 
unknown capacities of being variously affected ; and, in matter, 
any number of unknown powers of thus variously affecting it ;* 
and this though we are necessarily unable to imagine to ourselves 
what these actually may be. 

B. — What they are in particular ; and 1°, Considered as in 

Bodies. 

8. The Primary are the qualities of body in relation to our or- 
ganism, as a body simply ; the Secundo-prirnary, are the qualities 
of body in relation to our organism, as a propelling, resisting, co- 
hesive body ; the Secondary are the qualities of body in relation 
to our organism, as an idiopathically excitable and sentient body. 
(See p. 374 b— 376 a.) 

9. Under this head we know the Primary qualities immedi- 
ately as objects of perception ; the Secundo-prirnary, both imme- 
diately as objects of perception and mediately as causes of sen- 
sation ; the Secondary, only mediately as causes of sensation. 
In other words : — The Primary are known immediately in them- 
selves ; the Secundo-prirnary, both immediately in themselves and 
mediately in their effects on us ; the Secondary, only mediately 
in their effects on us. (See par. 15.) 

10. The Primary are known under the condition of sensations ; 
the Secundo-prirnary, in and along with sensations ; the Second- 
ary, in consequence of sensations. (See par. 20.) 

the quality which we infer to be in bodies and the quality of which we are 
conscious in ourselves. 

* Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, Voltaire, Hemsterhuis, Krueger, &c, no- 
tice this as possible ; but do not distinguish the possibility as limited to the 
Secondary Qualities. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 379 

11. The Primary are thus apprehended objects ; the Secondary, 
inferred powers ; the Secundo-primary, both apprehended objects 
and inferred powers. 

12. The Primary are conceived as necessary and perceived as 
actual ; the Secundo-primary are perceived and conceived a? 
actual ; the Secondary are inferred and conceived as possible. 

13. The Primary are perceived as conceived. The Secundo- 
primary are conceived as perceived. The Secondary are neither 
perceived as conceived, nor conceived as perceived ; — for to per- 
ception they are occult, and are conceived only as latent causes to 
account for manifest effects. (See par. 15, and foot-note *.) 

14. The Primary may be roundly characterized as mathemat- 
ical; the Secundo-primary, as mechanical; the Secondary, as 
physiological. 

2°. Considered as Cognitions ; and here (a) As in Sensitive 
Apprehension, or in relation to Sense. 

15. In this relation the Primary qualities are, as apprehended, 
unambiguously objective (object-objects) ; the Secondary, unam- 
biguously subjective (subject-objects) ;* the Secundo-primary, 
both objective and subjective (object-objects and subject-objects). 
In other words : — We are conscious, as objects, in the Primaiy 
qualities, of the modes of a not-self; in the Secondary, of the 
modes of self;* in the Secundo-primary, of the modes of self and 
of a not-self at once.f 

* How much this differs from the doctrine of Eeid, Stewart, &c, who hold 
that in every sensation there is not only a subjective object of sensation, but, 
also an objective object of perception, see Note D*, § l. 1 

t In illustration of this paragraph, I must notice a confusion and ambigu- 
ity in the very cardinal distinction of psycbology and its terms — the distinc- 
tion I mean of subjective and objective, which, as far as I am aware, has never 
been cleared up, nay, never even brought clearly into view. 

Our nervous organism (the rest of our body may be fairly thrown out of 
account), in contrast to all exterior to itself, appertains to the concrete human 
Ego, and in this respect is subjective, internal ; whereas, in contrast to the 



1 Chapter vi. below, in this vol. — W. 



380 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

16. Using the terms strictly, the apprehensions of the Primary 
are perceptions, not sensations ; of the Secondary, sensations, not 
perceptions ; of the Secnndo-primary, perceptions and sensations 
together. (See par. 15, foot-note *.) 



abstract immaterial Ego, the pure mind, it belongs to the Non-ego, and in 
this respect is objective, external. Here is one source of ambiguity sufficiently 
perplexing ; but the discrimination is here comparatively manifest, and any 
important inconvenience from the employment of the terms may, with prop- 
er attention, be avoided. 

The following problem is more difficult. Looking from the mind, and not 
looking beyond our animated organism, are the phenomena of which we are 
conscious in that organism all upon a level, i. e., equally objective or equally 
subjective ; or is there a discrimination to be made, and some phenomena to 
be considered as objective, being modes of our organism viewed as a mere por- 
tion of matter, and in this respect a Non-ego, while other phenomena are to 
be considered as subjective, being the modes of our organism as animated by 
or in union with the mind, and therefore states of the Ego? Without here 
attempting to enter on the reasons which vindicate my opinion, suffice it to 
say, that I adopt the latter alternative ; and hold further, that the discrim- 
ination of the sensorial phenomena into objective and subjective, coincides 
with the distinction made of the qualities of body into Primary and Second- 
ary, the Secundo-primary being supposed to contribute an element to each. 
Our nervous organism is to he viewed in two relations ; — 1°, as a body simply, 
and — 2°, as an animated body. As a body simply it can possibly exist, and 
can possibly he known as existent, only under those necessary conditions of 
all matter, which have been denominated its Primary qualities. As an ani- 
mated body it actually exists, and is actually known to exist, only as it is sus- 
ceptible of certain affections, which, and the external causes of which, have 
been ambiguously called the Secondary qualities of matter. Now, by a law 
of our nature, we are not conscious of the existence of our organism, conse- 
quently not conscious of any of its primary qualities, unless when we are 
conscious of it, as modified by a secondary quality, or some other of its 
affections, as an animated body. But the former consciousness requires the 
latter only as its negative condition, and is neither involved in it as a part, 
nor properly dependent on it as a cause. The object in the one conscious- 
ness is also wholly different from the object in the other. In that, it is a con- 
tingent passion of the organism, as a constituent of the human self; in 
this, it is some essential property of the organism, as a portion of the uni- 
verse of matter, and though apprehended by, not an affection proper to, the 
conscious self at all. In these circumstances, the secondary quality, say a 
color, which the mind apprehends in the organism, is, as a passion of self, 
recognized to be a subjective object; whereas the primary quality, extension, 
or figure, or number, which, when conscious of such affection, the mind 
therein at the same time apprehends, is, as not a passion of self, but a com- 
mon property of matter, recognized to be an objective object. (See par. 16-19, 
with foot-note ti and par. 18, with foot-note J.) 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 381 

17. In the Primary there is, thus, no concomitant Secondary 
quality ; in the Secondary there is no concomitant primary qual- 
ity ; in the Secundo-primary, a secondary and quasi-primary qual- 
ity accompany each other. 

18. In the apprehension of the Primary qualities the mind is 
primarily and principally active ; it feels only as it knows. In 
that of the Secondary, the mind is primarily and principally pas- 
sive ; it knows only as it feels.* In that of the Secundo-primary 

* Thus in vision the secondary quality of color is, in the strictest sense, a 
passive affection of the sentient ego ; and the only activity the mind can be 
said to exert in the sensation of colors, is in the recognitive conseioxisness 
that it is so and so affected. It thus knows as it feels, in knowing that it feels. 

But the apprehension of extension, figure, divisibility, &c, which, under 
condition of its being thus affected, simultaneously takes place, is, though 
necessary, wholly active and purely spiritual ; inasmuch as extension, figure, 
&c., are, directly and in their own nature, neither, subjectively considered, 
passions of the animated sensory, nor, objectively considered, efficient qual- 
ities in things by which such passion can be caused. The perception of parts 
out of parts is not given in the mere affection of color, but is obtained by 
a reaction of the mind upon such affection. It is merely the recognition of 
a relation. But a relation is neither a passion nor a cause of passion ; and, 
though apprehended through sense, is, in truth, an intellectual, not a sensi- 
tive cognition ; — unless under the name of sensitive cognition we compre- 
hend, as I think we ought, more than the mere recognition of an organic 
passion. 1 The perception of Extension is not, therefore, the mere conscious- 
ness of an affection — a mere sensation. — This is still more manifest in regard 
to Figure, or extension bounded. Visual figure is an expanse of color 
bounded in a certain manner by a line. Here all is nothing but relation. 
' 'Expanse of color" 1 is only colored extension ; and extension, as stated, is only 
the relation of parts out of parts. ' Bounded in a certain manner," 1 is also 
only the expression of various relations. A thing is 'hounded,'' only as it 
has a limited number of parts ; but limited, number, and parts, arc, all three, 
relations : and, further, ' in a certain manner'' denotes that these parts stand 
to each other in one relation and not in another. The perception of a thing 
as bounded, and bounded in a certain manner, is thus only the recognition 
of a thing under relations. Finally, ' by a line" 1 still merely indicates a rela- 
tion ; for a line is nothing hut the negation of each other, by two intersect- 
ing colors. Absolutely considered, it is a nothing ; and so far from there 
being any difficulty in conceiving a breadthless line, a line is, in fact, not a 
line (but a narrow surface between two lines) if thought as possessed of 
breadth. In such perceptions, therefore, if the mind can be said to feel, it 
can be said to feel only in being conscious of itself as purely active ; that is, 
as spontaneously apprehensive of an object-object or mode of the non-ego, 

• See the next chapter, § i. — W. 



382 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

the mind is equally and at once active and passive ; in one re- 
spect, it feels as it knows, in another, it knows as it feels.* 

and not of a subject-object or affection of the ego. (See par. 16-19, and rel- 
ative foot-note f.) 

The application of the preceding doctrine to the other primary qualities is 
even more obtrusive. 

To prevent misunderstanding, it may be observed, that in saying the mind 
is active, not passive, in a cognition, I do not mean to say that the mind is free 
to exert or not to exert the cognitive act, or even not to exert it in a deter- 
minate manner. The mind energizes as it lives, and it cannot choose but live ; 
it knows as it energizes, and it cannot choose but energize. An object being 
duly presented, it is unable not to apprehend it, and apprehend it, both in it- 
self, and in the relations under which it stands. We may evade the present- 
ation, not the recognition of what is presented. 1 But of this again. 

* This is apparent when it is considered that under the cognition of a 
secundo-primary quality are comprehended both the apprehension of a sec- 
ondary quality, i. e. the sensation of a subjective affection, and the appre- 
hension of a quasi-primary quality, i. e. the perception of an objective force. 
Take, for example, the Secundo-primary quality of Hardness. In the sen- 
sitive apprehension of this we are aware of two facts. The first is the fact 
of a certain affection, a certain feeling, in our sentient organism (Muscular 
and Skin senses). This is the sensation, the apprehension of a feeling conse- 
quent on the resistance of a body, and which in one of its special modifica- 
tions constitutes Hardness, viewed as an affection in us ; — a sensation which 
we know, indeed, by experience to be the effect of the pressure of an un- 
yielding body, but which we can easily conceive might be determined in us 
independently of all internal movement, all external resistance ; while we 
can still more easily conceive that such movement and resistance might be 
apprehended independently of such concomitant sensation. Here, there- 
fore, we know only as we feel, for here we only know, that is, are conscious 
that we feel. — The second is the fact of a certain opposition to the voluntary 
movement of a limb — to our locomotive energy. Of this energy we might 
be conscious, without any consciousness of the state, or even the existence, 
of the muscles set in motion ; and we might also be conscious of resistance 
to its exertion, though no organic feeling happened to be its effect. But as 
it is, though conscious of the sensations connected both with the active state 
of our muscular frame determined by its tension, and of the passive state in 
our skin and flesh determined by external pressure ; still, over and above 
these animal sensations, we are purely conscious of the fact, that the overt 
exertion of our locomotive volition is, in a certain sort, impeded. This con- 
sciousness is the perception, the objective apprehension, of resistance, which 
in one of its special modifications constitutes Hardness, as an attribute of 
body. In this cognition, if we can be said with any propriety to feel, we 
can be said only to feel as we know, because we only feel, i. e. are conscious, 
that we know. (See par. 18, foot-note J, and par. 25, first foot-note, Parti.) 



I See Cousin's History of Philosophy, second series, lecture xxv. — W, 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 383 

19. Thus Perception and Activity are at the maximum in the 
Primary qualities ; at the minimum in the Secondary ; Sensation 
and Passivity are at the minimum in the Primary, at the maxi- 
mum in the Secondary ; while, in the Secundo-primary, Percep- 
tion and Sensation, Activity and Passivity, are in equipoise. — 
Thus too it is, that the most purely material phenomena are ap- 
prehended in the most purely inorganic energy.* 

* The doctrine of paragraphs 16-19 seems to have been intended by Aris- 
totle (see above, page 314 b), in saying that the Common Sensibles (= the 
Primary Qualities) are percepts concomitant or consequent on the sensation 
of the Proper (== the Secondary Qualities), and on one occasion that the 
Common Sensibles are, in a certain sort, only to be considered as apprehen- 
sions of sense per accidens. For this may be interpreted to mean, that our 
apprehension of the common sensibles is not, like that of the proper, the 
mere consciousness of a subjective or sensorial passion, but, though only 
exerted when such passion is determined, is in itself the spontaneous energy 
of the mind in objective cognition. 

Tending towards, though not reaching to, the same result, might be ad- 
duced many passages from the works of the Greek interpreters of Aristotle. 
In particular, I would refer to the doctrine touching the Common Sensibles, 
stated by Simplicius in his Commentary on the De Anima (L. ii. c. 6, f, 35 a, 
L. hi. c. 1, f, 51 a, ed. Aid.), and by Priscianus Lydus, in his Metaphrase of 
the Treatise of Theophrastus on Sense (pp. 274, 275, 285, ed. Basil. Theoph.) : 
— but (as already noticed) these books ought, I suspect, from strong internal 
evidence, both to be assigned to Priscianus as their author ; while the doc- 
trine itself is probably only that which Iambhchus had delivered, in his lost 
treatise upon the Soid. It is to this effect : — The common sensibles might 
appear not to be sensibles at all, or sensibles only per accidens, as making 
no impression on the organ, and as objects analogous to, and apprehended 
by, the understanding or rational mind alone. This extreme doctrine is not, 
however, to be admitted. As sensibles, the common must be allowed to 
act somehow upon the sense, though in a different manner from the proper. 
Comparatively speaking, the proper act primarily, corporeally, and by caus- 
ing a passion in the sense ; the common, secondarily, formally, and by elicit- 
ing the sense and .understanding to energy. But though there be, in the 
proper more of passivity, in the common more of activity, still the common 
are, in propriety, objects of sense per se ; being neither cognized (as sub- 
stances) exclusively by the understanding, nor (as is the sweet by vision) 
accidentally by sense. 

A similar approximation may be detected in the doctrine of the more 
modern Aristotelians. (See page 315 a.) Expressed in somewhat different 
terms, it was long a celebrated controversy in the schools, whether a certain 
class of objects, under which common sensibles were included, did or did 
not modify the organic sense ; and if this they did, whether primarily and 
of themselves, or only secondarily through their modification of the proper 



384: PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

20. In the Primary, a sensation of organic affection is the 
condition of perception, a mental apj)rehension ; in the Secundo- 
primary, a sensation is the concomitant of the perception ; in the 
Secondary, a sensation is the all in all which consciousness ap- 
prehends. (See par. 10.) 

21. In the Piimary, the sensation, the condition of the percep- 
tion, is not itself caused by the objective quality perceived ; in 

sensibles, with which they were associated. Ultimately, it became the prev- 
alent doctrine, that of Magnitude, Figure, Place, Position, Time, Kelation in 
general, &c, 'nullam esse efficaciam vel actionem:' that is, these do not, 
like the affective qualities (qualitatos patihiles) or proper sensibles, make 
any real, any material impress on the sense ; but if they can he said to act 
at all, act only, either, as some held, spiritually or intentionally, or as others, 
by natural resultance (vel spiritualiter sivc intentionaliter, vel per naturalem 
resultantiam). See Toletus, Comm. De Anima, L. ii. c. 6, qq. 14, 15 ; — Za- 
iarella, Comm. De Anima, L. ii. Text. 65; De Kebus Naturalibus, p. 939 sq., 
De Sensu Agente, cc. 4, 5; — Goclenius, Adversaria, q. 55; — Suarez, Meta- 
physical Disputationes, disp. xviii. sec. 4 ; — Scheibler, Metaphysica, L. ii. e. 
5, art. 5, punct. 1 ; De Anima, P. ii. disp. ii. § 24 ; Liber Sententiarum, Ex. 
vi. ax. 4, Ex. xii. ax. 10. 

The same result seems, likewise, confirmed indirectly, by the doctrine of 
those philosophers who, as Condillac in his earlier writings, Stewart, Brown, 
Mill, J. Young, &c., hold that extension and color are only mutually con- 
comitant in imagination, through the influence of inveterate association. 
In itself, indeed, this doctrine I do not admit ; for it supposes that we could 
possibly be conscious of color without extension, of extension without color. 
Not the former ; for we are only, as in sense, so in the imagination of sense, 
aware of a minimum visible, as of a luminous or colored point, in contrast 
to and out of a surrounding expanse of obscure or differently colored sur- 
face ; and a visua*l object, larger than the minimum, is, ex hypothesi, pre- 
sented, or represented, as extended. Not the latter ; for, as I have already 
observed, psychologically speaking, the sensation of color comprehends con- 
tradictory opposites ; to wit, both the sensation of positive color, in many 
medes, and the sensation of a privation of all color, in one. But of contra- 
dictory predicates one or other must, by the logical law of excluded middle, 
be attributed in thought to every object of thought. We cannot, therefore, 
call up in imagination an extended object, without representing it either as 
somehow positively colored (red, or green, or blue, &c), or as negatively 
colored (black). But though I reject this doctrine, I do not reject it as ab- 
solutely destitute of truth. It is erroneous, I think ; but every error is a 
truth abused ; and the abuse in this case seems to lie in the extreme recoil 
from the counter error of the common opinion,— that the apprehension 
through sight of color, and the apprehension through sight of extension and 
figure, are as inseparable, identical cognitions of identical objects. — See Eeid, 
Inq. 145. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 385 

the Securido-primary, the concomitant sensation is the effect of 
the objective quality perceived : in the Secondary, the sensation 
is the effect of an objective quality supposed, but not perceived. 
In other words : — In the apprehension of the Primary, there is 
no subject-object determined by the object-object ; in the Secun- 
do-primary, there is a subject-object determined by the object- 
object ; in the Secondary, a subject-object is the only object of 
immediate cognition. 

22. In the Primary, the sensation of the secondary quality, 
which affords its condition to the perception of the primary, is 
various and indefinite ;* in the Secundo-primary, the sensation 



* The opinions so generally prevalent, that through touch, or touch and 
muscular feeling, or touch and sight, or touch, muscular feeling, and sight, 
— that through these senses, exclusively, we are percipient of extension, 
&c, I do not admit. On the contrary, I hold that all sensations whatsoever, 
of which we are conscious, as one out of another, eo ipso, afford us the con- 
dition of immediately and necessarily apprehending extension ; for in the 
consciousness itself of such reciprocal outness is actually involved a percep- 
tion of difference of place in space, and consequently, of the extended. 
Philosophers have confounded what supplies the condition of the more 
prompt and precise perception of extension, with what supplies the condi- 
tion of a perception of extension at all. 

And be it observed, that it makes no essential difference in this doctrine, 
whether the mind be supposed proximately conscious of the reciprocal out- 
ness of the sensations at the central extremity of the nerves, in an extended, 
sensorium commune, where each distinct nervous filament has its separate 
locality, or at the peripheral extremity of the nerves, in the places them- 
selves where sensations are excited, and to which they are referred. From 
many pathological phenomena the former alternative might appear the more 
probable. In this view, each several nerve, or rather, each several nervous 
filament (for every such filament has its peculiar function, and runs isolated 
from every other), is to be regarded merely as one sentient point ; which 
yields one indivisible sensation, out of and distinct from that of every other, 
by the side of which it is arranged; and not as a sentient line, each point 
of which, throughout its course, has for itself a separate local sensibility. 
For a stimulus applied to any intermediate part of a nerve, is felt not a» 
there, but as if applied to its peripheral extremity ; a feeling which continues 
when that extremity itself, nay, when any portion of the nerve, however 
great, has been long cut off. Thus it is that a whole line of nerve affords, at 
all its points, only the sensation of one determinate point. One point, there- 
fore, physiologically speaking, it is to be considered. (See Plutarch, De 
Plac. Philos. L. iv. c. 23 ; — Mmesms, De Horn. c. 8 ; — Fabricius Eildanus, 
Obs. Cent. iii. obs. 15 ;— Descartes, Princ. P. iv. § 196 -,—Blancard, Coll. Med. 
24 



386 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

of the secondary quality, which accompanies the perception of 
the quasi primary, is under the same circumstances, uniform and 
definite ; in the Secondary, the sensation is itself definite, but its 



Phys. cent. vii. obs. 15 ; — Stuart, De Motu Muse. c. 5 ;—Kaau Boerhaave, 
Imp. fac. § 368 sq. ;— Sir Oh. Bell, Idea, &c. p. 12 ; The Hand, p. 159 ;—Ma- 
gendie, Jonrn. t. v. p. 38 ; Mueller, Phys. pp. 692-696, Engl, tr.) 

Take for instance a man whose leg has been amputated. If now two nerv- 
ous filaments be irritated, the one of which ran to his great, the other to his 
little toe — he will experience two pains, as in these two members. Nor is 
there, in propriety, any deception in such sensations. Tor his toes, as all 
his members, are his only as they are to him sentient ; and they are only 
sentient and distinctly sentient, as endowed with nerves and distinct nerves. 
The nerves thus constitute alone the whole sentient organism. In these 
circumstances, the peculiar nerves of the several toes, running isolated from 
centre to periphery, and thus remaining, though curtailed in length, utimu- 
tilated in function, will, if irritated at any point, continue to manifest their 
original sensations ; and these being now, as heretofore, manifested out of 
each other, must afford the condition of a perceived extension, not less real 
than that which they afforded prior to the amputation. 

The hypothesis of an extended sensorium commune, or complex nervous 
centre, the mind being supposed in proximate connection with each of its 
constituent nervous terminations or origins, may thus be reconciled to the 
doctrine of natural realism ; and therefore what was said at page 276 a, No". 
2, and relative places, with reference to a sensorium of a different character, 
is to be qualified in conformity to the present supposition. 

It is, however, I think, more philosophical, to consider the nervous sys- 
tem as one whole, with each part of which the animating principle is equal- 
ly and immediately connected, so long as each part remains in continuity 
with the centre. To this opinion may be reduced the doctrine of Aristotle, 
that the soul contains the body, rather than the body the soul (De An. L. i. 
c. 9, § 4) — a doctrine on which was founded the common dogma of the 
Schools, that the Soul is all in the whole body, and all in every of its parts, 
meaning, thereby, that the simple, imextended mind, in some inconceivable 
manner, present to all the organs, is percipient of the peculiar affection 
which each is adapted to receive, and actuates each in the peculiar function 
which it is qualified to discharge. See also St. Gregory of Nyssa (De Horn. 
Opif. cc. 12, 14, 15), the oldest philosopher I recollect by whom this dogma 
is explicitly enounced. Compare Galen, De Sympt. Causis. L. ii. c. Of 
modern authorities to the same result, are — Perrault (Du Mouv. des Yeux, p. 
591, and Du Toucher, p. 531) ; Tabor (Tract, iii. c. 3) ; Stuart (De Motu 
Muse. c. 5) ; Leidenfrost (De Mente Humana, c. iii. §§ 11, 14, 15) ; Tiede- 
inann (Psychologie, p. 309, sq.) ; Berard, (Rapports &c. ch. i. § 2) ; R. G. 
Carus (Voiles ueb. Psychologie, passim) ; Vmbreit (Psychologie, c. 1, and 
Beilage, passim) ; F. Fischer (Ueb. d. Sitz d. Seele, passim, and Psychologie, 
c. 4). The two last seem to think that their opinion on this matter is some- 
thing new ? Eosmini also maintains the same doctrine, but as I have not 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKOEPTION. 387 

exciting cause, the supposed quality in bodies, various and indefi- 
nite. (See p. 374 b— 376 a.) 

23. The Primary and Secondary qualities are, in this relation, 



yet obtained his relative works, I am unable to refer to them articulately. — 
See Bibl. Univ. de Geneve, No. 76, June, 1842, p. 241 sq. 

As to the question of materialism this doctrine is indifferent. For the 
connection of an unextended with an extended substance is equally incom- 
prehensible, whether we contract the place of union to a central point, or 
whether we leave it coextensive with organization. 

The causes why the sensations of different parts of the nervous apparatus 
vary so greatly from each other in supplying the conditions of a perception of 
extension, &c, seem to me comprehended in two general facts, the one con- 
stituting a physiological, the other a psychological, law of perception ; laws, 
neither of which, however, has yet obtained from philosophers the consid- 
eration which it merits. 

The Physiological law is — That a nervous point yields a sensation felt as lo- 
cally distinct, in proportion as it is isolated in its action from any other. Phys- 
iological experiment has not yet been, and probably never may be, able to 
prove anatomically the truth of this law which I have here ventured to 
enounce ; physiologists indeed, seem hitherto to have wholly neglected the 
distinction. So far, however, is it from being opposed to physiological 
observation, it may appeal in its confirmation to the analogy of all the facts to 
which such observation reaches (see par 25, first note, III.) ; while the psycho- 
logical phenomena are such as almost to necessitate its admission. To say 
nothing of the ganglionic fusions, which are now disproved, the softness and 
colliquescence of the olfactory nerves and nervous expansion, for example, 
correspond with the impossibility we experience, in smell, of distinctly ap- 
prehending one part of the excited organism as out of another ; while the mar- 
vellous power we have of doing this in vision, seems, by every more minute 
investigation of the organic structure, more clearly to depend upon the iso- 
lation, peculiar arrangement, and tenuity of the primary fibrils of the retina 
and optic nerve ; though microscopical anatomy, it must be confessed, has 
not as yet been able to exhibit any nervous element so inconceivably small 
as is the minimum visibile. Besides the older experiments of Porterfield, 
Haller, &c, see Treviranus, Beytraege, 1835, p. 63 sq. ;— Volkmann, Neue 
Beytraege, 1836, pp. 61 sq., 197 sq. -—Mueller, Phys. 1838, pp. 1073 sq., 1121 
sq. Engl. tr. ;— also Baer, Anthropologic, 1824, § 153.— Of Touch and Feel- 
ing I am to speak immediately. 

And here I may say a word in relation to a difficulty which has perplexed 
physiologists, and to which no solution, I am aware of, has been attempted. 
— The retina, as first shown by Treviranus, is a pavement of perpendicular 
rods terminating in papillae. ; a constitution which may be roughly repre- 
sented to imagination by the bristles of a thick-set brush. The retina is, 
however, only the terminal expansion of the optic nerve ; and the rods 
which make up its area, after bending behind to an acute angle, run back aa 
the constituent, but isolated fibrils of that nerve; to their origin in the brain. 



388 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

simple and self-discriminated. For in the perception of a prima- 
ry, there is involved no sensation of a secondary with which it 
can be mixed up ; while in the sensation of a secondary there is 

On the smaller size of the papillae and fibrils of the optic nerve, principally 
depends, as already stated, the greater power we possess, in the eye, of dis- 
criminating one sensation as out of another, consequently of apprehending 
extension, figure, &c. — But here the difficulty arises : Microscopic observa- 
tions on the structure of the retina give the diameter of the papilla?, as about 
the eight or nine thousandth part of an inch. Optical experiments, again, 
on the ultimate capacity of vision, show that a longitudinal object (as a hair), 
viewed at such a distance that its breadth, as reflected to the retina, is not 
more than the six hundred thousandth or millionth of an inch, is distinctly 
visible to a good eye. Now there is here — 1°, a great discrepancy between 
the superficial extent of the apparent ultimate fibrils of the retina, and the 
extent of the image impressed on the retina by the impinging rays of light, 
the one being above a hundred times greater than the other ; and, 2°, it is 
impossible to conceive the existence of distinct fibrils so minute as would be 
required to propagate the impression, if the breadth of the part affected 
were actually no greater than the breadth of light reflected from the object 
to the retina. To me the difficulty seems soluble if we suppose, 1°, that the 
ultimate fibrils and papillae are, in fact, the ultimate units or minima of sen- 
sation ; and, 2°, that a stimulus of light, though applied only to part of a 
papilla, idiopathically affects the whole. This theory is confirmed by the 
analogy of the nerves of feeling, to which I shall soon allude. The objec- 
tions to which it is exposed I see ; but I think that they may easily be an- 
swered. On the discussion of the point I cannot however enter. 

The Psychological law is — That though a perception be only possible under 
condition of a sensation ; still, that above a certain limit the more intense the 
sensation or subjective consciousness, the more indistinct the perception or object- 
ive consciousness. 

On this, which is a special case of a still higher law, I have already inci- 
dentally spoken, and shall again have occasion to speak. 1 

1°. That we are only conscious of the existence of our organism as a phys- 
ical body, under our consciousness of its existence as an animal body, and 
are only conscious of its existence as an animal body under our conscious- 
ness of it as soxnehow or other sensitively affected. 

2o That though the sensation of our organism as animally affected, is, as 
it were, the light by which it is exhibited to our perception as a physically 
extended body ; still, if the affection be too strong, the pain or pleasure too 
intense, the light blinds by its very splendor, and the perception is lost in 
the sensation. Accordingly, if we take a survey of the senses, we shall find, 
that exactly in proportion as each affords an idiopathic sensation more or less 
capable of being carried to an extreme either of pleasure or of pain, does it 
afford, but in an inverse ratio, the condition of an objective perception more 
or less distinct. In the senses of Sight and Hearing, as contrasted with those 



l See the next chapter. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 389 

no perception of a primary at all. Thus prominent in themselves, 
and prominently contrasted as mutual extremes, neither class can 
be overlooked, neither class can be confounded with the other. 

of Taste and Smell, the counter-proportions are precise and manifest ; and 
precisely as in animals these latter senses gain in their objective character 
us means of knowledge, do they lose in their subjective character as sources 
of pleasurable or painful sensations. To a dog, for instance, in whom the 
sense of smell is so acute, all odors seem, in themselves, to be indifferent. In 
Touch or Feeling the same analogy holds good, and within itself; for in this 
case, where the sense is diffused throughout the body, the subjective and ob- 
jective vary in their proportions at different parts. The parts most subject- 
ively sensible, those chiefly susceptible of pain and pleasure, furnish precisely 
the obtusest organs of touch ; and the acutest organs of touch do not possess, 
if ever even that, more than an average amount of subjective sensibility. I 
am disposed, indeed, from the analogy of the other senses, to surmise, that the 
nerves of touch proper (the more objective) and of feeling proper (the more 
subjective) are distinct; and distributed in various proportions to different 
parts of the body. I should also surmise, that the ultimate fibrils of the former 
run in isolated action from periphery to centre, while the ultimate fibrils of the 
latter may, to a certain extent, be confounded with each other at their terminal 
expansion in the skin ; so that for this reason, likewise, they do not, as the 
former, supply to consciousness an opportunity of so precisely discriminating 
the reciprocal outness of their sensations. The experiments of Weber have 
shown, how differeutly in degree different parts of the skin possess the power 
of touch proper; this power, as measured by the smallness of the interval at 
which the blunted points of a pair of compasses, brought into contact with the 
skin, can be discriminated as double, varying from the twentieth of an En- 
glish inch at the tip of the tongue, and a tenth on the volar surface of the 
third finger, to two inches and a half over the greater part of the neck, back, 
arms, and thighs. — (De Pulsu, &c., p. 44^81, in particular, p. 58. An ab- 
stract, not altogether accurate, is given by Mueller, Phys. p. 700). If these 
experiments be repeated with a pair of compasses not very obtuse, and ca- 
pable, therefore, by a slight pressure, of exciting a sensation in the skin, it 
will be found, that while Weber's observations, as to the remarkable differ- 
ence of the different parts in the power of tactile discrimination, are correct ; 
that, at the same time, what he did not observe, there is no corresponding 
difference between the parts in their sensibility to superficial pricking, 
scratching, &c. On the contrary, it will be found that, in the places where 
objectively, touch is most alive, subjectively feeling is, in the first instance 
at least, in some degree deadened ; and that the parts the most obtuse in 
discriminating the duplicity of the touching points, are by no means the 
least acute to the sensations excited by their pressure. 

For example ; — the tip of the tongue has fifty, the interior surface of the 
third finger twenty-five, times the tactile discrimination of the arm. But it 
will be found, on trial, that the arm is more sensitive to a sharp point ap- 
plied, but not strongly, to the skin, ths>i either the tongue or the finger, 



390 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

The Secimdo-priinary qualities, on the contrary, are, at once; 
complex and confusive. For, on the one hand, as perceptions 
approximating to the primary, on the other, as sensations identi- 

and (depilated of course) at least as alive to the presence of a very light body, 
as a hair, a thread, a feather, drawn along the surface. In the several places 
the phenomena thus vary : — In those parts where touch proper prevails, a 
subacute point, lightly pressed upon the skin, determines a sensation of 
which we can hardly predicate either pain or pleasure, and nearly limited 
to the place on which the pressure is made. Accordingly, when two such 
points are thus, at the same time, pressed upon the skin, we are conscious 
of two distinct impressions, even when the pressing points approximate 
pretty closely to each other. — In those parts, on the other hand, where feel 
ing proper prevails, a subacute point, lightly pressed upon the skin, deter- 
mines a sensation which we can hardly call indifferent ; and which radiates, 
to a variable extent, from the place on which the pressure is applied. Ac- 
cordingly, when two such points are thus, at the same time, pressed upon 
the skin, we are not conscious of two distinct impressions, unless the pres- 
sing points are at a considerable distance from each other ; the two impres- 
sions, running, as it were, together and thus constituting one indivisible 
sensation. The discriminated sensations in the one case, depend manifest- 
ly on the discriminated action, through the isolated and unexpanded termi- 
nation of the nervous fibrils of touch proper; and the indistinguishable sen- 
sation in the other, will, I have no doubt, be ultimately found by microsco- 
pic anatomy to depend, in like manner, on the nervous fibrils of feeling 
proper being, as it were, fused or interlaced together at their termination, or 
rather, perhaps, on each ultimate fibril, each primary sentient unit being 
expanded through a considerable extent of skin. The supposition of such 
expansion seems, indeed, to be necessitated by these three facts : — 1", that 
every point of the skin is sensible ; 2°, that no point of the skin is sensible 
except through the distribution to it of nervous substance ; and, 3°, that the 
ultimate fibrils, those minima, at least, into which anatomists have, as yet, 
been able to analyze the nerves, are too large, and withal too few, to carry 
sensation to each cutaneous point, unless by an attenuation and diffusion of 
the finest kind. — Within this superficial sphere of cutaneous apprehension, 
the objective and subjective, perception and sensation, touch proper and 
feeling proper, are thus always found to each other in an inverse ratio. 

But take the same places, and puncture deeply. Then, indeed, the sense 
of pain will be found to be intenser in the tongue and finger than in the 
arm ; for the tongue and finger are endowed with comparatively more nu- 
merous nerves, and consequently with a more concentrated sensibility, than 
the arm ; though these may either, if different, lie beneath the termination 
of the nerves of touch, or, if the same, commence their energy as feeling 
only at the pitch where their energy as touch concludes. Be this, however, 
as it may, it will be always found, that in proportion as the internal feeling 
of a part becomes excited, is it incapacitated for the time, as an organ of ex- 
ternal touch. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 391 

fied with the secondary, they may, if not altogether overlooked, 
lightly be, as they have always hitherto been, confounded with 
the one or with the other of these classes. (See pp. 361 b, 363 a.) 

24. In the same relation a Primary or a Secondary quality, 
as simple, has its term univocal. A Secundo-primary, on the 
contrary, being complex, its term, as one, is necessarily equivocal. 
For, viewed on one side, it is the modification of a primary ; on 
the other, it is, in reality, simply a secondary quality. — (How, in 
a more general point of view, the Secondary qualities are no less 
complex, and their terms no less ambiguous than the Secundo- 
primary, see par. 6.) 

25. All the senses, simply or in combination, afford conditions 
for the perception of the Primary qualities (par. 22, note) ; and 
all, of course, supply the sensations themselves of the Secondary. 
As only various modifications of resistance, the Secundo-primary 
qualities are all, as percepts proper, as quasi-primary qualities, ap- 
prehended through the locomotive faculty,* and our conscious- 

I do not therefore assert, without a qualification, that touch and feeling 
are everywhere manifested in an inverse ratio ; for both together may be 
higher, both together may be lower, in one place than another. But whilst I 
diffidently hold that they are dependent upon different conditions — that the 
capacity of pain and pleasure, and the power of tactual discrimination, which 
a part possesses, are not the result of the same nervous fibres ; I maintain, 
with confidence, that these senses never, in any part, coexist in exercise in 
any high degree, and that wherever the one rises to excess, there the other 
will be found to sink to a corresponding deficiency. 

In saying, in the present note, that touch is more objective than feeling, I 
am not to be supposed to mean, that touch is, in itself, aught but a subject- 
ive affection — afeeling— a sensation. Touch proper is here styled objective, 
not absolutely, but only in contrast and in comparison to feeling proper ; 1°, 
iuasmuchas it affords in the cycle of its own phenomena a greater amount of 
information ; 2°, as it affords more frequent occasions of perception or objec- 
tive apprehension ; and, 3°, as it is feebly, if at all, characterized by the sub- 
jective affections of pain and pleasure. 

* I. — On, the Locomotive Faculty and Muscular Sense, in relation to Percep- 
tion. — I say that the Secundo-primary qualities, in their quasi-primary pha- 
eis, are apprehended through the locomotive faculty, and not the muscular 
sense ; for it is impossible that the state of muscular feeling can enable us to 
be immediately cognizant of the existence and degree of a resisting force. On 
the contrary, supposing all muscular feeling abolished, the power of mov- 
ing the musft.es at will remaining, however, entire, I hold (as will anon be 



392 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

ness of its energy ; as sensations, as secondary qualities, they are 
apprehended as modifications of touch proper, and of cutaneous 
and muscular feeling.* 

shown) that the consciousness of the mental motive energy, and of the 
greater or less intensity of such energy requisite, in different circumstances, 
to accomplish our intention, would of itself enable ns always to perceive the 
fact, and in some degree to measure the amount, of any resistance to our 
voluntary movements ; howbeit the concomitance of certain feelings with 
the different states of muscular tension, renders this cognition not only 
easier, but, in fact, obtrudes it upon our attention. Scaliger, therefore, in re- 
ferring the apprehension of weight, &c, to the locomotive faculty, is, in my 
opinion, far more correct than recent philosophers, in referring it to the 
muscular sense. (See II. of this foot-note.) 

We have here to distinguish three things : 

1°. The still immanent or purely mental act of will : what for distinction's 
sake I would call the liyperorganic volition to move ; — the actio elicita of the 
schools. Of this volition we are conscious, even though it do not go out 
into overt action. 

2°. If this volition become transeunt, be carried into effect, it passes into 
the mental effort or nisus to move. This I would call the enorganic volition, 
or, by an extension of the scholastic language, the actio imper am. Of this 
we are immediately conscious. For we are conscious of it, though by a nar- 
cosis or stupor of the sensitive nerves we lose all feeling of the movement 
of the limb ; — though by a paralysis of the motive nerves, no movement in 
the limb follows the mental effort to move ; — though by an abnormal stimu- 
lus of the muscular fibres, a contraction in them is caused even in opposi- 
tion to our will. 

3°. Determined by the enorganic volition, the cerebral influence is trans- 
mitted by the motive nerves ; the muscles contract or endeavor to contract, 
so that the limb moves or endeavors to move. This motion or effort to move 
I would call the organic movement, the organic nisus / by a limitation of the 
scholastic term, it might be denominated the actio imperata. 

It might seem at first sight, — 1°, that the organic movement is, immediate- 
ly determined by the enorganic volition ; and, 2°, that we are immediately 
conscious of the organic nisus in itself. But neither is the ease. — Not the 
former : for even if we identify the contraction of the muscles and the overt 
movement of the limb, this is only the mediate result of the enorganic voli- ■ 
tion, through the action of the nervous influence transmitted from the brain. 
The mind, therefore, exerts its effort to move, proximately in determining 
this tensmission ; but we are unconscious not only of the mode in which 
this operation is performed, but even of the operation itself.— Not the lat- 
ter : for all muscular contraction is dependent on the agency of one set of 
nerves, all feeling of muscular contraction on another. Thus, from the ex- 
clusive paralysis of the former, or the exclusive stupor of the latter, the one 
function may remain entire, while the other is abolished ; and it is only be- 
sause certain muscular feelings are normally, though contingently, associated 
vith the different muscular states, that, independently of the consciousness 






PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 393 



6) — As in Thought ; as in relation to Intellect. 

26. As modes of matter, the Primary qualities are thought as 
necessary and universal ; the Secundo-primary, as contingent and 
common ; the Secondary, as contingent and peculiar. 

of the enorganic volition, we are indirectly made aware of the various de- 
grees of the organic nisus exerted in our different members.* But though 
indirect, the information thus forced upon us is not the less valuable. By 
the associated sensations our attention is kept alive to the state of our mus- 
cular movements ; by them we are enabled to graduate with the requisite 
accuracy the amount of organic effort, and to expend in each movement pre- 
cisely the quantum necessary to accomplish its purpose. Sir Charles Bell 
records the case of a mother who, while nursing her infant, was affected with 
paralysis or loss of muscular motion on one side of her body, and by stupor 
or loss of sensibility on the other. With the arm capable of movement she 
could hold her child to her bosom ; and this she continued to do so long as 
her attention remained fixed upon the infant. But if surrounding objects 
withdrew her observation, there being no admonitory sensation, the flexor 
muscles of the arm gradually relaxed, and the child was in clanger of falling. 
(The Hand, p. 204.) 

These distinctions in the process of voluntary motion, especially the two 
last (for the first and second may be viewed as virtually the same), are of 
importance to illustrate the double nature of the secundo-primary qualities, 
each of which is, in fact, the aggregate of an objective or quasi-primary qual- 
ity, apprehended in a perception, and of a secondary or subjective quality 
caused by the other, apprehended in a sensation. Each of these qualities, 
each of these cognitions, appertains to a different part of the motive process. 
The quasi-primary quality and its perception, depending on the enorganic 
volition and the nerves of motion ; the secondary quality and its sensation, 
depending on the organic nisus and the nerves of sensibility. 



* I must here notice an error of inference, which runs through the experiments by 
Professor "Weber of Leipsie, in regard to the shares which the sense of touch proper 
and the consciousness of muscular effort have in the estimation of weight, as detailed 
in his valuable ' Annotationes de Pulsu, Eesorptione, Audita etTactu,' 1S34, pp. 81-113, 
134, 159-161. — "Weight he supposes to be tested by the Touch alone, when objects are 
laid upon the hand, reposing, say, on a pillow. Here there appears to me a very palpa- 
ble mistake. For without denying that different weights, up to a certain point, produce 
different sensations on the nerves of touch and feeling, and that consequently an expe- 
rience of the difference of such sensation may help us to an inference of a difference of 
weight; it is manifest, that if a body be laid upon a muscular part, that we estimate its 
weight proximately and principally by the amount of lateral pressure on the muscles, 
and this pressure itself, by the difficulty we find in lifting the body, however imper- 
ceptibly, by a contraction or bellying out of the muscular fibres. When superincum- 
bent bodies, however different in weight, are all still so heavy as to render this contrac- 
tion almost or altogether impossible; it will be found, that our power of measuring 
their comparative weights becomes, in the one case feeble and fallacious, in the othei 
null. 



394 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

27. Thought as necessary, and immediately apprehended as 
actual, modes of matter, we conceive the Primary qualities in 
what they objectively are. The Secundo-primary, thought in 



The quasi-primary quality is, always, simply a resistance to our enorganic 
volition, as realized in a muscular effort. But, be it remembered, there may 
be muscular effort, even if a body weighs or is pressed upon a part of our 
muscular frame apparently at rest. (See foot-note * of page 293.)— And how 
is the resistance perceived ? I have frequently asserted, that in perception 
we are conscious of the external object immediately and in itself. This is 
the doctrine of Natural Eealism. But in saying that a thing is known in 
itself, I do not mean that this object is known in its absolute existence, that 
is, out of relation to us. This is impossible ; for our knowledge is only of 
the relative. To know a thing in itself or immediately, is an expression I 
use merely in contrast to the knowledge of a thing in a representation, or 
mediately. 1 On this doctrine an external quality is said to be known in it- 
self, when it is known as the immediate and necessary correlative of an in- 
ternal quality of which I am conscious. Thus, when I am conscious of the 
exertion of an enorganic volition to move, and aware that the muscles are 
obedient to my will, but at the same time aware that my limb is arrested in 
its motion by some external impediment ; — in this case I cannot be conscious 
of myself as the resisted relative without at the same time being conscious, 
being immediately percipient, of a not-self as the resisting correlative. In 
this cognition there is no sensation, no subjectivo-organic affection. I sim- 
ply know myself as a force in energy, the not-self as a counter force in ener- 
gy. — So much for the quasi-primary quality, as dependent on the enorganic 
volition. 

But though such pure perception may be detected in the simple appre- 
hension of resistance, in reality it does not stand alone ; for it is always ac- 
companied by sensations, of which the muscular nisus or quiescence, on the 
one hand, and the resisting, the pressing body, on the other, are the causes. 
Of these sensations, the former, to wit, the feelings connected with the states 
of tension and relaxation, lie wholly in the muscles, and belong to what has 
sometimes been distinguished as the muscular sense. The latter, to wit the 
sensations determined by the foreign pressure, lie partly in the skin, and 
belong to the sense of touch proper and cutaneous feeling, partly in the flesh, 
and belonging to the muscular sense. These affections, sometimes pleasur- 
able, sometimes painful, are, in either case, merely modifications of the sen- 
sitive nerves distributed to the muscles and to the skin ; and, as manifested 
to us, constitute the secondary quality, the sensation of which accompanies 
the perception of every secundo-primary. 

Although the preceding doctrine coincide, in result, with that which M. 
Maine de Biran, after a hint by Locke, has so ably developed, more espe- 
cially in his '^Nouvelles Considerations sur les Kapports du Physique et du 
Moral de I'Homme ;' I find it impossible to go along with his illustrious ed- 



1 See chapter ii. above. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 395 

their objective phasis, as modifications of the Primary, and, in 
both their objective and subjective phases, immediately appre- 
hended, we conceive them in what they objectively, as well as in 



itor, M. Cousin (p. xxv. of Preface), in thinking that his examination of 
Hume's reasoning against the deduction of our notion of Power from the 
consciousness of efficacy in the voluntary movement of our muscles, ' leaves 
nothing to desire, and nothing to reply.' On the contrary, though always 
dissenting with diffidence from M. Cousin, I confess it does not seem to me, 
that in any of his seven assaults on Hume, has De Biran grappled with the 
most formidable objections of the great skeptic. The second, third, and sev- 
enth, of Hume's arguments, as stated and criticised by Biran, are not pro- 
posed, as arguments, by Hume at all ; and the fourth and fifth in Biran's 
array constitute only a single reasoning in Hume's. Of the three arguments 
which remain, the first and sixth in Biran's enumeration are the most im- 
portant. — But, under the first, the examples alleged by Hume, from cases of 
sudden palsy, Biran silently passes by ; yet these present by far the most 
perplexing difficulties for his doctrine of conscious efficacy. In another and 
subsequent work (Beponses, &c., p. 386) he, indeed, incidentally considers 
this objection, referring us back for its regular refutation to the strictures on 
Hume, where, however, as stated, no such refutation is to be found. Nor 
does he in this latter treatise relieve the difficulty. For as regards the argu- 
ment from our non-consciousness of loss of power, prior to an actual attempt 
to move, as shown in the case of paralysis supervening during sleep, — this, 
it seems to me, can only be answered from the fact, that we are never con- 
scious of force, as unexerted or in potentia (for the ambiguous term power, 
unfortunately after Locke employed by Hume in the discussion, is there 
equivalent to force, vis, and not to mere potentiality as opposed to actuality), 
but only of force, as in actu or exerted. For in this case, we never can pos- 
sibly be conscious of the absence of a force, previously to the effort made to 
put it forth. — The purport of the sixth argument is not given, as Hume, not- 
withstanding the usual want of precision in his language, certainly intended 
it; — which was to this effect: — Volition to move a limb, and the actual 
moving of it, are the first and last in a series of more than two successive 
events ; and cannot, therefore, stand to each other, immediately, in the re- 
lation of cause and effect. They may, however, stand to each other in the 
relation of cause and effect, mediately. But, then, if they can be known in 
consciousness as thus mediately related, it is a necessary condition of such 
knowledge, that the intervening series of causes and effects, through which 
the final movement of the limb is supposed to be mediately dependent on 
the primary volition to move, should be known to consciousness immediate- 
ly under that relation. But this intermediate, this connecting series is, con- 
fessedly, unknown to consciousness at all, far less as a series of causes and 
effects. It follows therefore, a fortiori, that the dependency of the last on 
the first of these events, as of an effect upon its cause, must be to conscious- 
ness unknown. In other words : — having no consciousness that the volition 
to move is the efficacious force (power) by which even the event immediately 



396 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

what they subjectively are. The Secondary being neither 
thought as necessary, nor immediately apprehended in their ex- 
ternal reality, we conceive adequately what they are in their 



consequent on it (say the transmission of the nervous influence from brain 
to muscle) is produced, such event being in fact itself to consciousness oc- 
cult ; multo minus can we have a consciousness of that volition being the 
efficacious force, by which the ultimate movement of the limb is mediately 
determined ? This is certainly the argument which Hume intended, and as 
a refutation of the doctrine, that in our voluntary movements at least, we 
have an apprehension of the causal nexus between the mental volition as 
cause and the corporeal movement as effect, it seems to me unanswerable. 
But as stated, and easily refuted, by De Biran, it is only tantamount to the 
reasoning — That as we are not conscious hoiv we move a limb, we cannot be 
conscious of the feeling tlmt we do exert a motive force. But such a feeling 
of force, action, energy, Hume did not deny. 

II. — Historical -notices touching the recognition of the Locomotive Faculty 
as a medium of perception, and of the Muscular Sense. — That the recognition 
of the Locomotive Faculty, or rather, the recognition of the Muscular Sense 
as a medium of apprehension, is of a recent date, and by psychologists of this 
country, is an opinion in both respects erroneous. — As far as I am aware, this 
distinction was originally taken by two Italian Aristotelians, some three 
centuries ago ; and when the observation was again forgotten, both France 
and Germany are before Scotland in the merit of its modern revival. 

It was first promulgated by Julius Caesar Scaliger about the middle of the 
sixteenth century (1557). Aristotle, followed by philosophers in general, had 
referred the perception of weight (the heavy and light) to the sense of 
Touch; though, in truth, under Touch, Aristotle seems to have compre- 
hended both the Skin and Muscular senses. See Hist. An. i. 4. De Part. 
An. ii. 1. 10. De Anima, ii. 11. On this particular doctrine, Scaliger, inter 
alia, observes : ' Et sane sic videtur. Namque gravitas et levitas tangendo de- 
prehenditur. Ac nemo est, qui non putet, attrectatione sese cognoscere gra- 
vitatem et levitatem. Mihi tamen baud persuadetur. Tactu motum depre- 
hendi fateor, gravitatem nego. Est autem maximum argumentum hoc. 
Gravitas est objectum motivae potestatis : cui sane competit actio. At tactus 
non fit, nisi patiendo. Gravitas ergo percipitur a motiva potestate, non a 
tactu. Nam duo cum sint instrumenta (de nervis atque spiritibus loquor), 
ad sensum et ob motum, a se invicem distincta : male confunderemus, quod 
est motricis objectum, cum objecto motae. Movetur enim tactus, non agit. 
Motrix autem movet grave corpus, non autem movetur ab eo. Idque rnani- 
festum est in paralysi. Sentitur calor, non sentitur gravitas Motrici namque 
instrumenta sublata sunt. — An vero sentitur gravitas ? Sentitur quidem a 
motrice, atque ab ea judicatur : quemadmodum difficile quippiam enunciatu 
[enunciatur ?] ab ipsa intellectus vi : quae tamen agit, non patitur, cum enun- 
ciat. Est enim omnibus commune rebus nostratibus hisce, quae pendent a 
materia: ut agendo patiantur.— Poterit aliquid objici de compressione. Nam 
etc. . . .Sunt praeterea duae rationes. Quando et sine tactu sentimus gravita- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 397 

subjective effects, but inadequately what they are as objective 
causes. 

28. Our conceptions of the Primary are clear and distinct ; of 



tern, et quia tactu non sentirnus. Nempe cuipiam gravi corpori manus im- 
posita contingit illud : at non sentit gravitatem. Sine tactu, vero, virtus motrix 
sentiet. Appensum filo plumbum grave sentitur. Manus tamen filum, non 
plumbum tanget. Deinde hoe. Brachiurn suo pondere cum deorsum fertur, 
sentitur grave. At nihil tangit.' (De Subtilitate, contra Cardanum, ex. 109.) 

It should, however, be noticed, that Sealiger may ha% r e taken the hint for 
the discrimination of this and another sense, from Cardan. This philosopher 
makes Touch fourfold. One sense apprehending the four primary qualities, 
the Hot and Cold, the Dry and Humid ; a second the Pleasurable and Pain- 
ful ; a third the Venereal sensations ; a fourth the Heavy and Light. (De 
Subtilitate, L. xiii.) 

This doctrine did not excite the attention it deserved. It was even redar- 
gued by Scaliger's admiring expositor Goclenius. (Adversaria, p. 75-89) ; nor 
do I know, indeed, that previous to its revival in very recent times, with the 
exception to be immediately stated, that this' opinion was ever countenanced 
by any other philosopher. Towards the end of the seventeenth ceutury it is 
indeed commemorated by Chauvin, no very erudite authority, in the first 
edition of his Lexicon Philosophicum (vv. Tactile audi Gravitas), as an opin- 
ion that had found supporters ; but it is manifest from the terms of the 
statement, for no names are given, that Sealiger and Sealiger only is referred 
to. In the subsequent edition the statement itself is omitted. 

By another philosophical physician, the celebrated Ceesarpinus of Arezzo, 
it was afterwards (in 1569) still more articulately shown, that only by the ex- 
ercise of the motive power are we percipient of those qualities which I de- 
nominate the Secundo-Primary ; though he can hardly be said, like Sealiger, 
to have discriminated that power as a faculty of perception or active appre- 
hension, from touch as a capacity of sensation or mere consciousness of pas- 
sion. It does not indeed appear that Ctesalpinus was aware of Scaliger's 
speculation at all. 

'Tactus igit'or si unus est sensus, circa unam erit contrarietatem, reliquce 
autem ad ipsam reducentur. [Compare Aristotle, De Anima, ii. 11.] Patet 
autem Calidum et Frigiduin maxime proprie ipshis tactus esse ; solum enim 
tangendo comprehenduntur. Humidmn autem et Siccum (Fluid and Solid), 
Durum et Molle, Grave et Leve, Asperum et Lene, Earum et Densum, alia- 
que hujusmodi, ut tactu comprehendantur, non satis est ea tangere, sed necesse 
est motum quendam adhilere, aut comprimendo, ant impehendo, aut trahendo, 
aut alia ratione patiendi potentiam experiendo. Sic enim quod proprium 
terminum nonretinet, et quod facile dividitur, Humidum esse cognoscimus ; 
quod autem opposito modo se habet, Siccum : et quod cedit comprimenti, 
Molle, quod non cedit, Durum. Similiter autem et reliquse tactivaa qualitates 
sine motu non percipiuntur. Idcirco et a reliquis sensibus cognosci possunt, 
ut a visu. [But not immediately.] Motus enim inter communia sensibilia 
ponitur. [There is here through ambiguity a mutatio elenchi.] Nihil autem 



398 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

the Secundo-primary, both as secondary and quasi-primary qual- 
ities, clear and distinct ; of the Secondary, as subjective affec- 
tions, clear and distinct, as objective, obscure and confused. For 



refert, an motus in organo an in re flat.' [?] (Qusestiones Peripateticee, L. 
iv. qu. 1.) 

In more recent times, the action of the voluntary motive faculty and its rel- 
ative sense in the perception of Extension, Figure, Weight, Eesistance, &c, 
was in France brought vaguely into notice by Condillac, and subsequently 
about the commencement of the present century more explicitly developed, 
among others, by his distinguished follower M. Destutt de Tracy, who estab- 
lished the distinction between active and passive touch. The speculations of 
M. Maine de Biran on muscular effort (from 1803) I do not here refer to ; as 
these have a different and greatly higher significance. (Condillac, Traite des 
Sensations. P. ii. cc. 3, 12. — De Tracy, Ideologic, t. i. cc. 9-13 ; t. iii. cc. 5, 9. 
— Compare Degerando, Histoire des Systemes, t. iii. p. 445, sq. orig. ed., and 
Labouliniere, Precis, p. 322, sq.) — In Germany, before the conclusion of the 
last century, the same analysis was made, and the active touch there first ob- 
tained the distinctive appellation of the Muscular Sense (Muskel Sinn.) The 
German physiologists and psychologists not only — what had been previously 
done — professedly demonstrated the share it had in the empirical apprehen- 
sion of Space, &c, and established its necessity as a condition even of the 
perceptions of Touch proper — the Skin Sense ; they likewise for the first time 
endeavored to show how in vision we are enabled to recognize not only figure, 
but distance, and the third dimension of bodies, through the conscious ad- 
justment of the eye. (Tittel, Kantische Denkformen (1787), p. 188, sq. — 
Tiedemann, in Hessiscke Beytraege (1789), St. i. p. 119, sq. ; Theaetet (1794), 
passim ; Idealistische Briefe (1798), p. 84, sq. ; Psychologie (1804), p. 405, sq. 
— Schulz, Pruefung (1791), i. p. 182, sq. —Engel, in Memoires de l'Academie de 
Berlin (1802). — Gruithuisen, Anthropologic (1810), pp. 130, sq. 361, sq. and 
the subsequent works of Herbart, Martmann, Lenhosselc, Tourtual, Benehe, 
and a host of others.) But see Eeid, 188, b. 

Britain has not advanced the inquiry whic ', if we discount some result- 
less tendencies by Hartley, Wells, and Darwin, she was the last in taking up ; 
and it is a curious instance of the unacquaintance with such matters preva- 
lent among us, that the views touching the functions of the will, and of the 
muscular sense, which constitute, in this relation certainly, not the least val- 
uable part of Dr. Brown's psychology, should to the present hour be regarded 
as original, howbeit these views, though propounded as new, are manifestly 
derived from sources with which all interested in psychological disquisitions 
might reasonably be presumed familiar. This is by no means a solitary in- 
stance of Brown's silent appropriation ; nor is he the only Scottish metaphy- 
sician who has borrowed, without acknowledgment, these and other psycho- 
logical analyses from the school of Condillac. De Tracy may often equally 
reclaim his own at the hands of Dr. John Young, Professor of Philosophy 
in Belfast College, whose frequent coincidences with Brown are not the mar- 
vels he would induce us to believe, when we know the common sources from 



PHILOSOPHY 03? PERCEPTION. 399 

the Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary, as subjective affec- 
tions, we can represent in imagination ; the Secondary, as objec- 
tive powers, we cannot. 



which the resembling doctrines are equally derived. It must be remembered, 
however, that the Lectures of both Professors were posthumously published; 
and are therefore not to be dealt with as works deliberately submitted to 
general criticism by their authors. Dr. Young, it should likewise be noticed, 
was a pupil of the late Professor Mylne of Glasgow, whose views of mental 
philosophy are well known to have closely resembled those of M. De Tracy. 
I see from M. Mignet's eloquent eloge that this acute philosopher was, like 
Kant, a Scotsman by descent, and ' of the clan Stutt,' (Stott ?) 

These notices of the gradual recognition of the sense of muscular feeling, 
as a special source of knowledge, are not given on account of any importance 
it may be thought to possess as the source from which is derived our notion 
of Space or Extension. This notion, I am convinced, though first manifest- 
ed in, cannot be evolved out of, experience ; and what was observed by Eeid 
(Inq. p. 126, a), by Kant (Cr. d. r. V. p. 38), by Schulz (Pruef. i. p. 114), and 
Stewart (Essays, p. 564), in regard to tho attempts which had previously 
been made to deduce it from the operations of sense, and in particular, from 
the motion of the hand, is equally true of those subsequently repeated. In 
all these attempts, the experience itself is only realized through a substitution 
of the very notion which it professes to generate ; there is always a conceal- 
ed petitio principii. Take for example the deduction so laboriously essayed 
by Dr. Brown, and for which he has received such unqualified encomium. 
(Lectt. 23 and 24). — Extension is made up of three dimensions; but Brown's 
exposition is limited to length and breadth. These only, therefore, can be 
criticised. 

As far as I can find his meaning in his cloud of words, he argues thus : — 
The notion of Time or succession being supposed, that of longitudinal ex- 
tension is given in tho succession of feelings which accompanies the gradual 
contraction of a muscle ; the notion of this succession constitutes, ipso facto, 
the notion of a certain length ; and the notion of this length [he quietly takes 
for granted] is the notion of longitudinal extension sought (p. 146 a). — The 
paralogism here is transparent. — Length is an ambiguous term ; and it is 
length in space, extensive length, and not length in time, protensive length, 
whose notion it is the problem to evolve. To convert, therefore, the notion 
of a certain kind of length (and that certain kind being also confessedly only 
length in time) into the notion of a length in space, is at best an idle begging 
of the question. — Is it not ? Then I would ask, whether the series of feelings 
of which we are aware in the gradual contraction of a muscle, involve the 
consciousness of being a succession or length (1), in time alone ? or (2) in 
space alone ? — or (S) in time and space together ? These three cases will be 
allowed to be exhaustive. If the first be affirmed, if the succession appear 
to consciousness a length in time exclusively, then nothing has been accom- 
plished ; for the notion of extension or space is in no way contained in tha 
notion of duration or time. — Again, if the second or the third be affirmed, 



400 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

29. Finally — The existential judgments are of the Primary 
assertory ; of the Secundo-primary, in both their aspects, assert- 
ory ; of the Secondary, as modes of mind, assertory, as modes of 
matter, problematic. (See par. 11, 12, 13.) 



if the series appear to consciousness a succession of length, either in space 
alone, or in space and time together, then is the notion it behooved to generate 
employed to generate itself. 

In the deduction of the notion of superficial extension he is equally illog- 
ical ; for here, too, his process of evolution only in the end openly extracts 
what in the commencement it had secretly thrown in. The elements, out of 
which he constructs the notion of extension, in the second dimension, he 
finds in the consciousness we have of several contemporaneous series of 
muscular feelings or lengths, standing in relation to each other, as proximate, 
distant, intermediate, &c. — Proximate! In what? In time? No; for the 
series are supposed to be in time coexistent ; and were it otherwise, the pro- 
cess would be unavailing, for proximity in time does not afford proximity in 
space. In space, then ? Necessarily. On this alternative, however, the no- 
tion of space or extension is already involved doubly deep in the elements 
themselves, out of which it is proposed to construct it ; for when two or 
more things are conceived as proximate in space, they are not merely con- 
ceived as in different places or out of each other, but over and above this 
elementary condition in which extension simply is involved, they are con- 
ceived as even holding under it a secondary and more complex relation. 
But it is needless to proceed, for the petition of the point in question is even 
more palpable if we think the series under the relations of the distant, the 
intermediate, &c. — The notion of Space, therefore, is not shown by this ex- 
planation of its genesis to be less a native notion than that of Time, which it 
admit*. Brown's is a modification of De Tracy's deduction, the change being 
probably suggested by a remark of Stewart (1. c.) ; but though both involve 
a paralogism, it is certainly tar more shrewdly cloaked in the original. 

III. — Historical notices in regard to the distinction of Nerves and nervous 
Filaments into Motive and Sensitive ; and in rega?'d to the peculiarity of func- 
tion, and absolute isolation, of the ultimate nervous Filaments. — The important 
discovery of Sir Charles Bell, that the spinal nerves are the organs of motion 
through their anterior roots, of sensation through their posterior ; and the 
recognition by recent physiologists, that each ultimate nervous filament is 
distinct in function, and runs isolated from its origin to its termination;— 
these are only the last of a long series of previous observations to the same 
effect, — observations, in regard to which (as may be inferred from the recent 
discussions touching the history of these results) the medical world is, in a 
great measure, uninformed. At the same time, as these are the physiolog- 
ical facts with which psychology is principally interested ; as a contribution 
towards- this doctrine and its history, I shall throw together a few notices, 
which have for the most part fallen in my way when engaged in researches 
for a different purpose. 

The cases of paralysis without narcosis (stupor), and of narcosis without 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 401 

c) — As both in Sensitive Apprehension and in Thought ; as in 
relation both to Sense and Intellect. 

30. In the order of nature and of necessary thought, the Pri- 



paralysis — for the ancient propriety of these terms ought to be observed— 
that is, the cases in which either motion or sensibility, exclusively, is lost, 
were too remarkable not to attract attention even from the earliest periods ; 
and at the same time, too peremptory not to necessitate the conclusion, that 
the several phenomena are, either the functions of different organs, or, if of 
the same, at least regulated by different conditions. Between these alterna- 
tives all opinions on the subject are divided ; and the former was the first, as 
it has been the last, to be adopted. 

No sooner had the nervous system been recognized as the ultimate organ 
of the animal and vital functions, and the intracranial medulla or encephalos 
{encephaloii is a modern misnomer) ascertained to be its centre, than Erasis- 
tratus proceeded to appropriate to different parts of that organism the func- 
tions which, along with Herophilus, he had distinguished, of sensibility and 
voluntary motion. He placed the source — of the former in the meninges or 
membranes, of the latter in the substance, of the encephalos in general, that 
is, of the Brain-proper and After-brain or Cerebellum. And while the nerves 
were, mediately or immediately, the prolongations of these, he viewed the 
nervous membranes as the vehicle of sensation, the nervous substance as the 
vehicle of motion. (Rufus Ephesius, L. i. c. 22; L. ii. cc. 2, 17.) This the- 
ory which is remarkable, if for nothing else, for manifesting the tendency 
from an early period to refer the phenomena of motion and sensation to dis- 
tinct parts of the nervous organism, has not obtained the attention which it 
even intrinsically merits. In modern times, indeed, the same opinion has 
been hazarded, even to my fortuitous knowledge, at least thrice. Firstly by 
Fernelius (1550, Physiologia, v. 10, 15) ; secondly by Bosetti (1722, Eaccolta 
d'Opuscoli, &c, t. v. p. 272 sq.) ; thirdly by Le Cat (1740, Traite des Sensa- 
tions, CEuv. Phys. t. i. p. 124, and Diss, sur la Sensibilite des Meninges, § i.) 
— By each of these the hypothesis is advanced as original. In the two last 
this is not to be marvelled at; but it is surprising how the opinion of Era- 
sistratus could have escaped the erudition of the first. I may observe, that 
Erasistratus also anticipated many recent physiologists in the doctrine, that 
the intelligence of man, and of animals in general is always in proportion to 
the depth and number of the cerebral convolutions, that is, in the ratio of 
the extent of cerebral surface, not of cerebral mass. 

The second alternative was adopted by Galen, who while he refutes ap- 
parently misrepresents the doctrine of Erasistratus ; for Erasistratus did not, 
if we may credit Rufus, an older authority than Galen, derive the nerves 
from the membranes of the encephalos, to the exclusion of its substance ; or 
if Galen be herein correct, this is perhaps the early doctrine which Erasis- 
tratus is by him said in his maturer years to have abandoned ; — a doctrinej 
however, which, under modifications, has in modern times found supporters 
in Rondeletius and others. (Laurentii Hist. Anat. iv. qu. 13.) — Recognizing, 
25 



402 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

mary qualities are prior to the Secundo.-priniary and Secondary ; 
but in the order of empirical apprehension, though chronologi- 
cally simultaneous, they are posterior to both. For it is only 



what has always indeed been done, the contrast of the two phenomena of 
sensibility and motion, Galen did not, however, regard them as necessarily 
the products of distinct parts of the nervous system, although, de facto, dif- 
ferent parts of that system were often subservient to their manifestation. 
As to the problem — Do the nerves perform their double function by the con- 
veyance of a corporeal fluid, or through the irradiation of an immaterial 
power ? — Galen seems to vacillate ; for texts may be adduced in favor of each 
alternative. He is not always consistent in the shares which he assigns to 
the heart and to the brain, in the elaboration of the animal spirits ; nor is he 
even uniform in maintaining a discrimination of origin, between the animal 
spirits and the vital. Degrading the membranes to mere envelopments, he 
limits every peculiar function of the nervous organism to the enveloped sub- 
stance of the brain, the after-brain, the spinal chord and nerves. But as the 
animal faculty is one, and its proximate vehicle the animal spirits is homo- 
geneous, so the nervous or cerebral substance which conducts these spirits 
is in its own nature uniform and indifferently competent to either function ; 
it being dependent upon two accidental circumstances, whether this sub- 
stance conduce to motion, to sensation, or to motion and sensation together. 

The first circumstance is the degree of hardness or softness ; a nerve 
being adapted to motion, or to sensation, in proportion as it possesses the 
former quality or the latter. Nerves extremely soft are exclusively compe- 
tent to sensation. Nerves extremely hard are pre-eminently, but not exclu- 
sively, adapted to motion ; for no nerve is wholly destitute of the feeling of 
touch. The soft nerves, short and straight in their course, arise from the 
anterior portion of the encephalos (the Brain proper) ; the hard, more devi- 
ous in direction, spring from the posterior portion of the brain where it 
joins the spinal chord (Medulla oblongata ?) the spinal chord being a contin- 
uation of the After-brain, from which no nerve immediately arises ; the 
hardest originate from the spinal chord itself, more especially towards its in- 
ferior extremity. A nerve soft in its origin, and, therefore, fitted only for 
sense, may, however, harden in its progress, and by this change become 
suitable for motion. 

The second circumstance is the part to which a nerve is sent ; the nerve 
being sensitive or motive as it terminates in an organ of sense, or in an or- 
gan of motion — a muscle ; every part being recipient only of the virtue 
appropriate to its special function. 

This theory of Galen is inadequate to the phenomena. For though loss 
of motion without the loss of sense may thus be accounted for, on the sup- 
position that the innervating force is reduced so low as not to radiate the 
stronger influence required for movement, and yet to radiate the feebler influ- 
ence required for feeling ; still this leaves the counter case (of which, though 
less frequently occurring, Galen has himself recorded some illustrious ex- 
amples) not only unexplained, but even renders it inexplicable. In this the- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 403 

under condition of the Sensation of a Secondary, that we are per- 
cipient of any Primary quality. 

31. The apprehension of a Primary quality is principally an 



ory Galen is, likewise, not always consistent with himself. The distinction 
of hard and soft, as corresponding with the distinction of motory and sensi- 
tive, nerves, though true in general, is, on his own admission, not absolutely 
through-going. (I must observe, however, that among other recent anat- 
omists this is maintained by Albinus, Malacarne, and Eeil.) And to say noth- 
ing of other vacillations, Galen, who in one sentence, in consistency with his 
distinction of cerebral and (mediately) cerebellar nerves, is forced to accord 
exclusively to those of the spine the function of motion ; in another finds 
himself compelled, in submission to the notorious fact, to extend to these 
nerves the function of sensation likewise. But if Galen's theory be inade- 
quate to their solution, it never leads him to overlook, to dissemble, or to 
distort, the phenomena themselves ; and with these no one was ever more 
familiarly acquainted. So marvellous, indeed, is his minute knowledge of 
the distribution and functions of the several nerves, that it is hardly too 
much to assert, that, with the exception of a few minor particulars, his pa- 
thological anatomy of the nervous system is practically on a level with the 
pathological anatomy of the present day. (De Usu Partium, i. 7, v. 9, 7, 14, 
viii. 3, 6, 19, 12, ix. 1, xii. 10, 11, 15, xiii. 8, xvi. 1, 3, 5, xvii. 2, 3.— De Causis 
Sympt., i. 5. — De Motu Muse, i. 13. — De Anat. Adm., vii. 8. — Ars parva, 
10, 11.— De Locis Aff., i. 6, 7, 12, iii. 6, 12.— De Diss. Nerv., 1.— De Plac. 
Hipp, et Plat. ii. 12, vii. 3, 4, 5, 8.) 

The next step was not made until the middle of the fourteenth century, 
subsequent to Galen's death ; when Sondeletms (c. 1550), reasoning from 
the phenomena of paralysis and stupor, enounced it as an observation never 
previously made, that ' All nerves, from their origin in the brain, are, even 
in the spinal marrow itself, isolated from each other. The cause of paraly- 
sis is therefore not so much to be sought for in the spinal marrow, as in 
the encephalic heads of the nerves ; Galen himself having indeed, remarked, 
that paralysis always supervenes, when the origin of the nerve is obstructed 
or diseased.' (Curandi Methodus, c. 32.) 

This observation did not secure the attention which it deserved; and 
some thirty years later (1595), another French physiologist, another cele- 
brated professor in the same university with Eondelet, I mean Laurentius of 
Montpellier, advanced this very doctrine of his predecessor, as ' a new and 
hitherto unheard-of observation.' This anatomist has, however, the merit 
of first attempting a sensible demonstration of the fact, by resolving, under 
water, the spinal chord into its constituent filaments. ' This new and admira- 
ble observation,' he says, ' explains one of the obscurest problems of nature ; 
why it is that from a lesion, say of the cervical medulla, the motion of the 
thigh may be lost, while the motions of the arms and thorax shall remain 
entire. In the second edition of his Anatomy, Dulaurens would seem, how- 
ever, less confident, not only of the absolute originality, but of the absolute 
accuracy, of the observation. Nor does he rise above the Galenic doctrine, 



404 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

intellectual cognition, in so far as it is, in itself, a purely mental 
activity, and not the mere sensation of an organic passion ; and 
secondarily, a sensible cognition, in so far as it is the perception 



that sensibility and motion may be transmitted by the same fibre. In fact, 
rejecting the discrimination of hard and soft nerves, he abolishes even the 
accidental distinction which had been recognized by Galen. (Compare Hist. 
Anat., later editions, iv. c. 18, qq. 9, 10, 11 ; x. c. 12, with the relative 
places in the first.) 

The third step was accomplished by Yarollius (1572) who showed Galen 
to be mistaken in holding that the spinal chord is a continuation of the 
After-brain alone. He demonstrated, against all previous anatomists, that 
this chord is made up of four columns, severally arising from four ence- 
phalic roots ; two roots or trunks from the Brain-proper being prolonged 
into its anterior, and two from the After-brain into its posterior columns. 
(Anatomia, L.iii: De Nervis Opticis Epistolse.) 

At the same time the fact was signalized by other contemporary anato- 
mists (as Colter, 1572, Laurentius, 1595), that the spinal nerves arise by 
double roots ; one set of filaments emerging from the anterior, another from 
the posterior, portion of the chord. It was in general noticed, too (as by 
Coiter, and C. Bauhinus, 1590), that these filaments, on issuing from the 
chord, passed into a knot or ganglion ; but, strange to say, it was reserved 
for the second Monro (1783), to record the special observation, that this gan- 
glion is limited to the fibres of the posterior root alone. 

Such was the state of anatomical knowledge touching this point at the 
close of the sixteenth century ; and it may now seem marvellous, that aware 
of the independence of the motory and sensitive functions, — aware that of 
these functions the cerebral nerves were, in general, limited to one, while 
the spinal nerves were competent to both, — aware that the spinal nerves, the 
nerves of double function, emerged by double roots and terminated in a two- 
fold distribution, — and, finally, aware that each nervous filament ran dis- 
tinct fro* : its peripheral extremity through the spinal chord to its central 
origin ; aware, I say, of all these correlative facts, it may now seem marvel- 
lous that anatomists should have stopped short, should not have attempted 
to lay fact and fact together, should not have surmised that in the spinal 
nerves difference of root is correspondent with difference of function, should 
not have instituted experiments, and anticipated by two centuries the most 
remarkable physiological discovery of the present day. But our wonder 
will be enhanced, in finding the most illustrious of the more modern schools 
of medicine teaching the same doctrine in greater detail, and yet never pro- 
posing to itself the question — May not the double roots correspond with the 
double function of the spinal nerves ? But so has it been with ah the most 
momentous discoveries. When Harvey proclaimed the circulation of the 
blood, he only proclaimed a .doctrine necessitated by the discovery of the 
venous valves ; and the Newtonian theory of the heavens was but a final 
generalization, prepared by foregone observations, and even already partially 
enounced. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 405 

of an attribute of matter, and, though not constituted by, still 
not realized without, the sensation of an organic passion. — The 
apprehension of a Secondary quality is solely a sensible cogni- 



The school I refer to is that of Leyden— the school of Boerhaave and his 
disciples. — Boerhaave held with Willis that the Brain-proper is the organ of 
animality; a distinct part thereof being destined to each of its two func- 
tions, sense and voluntary motion; that the After-brain is the organ of 
vitality, or the involuntary motions : — and that the two encephalic organs 
are prolonged, the former into the anterior, the latter into the posterior, 
columns of the spinal chord. In his doctrine all nerves are composite, 
being made up of fibrils of a tenuity, not only beyond our means of ob- 
servation, but almost beyond our capacity of imagination. Some nerves 
are homogeneous, their constituent filaments being either for a certain 
kind of motion alone, or for a certain kind of sensation alone ; others are 
heterogeneous, their constituent fibrils being some for motion, some for 
sensation; — and of this latter class are the nerves which issue from the 
spine. On Boerhaave's doctrine, however, the spinal nerves, in so far as 
they arise from the anterior column, are nerves both of the sensation and 
voluntary motion — of animality ; in so far as they arise from the poste- 
rior column, are nerves of involuntary motion — of vitality. A homoge- 
neous nerve does not, as a totality, perform a single office ; for every ele- 
mentary fibril of which it is composed runs from first to last isolated 
from every other, and has its separate sphere of exercise. As many dis- 
tinct spheres of sensation and motion, so many distinct nervous origins 
and terminations ; and as many different points of local termination in the 
body, so many different points of local origin in the brain. The Senso- 
rium Commune, the centre of sensation and motion, is not therefore an 
indivisible point, not even an undivided place ; it is, on the contrary, the 
aggregate of as many places (and millions of millions there may be) as 
there are encephalic origins of nervous fibrils. No nerve, therefore, in pro- 
priety of speech, gives off a branch ; their sheaths of dura mater alone 
are ramified; and there is no intercourse, no sympathy between the ele- 
mentary fibrils, except through the sensorium commune. That the nerves 
are made up of fibrils is shown, though inadequately, by various anatom- 
ical processes ; and that these fibrils are destined for distinct and often 
different purposes, is manifested by the phenomena of disjoined paralysis 
and stupor. (De Horbis Nervorum Praelectiones, by Van Eems. pp. 261, 
490-497, 696, 713-717. Compare Kaau Boerhaave, Impetum faciens, § 197 
-200.) 

The developed doctrine of Boerhaave on this point is to be sought for, 
neither in his Aphorisms nor in his Institutions and his Prelections on 
the Institutions — the more prominent works to which his illustrious disci- 
ples, Bailer and Van Swieten, appended respectively a commentary. The 
latter adopts, but does not advance the doctrine of his master. (Ad Aph. 
701, 711, 774, 1057, 1060.)— The former, who in his subsequent writings 
silently abandoned the opinion that sensation and motion are conveyed 



400 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

tion ; for it is nothing but the sensation of an organic passion. — ■ 
The apprehension of a Secundo-primary quality is, equally and 
at once, an intellectual and sensible cognition; for it involves 



by different nervous fibrils, in two unnoticed passages of his annotations 
on Boerhaave (1740), propounds it as a not improbable conjecture — that a 
total nerve may contain within its sheath a complement of motory and 
of sensitive tubules, distinct in their origin, transit, and distribution, but 
which at their peripheral extremity communicate ; the latter, like veins, 
carrying the spirits back to the brain, which the former had, like arteries, 
carried out. (Ad. Boerh. Instit. § 288, n. 2, § 293, n. 2.) 

The doctrine of the school of Leyden, on this point, was however still 
more articulately evolved by the younger (Bernard Siegfried) Albinvs ; 
not in any of his published works, but in the prelections he delivered 
for many years, in that university, on physiology. From a copy in my 
possession of his dictata in this course, very fully taken after the middle 
of the century, by Dr. William Grant (of Kothiemurcus), subsequently a 
distinguished medical author and practical physician in London, compared 
with another very accurate copy of these dictata, taken by an anonymous 
writer in the year 1741 ; I am enabled to present the following general 
abstract of the doctrine taught by this celebrated anatomist, though obliged 
to retrench both the special cases, and the reasoning in detail by which 
it is illustrated and confirmed. 

The nerves have a triple destination as they minister (1.) to voluntary 
motion, (2.) to sensation, (3.) to the vital energies — secretion, digestion, 
&c. Albinus seems to acquiesce in the doctrine, that the Brain-proper 
is the ultimate organ of the first and second function, the After-brain of 
the third. 

Nerves, again, are of two kinds. They are either such in which the func- 
tion of each ultimate fibril remains isolated in function from centre to peri- 
phery (the cerebro-spinal nerves) ; or such in which these are mutually 
confluent (the ganglionic nerves). 

To speak only of the cerebro-spinal nerves, and of these only in relation 
to the functions of motion and sensation ; — they are to be distinguished 
into three classes according as destined, (1.) to sense, (2.) to motion, (3.) to 
both motion and sensation. Examples — of the first class are the olfactory, 
the optic, the auditory, of which last he considers the portio mollis and the 
portio dura to be, in propriety, distinct nerves ; — of the second class, are the 
large portion of those passing to muscles, as the fourth and sixth pairs: — 
of the third class are the three lingual nerves, especially the ninth pair, 
fibrils of which he had frequently traced, partly to the muscles, partly to 
the gustatory papillae of the tongue, and the subcutaneous nerves, which 
are seen to give off branches, first to the muscles, and thereafter to the tac- 
tile papillae of the skin. The nervous fibres which minister to motion are 
distinct in origin, in transit, in termination, from those which minister to 
sensation. This is manifest, in the case of those nerves which run from their 
origin in separate sheaths, either to an organ of sense (as the olfactory and 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 407 

both the perception of a quasi-primary quality, and the sensation 
of a secondary. (See par 15, sq.') 



optic), or to an organ of motion (as the fourth and sixth pairs, which go to 
the muscles of the eye) ; but it is equally, though not so obtrusively true, 
in the case where a nerve gives off branches partly to muscles, partly to the 
cutaneous papillae. In this latter case, the nervous fibrils, or fistulas, are, 
from their origin in the medulla oblongata to their final termination in the 
skin, perfectly distinct. — The Medulla Oblongata is a continuation of the 
encephalos ; made up of two columns from the Brain-proper, and of two 
columns from the After-brain. Immediately or mediately, it is the origin, 
as it is the organ, of all the nerves. And in both respects it is double ; for 
one part, the organ of sense, affords an origin to the sensative fibrils ; whilst 
another, the organ of motion, does the same by the motory. In their pro- 
gress, indeed, after passing out, the several fibrils, whether homogeneous or 
not, are so conjoined by the investing membranes as to exhibit the appear- 
ance of a single nerve ; but when they approach their destination they 
separate, those for motion ramifying through the muscles, those for sensa- 
tion going to the cutaneous papillae or other organs of sense. Examples of 
this are afforded — in the ninth pair, the fibres of which (against more mod- 
ern anatomists), he holds to arise by a double origin in the medulla, and 
which, after running in the same sheath, separate according to their differ- 
ent functions and destinations ; and in the seventh pair, the hard and soft 
portions of which are respectively for motion and for sensation, though 
these portions, he elsewhere maintains, ought rather to be considered as 
two distinct nerves than as the twofold constituents of one. 

The proof of this is of various kinds. — In the first place, it is a theory 
forced upon us by the phenomena ; for only on this supposition can we ac- 
count for the following facts: — (1) That we have distinct sensations trans- 
mitted to the brain from different parts of the same sensitive organ (as the 
tongue) through which the same total nerve is diffused. (2) That we can 
send out from the brain a motive influence to one, nay, sometimes to a part 
of one muscle out of a plurality, among which the same total nerve (e. g. the 
ischiatic) is distributed. (3) That sometimes a part is either, on the one 
hand, paralyzed, without any loss of sensibility ; or, on the other, stupefied, 
without a diminution of its mobility. 

In the second place, we can demonstrate the doctrine, proceeding both from 
centre to periphery, and from periphery to centre. — Though ultimately divid- 
ing into filaments beyond our means of observation, we can still go far in 
following out a nerve both in its general ramifications, and in the special dis- 
tribution of its filaments, for motion to the muscles and for sensation to the 
skin, &c. ; and how far soever we are able to carry our investigation, we al- 
ways find the least fibrils into which we succeed in analyzing a nerve, equally 
distinct and continuous as the chord of which they were constituent. — And 
again, in following back the filaments of motion from the muscles, the fila- 



1 And the next chapter, § 1. — W. 



408 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

merits of sensation from the skin, we find them ever collected into larger 
and larger bundles within the same sheath, hut never losing their individu- 
ality, never fused together to form the substance of a larger chord.— The 
nerves are thus not analogous to arteries, which rise from a common trunk, 
convey a common fluid, divide into branches all similar in action to each 
other and to the primary trunk. For every larger nerve is only a comple- 
ment of smaller nerves, and every smallest nerve only a fasciculus of nervous 
fibrils; and these not only numerically different, but often differing from 
each other in the character of their functions. 

In the third place, that in the nerves for both motion and sensation are en- 
veloped distinct nerves or fibrils for these several functions — this is an infer- 
ence supported by the analogy of those nerves which are motive or sensitive, 
exclusively. And in regard to these latter, it becomes impossible, in some 
cases, to conceive why a plurality of nerves should have been found neces- 
sary, as in the case of the two portions of the seventh pair, in reality distinct 
nerves, if we admit the supposition that each nerve, each nervous fibril, is 
competent to the double office. 

In the fourth place, the two species of nerve are distinguished by a differ- 
ence of structure. For he maintains the old Galenic doctrine, that the nerves 
of motion are, as compared ■with those of sensation, of a harder and more 
fibrous texture ;— a diversity which he does not confine to the homogeneous 
nerves, but extends to the counter filaments of the heterogeneous. — This 
opinion, in modern times, by the majority surrendered rather than refuted, 
has been also subsequently maintained by a small number of the most accu- 
rate anatomists, as Malacarne and Eeil ; and to this result the recent observa- 
tians of Ehrenberg and others seem to tend. (See memoirs of the Berlin 
Academy for 1836, p. 605, sq. ; Mueller's Phys. p. 598.) 

Finally, to the objection — Why has nature not, in all cases as in some, in- 
closed the motive and the sentient fibrils in distinct sheaths ? — as answer, and 
fifth argument, he shows, with great ingenuity, that nature does precisely 
what, in the circumstances, always affords the greatest security to both, more 
especially to the softer, fibrils ; and he might have added, as a sixth reason 
and second answer — with the smallest expenditure of means. 

The subtilty of the nervous fibres is much greater than is commonly sus- 
pected; and there is probably no point of the body to which they are not 
distributed. What is the nature of their peripheral terminations it is, how- 
ever, difficult to demonstrate ; and the doctrines of Euysch and Malpighi in 
this respect are, as he shows, unsatisfactory. 

The doctrine of Albinus, indeed, of the whole school of Boerhaave, in re- 
gard to the nervous system, and, in particular, touching the distinction and 
the isolation of the ultimate nervous filaments, seems during a century cf 
interval not only to have been neglected but absolutely forgotten ; and a coun- 
ter opinion of the most erroneous character, with here and there a feeble 
echo of the true, to have become generally prevalent in its stead. For, 
strange to say, this very doctrine is that recently promulgated as the last con- 
summation of nervous physiology by the most illustrious physiologist in 
Europe. ' That the primitive fibres of all the cerebro-spinal nerves are to 
be regarded as isolated and distinct from their orign to their termination, and 
as radii issuing from the axis of the nervous system,' is the grand result, as 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 409 

stated by himself, of the elaborate researches of Johann Mueller ; and to the 
earliest discovery of this general fact he carefully vindicates his right against 
other contemporary observers, by stating that it had been privately commu- 
nicated by him to Van der Kolk, of Utrecht, so long ago as the year 1830. 
(Phys. p. 596-603.) 

In conclusion, I may observe that it is greatly to be regretted that these 
Prelections of Albinus were never printed. They present not only a full and 
elegant digest of all that was known in physiology at the date of their deliv- 
ery (and Albinus was celebrated for the uncommon care which he bestowed 
on the composition of his lectures) ; but they likewise contain, perdue, many 
original views, all deserving of attention, and some which have been subse- 
quently reproduced to the no small celebrity of their second authors. The 
speculation, for example, of John Hunter and Dr. Thomas Young, in regard 
to the self-contractile property of the Crystalline lens is here anticipated ; 
and that pellucidity and fibrous structure are compatible, shown by the anal- 
ogy of those gelatinous mollusca, the medusa? or sea-blubbers, which are not 
more remarkable for their transparency, than for their contractile and dila- 
tive powers. 

As I have already noticed, the celebrity of the Leyden School far from 
commanding acceptance, did not even secure adequate attention to the doc- 
trine of its illustrious masters ; and the Galenic theory, to which Haller lat- 
terly adhered, was, under the authority of Cullen and the Monros, that which 
continued to prevail in this country, until after the commencement of the 
present century. Here another step in advance was then made by Mr. Alex- 
ander Walker, an ingenious Physiologist of Edinburgh; who, in 1809, first 
started the prolific notion, that in the spinal nerves the filaments of sen- 
sation issue by the one root, the filaments of motion by the other. His attri- 
bution of the several functions to the several roots — sensation to the anterior, 
motion to the posterior — with strong presumption in its favor from general 
analogy, and its conformity with the tenor of all previous, and much subse- 
quent observation, is, however, opposed to the stream of later and more pre- 
cise experiment. Anatomists have been long agreed that the anterior col- 
umn of the spinal marrow is in continuity with the brain-proper, the poste- 
rior, with the after-brain. To say nothing of the Galenic doctrine, Willis 
and the School of Boerhaave had referred the automatic, Hoboken and Pou- 
teau the automatic and voluntary, motions to the cerebellum. Latterly, the 
experiments of Kolando, Flourens, and other physiologists, would show that 
to the after-brain belongs the power of regidated or voluntary motion ; while 
the parallelism which I have myself detected, between the relative develop- 
ment of that part of the encephalos in young animals and their command over 
the action of their limbs, goes, likewise, to prove that such motion is one, at 
least, of the cerebellic functions. (See Munro's Anatomy of the Brain, 1831, 
p. 4-9.) In contending, therefore, that the nervous filaments of sensation 
ascend in the anterior rachitic column to the brain-proper, and the nervous 
filaments of motion in the posterior, to the after-brain ; Mr. Walker origin- 
ally proposed, and still maintains, the alternative which, independently of 
precise experiment, had the greatest weight of general probability in its 
favor. (Archives of Science for 1809 ; The Nervous System, 1834, p. 50, sq.) 

In 1811, Sir Charles Bell, holding always the connection of the brain- 



410 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

proper with the anterior, of the after-brain with the posterior, cplumn of 
the spinal chord, proceeding, however, not on general probabilities, but on 
experiments expressly instituted on the roots themselves of the spinal nerves, 
first advanced the counter doctrine, that to the filaments ascending by the 
posterior roots belongs exclusively the function of sensation ; and thereafter, 
but still, as is now clearly proved, previously to any other physiologist, he 
further established by a most ingenious combination of special analogy and 
experiment, the correlative fact, that the filaments descending by the ante- 
rior roots are the sole vehicles of voluntary motion. These results, con- 
firmed as they have been by the principal physiologists throughout Europe, 
seem now placed above the risk of refutation. It still, however, remains to 
reconcile the seeming structural connection, and the manifest functional op- 
position, of the after-brain and posterior rachitic column ; for the decussation 
in the medulla oblongata, observed, among others, by Eolando and Solly, 
whereby the cerebellum and anterior column are connected, is apparently too 
partial to reconcile the discordant phenomena. (BeWs Nervous System ; 
Shaw's Narrative ; Mueller 's Physiology, &c.) 



As connected with the foregoing notices, I may here call attention to a re- 
markable case reported by M. Eey Kegis, a medical observer, in his ' Histoire 
Naturelle de l'Arne.' This work, which is extremely rare, I have been un- 
able to consult, and must therefore rely on the abstract given by M. de Biran 
in his ' Nouvelles Considerations,' p. 96, sq. This case, as far as I am aware, 
has escaped the observation of all subsequent physiologists. In its phe- 
nomena, and in the inferences to which they lead, it stands alone ; but 
whether the phenomena are themselves anomalous, or that experiments, with 
the same intent, not having been made, in like cases, they have not in these 
been brought in like manner into view, I am unable to determine. — A man 
lost the power of movement in one half of his body (one lateral half, proba- 
bly, but in De Biran's account the paralysis is not distinctly stated as hemi- 
plegia) ; while the sensibility of the parts affected remained apparently en- 
tire. Experiments, various and repeated, were, however, made to ascertain 
with accuracy, whether the loss of the motive faculty had occasioned any 
alteration in the capacity of feeling ; and it was found that the patient, though 
as acutely alive as ever to the sense of pain, felt, when this was secretly in- 
flicted, as by compression of his hand under the bed-clothes, a sensation of 
suffering or uneasiness, by which, when the pressure became strong, he was 
compelled lustily to cry out ; but a sensation merely general, he being alto- 
gether unable to localize the feeling, or to say from whence the pain pro- 
ceeded. It is unfortunately not stated whether he could discriminate one 
pain from another, say the pain of pinching from the pain of pricking ; but 
had this not been the case, the notice of so remarkable a circumstance could 
hardly, I presume, have been overlooked. The patient, as he gradually re- 
covered the use of his limbs, gradually also recovered the power of localizing 
his sensations. — It would be important to test the value of this observation 
by similar experiments, made on patients similarly affected. Until this bo 
done, it would be rash to establish any general inferences upon its facts. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 411 

I may notice also another problem, the solution of which ought to engage 
the attention of those who have the means of observation in their power. 
Is the sensation of heat dependent upon a peculiar set of nerves ? This to 
me seems probable ; 1°, because certain sentient parts of the body are in- 
sensible to this feeling ; and, 2°, because I have met with cases recorded, in 
which, while sensibility in general was abolished, the sensibility to heat re- 
mained apparently undiminished. 1 



1 Hero may be added a curious item, from the foot-notes to Reid (p. 246) : ' However 
astonishing, it is now proved beyond all rational doubt, that, in certain abnormal states 
of the nervous organism, perceptions are possible through other than the ordinary 
channels of the senses.' — W. 



CHAPTER VI. 

PEECEPTION PEOPEE AND SENSATION PEOPEE * 

| I. — Principal momenta of the Editor's doctrine of 
Perception. 

A) — In itself: 

i. — Perception in general. 

I. Sensitive Perception, or Perception simply, is that act of 
Consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body, 

* A word as to the various meanings of the terms here prominent — 
Perception, Sensation, Sense. 

i. — Perception (Perceptio ; Perception ; Percezione ; Perception, Wahrneh- 
mung) has different significations ; but under all and each of these, the term 
has a common ambiguity, denoting as it may, either 1° the perceiving Facul- 
ty, or 2° the Perceiving Act, or 3° the Object perceived. Of these the only 
ambiguity of importance is the last ; and to relieve it I would propose the 
employment, in this relation, of Percept, leaving Perception to designate both 
the faculty and its act ; for these it is rarely necessary to distinguish, as what 
is applicable to the one is usually applicable to the other. 

But to the significations of the term, as applied to different faculties, acts, 
and objects ; of which there are in all four • 

1. Perceptio — which has been naturalized in all the principal languages of 
modern Europe, with the qualified exception of the German, in which the 
indigenous term Wahrnehmung has again almost superseded it — Perceptio, 
in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and 
Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to Comprehension, Notion, or Cognition in 



2. From this first meaniug it was easily deflected to a second, in which it 
corresponds to an apprehension, a becoming aware of, in a word, a conscious- 
ness. In this meaning, though long thus previously employed in the schools, 
it was brought more prominently and distinctively forward in the writings 
of Descartes. From him it passed, not only to his own disciples, but, like 
the term Idea, to his antagonist, Gassendi, and, thereafter, adopted equally 
by Locke and Leibnitz, it remained a household word in every subsequent 
philosophy, until its extent was further limited, and thus a third signification 
given to it. 

Under this second meaning it is, however, proper to say a word in regard 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 413 

a.) Certain special affections, whereof as an animated organism 
it is contingently susceptible ; and 

b.) Those general relations of extension under which as a ma- 
terial organism it necessarily exists. 



to the special employment of the term in the Cartesian and Leibnitzio-Wol- 
fian philosophies. — Perception the Cartesians really identified with Idea, (using 
this term in its unexclusive universality, but discounting Descartes' own 
abusive application of it to the organic movement in the brain, of which the 
mind has, ex hypothesi, no consciousness) — -and allowed them only a logical 
distinction ; — the same representative act being called Idea, inasmuch as we 
regard it as a representation, i. e. view it in relation to what through it, 
as represented, is mediately known, and Perception, inasmuch as we regard 
it as a consciousness of such representation, i. e. view it in relation to the 
knowing mind. — The Leibnitzio-Wolfians, on the other hand, distinguished 
three acts in the process of representative cognition : — 1° the act of repre- 
senting a (mediate) object to the mind ; 2° the representation, or, to speak 
more properly, representamen, itself as an (immediate or vicarious) object 
exhibited to the mind ; 3° the act by which the mind is conscious, immedi- 
ately of the representative object, and, through it, mediately of the remote 
object represented. They called the first Perception ; the last Apperception ; 
the second Idea — sensual, to wit, for what they styled the material Idea was 
only an organic motion propagated to the brain, which, on the doctrine of 
the pre-established harmony, is in sensitive cognition the arbitrary concom- 
itant of the former, and, of course, beyond the sphere of consciousness or 
apperception. 

3. In its third signification, Perception is limited to the apprehensions of 
Sense alone. This limitation was first formally imposed upon the word by 
Eeid, for no very cogent reason besides convenience (222 b) ; and thereafter 
by Kant. Kant, again, was not altogether consistent ; for he employs ' Per- 
ception 1 in the second meaning, for the consciousness of any mental presenta- 
tion, and thus in a sense corresponding to the Apperception of the Leibnitz- 
ians, while its vernacular synonym ' Wahrnehmung'' he defines in conform- 
ity with the third, as the consciousness of an empirical intuition. Imposed 
by such authorities, this is now the accredited signification of these terms, 
in the recent philosophies of Germany, Britain, France, Italy, &c. 

4. But imder this third meaning it is again, since the time and through 
the authority of Eeid, frequently employed in a still more restricted accep- 
tation, viz. as Perception (proper) in contrast to Sensation (proper). The 
import of these terms, as used by Eeid and other philosophers on the one 
hand, and by myself on the other, is explained in the text. 

ii. — Sensation (Sensatio ; Sensation, Sentiment ; Sensazione ; Empfindung) 
has various significations ; and in all of these, like Perception, Conception, 
Imagination, and other analogous terms in the philosophy of mind, it is am- 
biguously applied ;— 1°, for a Faculty— 2 P , for its Act— 3°, for its Object. 
Here there is no available term like Percept, Concept, &c, whereby to dis- 
criminate the last. 



414 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

Of these Perceptions, the former, which is thus conversant about 
a subject-object, is Sensation proper ; the latter, which is thus 
conversant about an object-object, is Perception proper} 

2. All Perception is an act of Consciousness ; no Perception, 
therefore, is possible, except under the conditions under which 
Consciousness is possible. The eight following conditions are 
partly common to perception with the other acts of Consciousness ; 
partly proper to it as a special operation. 

3. The first is a certain concentration of consciousness on an ob- 
ject of sense ; — an act of Attention, however remiss.** 

4. The second is (independently of the necessary contrast of a 
subject and an object), a plurality, alteration, difference on the 
part of the perceived object or objects, and of a recognition or 



There are two principal meanings in which this term has been employed. 

1. Like the Greek msthesis, it was long and generally used to comprehend 
the process of sensitive apprehension both in its subjective and its objective 
relations. 

2. As opposed to Idea, Perception, &c., it was limited, first in tLs Carte- 
sian school, and thereafter in that of Eeid, to the subjective phasis of our 
sensitive cognitions ; that is, to our consciousness of the affections of our 
animated organism, — or on the Neo-Platonic, Cartesian, and Leibnitzian hy- 
potheses, to the affections of the mind corresponding to, but not caused by, 
the unknown mutations of the body. Under this restriction, Sensation 
may, both in French and English, be employed to designate our corporeal 
or lower feelings, in opposition to Sentiment, as a term for our higher, i. e. 
our intellectual and moral, feelings. 

iii. — Sense (Sensus ; Sens ; Senso ; Sinn) is employed in a looser and in a 
stricter application. 

Under the former head it has two applications ; — 1°, a psychological, as a 
popular term for Intelligence': 2°, a logical, as a synonym for Meaning. 

Under the latter head, Sense is employed ambiguously ; — 1°, for the Fac- 
ulty of sensitive apprehension ; 2°, for its Act ; 3°, for its Organ. 

In this relation, Sense has been distinguished into External and Internal ; 
but under the second term, in so many vague and various meanings, that I 
cannot here either explain or enumerate them. 

On the analogical employments of the word, see above, p. 378 sq. 

* St. Jerome — 'Quod mens videat et mens audiat, et quod nee audire 
quidpiam nee videre possumus, nisi sensus in ea qua? cernimus et audimus 
intentus, vetus sententia.' (Adv. Jovin. ii. 9.) See Aristotle (Probl. xi. 33), 
whom Jerome manifestly had in his eye ; Strato Physicus, as quoted bj 
Plutarch (De Sol. An. Opera, t. ii. p. 961) ; and Plutarch himself (Ibid.) 

1 See p. 380.— IF. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 415 

discrimination thereof on the part of the perceiving subject.* — 
This supposes the following : — Quality proper ; Quantity, Pro- 
tensive (Time), Extensive (Space), Intensive (Degree) ; and Rela- 
tion. Therefore — 

5. The third is Quality, quality strictly so called. For one 
affection is distinguished from another as it is, or is not, such and 
such ; in other words, as it has, or has not, this or that quality 
(suchness). 

6. The fourth is Time ; which supposes Memory, or, to speak 
more correctly, a certain continuous representation of the late and 
latest past, known with and in contrast to our apprehension of 
the passing present. For without such continuity of conscious- 
ness, no consciousness is possible. 

7. The fifth is Space. For we are only conscious of perceiv- 
ing, as we are conscious of perceiving something as discriminated 
from other coexistent things. But this in perception is to be 
conscious of one thing as out of another, that is, as extended, that 
is, as in space. 

8. The sixth is Degree. For all sensations are, though possi- 
bly of any, actually of one definite intensity ; and distinguished 
not only by differences in Quality, Time, Space, but also by differ- 
ences in Degree. 

9. The seventh is Relation. For discrimination, which all per- 
ception supposes, is a recognition of a relation, the relation of 
contrast ; and differences in Quality, Time, Space, Degree, are only 
so many various kinds of such relativity. 

1 0. Finally, the eighth is an Assertory Judgment, that within 
the sphere of sense an object (a) exists, and (b) exists thus or thus 
conditioned. \ All consciousness is realized in the enunciation — 



* It has been well said by Hobbes, in regard to the former, — ' Sentire sem- 
per idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt' (Elem. Philos. P. iv. c. 25, § 5) ; 
and by Galen and Nemesius in reference to the latter, — ' Sensation is not an 
alteration (affection, modification), but the recognition of an alteration.' 

+ Aristotle in various passages- asserts that Sensitive perception is a dis- 
crimination or a judgment. (Anal. Post. L. ii. c. 19, § 5. — Top. L. ii. c, 4, 



416 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

That is there (or This is here). All Perception consequently 
enounces — That is there; but in this case, there is especially- 
understood, by the That — an object manifested through one or 
more qualities, Secondary, Secundo-primary, Primary ; and by 
the is there — apprehended in, or in immediate relation to, our 
organism.* 

11. Such being the general conditions of Perception, it is man- 
ifestly impossible to discriminate with any rigor Sense from Intel- 
ligence. Sensitive apprehension is, in truth, only the recognition 
by Intelligence of the phenomena presented in or through its or- 
gans.f 



§ 2.— De An. L. iii. c. 1, § 10 ; c. 10, § 1; alibi.) And the Aphrodisian :— ' Al- 
though sensation be only brought to bear through certain corporeal passions, 
yet Sensation itself is not a passion, but a judgment.'' (On the Soul, f. 138 b, 
ed. Aid.) Eeid has the merit among modern philosophers of first approxi- 
mating to the recognition of judgment as an element or condition of con- 
sciousness in general, in laying it at the root of Perception, Sensation, Mem- 
ory, and [Self] Consciousness ; though he unfortunately fell short of the truth 
in refusing an existential judgment also to the acts of the representative fac- 
ulty, his Conception, Imagination, or Simple Apprehension. 

* In this qiialitative judgment there is only the consciousness of the qual- 
ity perceived in itself as a distinct object. The judgment, again, by which 
it is recognized of such a class or such a name, is a higher energy, and ought 
not, as is sometimes done, to be etyled Perception ; it is Judgment, emphati- 
cally so called, a simple act of, what I would call, the elaborative, or diano- 
etic, or discursive faculty, the faculty of relations, or comparison. 

t Tertullian : — ' Non enim et sentire intelligere est, et intelligere, sentire. 
At quid erit Sensus, nisi ejus rei qua, sentitur intelleclus t Quid erit intellec- 
tus, nisi ejus rei quae intelligitur sensus? Unde ista tormenta cruciandse 
simplicitatis, et suspendendaa veritatis ? Quis mihi exhibebit sensum non in- 
telligentem quod seutit ; aut intellectual non sentientem quod intelligit?' — 
(De Anima, c. 18 ; compare De Carne Christi, c. 12.) — To the same effect 
St. Gregory of Nyssa. (De Opif. Horn, cc 6, 10; and De Anima et Eesur., 
Opera, t. ii. p. 623 ed. Paris, 1615.) — See also St. Jerome as quoted in note 
* 414. — But this doctrine we may trace back to Aristotle and his school, and 
even higher. ' There is extant,' says Plutarch, 'a discourse of Strato Phys- 
icus, demonstrating — That a sensitive apprehension is ivholly impossible with- 
out an act of Intellect.'' (Op. Mor. p. 961.) And as to Aristotle "himself : — 
' To divorce (he says) Sensation from Understanding, is to reduce Sensation 
to an insensible process ; wherefore it has been said — Intellect sees, and In- 
tellect hears? (Prob'l. xi. 33.) 

This saying, as recorded by Aristotle, constitutes in the original (a differ- 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 417 

12. All perception is an immediate or presentative cognition : 
and has, therefore, in either form, only one univocal object ; that, 
to wit, which it apprehends as now and here existent. 1 

ence of dialect discounted) the first hernistich of the famous verse of Epi- 
charrnus : 

iiovg bpjj Kai N<% aicovei, T<5AAa Kwipa Kal rv<p\d. 
Mind it seeth, Mind it heareth ; all leside is deaf and Hind ; 
or less literally — 

What sees is Mind, what hears is Mind / 
The ear and eye are deaf and Hind. 

Though overlooked as a quotation, by both the commentators on the Prob- 
lems, by Erasmus, and many others, it has never been suspected that these 
words, as quoted, are not a quotation from the Syracusan poet. This nega- 
tive I, however, venture to maintain, at least, as a probable thesis ; for I am 
inclined to think that the line, however great its merit, does not ascend to 
Epicharmus, but was forged and fathered on him in an age considerably 
later than Aristotle's. . My reasons are these : 

1. Epicharmus was a Pythagorean philosopher and a Doric poet. But to 
fabricate Pythagorean treatises in the Dorio dialect seems to have become 
in the latter ages a matter of exercise and emulation among the Greek So- 
phistas and Syncretists. In fact, of the numerous fragments under the 
names of Pythagoras, Theano, Timseus, Ocellus, Archytas, Hippodamus, 
Euryphamus, Hipparchus, Theages, Metopus, Clinias, Crito, Polus, Lysis, 
Melissa, Mya, &c. ; there are hardly any to a critical eye not manifestly spu- 
rious, and none whatever exempt from grave suspicion. On general grounds, 
therefore, forgeries on Epicharmus are not only not improbable, but likely. 

2. And that such were actually committed we are not without special evi- 
dence. We know from Atheneeus (L. xiv.), that there were many Pseudoer- 
picharmia in circulation. Besides Apollodorus, he cites, as authorities for 
this, Aristoxenus (who was a scholar of Aristotle) in the eighth book of his 
Polity, and Philochorus (who lived about a century later) in his treatise on 
Divination. Among the more illustrious fabricators, the former of these 
commemorates Chrysogonus the flute-player ; the latter, Axiopistus of Lo- 
crus or Sicyon, with the names of his two supposititious works, the Canon 
and the Gnomes,. Of either of these, judging from their title, the line in 
question may have formed a part ; though it is not improbably of a still 
more recent origin. 

3. The words (and none could be more direct and simple) which make up 
the first hemistich of the verse, we find occasionally quoted as a proverbial 
philosopheme, subsequently to the time of Plato. To Plato's doctrine, and 
his language, I would indeed attribute its rise ; for it is idle to suppose, with 
Jacobs, that Sophocles (OEd. T. 889) and Euripides (Hel. 118) had either the 
verse or dogma in their eye. Aristotle, at least, the author of the Problems, 



i See chapter iii. § i. 4, S, 11.— W. 

26 



418 PHILOSOPHY OP PERCEPTION. 

13. All Perception is a sensitive cognition : it, therefore, appre- 
hends the existence of no object out of its organism, or not in 
immediate correlation to its organism ; for thus only can an ob- 
ject exist, noio and here, to sense. 



is the oldest testimony for such, a usage ; and long after Aristotle, after, in- 
deed, the line had been already fathered on Epicharmus, we have Pliny (H. 
N. xi. 37), Cassius Felix (Pr. 22), St. Jerome (Adv. Jovin. ii. 9), the manu- 
scripts of Stobaeus (iv. 42), and the Scholiast of Aristophanes (PI. 43), all ad- 
ducing it only as an adage. It is not, however, till nearly six centuries after 
Epicharmus, and considerably more than four centuries after Aristotle, that 
we find the saying either fully cited as a verse, or the verse ascribed to the 
Syracusan. But from the time of Plutarch, who himself thrice alleges it, its 
quotation in either fashion becomes frequent ; as by Tertullian, Clement of 
Alexandria, Maximus Tyrius, Julian, Theodoret, Olympiodorus (twice), and 
Tzetzes (four times). Porphyry (thrice) records it—but as a saying of Py- 
thagoras ; and Iamblichus, as a dictum of the Pythagorean School. These 
authors both had learning, though neither, certainly, was ever critical in its 
application. Their statements can only, therefore, be held to favor the opin- 
ion that they were unaware of any decisive evidence to vindicate the verse 
to Epicharmus. 

4. But if improbable, even at first sight, that such a verse of such an au- 
thor, should not, if authentic, have been adduced by any writer now extant, 
during the long period of six hundred years, the improbability is enhanced 
when we come to find, that during that whole period it is never quoted, 
even under circumstances when, had it been current as aline of Epicharmus, 
it could not but have been eagerly appealed to. Plato, as observed by Alci- 
mus and Laertius, was notoriously fond of quoting Epicharmus ; and there 
were at least two occasions— in the Theastetus (§ 102, sq.), and in the Piuedo 
(§ 25 [11 Wytt.])— when this gnome of his favorite poet would have confirmed 
and briefly embodied the doctrine he was anxiously inculcating. Could he fail 
to employ it ? In fact, it comes to this ;— these passages must either be held tc 
follow, or to found, the philosopheme in question.— In like manner Cicero, in 
his exposition of the first passage (Tusc. i. 20), could hardly have avoided as- 
sociating Epicharmus with Plato, as Tertullian and Olympiodorus have done in 
their expositions of the second— had the line been recognized in the age of the 
former, as it was in the age of the two latter. Nor could such an apothegm of 
such apoet have been unknown to Cicero,— to Cicero, so generally conver- 
sant with Hellenic literature,— and who, among other sayings of Epicharmus 
himself, adduces in Greek, as his brother Quintus paraphrases in Latin, the 
no less celebrated maxim — 

Be sober, and to doubt inclined : 
These are the very joints of mind ; 
or on the other reading — 

Be cool, and eke to doubt propense : 
These are the sineics of good sense. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 419 

ii. — Sensation proper and Perception proper, in correlation. 

14. In perception proper there is a higher energy of intelli- 
gence, than in Sensation proper. For though the latter be the 
apprehension of an affection of the Ego, and therefore, in a certain 
sort, the apprehension of an immaterial quality ; still it is only 
the apprehension of the fact of an organic passion ; whereas the 
former, though supposing Sensation as its condition, and though 
only the apprehension of the attributes of a material Non-ego, is, 
however, itself without corporeal passion, and, at the same time, 
the recognition not merely of a fact, but of relations. (See 22, 29, 
and p. 379 notef.) 

15. Sensation proper is the conditio sine qua non of a Percep- 
tion proper of the Primary qualities. For we are only aware of 
the existence of our organism, in being sentient of it, as thus or 
thus affected ; and are only aware of it being the subject of exten- 
sion, figure, division, motion, &c, in being percipient of its affec- 
tions, as like or as unlike, and as out of, or locally external to, 
each other. 

16. Every Perception proper has a Sensation proper as its con- 
dition ; but every Sensation has not a Perception proper as its 
conditionate — unless, what I think ought to be done, we view the 
general consciousness of the locality of a sensorial affection as a 
Perception proper. In this case, the two apprehensions will be 
always coexistent. 

17. But though the fact of Sensation proper, and the fact of 
Perception proper imply each other, this is all, — for the two cog- 
nitions, though coexistent, are not proportionally coexistent. On 
the contrary, although we can only take note of, that is perceive, 
the special relations of sensations, on the hypothesis that these 
sensations exist ; a sensation, in proportion as it rises above a low 
degree of intensity, interferes with the perception of its relations, 
by concentrating consciousness on its absolute affection alone. It 
may accordingly be stated as a general rule — That, above a cer- 
tain point, the stronger the Sensation, the weaker the Perception ; 



420 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

and the distincter the perception the less obtrusive the sensation ; 
in other words — Though Perception proper and Sensation proper 
exist only as they coexist, in the degree or intensity of their exist- 
ence, they are always found in an inverse ratio to each other. (See 
387 b, sq.) 

18. The organism is the field of apprehension, both to Sensa- 
tion proper and Perception proper ; but with this difference, — 
that the former views it as of the Ego, the latter, as of the Non- 
ego ; that the one draws it within, the other shuts it out from the 
sphere of self. As animated, as the subject of affections of which 
I am conscious, the organism belongs to me ; rmd of these affec- 
tions, which I recognize as mine, Sensation proper is the appre- 
hension. As material, as the subject of extension, figure, divisi- 
bility, and so forth, the organism does not belong to me, the con- 
scious unit ; and of these properties, which I do not recognize as 
mine, Perception proper is the apprehension.* — (See 38, 39, and 
p. 379 a f.) 

19. The affections in Sensation proper are determined, (a) by 
certain intra-organic, or (b) by certain extra-organic causes. The 

* It may appear, not a paradox merely, but a contradiction to say, that the 
organism is, at once, within and without the mind ; is, at once, subjective 
and objective ; is, at once, Ego and Non-ego. But so it is ; and so we must 
admit it to be, unless on the one hand, as Materialists, we identify mind 
with matter, or, on the other, as Idealists, we identify matter with mind. 
The organism, as animated, as sentient, is necessarily ours ; and its affec- 
tions are only felt as affections of the indivisible Ego. In this respect, and 
to this extent, our organs are not external to ourselves. But our organism 
is not merely a sentient subject, it is at the same time an extended, figured, 
divisible, in a word, a material, subject ; and the same sensations which are 
reduced to unity in the indivisibility of consciousness are in the divisible or- 
ganism recognized as plural and reciprocally external, and, therefore, as ex- 
tended, figured A and divided. Such is the fact : but how the immaterial can 
be united. with matter, how the unextended can apprehend extension, how 
the indivisible can measure the divided, — this is the mystery of mysteries to 
man. ' Modus (says the Pseudo-Augustin) — Modus quo corporibus adhse- 
rent spiritus, omnino mirus est, nee comprehendi ab hominibus potest; et 
hoc ipse homo est.' Thus paraphrased by Pascal : — ' Man is, to himself, the 
mightiest prodigy of nature. Tor he is unable to conceive what is Body, 
still less what is Mind, and, least of aU, how there can be united a body and 
a mind. This is the climax of his difficulties ; yet this is his peculiar nature.' 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 421 

latter, as powers in bodies, beyond the sphere of perception, and 
their effects m us, the objects of Sensation, are both (therefore 
ambiguously) denominated, either, in the language of modern 
philosophers, the Secondary Qualities of Matter, or, in the lan- 
guage of Aristotle and his school, the Proper Sensibles} 

20. Sensation proper has no object but a subject-object, i. e. the 
organic affection of which we are conscious. The cause of that 
affection, whether without organism or within, that is, whether 
or not a secondary quality of body, is immediately or in its own 
nature unknown ; being known only, if known it ever be, me- 
diately, by observation, induction, inference, conjecture. Even in 
the perception of the Secundo-primary qualities, where there is 
the perception proper of a quasi-primary quality, in some degree 
of resistance, and the sensation proper of a secondary quality, in 
some affection of the sentient organism, its effect ; still to Sensa- 
tion proper there is no other object but the subjective affection ; 
and even its dependence, as an effect, upon the resistance, as a 
cause, is only a conclusion founded on the observed constancy of 
their concomitance. (See 36, 37, and p. 376 b, sq.) 

21. Nay, the Perception proper, accompanying a sensation 
proper, is not an apprehension, far less a representation, of the 
external or internal stimulus, or concause, which determines the 
affection whereof the sensation is the consciousness. — Not the 
former ; for the stimulus or concause of a sensation is always, in 
itself, to consciousness unknown. Not the latter ; for this would 
turn Perception into Imagination — reduce it from an immediate, 
and assertory, and objective, into a mediate, and problematic, and 
subjective cognition. In this respect, Perception proper is an 
apprehension of the relations of sensations to each other, prima- 
rily in Space, and secondarily in Time and Degree. (See 31.) 

iii. — Sensation proper. 

22. Sensation proper, viewed, on one side, is a passive affection 

1 See previous chapter. — W. 



422 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

of the organism ; but viewed on the other, it is an active apper- 
ception, by the mind, of that affection. And as the former only 
exists for us, inasmuch as it is perceived by us; and as it is 
only perceived by us, inasmuch as it is apprehended, in an 
active concentration, discrimination, judgment, of the mind; — 
the latter, an act of intelligence, is to be viewed, as the principal 
factor in the percipient process, even in its lower form, that of 
Sensation proper.* (See 4, 10, 11, 14, with notes.) 

iv. — Perception proper. 

23. In Perception proper, the object-object perceived is, always, 
either a Primary quality, or the quasi-Primary phasis of a 
Secundo-primary. (See p. 3 76 b, sq.) 

24. The primary qualities are perceived as in our organism ; 
the Quasi-primary phasis of the Secundo-primary as in correla- 
tion to our organism. (See 394 a.) 

25. Thus a perception of the Primary qualities does not, 



* This is the true doctrine of Aristotle and his school, who are, however, 
not unfrequently misrepresented by relation to the extreme counter-opinion 
of the Platonists, as viewing in the cognitions of Sense a mere passion — a mis- 
representation to which, undoubtedly, a few of the Latin Schoolmen have 
afforded grounds. It is, indeed, this twofold character of the Sensitive pro- 
cess that enables us to reconcile the apparent confliction of those passages of 
Aristotle, where (as De Anima, L. ii. c. 4, § 8; c. 5, § 2; c. 11, § 14; c. 12, § 
1 ; De Sensu et Sensili, c. 1, § 5 ; Physica, L. vii. c. 3, § 12, Pacian division) 
he calls Sensation a passion or alteration of the Sentient; and those others 
where (as De Anima, L. iii. c. 8, § 2) he asserts that in Sensation the Sen- 
tient is not passively affected. In the former passages the sentient faculty is 
regarded on its organic side, in the latter on its mental. Compare De Somno 
et Vigilia, c. 1, § 6, where it is said, that ' Sensation is a process belonging 
exclusively neither to the soul nor to the body, but, as energy, a motion of 
the soid, through the [medium of the] body;' — a text which, however, may 
still be variously expounded. — See Alexander, in note +, p. 415 ; who, with 
the other Greek interpreters, Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, solves the 
difficulty by saying, that it is not the sentient mind that suffers, but the sen- 
tient organ. To the same effect are Galen and Nemesius, as quoted in note 
*, p. 415. Eeid is partly at one with the Peripatetics ; with whose doctrine, 
indeed, he is more frequently in accordance than he is always himself aware. 
(Inq. 114 a.) 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 423 

originally and in itself, reveal to us the existence, and qualitative 
existence, of aught beyond the organism, apprehended by us as 
extended, figured, divided, &c. 

26. The primary qualities of things external to our organism 
we do not perceive, i. e. immediately know. For these we only 
learn to infer, from the affections which we come to find that 
they determine in our organs ; — affections which, yielding us a 
perception of organic extension, we at length discover, by obser- 
vation and induction, to imply a corresponding extension in the 
extra-organic agents. 

27. Further, in no part of the organism have we any apprehen- 
sion, any immediate knowledge of extension in its true and abso- 
lute magnitude ; perception noting only the fact given in sensa- 
tion, and sensation affording no standard, by which to measure 
the dimensions given in one sentient part with those given in 
another. For, as perceived, extension is only the recognition of 
one organic affection in its outness from another ; as a minimum 
of extension is thus to perception the smallest extent of organism 
in which sensations can be discriminated as plural : — and as in 
one part of the organism this smallest extent is, perhaps, some 
million, certainly some myriad times smaller than in others ; it 
follows that, to perception, the same real extension will appear, 
in this place of the body, some million or myriad times greater 
than in that.* Nor does this difference subsist only as between 
sense and sense ; for in the same sense, and even in that sense 
which has very commonly been held exclusively to afford a 

* This difference in the power of discriminating affections, possessed by 
different parts of the body, seems to depend partly on the minuteness and 
isolation of the ultimate nervous fibrils, partly on the sensation being less 
or more connected with pleasure and pain. In this respect the eye greatly 
transcends all the other organs. For we can discriminate in the retina sen- 
sations, as reciprocally external, more minutely than we can in touch — as 
over the greater part of the body two million five hundred thousand fold — 
as at the most sensitive place of the hand, a hundred thousand fold — as at 
the tip of the tongue, where tactile discrimination is at its maximum, fifty 
thousand fold. I am, however, inclined to think, for reasons already given, 
that we must reduce millions to myriads. — (See p. 387, note.) 



424 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

knowledge of absolute extension, I mean Touch proper, the min- 
imum, at one part of the body, is some fifty times greater than 
it is at another. (See p. 389 ab, note.) 

28. The existence of an extra-organic world is apprehended, 
not in a perception of the Primary qualities, but in a perception 
of the quasi-primary phasis of the Secundo-primary ; tbat is, in 
the consciousness that our locomotive energy is resisted, and not 
resisted by aught in our organism itself. For in the conscious- 
ness of being thus resisted is involved, as a correlative, the con- 
sciousness of a resisting something external to our organism. 
Both are, therefore, conjunctly apprehended. (See p. 394 a, 
note.) This experience presupposes, indeed, a possession of the 
notions of space and motion in space. 

29. But on the doctrine that space, as a necessary condition, 
is a native element of thought ; and since the notion of any one 
of its dimensions, as correlative to, must inevitably imply the 
others ; it is evident that every perception of sensations out of 
sensations will afford the occasion, in apprehending any one, of 
conceiving all the three extensions ; that is, of conceiving space. 
On the doctrine, and in the language of Reid, our original cogni- 
tions of space, motion, &c, are instinctive ; a view which is con- 
firmed by the analogy of those of the lower animals, which have 
the power of locomotion at birth. It is truly an idle problem to 
attempt imagining the steps by which we may be supposed to 
have acquired the notion of extension ; when, in fact, we are 
unable to imagine to ourselves the possibility of that notion not 
being always in our possession. 

30. We have, therefore, a twofold cognition of space : a) an a 
priori or native imagination of it, in general, as a necessary con- 
dition of the possibility of thought ; and b) under that, an a 
posteriori or adventitious percept of it, in particular, as contin- 
gently apprehended in this or that actual complexus of sensations.* 

* This doctrine agrees with that of Kant and Eeid in the former ; it dif- 
fers certainly from that of Kant, and probably from that of Keid, in the lat- 
ter. But see chapter i. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 425 

B.) Editor's doctrine of Perception, in contrast to that of Reid, 
Stewart, Royer-Collard, and other philosophers of the Scottish 
School* 

31. Perception (proper) is the Notion or Conception of an 
object, instinctively suggested, excited, inspired, or, as it were, 
conjured up, on occasion or at the sign of a Sensation (proper).f 
Reid, Inq. Ill b, 121 a, 122 a, 123 b, 128 b, note, 130 b, 159 a, 183 
a, 188 a. I. P. 258 ab, 259 b, 260 b, 318 ab, 327 a; Stewart, 
El. vol. i. pp. 92, 93 ; Royer-Collard, in Jouffroy's Reid, vol. iii. 
pp. 402, 403. 

* I here contrast my own doctrine of perception with that of the philosophers 
in question, not because their views and mine are those at farthest variance 
on the point, but, on the contrary, precisely because they thereon approxi- 
mate the nearest. I have already shown that tbe doctrine touching Percep- 
tion held by Eeid (and in the present relation he and his two illustrious fol- 
lowers are in almost all respects at one) is ambiguous. For while some of 
its statements seem to harmonize exclusively with the conditions of natural 
presentationism, others, again, appear only compatible with those of an ego- 
istical representationism. Maintaining, as I do, the former doctrine, it is, of 
course, only the positions conformable to the latter, which it is, at present, 
necessary to adduce. 

t This is not the doctrine, at least not the language of the doctrine of real 
presentationism. It is the language, at best, of an egoistical representa- 
tionism; and, as a doctrine, it coincides essentially with the theory of 
mediate perception held by the lower Platonists, the Cartesians, and the 
Leibnitzians — as properly understood. The Platonizing Cudworth, in differ- 
ent parts of his works, gives, in fact, nearly in the same terms, the same 
account of the process of Sensitive Perception. He signalizes, firstly, the 
bodily affection, determined by the impression of an external something 
[precisely as Eeid] ; secondly, the sympathetic recognition thereof by the 
soul [Eeid's Sensation] ; thirdly, to quote his expressions, ' whereby accord- 
ing to nature's instinct, it hath several Seemings or Appearances begotten in 
it of those resisting objects, without it at a distance, in respect of color, mag- 
nitude, figure, and local motion.' — [Eeid's Conceptions or Notions of which 
Perception is made up.] (Imm. Mor. B. v. eh. 2, § 3. Compare B. iii. ch. 
1, § 5.) See also above, the Neoplatonic doctrine as stated, p. 387 b, note ; 
the Cartesian Sylvain Eegis, as quoted, p. 275 a ; and the Cartesian Andala, 
as quoted, p. 377 b, note ; and to these may be added the Aristotelian 
Compton Carlton (who did not reject the doctrine of a representative percep- 
tion of the Common Sensibles), as quoted, p. 318 a. "But that Eeid might 
possibly employ the terms notion and conception in a vague and improper 
sense, for cognition in general, see p. 318, b, 4. 



426 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

On the contrary, I hold, in general, that as Perception, in eithei 
form, is an immediate or presentative, not a mediate or represent- 
ative cognition, that a Perception proper is not, and ought not to 
be called a Notion or Conception. And, I hold in particular, 
that, on the one hand, in the consciousness of sensations, out of 
each other, contrasted, limited, and variously arranged, we have a 
Perception proper, of the primary qualities, in an externality to 
the mind, though not to the nervous organism, as an immediate 
cognition, and not merely as a notion or concept of something 
extended, figured, &c. ; and on the other, as a correlative contain- 
ed in the consciousness of our voluntary motive, energy resisted, 
and not resisted by aught within the limits of mind and its 
subservient organs, we have a Perception proper of the secundo- 
primary quality of resistance, in an extra-organic force, as an imme- 
diate cognition, and not merely as a notion or concept, of a resisting 
something external to our body, — though certainly in either 
case, there may be, and probably is, a concomitant act of imagi- 
nation, by which the whole complex consciousness on the occasion 
is filled up. (See 21.) 1 

32. On occasion of the Sensation (proper), along with the notion 
or conception which constitutes the Perception (proper), of the ex- 
ternal object, there is blindly created in us, or instinctively determin- 
ed, an invincible belief 'in its existence. (Reid, Inq. 159 a, 122 ab,. 
1 83 a, I. P. 258 a, 32 7 a, alibi ; Stewart and Royer-Collard, 11. cc.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that we only believe in the existence 
of what we perceive, as extended, figured, resisting, &c, inasmuch 
as we believe that we are conscious of these qualities as existing ; 
consequently, that a belief in the existence of an extended world 
external to the mind, and even external to the organism, is not a 
faith blindly created or instinctively determined, in supplement of 
a representative or mediate cognition, but exists in, as an integral 
constituent of, Perception proper, as an act of intuitive or imme 
diate knowledge. 

1 And chapter ii. § ii. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 427 

33. The object of Perception (proper) is a conclusion, or infer- 
ence, or result (instinctive, indeed, not ratiocinative), from a Sen- 
sation proper. (Reid, Inq. 125 a, 186 b, I. P. 310 ab, 319 a • 
— Roy er- Collar d, 1. c.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that the object of Perception proper 
is given immediately in and along with the object of Sensation 
proper. 

34. Sensation (proper) precedes, Perception (proper) follows. 
(Reid, Inq. 186 b, 187 b. I. P. 320 b ; Stewart and Royer- 
Collard, 11. cc.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that though Sensation proper be the 
condition of, and therefore anterior to, Perception proper in the 
order of nature, that, in the order of time, both are necessarily co- 
existent, — the latter being only realized in and through the pres- 
ent existence of the former. Thus visual extension cannot be 
perceived, or even imagined, except under the sensation of color ; 
while color, again, cannot be apprehended or imagined, without, 
respectively, a concomitant apprehension or phantasm of exten- 
sion. 

35. Sensation (proper) is not only an antecedent, but an arbi- 
trary antecedent, of Perception (proper.) The former is only a 
sign on occasion of which the latter follows ; they have no neces- 
sary or even natural connection ; and it is only by the will of God 
that we do not perceive the qualities of external objects indepen- 
dently of any sensitive affection. This last, indeed, seems to be 
actually the case in the perception of visible extension and figure. 
(Reid, Inq. Ill b, 121 a, 143 b, 122 a, 123 b, 187 b, 188 a. I. 
P. 257 b, 260 b, alibi ; Stewart and Roy er- Collar d, 11. cc.) 

On the contrary, I hold that Sensation proper is the universal 
condition of Perception proper. We are never aware even of the 
existence of our organism except as it is somehow affected ; and 
are only conscious of extension, figure, and the other objects of 
Perception proper, as realized in the relations of the affections of 
our sentient organism, as a body extended, figured, &c. As to 
color and visible extension, neither can be apprehended, neither 



428 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

can be even imagined apart from the other. (V. 320 a, foot- 
note, et alibi.) 

36. In a Sensation (proper) of the secondary qualities, as affec- 
tions in us, we have a Perception (proper) of them as properties 
in objects and causes of the affections in us. (Peid, I. P. 310 ab, 
and Inq. passim ; Royer- Collard, 1. c.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that as Perception proper is an imme- 
diate cognition ; and as the secondary qualities, in bodies, are 
only inferred, and therefore only mediately known to exist as oc- 
cult causes of manifest effects ; that these, at best only objects of 
a mediate knowledge, are not objects of Perception. (See 20, 21, 
and p. 378.) 

37. In like manner, in the case of various other bodily affec- 
tions, as the toothache, gout, &c, we have not only a Sensation 
proper of the painful feeling, but a conception and belief, i. e. a 
Perception (proper) of its cause. (Peid, I. P. 319 a, alibi.) 

On the contrary, and for the same reason, I hold, that there is 
in this case no such Perception. 

38. Sensation (proper) is an affection purely of the mind, and 
not in any way an affection of the body. (Peid, Inq. 105 a, 159 
ab, 187 a, I. P. 229 ab, 310.) 

On the contrary, I hold with Aristotle (De An. i. 5, De Som. 
c. 1, § 6), indeed, with philosophers in general, that Sensation is 
an affection neither of the body alone nor of the mind alone, but 
of the composite of which each is a constituent ; and that the 
subject of Sensation may be indifferently said to be our organism 
(as animated) or our soul (as united with an organism). For in- 
stance, hunger or color, are, as apprehended, neither modes of mind 
apart from body, nor modes of body apart from mind. (See 18.) 

39. Sensations (proper) as merely affections of the mind, have 
no locality in the body, no locality at all. (Reid, I. P. 319 ab, 
320 ab.) From this the inference is necessary, that, though con- 
scious of the relative place and reciprocal outness of sensations, we 
do not in this consciousness apprehend any real externality and 
extension. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 429 

On the contrary, I hold, that Sensation proper, being the con- 
sciousness of an affection, not of the mind alone, but of the mind 
as it is united with the body, that in the consciousness of sensa- 
tions, relatively localized and reciprocally external, we have a veri- 
table apprehension, and consequently, an immediate perception of 
the affected organism, as extended, divided, figured, &c. This 
alone is the doctrine of Natural Realism, of Common Sense. 
(See 18.) 

40. In the case of Sensation (proper) and the Secondary qual- 
ities, there is a determinate quality in certain bodies, exclusively 
competent to cause a determinate sensation in us, as color, odor, 
savor, &c. ; consequently, that from the fact of a similar internal 
effect, we are warranted to infer the existence of a similar external 
concause. (Reid, Inq. 137-142. I. P. 315, 316, alibi.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that a similar sensation only implies 
a similar idiopathic affection of the nervous organism ; but such 
affection requires only the excitation of an appropriate stimulus ; 
while such stimulus may be supplied by manifold agents of the 
most opposite nature, both from within the body and from with- 
out. 

41. Perception excludes memory ; Perception (proper) cannot 
therefore be apprehensive of motion. {Roy er- Collar d, supra 
352 ab.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that as memory, or a certain contin- 
uous representation, is a condition of consciousness, it is a condi- 
tion of Perception ; and that motion, therefore, cannot, on this 
ground, be denied as an object apprehended through sense. 
(See 6.) 

42. An apprehension of relations is not an act of Perception 
(proper). {Royer-Collard [apparently], ibid.) 

On the contrary, I hold, in general, that as all consciousness is 
realized only in the apprehension of the relations of plurality and 
contrast ; and as perception is a consciousness ; that the appre- 
hension of relation cannot, simpliciter, be denied to perception : 
and, in particular, that unless we annihilate Perception proper, by 



430 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

denying to it the recognition of its peculiar objects, Extensk>B ; 
Figure, and the other primary qualities, we cannot deny to it the 
recognition of relations ; for, to say nothing of the others, Exten- 
sion is perceived only in apprehending sensations out of sensa- 
tions — a relation ; and Figure is only perceived in apprehending 
one perceived extension as limited, and limited in a certain man- 
ner by another — a complexus of relations. (See 9, pp. 352 a, 
380 a.) 

43. Distant realities are objects of Perception (proper). Reid, 
Inq. 104 b, 145 a, 158 b, 159 ab, 160 a, 186 b; I. P. 299 a, 
302 a, 303 a, 304 a, 305 b ; Stewart, El. i. 79 sq.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that the mind perceives nothing exter- 
nal to itself, except the affections of the organism as animated, 
the reciprocal relations of these affections, and the correlative in- 
volved in the consciousness of its locomotive energy being resisted. 
(See pp. 260, 270.) 

44. Objects not in contact with the organs of sense are per- 
ceived by a medium. {Reid, Inq. 104 b, 186 ab, 187 b; LP. 
247 ab.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that the only object perceived is the 
organ itself, as modified, or what is in contact with the organ, as 
resisting. The doctrine of a medium is an error, or rather a con- 
fusion, inherited from Aristotle, who perverted, in this respect, 
the simpler and more accurate doctrine of Democritus. 

45. Extension and Figure are first perceived through the sen- 
sations of Touch. (Reid, Inq. 123-125, 188 a; I. P. 331; 
Stewart, El. i. 349, 357 ; Ess. 564.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that (unless by Extension be under- 
stood only extension in the three dimensions, as Reid in fact seems 
to do, but not Stewart) this is erroneous, for an extension is ap- 
prehended in the apprehension of the reciprocal externality of all 
sensations. Moreover, to allow even the statement as thus re- 
stricted to pass, it would be necessary to suppose, that under Touch 
it is meant to comprehend the consciousness of the Locomotive 
energy and of the Muscular feelings. (See 390 b, sq.) 



PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 431 

46. Externality is exclusively perceived on occasion of the sen- 
sations of Touch. (JReid, Inq. 123, 124, 188, a ; I. P. 332 and 
alibi ; Royer-Collard, Jouffroy's Reid, iii. 412.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that it is, primarily, in the conscious- 
ness of our locomotive energy being resisted, and, secondarily, 
through the sensations of muscular feeling, that the perception of 
Externality is realized. All this, however, might be confusedly 
involved in the Touch of the philosophers in question. (See 28.) 

47. Real (or absolute) magnitude is an object of perception 
(proper) through Touch, but through touch only. (Reid, I. P. 
303.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that the magnitude perceived through 
touch is as purely relative as that perceived through vision or 
any other sense ; for the same magnitude does not appear the 
same to touch at one part of the body and to touch at another. 
(303 b, note ; 863 ab, note ; and n. 27.) 

48. Color, though a secondary quality, is an object not of Sen- 
sation (proper) but of Perception (proper) ; in other words, we 
perceive Color, not as an affection of our own minds, but as a 
quality of external things. [Reid, Inq. 137 ab, 138 a; I. P. 
319 b.) 

On the contrary, I hold, that color, in itself, as apprehended or 
immediately known by us, is a mere affection of the sentient 
organism ; and therefore like the other secondary qualities, an 
object not of Perception, but of Sensation, proper. The only dis- 
tinguishing peculiarity in this case, lies in the three following 
circumstances : — a) That the organic affection of color, though 
not altogether indifferent, still, being accompanied by compara- 
tively little pleasure, comparatively little pain, the apprehension 
of this affection, qua affection, i. e. its Sensation proper, is, con- 
sequently, always at a minimum. — b) That the passion of color 
first rising into consciousness, not from the amount of the intensive 
quantity of the affection, but from the amount of the extensive 
quantity of the organism affected, is necessarily apprehended un- 
der the condition of extension. — c) That the isolation, tenuity 



432 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

and delicacy, of the ultimate filaments of the optic nerve, afford 
us sensations minutely and precisely distinguished, sensations real- 
ized in consciousness only as we are conscious of them as out of 
each other in space. — These circumstances show, that while in 
vision Perception proper is at its maximum, and Sensation pro- 
per at its minimum (1*7), the sensation of color cannot be real- 
ized apart from the perception of extension : but they do not 
warrant the assertions, that color is not, like the other secondary 
qualities, apprehended by us as a mere sensorial affection, aud, 
therefore, an object not of Sensation proper but of Perception 
proper. 

§ II. — Historical notices in regard to the distinction of 
Perception proper and Sensation proper. 

This distinction is universally supposed to be of a modern date ; 
no one has endeavored to carry it higher than Malebranche ; and, 
in general, the few indications of it noticed previous to Reid, have 
been commemorated as only accidental or singular anticipations.* 
This is altogether erroneous ; the distinction is ancient ; and 

* The only attempt of which I am aware, at any historical account of the 
distinction in hand, is hy Mr. Stewart, in Note F of his Essays. It contains, 
however, notices, and these not all pertinent, only of Hutcheson, Crousaz, 
Baxter, and D'Alembert, and none of these have any title to an historical 
commemoration on the occasion. For Hutcheson (as already once and again 
mentioned) only repeats, indeed, only thought of repeating, Aristotle ; while 
the others, at best, merely re-echo Malebranche and the Cartesians. 

I may here observe, that in that Note, as also repeatedly in the Disserta- 
tion, Mr. Stewart (who has been frequently followed) is wrong in stating, un- 
exclusively, that Keid's writings were anterior to Kant's ; founding thereon 
a presumption against the originality of the latter. The priority of Eeid is 
only true as limited to the ' Inquiry ;' but, on the ground of this alone there 
could be proved, between the philosophers, but little community of thought, 
on points where either could possibly "claim any right of property. But 
though Kant's first ' Critik' and ' Prolegomena' preceded Keid's ' Essays' 
by several years, no one will assuredly suspect any connection whatever be- 
tween these several works. In general, I must be allowed to say, that the 
tone and tenor of Mr. Stewart's remarks on the philosopher of Koenigsberg 
are remarkable exceptions to the usual cautious, candid, and dignified charac- 
ter of his criticism. 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 433 

adopting, for the standard, my own opinion of what the distinc- 
tion ought to be, I find it taken more simply and less incorrectly 
by Aristotle than by any modern philosopher whatever. 

Aristotle's discrimination of the Common and Proper Sensibles 
or Percepts (which has been already explained, 312 b, sq.) embod- 
ies not only the modern distinction of the Primary and Secondary 
Qualities of matter, but also the modern distinction of the two Per- 
ceptions, Perception proper and Sensation proper. The generaliza- 
tion of these two correlative distinctions into one, constitutes indeed 
the first peculiar merit of Aristotle's analysis and nomenclature. 
But a second is, that in his hands at least, the Common Sensibles, 
the immediate objects of Perception proper, are viewed as the object- 
objects of an intuitive, and not perverted into the subject-objects 
of a representative cognition. For in the writings of Aristotle 
himself I can find no ground for regarding him as other than a 
presentationist or natural realist. In this respect his doctrine 
stands distinguished from all the others in which the distinction 
in question has been recognized ; for the Neo-Platonic, the Neo- 
Aristotelic, the Scholastic (with certain exceptions), and the Car- 
tesian, all proceed on the ideality or representative character of the 
objects of which we are conscious in Perception proper. Even 
Reid himself, as we have seen, and the Scottish School in general, 
can only with doubt and difficulty be held as qualified excep- 
tions. 1 

Nay, the canon I have endeavored to establish of the univer- 
sal coexistence in an inverse ratio of Perception proper and Sen- 
sation proper (and in general of Feeling and Cognition), though 
not enounced in its abstract universality by Aristotle, may still be 
detected as supposed and specially applied by him. In his trea- 
tise On the Soul (ii. 9, 1), speaking of the sense of Smell, and of 
the difficulty of determining the nature and quality of its objects 
— odors, he says : ' The cause is, that we do not possess this sense 
in any high degree of accuracy, but are, in this respect, inferior 



1 See § I. B of this chapter and § II. of chapter iii. — W. 

27 



434 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

to many of the brutes ; for man smells imperfectly, and has no 
perception of things odorous, unaccompanied by either pain or 
pleasure ; the organ of this sense not being nicely discriminative.' 
And the same is implied, in what he adds touching the vision of 
the sclerophthalma. Does not this manifestly suppose the prin- 
ciple — that in proportion as a sense rises as a mean of informa- 
tion, it sinks as a vehicle of pleasure and pain ? — Galen, I may 
notice, has some remarkable observations to the same effect. In 
considering ' the causes of pleasure and pain in the several senses ;' 
and after stating, in general, the order of intensity in which these 
are susceptible of such affections, to wit, Touch or Feeling — Taste 
— Smell — Hearing — Vision ; he goes on to treat of them in de- 
tail. And here it is evident, that he also deems the capacity of 
pain and pleasure in a sense to be inversely as its power of cog- 
nitive discrimination. For, inter alia, he says of Hearing : ' The 
pleasurable is more conspicuous in this sense [than in that of 
Vision], because it is of a coarser nature and constitution ; but 
the pleasurable becomes even more manifest in the sensations of 
Smell, because the nature and constitution of this sense is coarser 
still.' (De Symt. causis L. i. c. 6.) 

The distinction of the Common and Proper Sensibles, and vir- 
tually, therefore, the distinction in question, was continued, with 
some minor developments, by the Greek and Latin Aristotelians. 
(See 318 a, 385 ab.) As to the interesting doctrine, on this 
point, of those Schoolmen who rejected intentional species in 
Perception, I may refer, instar omnium, to Biel. (Collect. L. ii. 
dist. 3. qu. 2.) 

Sensation proper and Perception proper were, however, even 
more strongly contradistinguished in the system of the lower 
Platonists. They discriminated, on the one hand, in the body, 
the organic passion and its recognition — that is, Sensation proper ; 
and on the other in the impassive sold, the elicitation into conscious- 
ness (through some inscrutable instinct or inspiration) of a gnos- 
tic reason, or subjective form, representative of the external object 
affecting the sense — that is, Perception proper. There might also 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 435 

be shown, in like manner, an analogy between the distinction in 
question, and that by the Schoolmen of the species impressa et 
expressa ; but on this I shall not insist. Nor on the JSTeo-PIa- 
tonic theory of Perception which has rarely been touched upon, 
and when touched on almost always misrepresented (even Mr. 
Harris, for instance, has wholly misconceived the nature of 
the gnostic reasons') ; — nor on this can I now enter, though, as 
recently noticed, it bears a striking analogy to one phasis of the 
doctrine of Reid. In special reference to the present distinction 
I may, however, refer the reader to a passage of Plotinus. (Enn. 
TIL vi. 2.) 

In the Cartesian philosophy, the distinction was virtually taken 
by Descartes, but first discriminated in terms by his followers. 
Tn general, Perception proper, and the Primary qualities as per- 
ceived, they denoted by Idea ; Sensation proper, and the Second- 
ary qualities as felt by Sensation (sensatio, sentiment). See Be 
Raei (Clavis, &c, p. 299, alibi, ed. 16V 7) ; Be la Forge (De 
l'Esprit, ch. 10, p. 109 sq., ch. IV, p. 2V6, ed. Amst. et supra 
328 a) ; Geulinx (DieVr— ---* Principia, pp. 45, 48, alibi, et supra 
328 a) ; Rohault (Physique, passim) ; Malebranche (Recherche, 
L. iii. P. ii. ch. 6 and V, with Ecclairc. on last, et supra 330 b) ; 
Silvain Regis (Cours, t. i. pp. 60, 61, V2, 145) ; Bossuet (Con- 
naisance de Dieu, ch. iii. art. 8); while Buffier, S' 'Gravesande, 
Croicsaz, Sinsert, ICeranflech, Genovesi, with a hundred others, 
might be adduced as showing that the same distinction had been 
very generally recognized before Reid ; who, far from arrogating 
to himself the credit of its introduction, remarks that it had been 
first accurately established by Malebranche. 

As already noticed (330 b), it is passing strange that Locke, 
but truly marvellous that Leibnitz, should have been ignorant of 
the Cartesian distinction of Sensation and Idea (Sentiment, Idee). 
Locke's unacquaintance is shown in his ' Essay,' besides other 
places, in B. ii. ch. 13, § 25, but, above all, in his 'Examination 
of P. Malebranche's Opinion ;' and that of Leibnitz, elsewhere, 
and in L. ii. ch. 8 of his ' Nouyeaux Essais,' but more particularly 



436 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 

in the ' Exainen du Sentiment du P. Malebranche,' both of which 
works he wrote in opposition to the relative treatises of Locke. 
As for Locke, he seems wholly unaware that any difference sub- 
sisted in the Cartesian school, between Idea and Sensation ; 
while Leibnitz actually thinks that Malebranche ' entend par sen- 
timent une perception d'imagination !' In his own philosophy, 
Leibnitz virtually supersedes the discrimination. I am, therefore, 
doubly surprised at the observation of M. Royer-Collard, that 
' Malebranche is the first among modern philosophers, and, with 
Leibnitz, perhaps the only one before Reid, who accurately dis- 
tinguished perception from the sensation which is its forerunnei 
and sign.' (Jouffroy's Reid, iii. 329.) 

In the Kantian school, and generally in the recent philosophy 
of Germany, the distinction is adopted, and marked out by the 
terms Anschauung or Intuitio for the one apprehension, and 
Empfindung or Sensatio for the other. In France and Italy, on 
the other hand, where the distinction has been no less universally 
recognized, Reid's expressions, Perception and Sensation, have 
become the prevalent; but their ambiguity, I think, ought to 
have been avoided, by the addition of some such epithet as — 
proper. 

Since generalizing the Law of the coexistence, but the coexist- 
ence in an inverse ratio, of Sensation and Perception, of the sub- 
jective and objective, and, in general, of feeling and cognition ; I 
have noticed, besides those adduced above from Aristotle and 
Galen, other partial observations tending to the same result, by 
sundry modern philosophers. Sulzer, in a paper published in 
1*759 (Vermischte Schriften, vol. i. p. 113), makes the remark, 
that ' a representation manifests itself more clearly in proportion 
as it has less the power of exciting in us emotion ;' and confirms 
it by the analogy observed in the gradation of the agreeable and 
disagreeable sensations. Kant in his Anthropologic (1798, § 14), 
in treating of the determinate or organic senses (Sensus fixi), 
says : — ' Three of these are rather objective than subjective — i. e. 
as empirical intuitions, they conduce more to the cognition of the 



PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 437 

external object, than they excite the consciousness of trie affected, 
organ ; but two are rather subjective than objective — i. e. the 
representation they mediate is more that of enjoyment [or suffer- 
ing] than of the cognition of the external object. . . . The 
senses of the former class are those — 1) of Touch (tactus), 2) of 
Sight (visus), 3) of Hearing (auditus) ; of the latter, those — a) 
of Taste (gustus), b) of Smell (olfactus).' This and the Galenic 
arrangement will appear less conflictive, if we recollect, that 
under Touch Galen comprehends Feeling proper, whereas Feeling 
proper is by Kant relegated to his vital sense or sensus vagus, 
the coeiicesthesis or common sense of others. See also Meiners, 
Untersuchungen, i. p. 64 ; Wetzel, Psychologie, i. § 225 ; Fries, 
N". Kritik, i. § 14-19 ; Anthropologic, i. §§ 27, 28, &c, &c. 

M. Ravaisson, in an article of great ability and learning on the 
' Fragments de Philosophie' which M. Peisse did me the honor 
to translate, when speaking of the reform of philosophy in France, 
originating in Maine de Birarfs recoil against the Sensualistic 
doctrine, has the following passage : — ' Maine de Biran commence 
par separer profondement de la passion l'activite, que Condillac 
avait confondue avec elle sous le titre commun de Sensation. 
La sensation proprement dite est une affection tout passive ; 
l'etre qui y serait reduit irait se perdre, s'absorber dans toutes 
ses modifications ; il deviendrait successivement chacune d'elles, 
il ne se trouverait pas, il ne se distinguerait pas, et jamais ne se 
connaitrait lui-meme. Bien loin que la connaissance soit la sen- 
sation seule, la sensation, en se melant a elle, la trouble et l'ob- 
scurcit, et elle eclipse a, son tour la sensation. De la, la loi que 
M. Hamilton a signalee dans son remarquable article sur la theo- 
rie de la perception : la sensation et la perception, quoique insepa- 
rables, sont en raison inverse Vune de Vautre. Cette loi fonda- 
mentale, Maine de Biran l'avait decouverte pres de trente ans 
auparavant, et en avait suivi toutes les applications ; il en avait 
surtout approfondi le principe, savoir, que la sensation resulte de 
la passion, et que la perception resulte de Taction.' (Revue des 
Deux Mondes, Nov. 1840.) It is perhaps needless for me to say, 



438 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTION. 

that when I enounced the law in question (in 1830), I had never 
seen the printed memoir by De Biran, which, indeed, from the 
circumstances of its publication, was, I believe, inaccessible 
through the ordinary channels of the trade, and to be found in 
no library in this country ; and now I regret to find that, through 
procrastination, I must send this chapter to press before having 
obtained the collective edition of his earlier works, which has 
recently appeared in Paris. All that I know of De Biran is 
comprised in the volume edited in 1834 by M. Cousin, from 
whose kindness I received it. In this, the ' Nouvelles Conside- 
rations sur les Kapports du Physique et du Moral de rHomme,' 
the treatise in which, as his editor informs us, the full and final 
development of his doctrine is contained, was for the first time 
published. But neither in that, nor in any other of the accom- 
panying pieces, can I discover any passage besides the following, 
that may be viewed as anticipating the law of coexistence and 
inversion : — ' Souvent une impression percue a tel degre cesse de 
l'etre a un degre plus eleve ou lorsqu'elle s'avive au point d'ab- 
sorber la conscience ou le moi lui-meme qui la devient. Ainsi 
plus la sensation serait eminemment animale, moins elle aurait 
le caractere vrai d'une perception humaine.' 



PART THIRD. 



PHILOSOPHY 



OF THE 



CONDITIONED, 



"Laudabilior est animus, cui nota est infirrnitas propria, quam qui, ea 
non respeeta, mcenia mundi, vias siderum, fundameuta terrarum et fastigia 
coelorum, etiam cogniturus, serutatur." — St. ArGVSTiNE, (Be Unitate, proem 
to the fourth book.) 



CHAPTER I. 1 

REFUTATION OP THE VAEIOUS DOCTRINES OP THE UNCONDI- 
TIONED, ESPECIALLY OF COUSIN'S DOCTEINE OF THE INFI- 
NITO- ABSOLUTE.* 

The delivery of these Lectures 2 excited an unparalleled- sensa- 
tion in Paris. Condemned to silence during the reign of Jesuit 
ascendency, M. Cousin, after eight years of honorable retirement, 



1 This was originally published in the Edinburgh Review, for October, 
1829. It has since been republished in the Discussions, pp. 1-37. — W. 

2 Hamilton is reviewing a work entitled, ' Cours de Philosophie, par M. 
Victor Cousin, Professeur de Philosophie a la Faculte des Lettres de Paris. 
Introduction a VHistoire de la Philosophie, 8vo. Paris, 182S.' See our trans- 
lation of ' Cousin's History of Philosophy,' vol. i. — W. 

* [Translated into French, by M. Peisse ; into Italian, by S. Lo Gatto : 
also in Cross's Selections from the Edinburgh Review. 

This article did not originate with myself. I was requested to write it by 
my friend, the late accomplished Editor of the Review, Professor Napier. 
Personally I felt averse from the task. I was not unaware, that a discussion 
of the leading doctrine of the book would prove unintelligible, not only 
to ' the general reader,' but, with few exceptions, to our British metaphysi- 
cians at large. But, moreover, I was still farther disinclined to the undertak- 
ing, because it would behoove me to come forward in overt opposition to a 
certain theory, which, however powerfully advocated, I felt altogether una- 
ble to admit ; whilst its author, M. Cousin, was a philosopher for whose 
genius and character I already had the warmest admiration, — an admiration 
which every succeeding year has only augmented, justified, and confirmed. 
Nor, in saying this, need I make any reservation. For I admire, even where 
I dissent ; and were M. Cousin's speculations on the Absolute utterly abol- 
ished, to him would still remain the honor, of doing more himself, and of 
contributing more to what has been done by others, in the furtherance of an 
enlightened philosophy, than any other living individual in France — I might 
say in Europe. Mr. Napier, however, was resolute ; it was the first number 
of the Review und,er his direction ; and the criticism was hastily written. 
In this country the reasonings were of course not understood, and naturally, 
for a season, declared incomprehensible. Abroad, in France, Germany, 
Italy, and latterly in America, the article has been rated higher than it de- 
serves. The illustrious thinker, against one of whose doctrines its argument 



442 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

not exempt from persecution, had again ascended the chair of 
Philosophy ; and the splendor with which he recommenced his 
academical career, more than justified the expectation which his 
recent celebrity as a writer, and the memory of his earlier prelec- 
tions, had inspired. Two thousand auditors listened, all with ad- 
miration, many with enthusiasm, to the eloquent exposition of 
doctrines intelligible only to the few ; and the oral discussion of 
philosophy awakened in Paris, and in France, an interest unex- 
ampled since the days of Abelard. The daily journals found it 
necessary to gratify, by their earlier summaries, the impatient cu- 
riosity of the public ; and the lectures themselves, taken in short- 
hand, and corrected by the Professor, propagated weekly the 
influence of his instruction to the remotest provinces of the king- 
dom. 

Nor are the pretensions of this doctrine disproportioned to the 
attention which it has engaged. It professes nothing less than to 
be the complement and conciliation of all philosophical opinion ; 
and its author claims the glory of placing the key-stone in the 
arch of science, by the discovery of elements hitherto unobserved 
among the facts of consciousness. 

Before proceeding to consider the claims of M. Cousin to ori- 
ginality, and of his doctrine to truth, it is necessary to say a few 
words touching the state and relations of philosophy in France. 

After the philosophy of Descartes and Malebranche had sunk 



is directed, was the first to speak of it in terms which, though I feel their 
generosity, I am ashamed to quote. I may, however, state, that maintaining 
always his opinion, M. Cousin (what is rare, especially in metaphysical dis- 
cussions) declared, that it was neither unfairly combated nor imperfectly 
understood. — In connection with this criticism, the reader should compare 
what M. Cousin has subsequently stated in defence and illustration of his 
system, in his Preface to the new edition of the Introduction a VHistoire de 
la Philosophic, and Appendix to the fifth lecture (CEuvres, Serie II. Tome i. 
pp. vii. ix., and pp. 112-129) ;— in his Preface to the second edition, and his 
Advertisement to the third edition of the Fragments Philosophiques ((Euvres 
S. III. T. iv.) — and in his Prefatory Notice to the Pensies de Pascal (QHuwes, 
S. IV. T. i.) — On the other hand, M. Peisse has ably advocated the counter- 
view, in his Preface and Appendix to the Fragments de Philosophic, &c] 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 44:3 

into oblivion, and from the time that Condillac, exaggerating the 
too partial principles of Locke, had analyzed all knowledge into 
sensation, Sensualism (or, more correctly, Sensuism), as a psycho- 
logical theory of the origin of our cognitions, became, in France, 
not only the dominant, but almost the one exclusive opinion. It 
was believed that reality and truth were limited to experience, 
and experience was limited to the sphere of sense ; while the 
very highest faculties of mind were deemed adequately explained 
when recalled to perceptions, elaborated, purified, sublimated, 
and transformed. From the mechanical relations of sense with 
its object, it was attempted to solve the mysteries of will and 
intelligence ; the philosophy of mind was soon viewed as cor- 
relative to the physiology of organization. The moral nature 
of man was at last formally abolished, in its identification with 
his physical : mind- became a reflex of matter ; thought a secre- 
tion of the brain. 

A doctrine so melancholy in its consequences, and founded 
on principles thus partial and exaggerated, could not be perma- 
nent : a reaction was inevitable. The recoil which began about 
twenty years ago, has been gradually increasing ; and now it is 
perhaps even to be apprehended, that its intensity may become 
excessive. As the poison was of foreign growth, so also has been 
the antidote. The doctrine of Condillac was, if not a corruption, 
a development of the doctrine of Locke ; and in returning to a 
better philosophy, the French are still obeying an impulse com- 
municated from without. This impulsion may be traced to two 
different sources, — to the philosophy of Scotland, and to the 
philosophy of Germany. 

In Scotland, a philosophy had sprung up, which, though pro- 
fessing, equally with the doctrine of Condillac, to build only on 
experience, did not, like that doctrine, limit experience to the 
relations of sense and its objects. Without vindicating to man 
more than a relative knowledge of ■ existence, and restricting the 
science of mind to an observation of the fact of consciousness, it, 
however, analyzed that fact into a greater number of more im- 



4:4:4: PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

portant elements than had been recognized in the school of Con- 
dillac. It showed that phenomena were revealed in thought 
which could not be resolved into any modifications of sense, — 
external or internal. It proved that intelligence supposed prin- 
ciples, which, as the conditions of its activity, cannot be the 
results of its operation ; that the mind contained knowledges, 
which, as primitive, universal, necessary, are not to be explained 
as generalizations from the contingent and individual, about 
which alone all experience is conversant. The phenomena of 
mind were thus distinguished from the phenomena of matter ; 
and if the impossibility of materialism were not demonstrated, 
there was, at least, demonstrated the impossibility of its proof. 

This philosophy, and still more the spirit of this philosophy 
was calculated to exert a salutary influence on the French. And 
such an influence it did exert. For a time, indeed, the truth 
operated in silence, and Reid and Stewart had already modified 
the philosophy of France, before the French were content to 
acknowledge themselves their disciples. In the works of Dege- 
rando and Laromiguiere, may be traced the influence of Scottish 
speculation ; but it is to Royer-Collard, and, more recently, to 
Jouffroy, that our countrymen are indebted for a full acknowl- 
edgment of their merits, and for the high and increasing estima- 
tion in which their doctrines are now held in France. M. Royer- 
Collard, whose authority has, in every relation, been exerted only 
for the benefit of his country, and who, once great as a professor, 
is now not less illustrious as a statesman, in his lectures, advo- 
cated with distinguished ability the principles of the Scottish 
school ; modestly content to follow, while no one was more 
entitled to lead. M. Jouffroy, by his recent translation of the 
works of Dr. Reid, and by the excellent preface to his version of 
Mr. Dugald Stewart's ' Outlines of Moral Philosophy,' has like- 
wise powerfully co-operated to the establishment, in France, of a 
philosophy equally opposed to the exclusive Sensualism of Con- 
dillac, and to the exclusive Rationalism of the new German 
school. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 445 

Germany may be regarded, latterly at least, as the metaphysi- 
cal antipodes of France. The comprehensive and original genius 
of Leibnitz, itself the ideal abstract of the Teutonic character, had 
reacted powerfully on the minds of his countrymen ; and Ra- 
tionalism (more properly Intellectualism*), has, from his time, 
always remained the favorite philosophy of the Germans. On 
the principle of this doctrine, it is in Reason alone that truth and 
reality are to be found. Experience affords only the occasions 
on which intelligence reveals to us the necessary and universal 
notions of which it is the complement ; and these notions con- 
stitute at once the foundation of all reasoning, and the guaran- 
tee of our whole knowledge of reality. Kant, indeed, pro- 
nounced the philosophy of Rationalism a mere fabric of delusion. 
He declared that a science of existence was beyond the compass 
of our faculties ; that pure reason, as purely subjective,! an & con ~ 

* [On the modern commutation of Intellect or Intelligence (Nouj, Mens, In- 
tellectus, Yerstand), and Season (Adyos, Batio, Vernunft), see Dissertations on 
Eeid, pp. 668, 669, 693. (This has nothing to do with the confusion of Sea- 
son and Seasoning. ) Protesting, therefore, against the abuse, I historically 
employ the terms as they were employed by the philosophers here commem- 
orated. This unfortunate reversal has been propagated to the French philos- 
ophy, and also adopted in England by Coleridge and his followers. — I may 
here notice that I use the term Understanding, not for the noetic faculty, 
intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the dianoetic or discursive fac- 
ulty, in its widest signification, for the faculty of relations or comparison ; 
and thus in the meaning in which Verstand is now employed by the Ger- 
mans. In this sense I have been able to be uniformly consistent.] 

t In the philosophy of mind, subjective denotes what is to be referred to 
the thinking subject, the Ego; objective what belongs to the object of 
thought, the Non-Ego. — It may be safe, perhaps, to say a few words in 
vindication of our employment of these terms. By the Greeks the word 
vTroKti^tvov was equivocally employed to express either the object of hioivledge 
(the materia circa quam), or the subject of existence (the materia, in qua). 
The exact distinction of subject and object was first made by the schoolmen ; 
and to the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what 
precision and analytic subtilty they possess. These correlative terms cor- 
respond to the first and most important distinction in philosophy ; they em- 
body the original antithesis in consciousness of self and not-self, — a distinc- 
tion which, in fact, involves the whole science of mind; for psychology is 
nothing more than a determination of the subjective and the objective, in 
themselves, and in their reciprocal relations. Thus significant of the prima- 
ry and most extensive analysis in philosophy, these terms, in their substan- 



446 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

scious of nothing but itself, was therefore unable to evince the 
reality of aught beyond the phenomena of its personal modifica- 
tions. But scarcely had the critical philosopher accomplished 
the recognition of this important principle, the result of which 
was, to circumscribe the field of speculation by narrow bounds ; 
than from the very disciples of his school there arose philoso- 
phers, who, despising the contracted limits and humble results 
of a philosophy of observation, re-established, as the predomi- 
nant opinion, a bolder and more uncompromising Rationalism 
than any that had ever previously obtained for their countrymen 
the character of philosophic visionaries — 

' Gens ratione ferox, et mentem pasta chiinseris.'* 
(' Minds fierce for reason, and on fancies fed.') 

tive and adjective forms, passed from the schools into the scientific language 
of Telesius, Campanella, Berigardus, Gassendi, Descartes, Spinosa, Leib- 
nitz, Wolf, &c. Deprived of these terms, the Critical philosophy, indeed 
the whole philosophy of Germany, -would he a blank. In this country, 
though familiarly employed in scientific language, even subsequently to the 
time of Locke, the adjective forms seem at length to have dropt out of the 
English tongue. That these words waxed obsolete was perhaps caused by 
the ambiguity which had gradually crept into the signification of the sub- 
stantives. Object, besides its proper signification, came to be abusively 
applied to denote motive, end, final cause (a meaning not recognized by John- 
son). This innovation was probably borrowed from the French, in whose 
language the word had been similarly corrupted after the commencement of 
the last century (Diet, de Trevoux, voce objef). Subject in English, as svjet 
in French, had been also perverted into a synonym for object, taken in its 
proper meaning, and had thus returned to the original ambiguity of the cor- 
responding term in Greek. It is probable that the logical application of the 
word (subject of attribution or predication) facilitated or occasioned this con- 
fusion. In using the terms, therefore, we think that an explanation, but 
no apology, is required. The distinction is of paramount importance, and of 
infinite application, not only in philosophy proper, but in grammar, rheto- 
ric, criticism, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, theology. It is adequately 
expressed by no other terms ; and if these did not already enjoy a prescrip- 
tive right, as denizens of the language, it cannot be denied, that, as strictly 
analogical, they would be well entitled to sue out their naturalization. — [Not 
that these terms were formerly always employed in the same signification 
and contrast which they now obtain. For a history of these variations, see 
Part U. chapter ii. p. 243 sq.- — Since this article was written, the words have 
in this country re-entered on their ancient rights ; they are now in common 
use.] 
* [This line, which was quoted from memory, has, I find, in the original, 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 447 

Founded by Fichte, but evolved by Schelling, this doctrine re- 
gards experience as unworthy of the name of science ; because, as 
only of the phenomenal, the transitory, the dependent, it is only 
of that which, having no reality in itself, cannot be established 
as a valid basis of certainty and knowledge. Philosophy must, 
therefore, either be abandoned, or we must be able to seize the 
One, the Absolute, the Unconditioned, immediately and in itself. 
And this they profess to do by a kind of intellectual vision* 
In this act, reason, soaring above the world of sense, but beyond 
the sphere of personal consciousness, boldly places itself at the 
very centre of absolute being, with which it claims to be, in fact, 
identified ; and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its re- 
lations, unveils to us the nature of the Deity, and explains, from 
first to last, the derivation of all created things. 

M. Cousin is the apostle of Rationalism in France, and we are 
willing to admit that the doctrine could not have obtained a more 
eloquent or devoted advocate. For philosophy he has suffered ; 



' furens ;' therefore translated — ' Minds mad with reasoning — and fancy-fed.' 
The author certainly had in his eye the ' ratione insanias ' of Terence. It is 
from a satire by Abraham Keini, who in the former half of the seventeenth 
century, was professor Eoyal of Eloquence in the University of Paris ; and 
it referred to the disputants of the Irish College in that illustrious school. 
The ' Hibernian Logicians' were, indeed, long famed over the continent of 
Europe, for their acuteness, pugnacity, and barbarism ; as is recorded by 
Patin, Bayle, Le Sage, and many others. The learned Menage was so de- 
lighted with the verse, as to declare that he would give his best benefice 
(and he enjoyed some fat ones) to have written it. It applies, not only 
with real, but with verbal accuracy, to the German Nationalists; who in 
Philosophy (as Aristotle has it), ' in making reason omnipotent, show their 
own impotence of reason,' and in Theology (as Charles II. said of Isaac 
Vossius), — ' believe every thing but the Bible.'] 

* [' Intellectuelle Anschauung ? — This is doubly wrong. — 1°, In grammatical 
rigor, the word in German ought to have been ' intellectual.' 2°, In phi- 
losophical consistency the intuition ought to have been called by its authors 
(Fichte and Schelling), intellectual, For, though this be, in fact, absolutely 
more correct, yet relatively it is a blunder ; for the intuition, as intended by 
them, is of their higher faculty, the Season (Vernunft), and not of their 
lower, the Understanding or Intellect (Verstand). In modern German 
Philosophy, Verstand is always translated by Intellectus ; and this again cor- 
responds to NoDf.] 



448 PHILOSOPHY OP THE CONDITIONED. 

to her ministry he has consecrated himself — devoted without 
reserve his life and labors. Neither has he approached the 
sanctuary with unwashed hands. The editor of Proclus and 
Descartes, the translator and interpreter of Plato, and the prom- 
ised expositor of Kant, will not be accused of partiality in the 
choice of his pursuits ; while his two works, under the title of 
Philosophical Fragments, bear ample evidence to the learning, 
elegance, and distinguished ability of their author. Taking him 
all in all, in France M. Cousin stands alone : nor can we contem- 
plate his character and accomplishments, without the sincerest 
admiration, even while we dissent from the most prominent prin- 
ciple of his philosophy. The development of his system, in all its 
points, betrays the influence of German speculation on his opin- 
ions. His theory is not, however, a scheme of exclusive Ra- 
tionalism ; on the contrary, the peculiarity of his doctrine con- 
sists in the attempt to combine the philosophy of experience, and 
the philosophy of pure reason, into one. The following is a con- 
cise statement of the fundamental positions of his system. 

Reason, or intelligence, has three integrant elements, affording 
three regulative principles, which at once constitute its nature, 
and govern its manifestations. These three ideas severally sup- 
pose each other, and, as inseparable, are equally essential and 
equally primitive. They are recognized by Aristotle and by 
Kant, in their several attempts to analyze intelligence into its 
principles ; but though the categories of both philosophers com- 
prise all the elements of thought, in neither list are these elements 
naturally co-arranged, or reduced to an ultimate simplicity. 

The first of these ideas, elements, or laws, though funda- 
mentally one, our author variously expresses, by the terms unity, 
identity, substance, absolute cause, the infinite, pure thought, &c. ; 
(we would briefly call it the unconditioned.) The second, he 
denominates plurality, difference, phenomenon, relative cause, 
the finite, determined thought, &c. ; (we would style it the con- 
ditioned.) These two elements are relative and correlative. The 
first, though absolute, is not conceived as existing absolutely in 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 449 

itself; it is conceived as an absolute cause, as a cause which can- 
not but pass into operation ; in other words, the first element 
must manifest itself in the second. The two ideas are thus con- 
nected together as cause and effect ; each is only realized through 
the other ; and this their connection, or correlation, is the third 
integrant element of intelligence. 

Reason, or intelligence, in which these ideas appear, and which, 
in fact, they make up, is not individual, is not ours, is not even 
human ; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us, is 
our free and voluntary activity ; what is not free and not volun- 
tary, is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant 
part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant with truth ; 
truth, as necessary and universal, is not the creature of my voli- 
tion ; and reason, which, as the subject of truth, is also universal 
and necessary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by 
a light which is not ours, and reason is a revelation of God in man. 
The ideas of which we are conscious, belong not to us, but to ab- 
solute intelligence. They constitute, in truth, the very mode and 
manner of its existence. For consciousness is only possible under 
plurality and difference, and intelligence is only possible through 
consciousness. 

The divine nature is essentially comprehensible. For the three 
ideas constitute the nature of the Deity ; and the very nature of 
ideas is to be conceived. God, in fact, exists to us, only in so far 
as he is known ; and the degree of our knowledge must always 
determine the measure of our faith. The relation of God to the 
universe is therefore manifest, and the creation easily understood. 
To create, is not to make something out of nothing, for this is 
contradictory, but to originate from self. We create so often 
as we exert our free causality, and something is created by us, 
when something begins to be by virtue of the free causality which 
belongs to us. To create, is, therefore, to cause, not with nothing, 
but with the very essence of our being — with our force, our will, 
our personality. The divine creation is of the same character. 
God, as he is a cause, is able tc create ; as he is an absolute cause, 
28 



450 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

he cannot but create. In creating the universe, he does not draw 
it from nothing ;. he draws it from himself. The creation of the 
universe is thus necessary ; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but 
not the Deity absolutely in himself; it is God passing into activ- 
ity, but not exhausted in the act. 

The universe created, the principles which determined the cre- 
ation are found still to govern the worlds of matter and mind. 

Two ideas and their connection explain the intelligence of 
God ; two laws in their counterpoise and correlation explain the 
material universe. The law of Expansion is the movement of 
unity to variety ; the law of Attraction is the return of variety to 
unity. 

In the world of mind the same analogy is apparent. The 
study of consciousness is psychology. Man is the microcosm of 
existence ; consciousness, within a narrow focus, concentrates a 
knowledge of the universe and of God ; psychology is thus the 
abstract of all science, human and divine. As in the external 
world, all phenomena may be reduced to the two great laws of 
Action and Eeaction ; so, in the internal, all the facts of con- 
sciousness may be reduced to one fundamental fact, comprising, 
in like manner, two principles and their correlation ; and these 
principles are again the One or the Infinite, the Many or the 
Finite, and the Connection of the infinite and finite. 

In every act of consciousness we distinguish a Self or Ego, and 
something different from self, a Non-ego ; each limited and mod- 
ified by the other. These, together, constitute the finite element. 
But at the same instant, when we are conscious of these exist- 
ences, plural, relative, and contingent, Ave are conscious, likewise, 
of a superior unity in which they are contained, and by which 
they are explained ; — a unity absolute as they are conditioned, 
substantive as they are phenomenal, and an infinite cause as they 
are finite causes. This unity is God. The fact of consciousness 
is thus a complex phenomenon, comprehending three several 
terms : 1°, The idea of the Ego and Non-ego as Finite ; 2°, The 
idea of something else as Infinite ; and, 3°, The idea of the Rela- 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 451 

tion of the finite element to the infinite. These elements are 
revealed in themselves and in their mutual connection, in every 
act of primitive or Spontaneous consciousness. They can also be 
reviewed by Reflection in a voluntary act ; but here reflection 
distinguishes, it does not create. The three ideas, the three cate- 
gories of intelligence, are given in the original act of instinctive 
apperception, obscurely, indeed, and without contrast. Reflection 
analyzes and discriminates the elements of this primary synthesis ; 
and as will is the condition of reflection, and will at the same 
time is personal, the categories, as obtained through reflection, 
have consequently the appearance of being also personal and 
subjective. It was this personality of reflection that misled Kant : 
caused him to overlook or misinterpret the fact of spontaneous 
consciousness ; to individualize intelligence ; and to collect under 
this personal reason all that is conceived by us as necessary and 
universal. But as, in the spontaneous intuition of reason, there 
is nothing voluntary, and consequently nothing personal ; and as 
the truths which intelligence here discovers, come not from our- 
selves ; we have a right, up to a certain point, to impose these 
truths on others as revelations from on high ; while, on the con- 
trary, reflection being wholly personal, it would be absurd to 
impose on others what is the fruit of our individual operations. 
Spontaneity is the principle of religion ; reflection of philosophy. 
Men agree in spontaneity ; they differ in reflection. The former 
is necessarily veracious ; the latter is naturally delusive. 

The condition of Reflection is separation : it illustrates by dis- 
tinguishing ; it considers the different elements apart, and while 
it contemplates one, it necessarily throws the others out of view. 
Hence, not only the possibility, but the necessity of error. The 
primitive unity, supposing no distinction, admits of no error ; 
reflection in discriminating the elements of thought, and in con- 
sidering one to the exclusion of others, occasions error, and a 
variety in error. He who exclusively contemplates the element 
of the Infinite, despises him who is occupied with the idea of the 
Finite ; and vice versa. It is the wayward development of the 



452 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

various elements of intelligence, which determines the imperfec- 
tions and varieties of individual character. Men under this par- 
tial and exclusive development, are but fragments of that human- 
ity which can only be fully realized in the harmonious evolution 
of all its principles. What Reflection is to the individual, History 
is to the human race. The difference of an epoch consists exclu- 
sively in the partial development of some one element of intelli- 
gence in a prominent portion of mankind ; and as there are only 
three such elements, so there are only three grand epochs in the 
history of man. 

A knowledge of the elements of reason,' of their relations and 
of their laws, constitutes not merely Philosophy, but is the con- 
dition of a History of Philosophy. The history of hurnan rea- 
son, or the history of philosophy, must be rational and philo 
sophic. It must be philosophy itself, with all its elements, in all 
their relations, and under all their laws, represented in striking 
characters by the hands of time and of history, in the manifested 
progress of the human mind. The discovery and enumeration of 
all the elements of intelligence enable us to survey the progress 
of speculation from the loftiest vantage ground ; it reveals to us 
the laws by which the development of reflection or philosophy is 
determined; and it supplies us with a canon by which the 
approximation of the different systems to the truth may be finally 
ascertained. And what are the results ? Sensualism, Idealism, 
Skepticism, Mysticism, are all partial and exclusive views of the 
elements of intelligence. But each is false only as it is incom- 
plete. They are all true in what they affirm, all erroneous in 
what they deny. Though hitherto opposed, they are, conse- 
quently, not incapable of coalition ; and, in fact, can only obtain 
their consummation in a powerful Eclecticism — a system which 
shall comprehend them all. This Eclecticism is realized in the 
doctrine previously developed; and the possibility of such a 
catholic philosophy was first afforded by the discovery of M. Cousin, 
made so long ago as the year 1817, — ' that consciousness contained 
many more phenomena than had previously been suspected.' 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 453 

The present course is at once an exposition of these principles, 
as a true theory of philosophy, and an illustration of the mode 
in which this theory is to be applied, as a rule of criticism in the 
history of philosophical opinion. As the justice of the applica- 
tion must be always subordinate to the truth of the principle, 
we shall confine ourselves exclusively to a consideration of M. 
Cousin's system, viewed absolutely in itself. This, inde-ed, we 
are afraid will prove comparatively irksome ; and, therefore, soli- 
cit indulgence, not only for the unpopular nature of the discus- 
sion, but for the employment of language which, from the total 
neglect of these speculations in Britain, will necessarily appear 
abstruse — not merely to the general reader. 

Now, it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is 
involved in the proposition, — that the Unconditioned, the Abso- 
lute, the Infinite, is. immediately known in consciousness, and this 
by difference, "plurality, and relation. The unconditioned, as an 
original element of knowledge, is the generative principle of his 
system, but common to him with others ; whereas the mode in 
which the possibility of this knowledge is explained, affords its 
discriminating peculiarity. The other positions of his theory, as 
deduced from this assumption, may indeed be disputed, even if 
the antecedent be allowed ; but this assumption disproved, every 
consequent in his theory is therewith annihilated. The recogni- 
tion of the absolute as a constitutive principle of intelligence, our 
author regards as at once the condition and the end of philoso- 
phy ; and it is on the discovery of this principle in the fact of 
consciousness, that he vindicates to himself the glory of being 
the founder of the new eclectic, or the one catholic, philosophy. 
The determination of this cardinal point will thus briefly satisfy 
us touching the claim and character of the system. To explain 
the nature of the problem itself, and the sufficiency of the solu- 
tion propounded by M. Cousin, it is necessary to premise a state- 
ment of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the 
Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of 
thought. 



454 PHILOSOPHY OP THE CONDITIONED. 

These opinions may be reduced to four. — 1°, The Uncondi- 
tioned is incognizable and inconceivable ; its notion being only 
negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively 
known or conceived. — 2°, It is not an object of knowledge ; but 
its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more 
than a mere negation of the conditioned. — 3°, It is cognizable, 
but not conceivable ; it can be known by a sinking back into 
identity with the absolute, but is incomprehensible by conscious- 
ness and reflection, which are only of .he relative and the dif- 
ferent. — 4°, It is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and 
reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality. 

The first of these opinions we regard as true ; the second is 
held by Kant ; the third by Schelling ; and the last by our 
author. 

1. In our opinion the mind can conceive, and consequently 
can know, only the limited, and the conditionally limited. The 
unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the unconditionally 
limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the 
mind ; they can be conceived, only by a thinking away from, or 
abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself 
is realized ; consequently the notion of the Unconditioned is only 
negative, — negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on 
the one hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute 
whole, that is, a whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it 
as a relative part of a still greater whole ; nor an absolute part, 
that is, a part so small, that we cannot also conceive it as a rela- 
tive whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other hand, we 
cannot positively represent, or realize, or construe to the mind (as 
here understanding and imagination coincide),* an infinite whole, 

* [The Understanding, thought proper, notion, concept, &c, may coincide 
or not with Imagination, representation proper, image, &c. The two facul- 
ties do not coincide in a general notion ; for we cannot represent Man or 
Horse in an actual image without individualizing the universal ; and thus 
contradiction emerges. But in the individual, say, Socrates or Bucephalus, 
they do coincide ; for I see no valid ground why we should not fhmk, in the 
strict sense of the word, or conceive the individuals which we represent. In 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 455 

for this could only be clone by the infinite synthesis in thought 
of finite wholes, which would itself require an infinite time for 
its accomplishment ; nor, for the same reason, can we follow out 
in thought an infinite divisibility of parts. The result is the 
same, whether we apply the process to limitation in space, in time, 
or in degree} The unconditional negation, and the uncondition- 
al affirmation of limitation ; in other words, the infinite and the 
absolute, properly so called* are thus equally inconceivable to us. 

dke manner there is no mutual contradiction between the fringe and the 
concept of the Infinite or Absolute, if these be otherwise possible ; for there 
is not necessarily involved the incompatibility of the one act of cognition 
with the other.] 

* It is right to observe, that though we are of opinion that the terms, 
Infinite and Absolute, and Unconditioned,, ought not to be confounded, and 
accurately distinguish them in the statement of our own view; yet, in 
speaking of the doctrines of those by whom they are indifferently employed, 
we have not thought it necessary, or rather, we have found it impossible, to 
adhere to the distinction. The Unconditioned in our use of language de- 
notes the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species. 

[The term Absolute is of a twofold (if not threefold) ambiguity, correspond- 
ing to the double (or treble) signification of the word in Latin. 

1. Absolutum means what is freed or loosed ; in which sense the Absolute 
will be what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, condition, depen- 
dence, &c, and thus is tantamount to ri air6\vTov of the lower Greeks. In 
this meaning the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite. 

2. Absolutum means finished, perfected, completed ; in which sense the Ab- 
solute will be what is out of relation, &c, as finished, perfect, complete, 
total, and thus corresponds to rd 8\ov and to Ttkuov of Aristotle. In this 
acceptation, — and it is that in which for myself I exclusively use it, — the Ab- 
solute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite. 

Besides these two meanings, there is to be noticed the use of the word, 
for the most part in its adverbial form ; — absolutely {absolute) in the sense of 
simply, simpliciter (arrXSg), that is, considered in and for itself— considered 
not in relation. This holds a similar analogy to the two former meanings 
of Absolute, which the Indefinite (to a6purrov) does to the Infinite (r4 
anciaov). It is subjective as they are objective ; it is in our thought as they 
are in their own existence. This application is to be discounted, as here 
irrelevant.] 

1 The distinction between the absolute and the infinite is one of the most 
important points in Hamilton's philosophy. Inasmuch as it is somewhat 
difficult to apprehend this distinction, we will illustrate it, with reference to 
the three species of quantity that constitute the relation of Existence. In 
regard to time ;— the distinction may be made in three ways : — 1°, we cannot 
conceive it as having an absolute commencement, or an infinite non-com- 



456 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the 
conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of 
positive thought — thought necessarily supposes conditions. To 
think is to condition ; and conditional limitation is the funda- 
mental law of the possibility of thought. For, as the greyhound 
cannot outstrip his shadow, nor (by a more appropriate simile) 
the eagle out-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and b} 
which alone he may be supported ; so the mind cannot transcend 
that sphere of limitation, within and through which exclusively 
the possibility of thought is realized. Thought is only of the 
conditioned ; because, as we have said, to think is simply to 
condition. The absolute is conceived merely by a negation of 
conceivability ; and all that we know, is only known as 

' won from the void and formless infinite." 1 



How, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought is only of the 
conditioned, may well be deemed a matter of the profoundest 
admiration. Thought cannot transcend consciousness ; conscious- 
ness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object 
of thought, known only in correlation, and mutually limiting 
each other ; while, independently of this, all that we know either 
of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowl- 
edge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of 
the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the conse- 
quence of this doctrine is, — that philosophy, if viewed as more 
than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from 



mencement ; 2°, we cannot conceive it as having an absolute termination, or 
an infinite non-termination ; 3°, we cannot conceive it as ■ an absolute mini- 
mum, or as one of the parts of an infinite division. In regard to space ; — the 
distinction may he made in two ways : — 1°, we cannot conceive it as a whole, 
absolutely hounded, or infinitely unbounded ; 2°, we cannot conceive it as a 
part, which is absolutely indivisible, or is the product of an infinite division. 
In regard to degree; — the distinction may also be made in two ways : — 1°, we 
cannot conceive it as absolutely greatest, or, in increase, as infinitely unlimit- 
ed ; 2°, we cannot conceive it as an absolute least, or, in diminution, as infi- 
nitely without limit. — The mind takes cognizance of no other quantities, and 
it is impossible to carry the distinction any further. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 457 

the particular, we admit that we can never, in our highest gener- 
alizations, rise above the finite ; that our knowledge, whether of 
mind or matter, can be nothing more than a knowledge of the 
relative manifestations of an existence, which in itself it is our 
highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy, 
— in the language of St. Austin, — ' cognoscendo ignorari, et igno- 
rando cognoscV 

The conditioned is the mean between two extremes, — two in- 
conditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of which -.an be 
conceived as possible, but of which, on the principles of contra- 
diction and excluded middle, one must be admitted as necessary. 
On this opinion, therefore, reason is shown to be weak, but not 
deceitful. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propo- 
sitions subversive of each other, as equally possible ; but only, as 
unable to understand as possible, either of two extremes ; one 
of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it 
is compelled to recognize as true. We are thus taught the salu- 
tary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted 
into the measure of existence ; and are warned from recognizing 
the domain of our knowledge as necessarity coextensive with the 
horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are 
thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught 
above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the exist- 
ence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all com- 
prehensible reality.* 

2. The second opinion, that of Kant, is fundamentally the 
same as the preceding. Metaphysic, strictly so denominated, the 

* [True, therefore, are the declarations of a pious philosophy : — ' A God 
understood would be no God at all ;' — ' To think that God is, as we can 
think him to be, is blasphemy.' — The Divinity, in a certain sense, is re- 
vealed ; in a certain sense is concealed : He is at once known and unknown. 
But the last and highest consecration of all true religion, must be an altar — 
'Ayi/aJo-nj) QeCS — ' To the unknown and unknowable God.'' In this consumma- 
tion, nature and revelation, paganism and Christianity, are at one ; and from 
either source the testimonies are so numerous that I must refrain from quo- 
ting any. — Am I wrong in thinking that M. Cousin would not repudiate 
this doctrine ?] 



458 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

philosophy of Existence, is virtually the doctrine of the uncondi- 
tioned. From Xenophanes to Leibnitz, the infinite, the absolute, 
the unconditioned, formed the highest principle of speculation ; 
but from the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elea until the 
rise of the Kantian philosophy, no serious attempt was made to 
investigate the nature and origin of this notion (or notions) as a 
psychological phenomenon. Before Kant, philosophy was rather 
a deduction from principles, than an inquiry concerning princi- 
ples themselves. At the head of every system a cognition figured 
which the philosopher assumed in conformity to his views ; but 
it was rarely considered necessary, and more rarely attempted, to 
ascertain the genesis, and determine the domain, of this notion 
or judgment, previous to application. In his first Critique, Kant 
undertakes a regular survey of consciousness. He professes to 
analyze the conditions of human knowledge, — to mete out its 
limits, — to indicate its point of departure, — and to determine its 
possibility. That Kant accomplished much, it would be preju- 
dice to deny ; nor is his service to philosophy the less, that his 
success has been more decided in the subversion of error than in 
the establishment of truth. The result of his examination was 
the abolition of the metaphysical sciences, — of rational psycholo- 
gy, ontology, speculative theology, &c, as founded on mere petfc 
tiones principiorum. Existence is revealed to us only under spe- 
cific modifications, and these are known only under the condi- 
tions of our faculties of knowledge. ' Things in themselves,' Mat- 
ter, Mind, God, — all, in short, that is not finite, relative, and phe- 
nomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond the 
verge of our knowledge. Philosophy was thus restricted to the 
observation and analysis of the phenomena of consciousness ; and 
what is not explicitly or implicitly given in a fact of conscious- 
ness, is condemned, as transcending the sphere of a legitimate 
speculation. A knowledge of the unconditioned is declared im- 
possible ; either immediately, as a notion, or mediately as an in- 
ference. A demonstration of the absolute from the relative is 
logically absurd ; as in such a syllogism we must collect in the 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 459 

conclusion what is not distributed in the premises : And an im- 
mediate knowledge of the unconditioned is equally impossible. — 
But here we think his reasoning complicated, and his reduction 
incomplete. We must explain ourselves. 

While we regard as conclusive, Kant's analysis of Time and 
Space into conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his de- 
duction of the ' Categories of Understanding,' and the ' Ideas of 
Speculative Reason,' as the work of a great but perverse inge- 
nuity. The categories of understanding are merely subordinate 
forms of the conditioned. Why not, therefore, generalize the 
Condition — Existence conditioned, as the supreme categoiy, or 
categories, of thought ? — and if it were necessary to analyze this 
form into its subaltern applications, why not develop these im- 
mediately out of the generic principle, instead of preposterously, 
and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws of the 
understanding from a questionable division of logical proposi- 
tions ? Why distinguish Reason ( Vernunft) from Understand- 
ing ( Ver stand), simply on the ground that the former is conver- 
sant about, or rather tends towards, the unconditioned ; when it 
is sufficiently apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived only 
as the negation of the conditioned, and also that the conception 
of contradictories is one ? In the Kantian philosophy both facul- 
ties perform the same function, both seek the one in the many ; 
— the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff) sublimated into 
the inconceivable ; Reason only the Understanding which has 
' overleaped itself.' Kant has clearly shown, that the idea of the 
unconditioned can have no objective reality, — that it conveys no 
knowledge, — and that it involves the most insoluble contradic- 
tions. But he ought to have shown that the unconditioned had 
no objective application, because it had, in fact, no subjective af- 
firmation, — that it afforded no real knowledge, because it con- 
tained nothing even conceivable, — and that it is self-contradicto- 
ry, because it is not a notion, either simple or positive, but only 
a fasciculus of negations — negations of the conditioned in its op- 
posite extremes, and bound together merely by the aid of Ian- 



460 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

guage and their common character of incomprehensibility. And 
while he appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cogni- 
zance of these negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platon- 
ic name of Ideas ; so also, as a pendant to his deduction of the cat- 
egories of Understanding from a logical division of propositions, 
he deduced the classification and number of these ideas of Reason 
from a logical division of syllogisms. — Kant thus stands interme- 
diate between those who view the notion of the absolute as the 
instinctive affirmation of an encentric intuition, and those who 
regard it as the factitious negative of an eccentric generaliza- 
tion. 

Were we to adopt from the Critical Philosophy the idea of 
analyzing thought into its fundamental conditions, and were we 
to carry the reduction of Kant to what we think its ultimate sim- 
plicity, we would discriminate thought into positive and negative, 
according as it is conversant about the conditioned or uncondi- 
tioned. This, however, would constitute a logical, not a psycho- 
logical distinction ; as positive and negative in thought are known 
at once, and by the same intellectual act. The twelve Categories 
of the Understanding would be thus included under the former ; 
the three Ideas of Reason under the latter ; and to this intent the 
contrast between understanding and reason would disappear. 
Finally, rejecting the arbitrary limitation of time and space to the 
sphere of sense, we would express under the formula of — The 
Conditioned in Time and Space — a definition of the conceiv- 
able, and an enumeration of the three categories of thought. 1 

The imperfection and partiality of Kant's analysis are betrayed 
in its consequences. His doctrine leads to absolute skepticism. 
Speculative reason, on Kant's own admission, is an organ of 
mere delusion. The idea of the unconditioned, about which it is 
conversant, is shown to involve insoluble contradictions, and yet 
to be the legitimate product of intelligence. Hume has well ob- 



1 See the next chapter, § I., for a more matured view of these categories or 
conditions of thought. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 461 

served, ' that it matters not whether we possess a false reason, or 
no reason at all.' If ' the light that leads astray, he light from 
heaven,' what are we to believe ? If our intellectual nature he 
perfidious in one revelation, it must be presumed deceitful in all ; 
nor is it possible for Kant to establish the existence of God, Free- 
will, and Immortality, on the presumed veracity of reason, in a 
practical relation, after having himself demonstrated its mendacity 
in a speculative. 

Kant had annihilated the older metaphysic, but the germ of a 
more visionary doctrine of the absolute, than any of those refuted, 
was contained in the bosom of his own philosophy. He had slain 
the body, but had not exorcised the spectre of the absolute ; and 
this spectre has continued to haunt the schools of Germany even 
to the present day. The philosophers were not content to aban- 
don their metaphysic ; to limit philosophy to an observation of 
phenomena, and to the generalization of these phenomena into 
laws. The theories of Bouterweck (in his earlier works), of Bar- 
dili, of Reinhold, of Fichte, of Schelling, of Hegel, and of sundry 
others, are just so many endeavors, of greater or of less ability, 
to fix the absolute as a positive in knowledge ; but the absolute, 
like the water in the sieves of the Danaides, has always hitherto 
run through as a negative into the abyss of nothing. 

3. Of these theories, that of Schelling is the only one in re- 
gard to which it is now necessary to say any thing. His opinion 
constitutes the third of those enumerated touching the knowledge 
of the absolute ; and the following is a brief statement of its prin- 
cipal positions : 

While the lower sciences are of the relative and conditioned, 
Philosophy, as the science of sciences, must be of the absolute — 
the unconditioned. Philosophy, therefore, supposes a science of 
the absolute. Is the absolute beyond our knowledge ? — then is 
philosophy itself impossible. 

But how, it is objected, can the absolute be known ? The ab- 
solute, as unconditioned, identical, and one, cannot be cognized 
under conditions, by difference and plurality. It cannot, there* 



462 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

fore, be known, if the subject of knowledge be distinguished 
from the object of knowledge ; in a knowledge of the absolute, 
existence and knowledge must be identical ; the absolute can only 
be known, if adequately known, and it can only be adequately 
known, by the absolute itself. But is this possible ? We are 
wholly ignorant of existence in itself : — the mind knows nothing, 
except in parts, by quality, and difference, and relation ; con- 
sciousness supposes the subject contradistinguished from the ob- 
ject of thought ; the abstraction of this contrast is a negation of 
consciousness ; and the negation of consciousness is the annihi- 
lation of thought itself. The alternative is therefore unavoidable : 
— either finding the absolute, we lose ourselves ; or retaining self 
and individual consciousness, we do not reach the absolute. 

All this Scheiling frankly admits. He admits that a knowledge 
of the absolute is impossible, in personality and consciousness: 
he admits that, as the understanding knows, and can know, only 
by consciousness, and consciousness only by difference, we, as con- 
scious and understanding, can apprehend, can conceive only the 
conditioned ; and he admits that, only if man be himself the 
infinite, can the infinite be known by him : 

' Nee sentire Deum, nisi qui pars ipse Deoruni est ;'* 
-(' None can feel God, who shares not in the Godhead.') 

* [This line is from Manilius. But as a statement of Schilling's doctrine 
it is inadequate ; for on his doctrine the Deity can he known only if fully 
known, and a full knowledge of deity is possible only to the absolute deity — 
that is, not to a sharer in the Godhead. Manilius has likewise another (poet- 
ically) laudable line, of a similar, though less exceptionable, purport : 
' Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parva ;" 
('Each is himself a miniature of God.') 
For we should not recoil to the opposite extreme ; and, though man be not 
identical with the Deity, still is he ' created in the image of God.' It is, in- 
deed, only through an analogy of the human with the Divine nature, that we 
are percipient and recipient of Divinity. As St. Prosper has it: — 'Nemo 
possidet Deum, nisi qui possidetur a Deo.' — So Seneca: — 'In unoquoque 
virorum bonorurn habitat Deus.' — So Plotinus : — ' Virtue tending to consum- 
mation, and irradicated in the soul by moral wisdom, reveals a God ; but a 
God destitute of true virtue is an empty name.' — So Jacobi: — 'From the 
enjoyment of virtue springs the idea of a virtuous ; from the enjoyment of 
freedom, the idea of a free ; from the enjoyment of life, the idea of a living ; 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 463 

But Schelling contends that there is a capacity of knowledge 
above consciousness, and higher than the understanding, and that 
this knowledge is competent to human reason, as identical with 
the Absolute itself. In this act of knowledge, which, after Fichte, 
he calls the Intellectual Intuition, there exists no distinction of 
subject and object, — no contrast of knowledge and existence ; all 
difference is lost in absolute indifference, — all plurality in abso- 
lute unity. The Intuition itself, — Eeason, — and the Absolute are 
identified. The absolute exists only as known by reason, and 
reason knows only as being itself the absolute. 

This act (act !) is necessarily ineffable : 

' The vision and the faculty divine,' 

to be known, must be experienced. It cannot be conceived by 
the understanding, because beyond its sphere ; it cannot be de- 
scribed, because its essence is identity, and all description supposes 
discrimination. To those who are unable to rise beyond a philos- 
ophy of reflection, Schelling candidly allows that the doctrine of 
the absolute can appear only a series of contradictions ; and he 
has at least the negative merit of having clearly exposed the im- 
possibility of a philosophy of the unconditioned, as founded on a 
knowledge by difference, if he utterly fails in positively proving 
the possibility of such a philosophy, as founded on a knowledge 
in identity, through an absorption into, and vision of, the absolute. 

from the enjoyment of the divine, the idea of a godlike — and of a God.' — 
So Goethe: 

' "Waer nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, 

Wie koennten wir das Licht erhlicken ? 

Lebt' nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft, 

"Wie koennte uns das Goettliches entzuecken ?' 
So Kant and many others. (Thus morality and religion, necessity and 
atheism, rationally go together.) — The Platonists and Fathers have indeed 
finely said, that ' God is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the 
body.' 

' Vita Animse Deus est ; hsec Corporis. Hac fugiente, 

Solvitur hoc ; perit hasc, destituente Deo.' 
These verses are preserved to us from an ancient poet by John of Salisbury, 
and they denote the comparison of which Buchanan has made so admirable 
a use in his Calvini Epicedium.] 



464 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

Out of Laputa or the Empire it would be idle to euter into an 
articulate refutation of a theory, which founds philosophy on the 
annihilation of consciousness, and on the identification of the un- 
conscious philosopher with God. The intuition of the absolute 
is manifestly the work of an arbitrary abstraction, and of a self- 
delusive imagination. To reach the point of indifference, — by 
abstraction we annihilate the object, and by abstraction we anni- 
hilate the subject, of consciousness. But what remains ? — Noth- 
ing. ' Nil conscimus nobis.' We then hypostatize the zero ; we 
baptize it with the name of Absolute ; and conceit ourselves that 
we contemplate absolute existence, when we only speculate abso- 
lute privation.* This truth has been indeed virtually confessed 
by the two most distinguished followers of Schelling. Hegel at 
last abandons the intuition, and regards 'pure or undetermined 
existence 1 as convertible with ' pure nothing ;' whilst Oken, if he 
adhere to the intuition, intrepidly identifies the Deity or Absolute 
with zero. God, he makes the Nothing, the Nothing, he makes 
God; 

' And Naught 
Is every thing, and every thing is Naught.'t 



* [The Infinite and Absolute are only the names of two counter imbecili- 
ties of the human mind, transmuted into properties of the nature of tilings, — 
of two subjective negations, converted into objective affirmations. We tire 
ourselves, either in adding to, or in taking from. Some, more reasonably, 
call the thing unfinishable — infinite; others, less rationally, call it finished — 
absolute. But in both cases, the metastasis is in itself irrational. Not, how- 
ever, in the highest degree ; for the subjective contradictories were not at first 
objectified by the same philosophers ; and it is the crowning irrationality of 
the Infinito-absolutists, that they have not merely accepted as objective what 
is only subjective, but quietly assumed as the same, what are not only differ- 
ent but conflictive, not only confiictive, but repugnant. Seneca (Ep. 118) has 
given the true genealogy of the original fictions ; but at his time the consum- 
mative union of the two had not been attempted. ' Ubi animus aliquid diu 
protulit, et magnitudinem ejus sequendo lassatus est, infinitum coepit vocarL 
Eodem modo, aliquid difficulter secari cogitavimus, novissime, crescente 
difficultate, insecabile inventum est.'] 

T [From the Rejected Addresses. Their ingenious authors have embodied 
a jest in the very words by which Oken, in sober seriousness, propounds the 
first and greatest of philosophical truths. Jacobi (or Neeb ?) might well say, 
that, in reading this last consummation of German speculation, he did not 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 465 

Nor does the negative chimera prove less fruitful than the posi- 
tive ; for Schelling has found it as difficult to evolve the one into 
the many, as his disciples to deduce the universe and its contents 
from the first self-affirmation of the ' primordial Nothing.' 

' Miri. homines ! Nihil esse aliquid statuantve negentve ; 
Quodque negant statu unt, quod statuuntque negant.' 

To Schelling, indeed, it has been impossible, without gratuitous 
and even contradictory assumptions, to explain the deduction of 
the finite from the infinite. By no salto inortale has he been able 
to clear the magic circle in which he had inclosed himself. Un- 
able to connect the unconditioned and the conditioned by any 
natural correlation, he has variously attempted to account for the 
phenomenon of the universe, either by imposing a necessity of 
self-manifestation on the absolute, i. e. by conditioning the uncon- 
ditioned ; or by postulating a fall of the finite from the infinite, 
i. e. by begging the very fact which his hypothesis professed its 
exclusive ability to explain. The veil of Isis is thus still unwith- 
drawn ;* and the question proposed by Orpheus at the dawn of 
speculation will probably remain unanswered at its setting : 

' n«f <5t fioi 'iv ti ra TrdvT 1 'imai Kai ;\;wpis Zkcuttov ;' 
('How can I think each, separate, and all, one?') 

In like manner, annihilating consciousness in order to recon- 

know whether he were standing on his head or his feet. The book in which 
Oken so ingeniously deduces the All from the Nothing, has, I see, been lately 
translated into English, and published by the Bay Society (I think). The 
statement of the paradox is, indeed, somewhat softened in the second edi- 
tion, from which, I presume, the version is made. Not that Oken and Hegel 
are original even in the absurdity. For as Varro right truly said : — ' Nihil 
tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum ;' so the 
Intuition of God = the Absolute, = the Nothing, we find asserted by the 
lower Platonists, by the Buddhists, and by Jacob Boehme.] 

* [Isis appears as the iEgypto-Grecian symbol of the Unconditioned. 
( r Iai; — 'I(7i'a — Ovaia : "Iccwv, — yvSiats tov dvTo;. Blut. I. et 0.) In the templo 
of Athene-Isis, at Sais, on the fane there stood this sublime inscription : 

I AM ALL THAT WAS, AND IS, AND SHALL BE ; 
NOB MY VEIL, HAS IT BEEN WITHDEAWN BY MOETAL. 
(' 'Eyd efyu irav rb ysyovbs, Kal dv, Kai icdjicvov, Kal tov iiibv irtTrXov oiSeis nm 
Bviirbs aJ^£/azADl/'£. , )] 

29 



4:66 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

struct it, Schelling has never yet been able to connect the faculties 
conversant about tbe conditioned, with the faculty of absolute 
knowledge. One simple objection strikes us as decisive, although 
we do not remember to have seen it alleged. ' We awaken,' says 
Schelling, ' from the Intellectual Intuition as from a state of death ; 
we awaken by Reflection, that is, through a compulsory return to 
ourselves.'* We cannot, at the same moment, be in the intel- 
lectual intuition and in common consciousness ; we must there- 
fore be able to connect them by an act of memory — of recollection. 
But how can there be a remembrance of the absolute and its intu- 
ition ? as out of time, and space, and relation, and difference, it 
is admitted that the absolute cannot be construed to the under- 
standing. But as remembrance is only possible under the con- 
ditions of the understanding, it is consequently impossible to re- 
member any thing anterior to the moment when we awaken into 
consciousness ; and the clairvoyance of the absolute, even granting 
its reality, is thus, after the crisis, as if it had never been. We 
defy all solution of this objection. 

4. What has now been stated may in some degree enable the 
reader to apprehend the relations in which our author stands, 
both to those who deny and to those who admit a knowledge of 
the absolute. If we compare the philosophy of Cousin with the 
philosophy of Schelling, we at once perceive that the former is a 
disciple, though by no means a servile disciple, of the latter. 
The scholar, though enamored with his master's system as a 
whole, is sufficiently aware of the two insuperable difficulties of 
that theory. He saw that if he pitched the absolute so high, it 
was impossible to deduce from it the relative ; and he felt, prob- 
ably, that the Intellectual Intuition — a stumbling-block to him- 
self — would be arrant foolishness in the eyes of his countrymen. 
Cousin and Schelling agree, that as philosophy is the science of 
the unconditioned, the unconditioned must be within the com- 
pass of science. They agree that the unconditioned is known, 

* In Fichte's u. Niethkammer's Phil. Journ., vol. iii. p. 214. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 467 

and immediately known ; and they agree that intelligence, as 
competent to the unconditioned, is impersonal, infinite, divine. 
But while they coincide in the fact of the ahsolute, as known, 
they are diametrically opposed as to the mode in which they 
attempt to realize this knowledge ; each regarding, as the climax 
of contradiction, the manner in which the other endeavors to 
bring human reason and the absolute into proportion. Accord- 
ing to Schelling, Cousin's absolute is only a relative ; according 
to Cousin, Schelling's knowledge of the absolute is a legation of 
thought itself. Cousin declares the condition of all knowledge 
to be plurality and difference ; and Schelling, that the condition, 
under which alone a knowledge of the absolute becomes possible, 
is indifference and unity. The one thus denies a notion of the 
absolute to consciousness ; whilst the other affirms that conscious- 
ness is implied in every act of intelligence. Truly, we must view 
each as triumphant over the other ; and the result of this mutual 
neutralization is — that the absolute, of which both assert a 
knowledge, is for us incognizable.* 

* [' Quod genus hoc pugnse, qua victor victus uterque !' 

is still further exhibited in the mutual refutation of the two great apostles 
of the Absolute, in Germany — Schelling and Hegel. They were early 
friends — contemporaries at the same university — occupiers of the same 
bursal room (college chums) : Hegel, somewhat the elder man, was some- 
what the younger philosopher; and they were joint editors of the journal in 
which their then common doctrine was at first promulgated. So far all was 
in unison ; but now they separated, locally and in opinion. Both, indeed, 
stuck to the Absolute, but each regarded the way in which the other pro- 
fessed to reach it as absurd. Hegel derided the Intellectual Intuition of 
Schelling, as a poetical play of fancy ; Schelling derided the Dialectic of 
Hegel as a logical play with words. Both, I conceive, were right; but 
neither fully right. If Schelling's Intellectual Intuition were poetical, it was 
a poetry transcending, in fact abolishing, human imagination. If Hegel's 
Dialectic were logical, it was a logic outraging that science and the condi- 
tions of thought itself. Hegel's whole philosophy is indeed founded on two 
errors ; — on a mistake in logic, and on a violation of logic. In his dream of 
disproving the law of Excluded Middle (between two Contradictories), he 
inconceivably mistakes Contraries for Contradictories ; and in positing pure 
or absolute existence as a mental datum, immediate, intuitive, and above 
proof (though, in truth, this be palpably a mere relative gained by a process 
of abstraction), he not only mistakes the fact, but violates the logical law 



468 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

In these circumstances, we might expect our author to have 
stated the difficulties to which his theory was exposed on the one 
side and on the other ; and to have endeavored to obviate the 
objections, both of his brother absolutists, and of those who alto- 
gether deny a philosophy of the unconditioned. This he has not 
done. The possibility of reducing the notion of the absolute to 
a negative conception is never once contemplated; and if one or 
two allusions (not always, perhaps, correct) are made to his doc- 
trine, the name of Schelling does not occur, as we recollect, in the 
whole compass of these lectures. Difficulties, by which either the 
doctrine of the absolute in general, or his own particular modifi- 
cation of that doctrine, may be assailed, are either avoided or 
solved only by still greater. Assertion is substituted for proof; 
facts of consciousness are alleged, which consciousness never 
knew ; and paradoxes, that baffle argument, are promulgated as 
intuitive truths, above the necessity of confirmation. With every 
feeling of respect for M. Cousin as a man of learning and genius, 
we must regard the grounds on which he endeavors to establish 
his doctrine as assumptive, inconsequent, and erroneous. In vin- 
dicating the truth of this statement, we shall attempt to show : — 
in the first place, that M. Cousin is at fault in all the authorities 
he quotes in favor of the opinion, that the absolute, infinite, 
unconditioned, is a primitive notion, cognizable by our intellect ; 
in the second, that his argument to prove the correality of his 
three ideas proves directly the reverse ; in the third, that the 
conditions under which alone he allows intelligence to be possi- 
ble, necessarily exclude the possibility of a knowledge, not to say 
a conception, of the absolute ; and in the fourth, that the abso- 
lute, as defined by him, is only a relative and a conditioned. 

which, prohibits us to assume the principle 'which it behooves us to prove. 
On these two' fundamental errors rests Hegel's dialectic ; and Hegel's dialec- 
tic is the ladder by which he attempts to scale the Absolute. — The peculiar 
doctrine of these two illustrious thinkers is thus to me only another mani- 
festation of an occurrence of the commonest in human speculation ; it is 
only a sophism of relative self-love, victorious over the absolute love of 
truth: — ' Quod volunt sapiunt, et nolunt sapere qute vera sunt.'] 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 469 

In the first place, then, M. Cousin supposes that Aristotle and 
Kant, in their several categories, equally proposed an analysis of 
the constituent elements of intelligence ; and he also supposes 
that each, like himself, recognized among these elements the 
notion of the infinite, absolute, unconditioned. In both these 
suppositions we think him wrong. 

It is a serious error in a historian of philosophy to imagine 
that, in his scheme of categories, Aristotle proposed, like Kant, 
' an analysis of the elements of human reason.' It is just, how- 
ever, to mention that in this mistake M. Cousin has been pre- 
ceded by Kant himself. But the ends proposed by the two phi- 
losophers were different, even opposed. In their several tables : 
— Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their multiplicity — 
a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought ; — Kant, 
an analysis of mind in its unity — a dissection of thought, pure, 
but in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are 
thus objective, of things as understood ; those of Kant subjective, 
of the mind as understanding. The former are results a poste- 
riori — the creations of abstraction and generalization ; the latter, 
anticipations a priori — the conditions of those acts themselves. 
It is true, that as the one scheme exhibits the unity of thought 
diverging into plurality, in appliance to its objects, and the other 
exhibits the multiplicity of these objects converging towards unity 
by a collective determination of the mind ; while, at the same 
time, language usually confounds the subjective and objective 
under a common term ; — it is certainly true, that some elements 
in the one table coincide in name with some elements in the 
other. This coincidence is, however, only equivocal. In reality, 
the whole Kantian categories' must be excluded from the Aristo- 
telic list as entia rationis, as notiones secundce — in short, as deter- 
minations of thought, and not genera of real things ; while the 
several elements would be specially excluded, as partial, privative, 
transcendent, &c. But if it would be unjust to criticise the cate- 
gories of Kant in whole, or in part, by the Aristotelic canon, 
what must we think of Kant, who, after magnifying the idea of 



470 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

investigating the forms of pure intellect as worthy of the mighty 
genius of the Stagirite, proceeds, on this false hypothesis, to blame 
the execution, as a kind of patchwork, as incomplete, as confound- 
ing derivative with simple notions ; nay, even, on the narrow 
principles of his own Critique, as mixing the forms of pure sense 
with the forms of pure understanding ?* If M. Cousin also were 
correct in his supposition that Aristotle and his followers had 
viewed his categories as an analysis of the fundamental forms of 
thought, he would find his own reduction of the elements of rea- 
son to a double principle anticipated in the scholastic division of 
existence into ens per se and ens per accident . 

Nor is our author correct in thinking that the categories of 
Aristotle and Kant are complete, inasmuch as they are coexten- 
sive with his own. As to the former, if the Infinite were not 
excluded, on what would rest the scholastic distinction of ens cat- 
egoricum and ens transcendens ? The logicians require that pre- 
dicamental matter shall be of a limited and finite nature ;f God, 
as infinite, is thus excluded : and while it is evident from the 
whole context of his book of categories, that Aristotle there only 
contemplated a distribution of the finite, so, in other of his works, 
he more than once emphatically denies the infinite as an object 
not only of knowledge, but of thought ; — <ro awsipov ayvudrov 77 
cwrsipov — to citfSipov ours vovj-rov, ours ditfd>jrov.J But if Aristotle 
thus regards the Infinite as beyond the compass of thought, Kant 
views it as, at least, beyond the sphere of knowledge. If M. 



* See the Critik d. r. Y. and the Prolegomena. 

t [M. Peisse, in a note here, quotes the common logical law of categorical 
entities, well and briefly expressed in the following verse : 

' Entia per sese, finitu, realia, tota.' 
He likewise justly notices, that nothing is included in the Aristotelic cate- 
gories but what is susceptible of definition, consequently of analysis.] 

X Phys. L. hi. c. 10, text. 66, c. 7, text. 40. See also Metaph. L. ii. c. 2. 
text. 11. Analyt. Post. L. i. c. 20, text. 89 — et alibi. — [Aristotle's definition 
of the Infinite (of the axeipov in contrast to the adpioTov) — ' that of which then 
is always something beyond,' may be said to be a definition only of the Indefi- 
nite. This I shall not gainsay. But it was the only Infinite which he con- 
templated ; as it is the only Infinite of which we can form a notion.] 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 471 

Cousin indeed employed the term category in relation to the 
Kantian philosophy in the Kantian acceptation, he would be as 
erroneous in regard to Kant as he is in regard to Aristotle ; but 
we presume that he wishes, under that term, to include not only 
the ' Categories of Understanding,' but the ' Ideas of Beason.'* 
But Kant limits knowledge to experience, and experience to the 
categories of the understanding, which, in reality, are only so 
many forms of the conditioned ; and allows to the notion of the 
unconditioned (corresponding to the ideas of reason) no objective 
reality, regarding it merely as a regulative principle in the 
arrangement of our thoughts. As M. Cousin, however, holds 
that the unconditioned is not only subjectively conceived, but 
objectively known ; he is thus totally wrong in regard to the one 
philosopher, and wrong in part in relation to the other. 

In the second place, our author maintains that the idea of the 
infinite, or absolute, and the idea of the finite, or relative, are 
equally real, because the notion of the one necessarily suggests 
the notion of the other. 

Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but correlatives may, 
or may not, be equally real and positive. In thought contradic- 
tories necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of contra- 
dictories is one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far from 
guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing else than its ne- 
gation. Thus every positive notion (the concept of a thing by 
what it is) suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by 
what it is not) ; and the highest positive notion, the notion of the 
conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the no- 
tion of the inconceivable. But though these mutually suggest 



* [' The Categories of Kant are simple forms or frames (schemata) of the 
Understanding ( Verstand), under which, an object to be known, must be 
necessarily thought. Kant's Ideas, a word which he expressly borrowed 
from Plato, are concepts of the Beason ( Vernunft) ; whose objects transcend- 
ing the sphere of all experience actual or possible, consequently do not fall 
under the categories, in other words, are positively unknowable. These 
ideas are God, Matter, Soul, objects which, considered out of relation, or in 
their transcendent reality, are so many phases of the Absolute? — M. Peisse.] 



4:72 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

each other, the positive alone is real ; the negative is only at 
abstraction of the other, and in the highest generality, even an 
abstraction of thought itself. It therefore behooved M. Cousin, 
instead of assuming the objective correality of his two elements on 
the fact of their subjective correlation, to have suspected, on this 
very ground, that the reality of the one was inconsistent with the 
reality of the other. In truth, upon examination, it will be found 
that his two primitive ideas are nothing more than contradictory 
relatives. These, consequently, of their very nature, imply each 
other in thought ; but they imply each other only as affirmation 
and negation of the same. 

We have already shown, that though the Conditioned (condi- 
tionally limited) be one, what is opposed to it as the Uncondition- 
ed, is plural : that the unconditional negation of limitation gives 
one unconditioned, the Infinite ; as the unconditional affirmation 
of limitation affords another, the Absolute. This, while it coin- 
cides with the opinion, that the Unconditioned in either phasis is 
inconceivable, is repugnant to the doctrine, that the uncondition- 
ed (absoluto-infinite) can be positively construed to the mind. 
For those who, with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the uncondi- 
tioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence in its all-com- 
prehensive unity, and who consequently employ the terms Abso- 
lute, Infinite, Unconditioned, as only various expressions for the 
same identity, are imperatively bound to prove that their idea of 
the One corresponds — either with that Unconditioned we have dis 
iinguished as the Absolute — or with that Unconditioned toe have 
distinguished as the Infinite — or that it includes both, — or that 
it excludes both. This they have not done, and, we suspect, have 
never attempted to do. 

Our author maintains, that the unconditioned is known undei 
the laws of consciousness ; and does not, like Schelling, pretend 
to an intuition of existence beyond the bounds of space and time. 
Indeed, he himself expressly predicates the absolute and infinite 
of these forms. 

Time is only the image or the concept of a certain correlation 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE COlSDITKWSrED. 4/T3 

of existences — of existence therefore, pro tanto, as conditioned. It 
is thus itself only a form of the conditioned. But let that pass. — 
Is, then, the Absolute conceivable of time ? Can we conceive time 
as unconditionally limited ? We can easily represent to ourselves 
time under any relative limitation of commencement and termina- 
tion ; but we are conscious to ourselves of nothing more clearly, 
than that it would be equally possible to think without thought, 
as to construe to the mind an absolute commencement, or an ab- 
solute termination, of time ; that is, a beginning and an end, 
beyond which, time is conceived as non-existent. Goad imagina- 
tion to the utmost, it still sinks paralyzed within the bounds of 
time ; and time survives as the condition of the thought itself in 
which we annihilate the universe : 

' Sot les mondes detruits le Temps dort immobile.' 

But if the Absolute be inconceivable of this form, is the Infinite 
more comprehensible ? Can we imagine time as unconditionally 
unlimited ? — We cannot conceive the Infinite regress of time ; for 
such a notion could only be realized by the infinite addition in 
thought of finite times, and such an addition would, itself, require 
an eternity for its accomplishment. If we dream of affecting this, 
we only deceive ourselves by substituting the indefinite for the in- 
finite, than which no two notions can be more opposed. The ne- 
gation of the commencement of time involves likewise the affir- 
mation, that an infinite time has at every moment already run ; 
that is, it implies the contradiction, that an infinite has been com- 
pleted. — For the same reasons we are unable to conceive an infi- 
nite progress of time ; while the infinite regress and the infinite 
progress, taken together, involve the triple contradiction of an in- 
finite concluded, of an infinite commencing, and of two infinites, 
not exclusive of each other. 

Sioace, like time, is only the intuition or the concept of a cer- 
tain correlation of existence — of existence, therefore, pro tanto, 
as conditioned. It is thus itself only a form of the conditioned. 
But apart from this, thought is equally powerless in realizing a 



474r PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

notion either of the absolute totality, or of the infinite immensity, 
of space. — And while time and space, as wholes, can thus neither 
he conceived as absolutely limited, nor as infinitely unlimited ; st 
their parts can be represented to the mind neither as absolutely 
individual, nor as divisible to infinity. The universe cannot be 
imagined as a whole, which may not also be imagined as a part ; 
nor an atom be imagined as a part, which may not also be im- 
agined as a whole. 

The same analysis, with a similar result, can be applied to 
cause and effect, and to substance and phenomenon. These, how- 
ever, mav both be reduced to the law itself of the conditioned. 1 

The Conditioned is, therefore, that only which can be positive- 
ly conceived ; the Absolute and Infinite are conceived only as ne- 
gations of the conditioned in its opposite poles. 

Now, as we observed, M. Cousin, and those who confound the 
absolute and infinite, and regard the unconditioned as a positive 
and indivisible notion, must show that this notion coincides 
either, 1°, with the notion of the Absolute, to the exclusion of the 
infinite ; or 2°, with the notion of the Infinite, to the exclusion ot 
the absolute ; or 3°, that it includes both as true, carrying them 
up to indifference ; or 4°, that it excludes both as false. The last 
two alternatives are impossible, as either would be subversive ot 
the highest principle of intelligence, which asserts, that of two 
contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be true. It only, 
therefore, remains to identify the unity of the Unconditioned with 
the Infinite, or with the Absolute — with either, to the exclusion 
of the other. But while every one must be intimately conscious 
of the impossibility of this, the very fact that our author and 
other philosophers a priori have constantly found it necessary to 
confound these contradictions, sufficiently proves that neither 
term has a right to represent the unity of the unconditioned, to 
the prejudice of the other. 

The Unconditioned is, therefore, not a positive concept ; nor 

1 See the next chapter, § L for the applications of that doctrine. — W, 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 475 

has it even a real or intrinsic unity ; for it only combines the Ab- 
solute and the Infinite, in themselves contradictory of each other, 
into a unity relative to us by the negative bond of their incon- 
ceivability. It is on this mistake, of the relative for the irre- 
spective, of the negative for the positive, that M. Cousin's theory 
is founded : And it is not difficult to understand how the mistake 
originated. 

This reduction of M. Cousin's two ideas of the Infinite and Fi- 
nite to one positive conception and its negative, implicitly anni- 
hilates also the third idea, devised by him as a connection be- 
tween his two substantive ideas ; and which he marvellously iden- 
tifies with the relation of cause and effect. 

Yet before leaving this part of our subject, we may observe, 
that the very simplicity of our analysis is a strong presumption 
in favor of its truth. A plurality of causes is not to be postula- 
ted, where one is sufficient to account for the phenomena {Entia 
non sunt multiplicanda prceter necessitatem) ; and M. Cousin, in 
supposing three positive ideas, where only one is necessary, brings 
the rule of parsimony against his hypothesis, even before its un- 
soundness may be definitely brought to light. 

In the third place, the restrictions to which our author subjects 
intelligence, divine and human, implicitly deny a knowledge — 
even a concept — of the absolute, both to God and man. ' The 
condition of intelligence,' says M. Cousin, ' is difference ; and an 
act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality 
of terms. Unity does not suffice for conception ; variety is ne- 
cessary ; nay more, not only is variety necessary, there must like- 
wise subsist an intimate relation between the principles of unity 
and variety ; without which, the variety not being perceived by 
the unity, the one is as if it could not perceive, and the other as 
if it could not be perceived. Look back for a moment into your- 
selves, and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our 
feeble consciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of 
which the one perceives the other, of which the other is perceived 
by the first : in this consists self-knowledge, — in this consists self- 



476 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

comprehension, — in this consists intelligence : intelligence with- 
out consciousness is the abstract possibility of intelligence, not in- 
telligence in the act ; and consciousness implies diversity and dif- 
ference. Transfer all this from human to absolute intelligence ; — 
that is to say, refer the ideas to the only intelligence to which 
they can belong. You have thus, if I may so express myself, the 
life of absolute intelligence ; you have this intelligence with the 
complete development of the elements which are necessary for it 
to be a true intelligence ; you have all the momenta whose rela- 
tion and motion constitute the reality of knowledge.' — In all this, 
so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially agree ; for 
a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only that 
a knowledge, and even a notion, of the absolute is impossible for 
man, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a 
knowledge, even in the Deity, without contradicting our human 
conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself. Our author, 
however, recognizes no contradiction ; and, without argument or 
explanation, accords a knowledge of that which can only be 
known under the negation of all difference and plurality, to that 
which can only know under the affirmation of both. 

If a knowledge of the absolute were possible under these con- 
ditions, it may excite our wonder that other philosophers should 
have viewed this supposition as utterly impossible ; and that 
Schelling, whose acuteness was never questioned, should have 
exposed himself gratuitously to the reproach of mysticism, by his 
postulating for a few, and through a faculty above the reach of 
consciousness, a knowledge already given to all in the fact of con- 
sciousness itself. Monstrous as is the postulate of the Intellectual 
Intuition, we freely confess that it is only through such a faculty 
that we can imagine the possibility of a science of the absolute ; 
and have no hesitation in acknowledging, that if Schelling's 
hypothesis appear to us incogitable, that of Cousin is seen to be 
self-contradictory. 

Our author admits, and must admit, that the Absolute, as ab- 
solutely universal, is absolutely one ; absolute unity is convertible 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 477 

with the absolute negation of plurality and difference ; the abso- 
lute, and the knowledge of the absolute, are therefore identical. 
But knowledge, or intelligence, it is asserted by M. Cousin, sup- 
poses a plurality of terms — the plurality of subject and object. 
Intelligence, whose essence is plurality, cannot therefore be iden- 
tified with the absolute, whose essence is unity ; and if known, 
the absolute, as known, must be different from the absolute as 
existing ; that is, there must be two absolutes — an absolute in 
knowledge, and an absolute in existence, which is contradictory. 

But waiving this contradiction, and allowing the non-identity 
of knowledge and existence, the absolute as kncwn must be 
known under the conditions of the absolute as existing, that is, 
as absolute unity. But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the 
condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference ; 
consequently the condition of the absolute, as existing, and under 
which it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as ca- 
pable of knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the ab- 
solute cognizable : it must be identified either, — 1°, with the 
subject knowing ; or, 2°, with the object known ; or, 3°, with the 
indifference of both. The first hypothesis, and the second, are 
contradictory of the absolute. For in these the absolute is sup- 
posed to be known, either as contradistinguished from the know- 
ing subject, or as contradistinguished from the object known ; in 
other words, the absolute is asserted to be known as absolute 
unity, i. e. as the negation of all plurality, while the very act by 
which it is known, affirms plurality as the condition of its own 
possibility. The third hypothesis, on the other hand, is contra- 
dictory of the 'plurality of intelligence ; for if the subject and the 
object of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of terms is 
not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is 
therefore necessary : — Either the absolute cannot be known or 
conceived at all ; or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to 
the conditions of plurality and difference. It was the iron neces- 
sity of the alternative that constrained Schelling to resort to the 
hypothesis of a knowledge in identity through the intellectual 



478 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

intuition ; and it could only be from an oversight of the main 
difficulties of the problem that M. Cousin, in abandoning the in- 
tellectual intuition, did not abandon the absolute itself. For how 
that, whose essence is all-comprehensive unity, can be known by 
the negation of that unity under the condition of plurality ; — how 
that, which exists only as the identity of all difference, can be 
known under the negation of that identity, in the antithesis of 
subject and object, of knowledge and existence : — these are con- 
tradictions which M. Cousin has not attempted to solve, — contra- 
dictions which he does not seem to have contemplated. 

In the fourth place. — The objection of the inconceivable nature 
of Schelling's intellectual intuition, and of a knowledge of the 
absolute in identity, apparently determined our author to adopt 
the opposite, but suicidal alternative, of a knowledge of the 
absolute in consciousness, and by difference. — The equally insu- 
perable objection, — that from the absolute defined as absolute, 
Schelling had not been able, without inconsequence, to deduce 
the conditioned, seems, in like manner, to have influenced M. 
Cousin to define the absolute by a relative ; not observant, it 
would appear, that though he thus facilitated the derivation of 
the conditioned, he annihilated in reality the absolute itself. — By 
the former proceeding, our author virtually denies the possibility 
of the absolute in thought ; by the latter, the possibility of the 
absolute in existence. 

The absolute is defined by our author, ' an absolute cause, — a 
cause which cannot but pass into act.' — Now, it is sufficiently 
manifest that a thing existing absolutely {i.e. not under relation), 
and a thing existing absolutely as a cause, are contradictory. 
The former is the absolute negation of all relation, the latter is 
the absolute affirmation of a particular relation. A cause is a 
relative, and what exists absolutely as a cause, exists absolutely 
under relation. Schelling has justly observed, that ' he would 
deviate wide as the poles from the idea of the absolute, who 
would think of defining its nature by the notion of activity? * 

* Bruno, p. 171. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 4:79 

But he who would define the absolute by the notion of a cause, 
would deviate still more widely from its nature ; inasmuch as 
the notion of a cause involves not only the notion of a determi- 
nation to activity, but of a determination to a particular, nay a 
dependent kind of activity, — an activity not immanent, but 
transeunt. What exists merely as a cause, exists merely for the 
sake of something else, — is not final in itself, but simply a mean 
towards an end ; and in the accomplishment of that end, it con- 
summates its own perfection. Abstractly considered, the effect 
is therefore superior to the cause. A cause, as cause, may indeed 
be better than one or two or any given number of its effects. 
But the total complement of the effects of what exists only as a 
cause, is better than that which, ex hypothesi, exists merely for 
the sake of their production. Further, not only is an absolute 
cause dependent on the effect for its perfection, — it is dependent 
on it even for its reality. For to what extent a thing exists 
necessarily as a cause, to that extent it is not all-sufficient to 
itself; since to that extent it is dependent on the effect, as on 
the condition through which alone it realizes its existence ; and 
what exists absolutely as a cause, exists, therefore, in absolute 
dependence on the effect for the reality of its existence. An 
absolute cause, in truth, only exists in its effects : it never 
is, it always becomes ; for it is an existence in potentia, and 
not an existence in actu, except through and in its effects. 
The absolute is thus, at best, a being merely inchoative and 
imperfect. 

The definition of the absolute by absolute cause, is, therefore, 
tantamount to a negation of itself; for it defines by relation 
and conditions that which is conceived only as exclusive of both. 
The same is true of the definition of the absolute by substance. 
But of this we do not speak. 

The vice of M. Cousin's definition of the absolute by absolute 
cause, is manifested likewise in its applications. He maintains 
that his theory can alone explain the nature and relations of the 
Deity ; and on its absolute incompetency to fulfil the conditions 



480 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

of a rational theism, we are willing to rest our demonstration of 
its radical unsoundness. 

' God,' says our author, ' creates ; he creates in virtue of his 
creative power, and he draws the universe, not from nonentity, 
but from himself, who is absolute existence. His distinguishing 
characteristic being an absolute creative force, which cannot but 
pass into activity, it follows, not that the creation is possible, but 
that it is necessary.'' 

We must be very brief. — The subjection of the Deity to a 
necessity — a necessity of self-manifestation identical with the 
creation of the universe, is contradictory of the fundamental pos- 
tulates of a divine nature. On this theory, God is not distinct 
from the world ; the creature is a modification of the creator. 
N~ow, without objecting that the simple subordination of the 
Deity to necessity, is in itself tantamount to his dethronement, 
let us see to what consequences this necessity, on the hypothesis 
of M. Cousin, inevitably leads. On this hypothesis, one of two 
alternatives must be admitted. God, as necessarily determined 
to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation, is deter- 
mined to pass either from the better to the ivorse, or from the 
worse to the better. A third possibility, that both states are equal, 
as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted by our author, it is 
not necessary to consider. 

The first supposition must be rejected. The necessity in this 
case determines God to pass from the better to the worse ; that 
is, operates to his partial annihilation. The power which com- 
pels this must be external and hostile, for nothing operates wil- 
lingly to its own deterioration ; and, as superior to the pretended 
God, is either itself the real deity, if an intelligent and free 
cause, or a negation of all deity, if a blind force or fate. 

The second is equally inadmissible : — that God, passing into 
the universe, passes from a state of comjjarative imperfection, 
into a state of comparative perfection. The divine nature is 
identical with the most perfect nature, and is also identical with 
the first cause. If the first cause be not identical with the most 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 481 

perfect nature, there is no God, for the two essential conditions 
of his existence are not in combination. Now, on the present 
supposition, the most perfect nature is the derived ; nay the uni- 
verse, the creation, the yivo/xsvov, is, in relation to its cause, the 
real, the actual, the ovrug ov. It would also be the divine, but 
that divinity supposes also the notion of cause, while the uni- 
verse, ex hypothesis is only an effect. 

It is no answer to these difficulties for M. Cousin to say, that 
the Deity, though a cause which cannot choose but create, is not 
however exhausted in the act ; and though passing with all the 
elements of his being into the universe, that he remains entire in 
his essence, and with all the superiority of the cause over the 
effect. The dilemma is unavoidable : — Either the Deity is in- 
dependent of the universe for his being or perfection ; on which 
alternative our author must abandon his theory of God, and the 
necessity of creation : Or the Deity is dependent on his manifes- 
tation in the universe for his being or perfection ; on which alter- 
native, his doctrine is assailed by the difficulties previously 
stated. 

The length to which the preceding observations have extended, 
prevents us from adverting to sundry other opinions of our 
author, which we conceive to be equally unfounded. — For exam- 
ple (to say nothing of his proof of the impersonality of intelligence, 
because, forsooth, truth is not subject to our will), what can be 
conceived more self-contradictory than his theory of moral liber- 
ty ? Divorcing liberty from intelligence, but connecting it with 
personality, he defines it to be a cause which is determined to act 
by its proper energy alone. But (to say nothing of remoter 
difficulties) how liberty can be conceived, supposing always a 
plurality of modes of activity, without a knowledge of that plu- 
rality ; how a faculty oan resolve to act by preference in a par- 
ticular manner, and not determine itself by final causes ; — how 
intelligence can influence a blind power, without operating as an 
efficient cause ; — or how, in fine, morality can be founded on a 
liberty which, at best, only escanes necessity by taking refuge 
30 



4:82 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

with chance : — these are problems which M. Cousin, in none 
of his worts, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable 
to solve. 

After the tenor of our previous observations, it is needless to 
say that we regard M. Cousin's attempt to establish a general 
peace among philosophers, by the promulgation of his Eclectic 
theory, as a failure. But though no converts to his Uncondi- 
tioned, and viewing with regret what we must regard as the mis- 
application of his distinguished talents, we cannot disown a strong 
feeling of interest and admiration for those qualities, even in their 
excess, which have betrayed him, with so many other aspiring 
philosophers, into a pursuit which could only end in disappoint- 
ment : — we mean his love of truth, and his reliance on the pow- 
ers of man. Not to despair of philosophy is ' a last infirmity of 
noble minds.' The stronger the intellect, the stronger the confi- 
dence in its force ; the more ardent the appetite for knowledge, 
the less are we prepared to canvass the uncertainty of the frui- 
tion. ' The wish is parent to the thought.' Loth to admit 
that our science is at best the reflection of a reality we cannot 
know, we strive to penetrate to existence in itself; and what we 
have labored intensely to attain, we at last fondly believe we 
have accomplished. But, like Ixion, we embrace a cloud for a 
divinity. Conscious only of, conscious only in and through, lim- 
itation, we think to comprehend the infinite ; and dream even of 
establishing the science — the nescience of man, on an identity 
with the omniscience of God. It is this powerful tendency of 
the most vigorous minds to transcend the sphere of our faculties, 
which makes a ' learned ignorance' the most difficult acquire- 
ment, perhaps, indeed, the consummation of knowledge. In 
the words of a forgotten, but acute philosopher , — ' Magna, 
immo maxima pars sapiential est, — qucedam aiquo animo nescire 
veiled ' 



1 See the next chapter, § 2, for testimonies in regard to the limitation of 
our knowledge. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 



483 



['Infinitas! Infinitas! 



Hie mundus est infirdtas. 

Infinitas et totus est, 

(Nam rneiite numquam absolveris ;) 

Infinitas et illius 

Pars quselibet, partisque pars. 

Quod tangis est infinitas ; 

Quod cernis est infinitas ; 

Quod non vides corpusculum, 

Sed inente sola concipis, 

Corpusouli et corpusculum, 

Hujusque pars corpusouli, 

Partisque pars, hujusque pars, 

In hacque parte quicquid est, 

Infinitatem continet. 



Secare mens at pergito, 
Numquam secare desine ; 
In sectione qualibet 
Infinitates dissecas. 
Quiesce mens heic denique, 
Arctosque nosce limites 
Queis eontineris undique ; 
Quiesce mens, et limites 
In orbe cessa quserere. 
Quod quseris in te repperis : 
In mente sunt, in mente sunt, 
Hi, quos requiris, termirji ; 
A rebus absunt limites, 
In hisce tantam infinitas, 



Infinitas ! Infinitas ! 
Proh, quantus heic acervus est ! 
Et quam nihil quod nostra mens 
Ex hoc acervo intelligit ! 
At ilia Mens vah, qualis est, 
Conspecta cui stant omnia ! 
In singulis quae perspicit 
Quascunque sunt in singulis 
Et singulorum singulis !'] 



CHAPTER II. 

LIMITATION OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE. 

§ I. — A Doctrine of the Relative : The Categories of 
Thought. 

Thinking (employing that term as comprehending all our cog- 
nitive energies 1 ) is of two hinds. It is either A) Negative or B) 
Positive. 

A.) Thinking is Negative (in propriety, a negation of thought), 
when Existence is not attributed to an object. It is of two kinds ; 
inasmuch as the one or the other of the conditions of positive 
thinking is violated. In either case, the result is Nothing. 

I.) If the condition of Non-contradiction be not fulfilled, there 
emerges The really Impossible, what has been called in the schools, 
Nihil purum. 

II.) If the condition of Relativity be not purified, there results 
The Impossible to thought ; that is, what may exist, but what we 
are unable to conceive existing. This impossible, the schools have 
not contemplated ; we are, therefore, compelled, for the sake of 
symmetry and precision, to give it a scholastic appellation in the 
Nihil cogitabile. 

B.) Thinking is Positive (and this in propriety is the only 
real thought), when Existence is predicated of an object. By ex- 
istence is not, however, here meant real or objective existence, but 



1 ' Thought and thinking are used in a more, and in a less, restricted signi- 
fication. In the former meaning they are limited to the discursive energies 
alone ; in the latter, they are co-extensive with consciousness. In the Car- 
tesian language, the term thought included all of which we are conscious.' — 
Keid, pp. 222, 270.— W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 485 

only existence subjective or ideal. Thus, imagining a Centaur or 
a Hippogryph, we do not suppose that the phantasm has any 
being beyond our imagination ; but still we attribute to it an ac- 
tual existence in thought. Nay, we attribute to it a possible ex- 
istence in creation ; for we can represent nothing, which Ave do 
not think, as within the limits of Almighty power to realize. — 
Positive thinking can be brought to bear only under two condi- 
tions ; the condition of I) Non-contradiction, and the condition 
of II) Relativity. If both are fulfilled, we think Something. 

I. Non-contradiction. This condition is insuperable. We 
think it, not only as a law of thought, but as a law' of things ; 
and while we suppose its violation to determine an absolute im- 
possibility, we suppose its fulfilment to afford only the Not-im- 
possible. Thought is, under this condition, merely explicative or 
analytic ; and the condition itself is brought to bear under three 
phases, constituting three laws : i.) — the law of Identity ; ii.) — 
the law of Contradiction ; iii.) — the law of Excluded Middle. 
The science of these laws is Logic ; and as the laws are only ex- 
plicative, Logic is only formal. (The principle of Sufficient Rea- 
son 1 should be excluded from Logic. For, inasmuch as this prin- 
ciple is not material (material == non-formal), it is only a deriva- 
tion of the three formal laws ; and inasmuch as it is material, it 
coincides with the principle of Causality, and is extra-logical.) 

Though necessary to state the condition of Non-contradiction, 
there is no dispute about its effect, no danger of its violation. 
When I, therefore, speak of the Conditioned, I use the term in 



1 Sufficient Reason=Sumof Causes. — ' The principle of the Sufficient Rea- 
son (p. rationis sufficientis). — called, likewise, by Leibnitz, that of the Deter- 
mining Reason {p. rationis determinantis) — of Convenience (p. convenientim) — 
of Perfection {p. perfectionis) — and of the Order of Existences (p. exisUntia- 
runri) — is one of the most extensive, not to say ambiguous, character. For it 
is employed to denote, conjunctly and severally, the two metaphysical or real 
principles — 1°, Why a thiug is (principiitm or ratio essendi) ; 2°, Why a 
thing becomes or is produced (p. or r.fiendi) ; and, 3°, the logical or ideal 
principle, Why a thing is knoion or conceived (p. or r. cognoscendi)? Keid, 
p. 464.— W. 



486 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

special reference to Relativity. By existence conditioned, is meant, 
emphatically, existence relative, existence thought under relation. 
Relation may thus be understood to contain all the categories and 
forms of positive thought. 

II.) Relativity. This condition (by which, be it observed, is 
meant the relatively or conditionally ' relative, and, therefore, not 
even the relative, absolutely or infinitely) — this condition is not 
insuperable. We should not think it as a law of things, but 
merely as a law of thought ; for we find that there are contradic- 
tory opposites, one of which, by the rule cf Excluded Middle, 
must be true, but neither of which can by us be positively thought, 
as possible. — Thinking, under this condition, is ampliative or syn- 
thetic. Its science, Metaphysic (using that term in a comprehen- 
sive meaning) is therefore material, in the sense of non-formal. 
The condition of Relativity, in so far as it is necessary, is brought 
to bear under three principal relations ; the first of which springs 
from the subject of knowledge — the mind thinking [the relation 
of Knowledge) ; the second and third from the object of knowl- 
edge — the thing thought about {the relations of Existence). 

(Besides these necessary and original relations, of wbich alone 
it is requisite to speak in an alphabet of human thought, there 
are many relations, contingent and derivative, which we frequently 
employ in the actual applications of our cognitive energies. Such 
for example (without arrangement), as — True and False, Good 
and Bad, Perfect and Imperfect, Easy and Difficult, Desire and 
Aversion, Simple and Complex, Uniform and Various, Singular 
and Universal, Whole and Part, Similar and Dissimilar, Congru- 

1 We can know, we can conceive, only what is relative. Our knowledge 
of qualities or phenomena is necessarily relative ; for these exist only as they 
exist in relation to our faculties. The knowledge or even the conception, of a 
substance in itself, and apart from any qualities in relation to, and therefore 
cognizable or conceivable by, our minds, involves a contradiction. Of such 
we can form only a negative notion ; that is, we can merely conceive it as incon- 
ceivable. But to call this negative notion a relative notion, is wrong ; 1°, be- 
cause all our (positive) notions are relative ; and 2°, because this is itself a 
negative notion — i. e. no notion at all — simply because there is no relation. 
Seid, p. 323.— W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 487 

ent and Incongruent, Equal and Unequal, Orderly and Disorderly, 
Beautiful and Deformed, Material and Immaterial, Natural and 
Artificial, Organized and Inorganized, Young and Old, Male and 
Female, Parent and Child, &c, &c. These admit of classification 
from different points of view ; but to attempt their arrangement 
at all, far less on any exclusive principle, would here be manifestly 
out of place.) 

i.) The relations of Knowledge are those which arise from the 
reciprocal dependence of the subject and of the object of thought, 
Self and Not-self (Ego and Non-ego, — Subjective and Object- 
ive). Whatever comes into consciousness, is thought by us, either 
as belonging to the mental self, exclusively (subjectivo-subjective), 
or as belonging to the not-self, exclusively (objectivo-objective), 
or as belonging partly to both (subjectivo-objective). It is diffi- 
cult, however, to find words to express precisely all the complex 
correlations of knowledge. For in cognizing a mere affection of 
self, we objectify it ; it forms a subject-object or subjective object, 
or subjectivo-subjective object : and how shall we name and dis- 
criminate a mode of mind, representative of and relative to a 
mode of matter ? This difficulty is, however, strictly psycholo- 
gical. In so far as we are at present concerned, it is manifest that 
all these cognitions exist for us, only as terms of a correlation. 

The relations of Existence, arising from the object of knowledge, 
are twofold ; inasmuch as the relation is either Intrinsic or Ex- 
trinsic. 

ii.) As the relation of Existence is Intrinsic, it is that of Sub- 
stance and Quality (form, accident, property, mode, affection, 
phenomenon, appearance, attribute, predicate, &c.) It may be 
called qualitative. 

Substance and Quality are, manifestly, only thought as mutual 
relatives. We cannot think a quality existing absolutely, in or 
of itself. We are constrained to think it, as inhering in some 
basis, substratum, hypostasis, or substance ; but this substance 
cannot be conceived by us. except negatively, that is, as the un- 



488 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

apparent — the inconceivable correlative of certain appearing qual 
ities. If we attempt to think it positively, we can think it only 
by transforming it into a quality or bundle of qualities, which, 
again, we are compelled to refer to an unknown substance, now 
supposed for their incogitable basis. Every thing, in fact, may 
be conceived as the quality, or as the substance of something else. 
But absolute substance and absolute quality, these are both in- 
conceivable, as more than negations of the conceivable. It is 
hardly requisite to observe, that the term substance is vulgarly 
applied, in the abusive signification, to a congeries of qualities, 
denoting those especially which are more permanent, in contrast 
to those which are more transitory. (See the treatise De Mundo, 
attributed to Aristotle, c. iv.) 

What has now been said, applies equally to Mind and Matter. 

As the relation of Existence is Extrinsic, it is threefold ; and 
as constituted by three species of quantity, it maybe called quan- 
titative. It is realized in or by: 1°. Pro tensive quantity, Pro- 
tension or Time ; 2°. Extensive quantity, Extension or Space ; 
3°. Intensive quantity, Intension or Degree. These quantities 
may be all considered either as Continuous or as Discrete ; and 
they constitute the three last great relations which we have here 
to signalize. 

iii.) Time, Protension or protensive quantity, called likewise 
Duration, is a necessary condition of thought. It may be consid- 
ered both in itself and in the things which it contains. 

Considered in itself. — Time is positively inconceivable, if we 
attempt to construe it in thought ; — either, on the one hand, as 
absolutely commencing or absolutely terminating, or on the other, 
as infinite or eternal, whether ab ante or a post ; and it is no 
less inconceivable, if we attempt to fix an absolute minimum or 
to follow out an infinite division. It is positively conceivable : 
if conceived as an indefinite past, present, or future ; and as an 
indeterminate mean between the two unthinkable extremes of 
an absolute least and an infinite divisibility. For thus it is 
relative. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 489 

In regard to Time Past and Time Future there is compara- 
tively no difficulty, because these are positively thought as pro- 
tensive quantities. But Time Present, when we attempt to 
realize it, seems to escape us altogether — to vanish into nonen- 
tity. The present cannot be conceived as of any length, of any 
quantity, of any protension, in short, as any thing positive. It 
is only conceivable as a negation, as the point or line (and these 
are only negations) in which the past ends and the future begins, 
in which they limit each other. 

' Le moment ou je parle, est deja loin de moi.* 

In fact, we are unable to conceive how we do exist ; and, specu- 
latively we must admit, in its most literal acceptation — l Victuri 
semper, vivimus nunquam.' The Eleatic Zeno's demonstration 
of the impossibility of Motion, is not more insoluble than could 
be framed a proof, that the Present has no reality ; for however 
certain we may be of both, we can positively think neither. So 
true is it as said by St. Augustin : ' What is Time, — if not asked, 
I" know ; but attempting to explain, I know not.' 

Things in Time are either co-inclusive or co-exclusive. Things 
co-inclusive — if of the same time are, pro tanto, identical, appa- 
rently and in thought ; if of different times (as causes and effect, 
causae et causatum), they appear as different, but are thought as 
identical. Things co-exclusive are mutually, either prior and pos- 
terior, or contemporaneous. 

The impossibility we experience of thinking negatively or as 
non-existent, non-existent, consequently in time (either past or 
future), aught, which we have conceived positively or as existent, 
— this impossibility affords the principle of Causality, &c. (Spe- 
cially developed in the sequel.) 

Time applies to both Substance and Quality ; and includes the 
other quantities, Space and Degree. 

iv.) — Space, Extension or extensive quantity is, in like man- 
ner, a necessary condition of thought ; and may also be consid- 
ered, both in itself, and in the things which it contains. 



490 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

Considered in itself. — Space is positively inconceivable :— as a 
whole, either infinitely unbounded, or absolutely bounded ; as a 
part, either infinitely divisible, or absolutely indivisible. Space 
is positively conceivable : — as a mean between these extremes ; 
in other words, we can think it either as an indefinite whole, or 
as an indefinite part. For thus it is relative. 

The things contained in Space may be considered, either in 
relation to this form, or in relation to each other. — In relation to 
Space : the extension occupied by a thing is called its place ; and 
a thing changing its place, gives the relation of motion in space, 
space itself being always conceived as immovable, 

' stabilisque martens dat cuncta moveri.' 

— Considered in relation to each other. Things, spacially, are 
either inclusive, thus originating the relation of containing and 
contained ; or co-exclusive, thus determining the relation of posi- 
tion or situation — of here and there. 

Space applies, proximately, to things considered as Substance ; 
for the qualities of substances, though they are in, may not oc- 
cupy, space. In fact, it is by a merely modern abuse of the term, 
that the affections of Extension have been styled Qualities. It 
is extremely difficult for the human mind to admit the possibility 
of unextended substance. Extension, being a condition of posi- 
tive thinking, clings to all our conceptions ; and it is one merit 
of the philosophy of the Conditioned, that it proves space to be 
only a law of thought, and not a law of things. The difficulty 
of thinking, or rather of admitting as possible, the immateriality 
of the soul, is shown by the tardy and timorous manner in which 
the inextension of the thinking subject was recognized in the 
Christian Church. Some of the early Councils and most of the 
Fathers maintained the extended, while denying the corporeal, 
nature of the spiritual principle ; and, though I cannot allow, 
that Descartes was the first by whom the immateriality of mind 
was fully acknowledged, there can be no doubt that an assertion 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 491 

of the inextension and illocality of the soul, was long and very 
generally eschewed, as tantamount to the assertion that it was a 
mere nothing. 

On space are dependent what are called the Primary Qualities 
of body, strictly so denominated, and Space combined with De- 
gree affords, of body, the Secundo-primary Qualities. 1 

Our inability to conceive an absolute elimination from space of 
aught, which we have conceived to occupy space, gives the law 
of what I have called Ultimate Incompressibility, &c. 2 

v.) Degree, Intension or intensive quantity, is not, like Time 
and Space, an absolute condition of thought. Existences are not 
necessarily thought under it ; it does not apply to Substance, but 
to Quality, and that in the more limited acceptation of the word. 
For it does not apply to what have (abusively) been called by 
modern philosophers the Primary Qualities of body ; these being 
merely evolutions of Extension, which, again, is not thought un- 
der Degree. 3 Degree may, therefore, be thought as null, or as 
existing only potentially. But thinking it to be, we must think 
it as a quantity ; and, as a quantity, it is positively both incon- 
ceivable and conceivable. — It is positively inconceivable : abso- 
lutely, either as least or as greatest ; infinitely, as without limit, 
either in increase or in diminution. — On the contrary, it is posi- 
tively conceivable ; as indefinitely high or higher, as indefinitely 
low or lower. — The things thought under it ; if of the same in- 
tension are correlatively uniform, if of a different degree, are cor- 
relatively higher or lower. 

Degree affords the relations of Actuality and Potentiality, — of 
Action and Passion, — of Power active, and Power passive, &c, &c. 

Degree is, likewise, developed into what, in propriety, are 
called the Secondary Qualities of body; and combined with 
Space, into the Secundo-primary* 



1 On this distinction, see Part Second, chapter hi. pp. 352, 370. — W. 

2 lb. p. 356— W. 8 lb. p. 354.— W. * lb. p. 370, p. 358, sq.— W. 



492 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

So much for the Conditions of Thinking, in detail 

If the general doctrine of the Conditioned be correct, it yields 
as a corollary, that Judgment, that Comparison is implied in 
every act of apprehension ; and the fact, that consciousness can- 
not be realized without an energy of judgment, is, again, a proof 
of the correctness of the theory, asserting the Relativity of 
Thought. 

The philosophy of the Conditioned even from the preceding 
outline, is, it will be seen, the express converse of the philosophy 
of the Absolute, — at. least, as this system has been latterly evolved 
in Germany. For this asserts to man a knowledge of the Uncon- 
ditioned, — of the Absolute and Infinite ; while that denies to him 
a knowledge of either, and maintains, all which we immediately 
know, or can know, to be only the Conditioned, the Relative, the 
Phenomenal, the Finite. The one, supposing knowledge to 
be only of existence in itself, and existence in itself to be appre- 
hended, and even understood, proclaims — ' Understand that you 
may believe' (' Intellige ut credas') ; the other, supposing that 
existence, in itself, is unknown, that apprehension is only of phe- 
nomena, and that these are received only upon trust, as incompre- 
hensibly revealed facts, proclaims, with the prophet, — ' Believe 
that ye may understand' (' Crede ut intelligas.' Is. vii. 9, sec. 
lxx.) — But extremes meet. In one respect, both coincide ; for 
both agree, that the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or re- 
sult of all true philosophy : 

' Scire fflhil, — studiurn, quo nos lsetamur utrique.' 

But the one doctrine, openly maintaining that the Nothing 
must yield every thing, is a philosophic omniscience ; whereas the 
other, holding that Nothing can yield nothing, is a philosophic 
nescience. In other words : the doctrine of the Unconditioned 
is a philosophy confessing relative ignorance, but professing ab- 
solute knowledge ; while the doctrine of the Conditioned is a phi- 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 493 

losophy professing relative knowledge, but confessing absolute ig- 
norance. Thus, touching the absolute : the watchword of the 
one is, — ' Noscendo cognoscitur, ignorando ignoratur ;' the watch- 
word of the other is, — ' Noscendo ignoratur, ignorando cognosci- 
tur.' 

But which is true ? — To answer this, we need only to examine 
our own consciousness ; there shall we recognize the limited ' ex- 
tent of our tether.' 

' Tecum habita, etnoris quam sittibi curta supellex.' 

But this one requisite is fulfilled (alas ! ) by few ; and the same 
philosophic poet has to lament : 

' Ut nemo in sese tentat descendere, — nemo ; 
Sed prjecedenti spectatur mantica tergo !' 

To manifest the utility of introducing the principle of the Con- 
ditioned into our metaphysical speculations, I shall (always in 
outline) give one only, but a signal illustration of its importance. 
— Of all questions in the history of philosophy, that concerning 
the origin of our judgment of Cause and Effect is, perhaps, the 
most celebrated ; but strange to say, there is not, so far as I am 
aware, to be found a comprehensive view of the various theories, 
proposed in explanation, not to say, among these, any satisfactory 
explanation of the phenomenon itself. 

The phenomenon is this : — When aware of a new appearance, 
we are unable to conceive that therein has originated any new 
existence, and are, therefore, constrained to think, that what now 
appears to us under a new form, had previously an existence 
under others. These others (for they are always plural) are 
called its cause ; and a cause (or more properly causes) we cannot 
but suppose ; for a cause is simply every thing without which the 
effect would not result, and all such concurring, the effect cannot 
but result. "We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as 
possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased 
or diminished. We cannot conceive, either, on the one hand, 
nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming 



494 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

nothing. When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, 

we think this, by supposing, that he evolves the universe out of 

himself; and in like manner, we conceive annihilation, only by 

conceiving the creator to withdraw his creation from actuality into 

power. 

' Nil posse creari 
De NiMlo, ne que quod genitu 'st ad Nil revocari ;' 

' Gigni 

De Nihilo Nihil, in Nihilum Nil posse reverti :' — 

— these lines of Lucretius and Persius enounce a physical axiom 
of antiquity ; which, when interpreted by the doctrine of the Con- 
ditioned, is itself at once recalled to harmony with revealed truth, 
and expressing, in its purest form, the conditions of human thought, 
expresses also, implicitly, the whole intellectual phenomenon of 
causality. 

The mind is thus compelled to recognize an absolute identity 
of existence in the effect and in the complement of its causes, — 
between the causatum and the causa. We think the causes to 
contain all that is contained in the effect ; the effect to contain 
nothing but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum of 
the other. ' Omnia mutantur, nihil interit] is what we think, 
what we must think ; nor can the change itself be thought without 
a cause. Our judgment of causality simply is : — We necessarily 
deny in thought, that the object which we apprehend as begin- 
ning to be, really so begins ; but, on the contrary, affirm, as we 
must, the identity of its present sum of being, with the sum of its 
past existence. — And here, it is not requisite for us to know, under 
what form, under what combination this quantum previously ex- 
isted ; in other words, it is unnecessary for us to recognize the 
particular causes of this particular effect. A discovery of the 
determinate antecedents into which a determinate consequent 
may be refunded, is merely contingent, — merely the result of 
experience ; but the judgment, that every event should have its 
causes, is necessary, and imposed on us, as a condition of our 
human intelligence itself. This necessity of so thinking, is the 
only phenomenon to be explained. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 495 

Now, throwing out of account the philosophers, who, like Dr. 
Thomas Brown,* quietly eviscerate' the problem of its sole diffi- 
culty, and enumerating only the theories which do not accommo- 
date the phenomenon to be explained to their attempts at expla- 
nation, — these are, in all, seven. 

1°, — And, in the first place, they fall into two supreme classes. 
The one (A) comprehends those theories which consider the causal 
judgment as adventitious, empirical, or a posteriori, that is, as 
derived from exj}erience ; the other (B) comprehends those which 
view it as native, pure, or a priori, that is, as a condition of intel- 
ligence itself. — The two primary genera, are, however, severally 
subdivided into various species. 

2°, — The former class (A) falls into two subordinates ; inas- 
much as the judgment is viewed as founded either on an original 
(a) or on a derivative (b) cognition. 

3°, — Each of these is finally distributed into two ; according as 
the judgment is supposed to have an objective or a subjective ori- 
gin. In the former case (a) it is objective, perhaps objectivo- 
objective, (1) when held to consist in an immediate apprehension 
of the efficiency of causes in the external and internal worlds ; 
and subjective, or rather subjectivo-objective, (2) when viewed" as 
given through a self-consciousness alone of the efficiency of our 
own volitions. — In the latter case (b) it is regarded, if objective 
(3), as a product of induction and generalization ; if subjective 
(4), as a result of association and custom. 

4°, — In like manner, the latter supreme class (B) is divided 
into two, according as the opinions under it, view in the causal 
judgment, a law of thought : — either ultimate, primary (c) ; or 
secondary, derived (d). 

* The fundamental vice of Dr. Brown's theory has been, with great acute- 
ness, exposed by his successor, Professor Wilson. (See Blackwood's Maga- 
zine, July 1836, vol. xl. p. 122, sq.) 

1 ' In this theory, the phenomenon to be saved is silently or in effect evac- 
uated of its principal quality — the quality of Necessity ; for the real problem 
is to explain how it is that we cannot but think that all which begins to be has 
not an absolute but only a relative commencement. These philosophers do 
not anatomize but truncate.' 1 — Eeid, p. 604. — W. 



496 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

5°, — It is a corollary of the former doctrine (c), (which is not 
subdivided), that the judgment is a positive act, an affirmative 
deliverance of intelligence (5). — The latter doctrine (d), on the 
other hand, considers the judgment as of a negative character ; 
and is subdivided into two. For some maintain that the princi- 
ple of causality may be resolved into the principle of Contradic- 
tion, or, more properly, non-contradiction (6) ; whilst, though 
not previously attempted, it may be argued that the judgment 
of causality is a derivation from the Condition of Relativity in 
Time (7). 

First and Second theories. — Of these seven opinions, the firsi 
has always been held in combination with the second ; whereas, 
the second has been frequently held by those who abandon the 
first. Considering them together, that is, as the opinion, that we 
immediately apprehend the efficiency of causes external or inter- 
nal ; — this is obnoxious to two fatal objections. 

The first is, — that we have no such apprehension, no such ex- 
perience. It is now, indeed, universally admitted, that we have 
no perception of the causal nexus in the material world. Hume 
it was, who decided the opinion of philosophers upon this point. 
But though he advances his refutation of the vulgar doctrine as 
original, he was, in fact, herein only the last of a long series of 
metaphysicians, some of whom had even maintained their thesis 
not less lucidly than the Scottish skeptic. I cannot indeed be- 
lieve, that Hume could have been ignorant of the anticipation. — 
But whilst surrendering the first, there are many philosophers who 
still adhere to the second opinion ; a theory which has been best 
stated and most strenuously supported by the late M. Maine de Bi- 
ran, one of the acutest metaphysicians of France. I will to move 
my arm, and I move it. When we analyze this phenomenon, says 
De Biran, the following are the results : — 1°, the consciousness of 
an act of will; 2°, the consciousness of a motion produced; 3°, 
the consciousness of a relation of the motion to the volition. And 
what is this relation ? Not one of simple succession. The will 
is not for us an act without efficiency ; it is a productive energy ; 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 497 

so that, in a volition, there is given to us the notion of cause ; and 
this notion we subsequently project out from our internal activities 
into the changes of the external world. — But the empirical fact, 
here asserted, is incorrect. For between the overt fact of corpo- 
real movement, which we perceive, and the internal act of the 
will to move, of which we are self-conscious, there intervenes a 
series of intermediate agencies, of which we are wholly unaware ; 
consequently, we can have no consciousness, as this hypothesis 
maintains, of any causal connection between the extreme links of 
this chain, that is, between the volition to move and the arm 
moving. 1 

But independently of this, the second objection is fatal to the 
theory which would found the judgment of causality on any em- 
pirical apprehension whether of the phenomena of mind or of the 
phenomena of matter. Admitting the causal efficiency to be cog- 
nizable, and perception with self-consciousness to be competent 
for its apprehension, still as these faculties can inform us only of 
individual causations, the quality of necessity and consequent 
universality by which this judgment is characterized remains 
wholly unexplained. (See Cousin on Locke.) So much for the 
two theories at the head of our enumeration. 

As the first and second opinions have been usually associated, 
so also have been the third and fourth. 

Third theory. — In regard to the third opinion it is manifest, 
that the observation of certain phenomena succeeding certain 
other phenomena, and the generalization, consequent thereon, 
that these are reciprocally causes and effect, — it is manifest that 
this could never of itself have engendered, not only the strong, 
but the irresistible, conviction, that every event must have its 
causes. Each of these observations is contingent, and any num- 
ber of observed contingencies will never impose upon us the con- 
sciousness of necessity, that is, the consciousness of an inability to 
think the opposite. This theory is thus logically absurd. For it 

31 i See p. , above.— W. 



498 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

would infer as a conclusion, the universal necessity of the causai 
judgment, from a certain number of actual consecutions ; that is, 
it would collect that all must be, because some are. Logically 
absurd, it is also psychologically false. For we find no difficulty 
in conceiving the converse of one or of all observed consecutions , 
and yet, the causal judgment which, ex hypothesi, is only the re- 
sult of these observations, we cannot possibly think, as possibly 
unreal. We have always seen a stone returning to the ground 
when thrown into the air ; but we find no difficulty in represent- 
ing to ourselves some or all stones rising from the earth ; nay, we 
can easily suppose even gravitation itself to be reversed. Only, 
we are unable to conceive the possibility of this or of any other 
event, — without a cause. 

Fourth ojrinion. — Nor does the fourth theory afford a better 
solution. The necessity of so thinking, cannot be derived from 
a custom of so thinking. The force of custom, influential as it 
may be, is still always limited to the customary ; and the custom- 
ary never reaches, never even approaches, to the necessary. As- 
sociation may explain a strong and special, but it can never ex- 
plain a universal and absolutely irresistible belief. — On this theory, 
also, when association is recent, the causal judgment should be 
weak, and rise only gradually into full force, as custom becomes 
inveterate. But we do not find that this judgment is feebler in 
the young, stronger in the old. In neither case, is there less and 
more ; in both cases the necessity is complete. — Mr. Hume pat- 
ronized the opinion, that the causal judgment is an offspring of 
experience engendered upon custom. But those have a sorry in- 
sight into the philosophy of that great thinker who suppose, like 
Brown, that this was a dogmatic theory of his own, or one con- 
sidered satisfactory by himself. On the contrary, in his hands it 
was a reduction of the prevalent dogmatism to palpable absurd- 
ity, by showing out the inconsistency of its results. To the 
Lockian sensualism, Hume proposed the problem, — to account 
for the phenomenon of necessity in our thought of the causal 
nexus. That philosophy afforded no other principle than the 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 499 

custom of experience, through which even the attempt at a solu- 
tion could be made ; and the principle of custom Hume shows 
could never account for the product of any real necessity. The 
alternative was plain. Either the doctrine of sensualism is false ; 
or our nature is a delusion. Shallow thinkers admitted the latter 
alternative, and were lost ; profound thinkers, on the contrary, 
were determined to build philosophy on a deeper foundation than 
that of the superficial edifice of Locke ; and thus it is, that Hume 
has, immediately or mediately, been the cause or the occasion of 
whatever is of principal value in the subsequent speculations of 
Scotland, Germany, and France. 

Fifth theory. — In regard to the second supreme genus (B), 
the first of the three opinions which it contains (the fifth in gen- 
eral) maintains that the causal judgment is a primary datum, a 
positive revelation of intelligence. To this are to be referred the 
relative theories of Leibnitz, Reid, Kant, Stewart, Cousin, and 
the majority of recent philosophers. To this class Brown like- 
wise belongs ; inasmuch as he idly refers what remains in his 
hands of the evacuated phenomenon to an original belief. 

Without descending to details, it is manifest in general, that 
against the assumption of a special principle, which this doctrine 
makes, there exists a primary presumption of philosophy. This 
is the law of parsimony ; which prohibits, without a proven ne- 
cessity, the multiplication of entities, powers, principles, or 
causes ; above all, the postulation of an unknown force where a 
known impotence can account for the phenomenon. We are, 
therefore, entitled to apply ' Occam's razor' to this theory of 
causality, unless it be proved impossible to explain the causal 
judgment at a cheaper rate, by deriving it from a common, and 
that a negative, principle. On a doctrine like the present is 
thrown the burden of vindicating its necessity, by showing that 
unless a special and positive principle be assumed, there exists 
no competent mode to save the phenomenon. The opinion can 
therefore only be admitted provisorily ; and it falls, of course, if 
what it would explain can be explained on less onerous conditions. 



500 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

Leaving, therefore, this theory, which certainly does account 
for the phenomenon, to fall or stand, according as either of the 
two remaining opinions be, or be not, found sufficient, I go on to 
this consideration. 

Sixth opinion. — Of these, the former, that is, the sixth theory, 
lias been long exploded. It attempts to establish the causal judg- 
ment upon the principle of Contradiction. Leibnitz was too 
acute a metaphysician to attempt the resolution of the principle 
of Sufficient Reason or Causality, which is ampliative or syn- 
thetic, into the principle of Contradiction, which is merely ex- 
plicative or analytic. But his followers were not so wise. Wolf, 
Baumgarten, and many other Leibnitians, paraded demonstrations 
of the law of Sufficient Reason on the ground of the law of Con- 
tradiction; but the reasoning always proceeds n a covert as- 
sumption of the very point in question. The same argument is, 
however, at an earlier date, to be found in Locke, while modifi- 
cations of it are also given by Hobbes and Samuel Clarke. Hume, 
who was only aware of the demonstration, as proposed by the 
English metaphysicians, honors it with a refutation which has 
obtained even the full approval of Reid ; whilst by foreign phi- 
losophers, the inconsequence of the reduction, at the hands of the 
Wolfian metaphysicians, has frequently been exposed. I may 
therefore pass it in silence. 

Seventh opinion. — The field is thus open for the last theory, 
which would analyze the judgment of causality into a form of 
the mental law of the Conditioned. This theory, which has not 
hitherto been proposed, comes recommended by its cheapness and 
simplicity. It postulates no new, no express, no positive princi- 
ple. It merely supposes that the mind is limited ; the law of 
limitation, — the law of the Conditioned constituting, in one of its 
applications, the law of Causality. The mind is astricted to 
think in certain forms ; and, under these, thought is possible only 
in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradic- 
tory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, 
but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 501 

other is necessarily true. In reference to the present question, it 
need only be recapitulated, that we ■ must think under the condi- 
tion of Existence, — Existence Relative, — and Existence Relative 
in Time. But what does existence relative in time imply ? It 
implies, 1°, that we are unable to realize in thought : on the one 
pole of the irrelative, either an absolute commencement, or an 
absolute termination of time; as on the other, either an infinite 
non-commencement, or an infinite non-termination of time. It 
implies, 2°, that we can think, neither, on the one pole, an abso- 
lute minimum, nor, on the other, an infinite divisibility of time. 
Yet these constitute two pairs of contradictory propositions ; 
which, if our intelligence be not all a lie, cannot both be true, 
whilst, at the same time, either the one or the other necessarily 
must. But, as not relatives, they are not cogitables. 

Now the phenomenon of causality seems nothing more than a 
corollary of the law of the conditioned, in its application to a 
thing thought under the form or mental category of existence 
relative in time. We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, ex- 
cept under the attribute of existence ; we cannot know or think 
a thing to exist, except as in time ; and we cannot know or think 
a thing to exist in time, and think it absolutely to commence. 
Now this at once imposes on us the judgment of causaHty. And 
thus : — An object is given us, either by our presentative, or by 
our representative, faculty. As given, we cannot but think it ex- 
istent, and existent in time. But to say, that we cannot but think 
it to exist, is to say, that we are unable to think it non-existent, 
— to think it away, — to annihilate it in thought. And this we 
cannot do. We may turn away from it ; we may engross our 
attention with other objects ; we may, consequently, exclude it 
from our thought. That we need not think a thing is certain ; 
but thinking it, it is equally certain that we cannot think it not 
to exist. So much will be at once admitted of the present ; but 
it may probably be denied of the past and future. Yet if we 
make the experiment, we shall find the mental annihilation of an 
object, equally impossible under time past, and present, and fu- 



502 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

ture. To obviate, however, misapprehension, a very simple 
observation may be proper. In saying that it is impossible to 
annihilate an object in thought, in other words, to conceive at 
non-existent, what had been conceived as existent, — it is of course 
not meant, that it is impossible to imagine the object wholly 
changed in form. We can represent to ourselves the elements of 
which it is composed, divided, dissipated, modified in any way ; 
we can imagine any thing of it, short of annihilation. But the 
complement, the quantum, of existence, thought as constituent of 
an object, — that we cannot represent to ourselves, either as in- 
creased, without abstraction from other entities, or as diminished, 
without annexation to them. In short, we are unable to construe 
it in thought, that there can be an atom absolutely added to, or 
absolutely taken away from, existence in general. Let us make 
the experiment. Let us form to ourselves a concept of the uni- 
verse. Now, we are unable to think, that the quantity of exist- 
ence, of which the universe is the conceived sum, can either be 
amplified or diminished. We are able to conceive, indeed, the 
creation of a world ; this indeed as easily as the creation of an 
atom. But what is our thought of creation ? It is not a thought 
of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the con- 
trary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the 
evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat 
of the deity. Let us place ourselves in imagination at its very 
crisis. Now, can we construe it to thought, that the moment after 
the universe flashed into material reality, into manifested being, 
that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe 
and its author together, than, the moment before, there subsisted 
in the deity alone ? This we are unable to imagine. And what 
is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of anni- 
hilation. We can think no real annihilation, — no absolute sink- 
ing of something into nothing. But, as creation is cogitable by 
us, only as a putting forth of divine power, so is annihilation by 
us only conceivable, as a withdrawal of that same power. All 
that is now actually existent in the universe, this we think and 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 503 

must think, as having, prior to creation, virtually existed in the 
creator ; and in imagining the universe to be annihilated, we can 
only conceive this, as the retractation by the deity of an overt 
energy into latent power. — In short, it is impossible for the human 
mind to think what it thinks existent, lapsing into non-existence, 
either in time past or in time future. 

Our inability to think what we have once conceived existent 
in time, as in time becoming non-existent, corresponds with our 
inability to think, what we have conceived existent in space, as in 
space becoming non-existent. We cannot realize it to thought, 
that a thing should be extruded, either from the one quantity or 
from the other. Hence, under extension, the law of ultimate 
incompressibility ; under protension, the law of cause and effect. 

I have hitherto spoken only of one inconceivable pole of the 
conditioned, in its application to existence in time, of the absolute 
extreme, as absolute commencement and absolute termination. 
The counter or infinite extreme, as infinite regress or non-com- 
mencement and infinite progress or non-termination, is equally 
unthinkable. With 'this latter we have, however, at present 
nothing to do. Indeed, as not obtrusive, the Infinite figures far 
less in the theatre of mind, and exerts a far inferior influence in 
the modification of thought, than the Absolute. It is, in fact, 
both distant and delitescent ; and in place of meeting us at every 
turn, it requires some exertion on our part to seek it out. It is 
the former and more obtrusive extreme — it is the Absolute alone 
which constitutes and explains the mental manifestation of the 
causal judgment. An object is presented to our observation 
which has phenominally begun to be. But we cannot construe 
it to thought, that the object, that is, this determinate complement 
of existence, had really no being at any past moment ; because, in 
that case, once thinking it as existent, we should again think it 
as non-existent, which is for us impossible. What then can Ave 
— must we do ? That the phenomenon presented to us, did, as 
a phenomenon, begin to be — this we know by experience ; but 
that the elements of its existence only began, when the phenome- 



504: PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

non which they constitute came into manifested being — this we 
are wholly unable to think. In these circumstances how do we 
proceed ? There is for us only one possible way. We are com- 
pelled to believe that the object (that is, the certain quale and 
quantum of being), whose phenomenal rise into existence we have 
witnessed, did really exist prior to this rise, under other forms. 
But to say, that a thing previously existed under different forms, 
is only to say, in other words, that a thing had causes. (It 
would be here out of place to refute the error of philosophers, in 
supposing that any thing can have a single cause ;' — meaning 
always by a cause that without which the effect would not have 
been. I speak of course only of second causes, for of the divine 
causation we can form no conception.) 

I must, however, now cursorily observe, that nothing can be 
more erroneous in itself, or in its consequences more fertile in 
delusion than the common doctrine, that the causal judgment is 
elicited, only when we apprehend objects in consecution, and uni- 
form consecution. No doubt, the observation of such succession 
prompts and enables us to assign particular causes to particular 
effects. But this assignation ought to be carefully distinguished 
from the judgment of causality absolutely. This consists, not in 
the empirical and contingent attribution of this phenomenon, as 
cause, to that phenomenon, as effect ; but in the universal neces- 
sity of which we are conscious, to think causes for every event, 
whether that event stand isolated by itself, and be by us referable 
to no other, or whether it be one in a series of successive phe- 
nomena, which, as it were, spontaneously arrange themselves 



' There is no reason why whatever is conceived as necessarily going to the 
constitution of the phenomenon called the effect — in other words, why all 
and each of its coefficients — may not be properly called causes, or rather con- 
causes ; for there must always be more causes than one to an effect. This 
would be more correct than to give exclusively the name of Cause to any 
partial constituent or coefficient, even though proximate and principal. In 
this view, the doctrine of Aristotle and other ancients, is more rational than 
that of our modern philosophers.' — Beid, p. 607. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 505 

under the relation of effect and cause. On this, not sunken, 
rock, Dr. Brown and others have been shipwrecked. 

The preceding doctrine of causality seems to me the one pref- 
erable, for the following, among other reasons. 

In the first place, to explain the phenomena of the casual 
judgment, it postulates no new, no extraordinary, no express 
principle. It does not even proceed on the assumption of a posi- 
tive power ; for while it shows, that the phenomenon in nuestion 
is only oi^e of a class, it assigns, as their common cause, only a 
negative impotence. In this respect, it stands advantageously 
contrasted with the only other theory which saves the phenome- 
non, but which saves it, only on the hypothesis of a special prin- 
ciple, expressly devised to account for this phenomenon alone. 
But nature never works by more, and more complex instruments 
than are necessary — prfiev rfepirrug : and to excogitate a particu- 
lar force to perform what can be better explained on the ground 
of a general imbecility, is contrary to every rule of philoso- 
phizing. 

But, in the second place, if there be postulated an express and 
positive affirmation of intelligence, to account for the mental 
deliverance, — that existence cannot absolutely commence ; we 
must equally postulate a counter affirmation of intelligence, posi- 
tive and express, to explain the counter mental deliverance,- - 
that existence cannot infinitely not commence. The one neces- 
sity of mind is equally strong as the other ; and if the one be a 
positive datum, an express testimony of intelligence, so likewise 
must be the other. But they are contradictories ; and, as con- 
tradictories they cannot both be true. On this theory, therefore, 
the root of our nature is a lie. By the doctrine, on the contrary, 
which I propose, these contradictory phenomena are carried up 
into the common principle of a limitation of our faculties. In- 
telligence is shown to be feeble, but not false ; our nature is, 
thus, not a lie, nor the author of our nature a deceiver. 

In the third place, this simpler and easier doctrine, avoids a 
most serious inconvenience which attaches to the more difficult 



506 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED 

and complex. It is this. To suppose a positive and special prin- 
ciple of causality, is to suppose that there is expressly revealed 
to us, through intelligence, an affirmation of the fact, that there 
exists no free causation ; that is, that there is no cause which is 
not itself merely an effect, existence being only a series of deter- 
mined antecedents and determined consequents. But this is an 
assertion of Fatalism. Such, however, many of the partisans of 
that doctrine will not admit. An affirmation of absolute neces- 
sity is, they are aware, virtually the negation of a moral universe, 
consequently of the moral governor of a moral universe. But 
this is Atheism. Fatalism and Atheism are, indeed, convertible 
terms. 1 The only valid arguments for the existence of a God, 
and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of 
man's moral nature ; consequently, if that moral nature be anni- 
hilated, which in any scheme of thorough-going necessity it is, 
every conclusion, established on such a nature, is annihilated like- 
wise. Aware of this, some of those who make the judgment of 
causality a positive dictate of intelligence, find themselves com- 
pelled, in order to escape from the consequences of their doctrine, 
to deny that this dictate, though universal in its deliverance, 
should be allowed to hold universally true ; and accordingly, they 
would exempt from it the facts of volition. Will, they hold to 
be a free cause, a cause which is not an effect ; in other words, 
they attribute to it the power of absolute origination. But here 
their own principle of causality is too strong for them. They 
say, that it is unconditionally promulgated, as an express and 
positive law of intelligence, that every origination is an apparent 
only, not a real, commencement. Now to exempt certain phe- 
nomena from this universal law, on the ground of our moral con- 
sciousness, cannot validly be done. — For, in the first place, this 

1 ' It can easily be proved to those who are able and not afraid to reason, 
that the doctrine of Necessity is subversive of religion, natural and reveal- 
ed ; and, Fatalism involving Atheism, the Necessitarian who intrepidly fol- 
lows out his scheme to its consequences, however monstrous, will consist- 
ently reject every argument which proceeds upon the supposition of a Deity ; 
and divine attributes.' — Eeid, p. 617. — W. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 507 

would be an admission, that the mind is a complement of con- 
tradictory revelations. If mendacity he admitted of some of our 
mental dictates, we cannot vindicate veracity to any. If one be 
delusive, so may all. ' Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.' Ab- 
solute skepticism is here the legitimate conclusion. — But, in the 
second place, waving this conclusion, what right have we, on this 
doctrine, to subordinate the positive affirmation of causality to 
our consciousness of moral liberty, — what right have we, for the 
interest of the latter, to derogate from the former ? We have 
none. If both be equally positive, we are not entitled to sacri- 
fice the alternative, which our wishes prompt us to abandon. 

But the doctrine which I propose is not obnoxious to these 
objections. It does not maintain, that the judgment of causality 
is dependent on a power of the mind, imposing, as necessary in 
thought, what is necessary in the universe of existence. On the 
contrary, it resolves this judgment into a mere mental impotence, 
— an impotence to conceive either of two contradictories. And 
as the one or the other of contradictories must be true, whilst 
both cannot ; it proves that there is no ground for inferring a 
certain fact to be impossible, merely from our inability to conceive 
it possible. At the same time, if the causal judgment be not an 
express affirmation of mind, but only an incapacity of thinking 
the opposite ; it follows that such a negative judgment cannot 
counterbalance the express affirmative, the unconditional testi- 
mony, of consciousness, — that we are, though we know not how, 
the true and responsible authors of our actions, not merely the 
worthless links in an adamantine series of effects and causes. It 
appears to me, that it is only on such a doctrine, that we can 
philosophically vindicate the liberty of the human will, — that we 
can rationally assert to man — ' fatis avolsa voluntas.' Hoio the 
will can possibly be free, must remain to us, under the present 
limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible. 1 We are 



1 ' To conceive a free act, is to conceive an act which, heing a cause, is not 
itself an effect ; in other words, to conceive an ahsolute commencement. But 
is such by us conceivable V — Eeid, p 602. — W. 



508 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

unable to conceive an absolute commencement ; we cannot, 
therefore, conceive a free volition. A determination by motives, 
cannot, to ouv understanding, escape from necessitation. 1 Nay, 



1 ' A motive, abstractly considered, Li palled an cad oTjmal cause. It was 
well denominated in the Greek philosophy, to 'htica. oi — that for the sake of 
which. A motive, however, in its concrete reality, is nothing apart from the 
mind ; only a mental tendency.' 

'If Motives "influence to action," they must co-operate in producing a 
certain effect upon the agent ; and the determination to act, and to act in a 
certain manner — is that effect. They are thus, on Keid's own view, in this 
relation, causes, and eflicient causes. It is of no consequence in the argu- 
ment whether motives be said to determine a man to act or to influence (that 
is to determine) him to determine himself to act. It does not, therefore, 
seem consistent to say that motives are not causes, and that they do not act? 

' I shall now,' says Leibnitz, in his controversy with Clark, ' come to an 
objection raised here, against my comparing the weights of a balance with 
the motives of the Will. It is objected, that a balance is merely passive, 
and moved by the weights ; whereas agents intelligent and endowed with 
will, are active. To this I answer, that the principle of the want of a suffi- 
cient reason, is common both to agents and patients. They want a sufficient 
reason of their action, as well as of their passion. A balance does not only 
not act when it is equally pulled on both sides, but the equal weights like- 
wise do not act when they are in an equilibrium, so that one of them cannot 
go down without the other rising up as much. 

' It must also be considered that, properly speaking, motives do not act 
upon the mind as weights do upon a balance ; but it is rather the mind that 
acts by virtue of the motives, which are its dispositions to act. And, there- 
fore, to pretend, as the author does here, that the mind prefers sometimes 
weak motives to strong ones, and even that it prefers that which is indiffer- 
ent before motives — this, I say, is to divide the mind from the motives, as if 
they were without the mind, as the weight is distinct from the balance, and 
as if the mind had, besides motives, other dispositions to act, by virtue of 
which it could reject or accept the motives. Whereas, in truth, the motives 
comprehend all the dispositions which the mind can have to act voluntarily ; 
for they include not only the reasons, but also the inclinations arising from 
passions or other preceding impressions. Wherefore, if the mind should 
prefer a weak inclination to a strong one, it would act against itself, and oth- 
erwise than it is disposed to act. Which shows that the author's notions, 
contrary to mine, are superficial, and appear to have no solidity in them, 
when they are well considered. 

' To assert, also, that the mind may have good reasons to act, when it has 
no motives, and when things are absolutely indifferent, as the author ex- 
plains himself here — this, I say, is a manifest contradiction ; for, if the mind 
has good reasons for taking the part it takes, then the things are not indif- 
ferent to the mind.' — Collection of Papers, <£c, Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, 
§§ 14^16. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 509 

were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, 
still the doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only castial- 
ism ; and the free acts of an indifferent, are, morally and ration- 
ally, as worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined 
will. How, therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is possible in man 
or God, we are utterly unable speculatively to understand. 1 But 



' The death of Leibnitz terminated his controversy with Clarke ; but a de- 
fence of the fifth and last paper of Leibnitz against the answer of Clarke, by 
Thummig, was published, who, in relation to the poi7_t in question, says — 
" The simile of the balance is very unjustly interpreted. No resemblance 

is intended between scales and motives It is of no consequence 

whether, in their reciprocal relations, the scales are passive, while the mind 
is active, since, in this respect, there is no comparison attempted. But, in 
so far as the principle of Sufficient Eeason is concerned, that principle ap- 
plies equally to actions and passions, as has been noticed by Baron Leibnitz. 

It is to philosophize very crudely concerning mind, and to 

image every thing in a corporeal manner, to conceive that actuating reasons 
are something external, which make an impression on the mind, and to dis- 
tinguish motives from the active principle (principio actionis) itself." (In 
Koehler's German Translation of these Papers.) 

1 On the supposition that the sum of influences (motives, dispositions, ten- 
dencies) to volition A, is equal to 12, and the sum of influences to counter 
volition B, equal to 8 — can we conceive that the determination of volition A 
should not be necessary? — We can only conceive the volition B to be deter- 
mined by supposing that the man creates (calls from non-existence into ex- 
istence) a certain supplement of influences. But this creation as actual, or, 
in itself, is inconceivable, and even to conceive the possibility of this incon- 
ceivable act, we must suppose some cause by which the man is determined 
to exert it. We thus, in thought, never escape determination and necessity. 
It will be observed, that I do not consider this inability to the notion, any 
disproof of the fact of Free Will.'— Keid, pp. 607, 610-11.— IT. 

1 Is the person an original undetermined cause of the determination of his 
will ? If he be not, then is he not a, free agent, and the scheme of Necessity 
is admitted. If he be, in the first place, it is impossible to conceive the pos- 
sibility of this ; and, in the second, if the fact, though inconceivable, be al- 
lowed, it is impossible to see how a cause, undetermined by any motive, can be 
a rational, moral, and accountable, cause. There is no conceivable medium 
between Fatalism and Gasualism ; and the contradictory schemes of Liberty 
and Necessity themselves are inconceivable. For, as we cannot compass in 
thought an undetermined cause — an absolute commencement — the fundamental 
hypothesis of the one ; so we can as little think an infinite series of determined 
causes — of relative commencements — the fundamental hypothesis of the other. 
The champions of the opposite doctrines, are thus at once resistless in as- 
sault, and impotent in defence. Each is hewn down, and appears to die 



510 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

practically, the fact, that we are free, is given to us in the con- 
sciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the conscious- 
ness of our moral accountability ; and this fact of liberty cannot 
be redargued on the ground that it is incomprehensible, for the 
philosophy of the conditioned proves, against the necessitarian, 
that things there are, which may, nay must be true, of which 
the understanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the pos- 
sibility. 1 

But this philosophy is not only competent to defend the fact of 
our moral liberty, possible though inconceivable, against the as- 
under the home-thrusts of his adversary ; hut each again recovers life from 
the very death of his antagonist, and, to horrow a simile, hoth are like the 
heroes in Valhalla, ready in a moment to amuse themselves anew in the 
same Woodless and interminable conflict. The doctrine of Moral Liberty 
cannot be made conceivable, for we can only conceive the determined and 
the relative . As already stated, all that can be done, is to show — 1°, That for 
the fact of Liberty, we have, immediately or mediately, the evidence of con- 
sciousness ; and, 2°, That there are, among the phenomena of mind, many 
facts which we must admit as actual, but of whose possibility we are wholly 
unable to form any notion. I may merely observe, that the fact of Motion 
can be shown to be impossible, on grounds not less strong than those on 
which it is attempted to disprove the fact of Liberty ; to say nothing of 
many contradictories, neither of which can be thought, but one of which 
must, on the laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, necessarily be.'' — 
Beid, p. 602.— W. 

1 We must be unable to conceive the possibility of the fact of Liberty. But, 
though inconceivable, this fact is not therefore false. For there are many 
contradictories (and, of contradictories, one must, and one only can, be true) 
of which, we are equally unable to conceive the possibility of either. The 
philosophy, therefore, which I profess, annihilates the theoretical problem- 
How is the scheme of Liberty, or the scheme of Necessity, to be rendered 
comprehensible ? — by showing that both schemes are equally inconceivable ; 
but it establishes Liberty practically as a fact, by showing that it is either 
itself an immediate datum, or is involved in an immediate datum of con- 
sciousness. 

Hommel, certainly one of the ablest and most decided fatalists, says, ' I 
have a feeling of Liberty even at the very moment when I am writing against 
Liberty, upon grounds which I regard as incontrovertible. Zeno was a fatal- 
ist only in theory ; in practice, he did not act in conformity to that convic- 
tion.' 

Among others, Eeid's friend, Lord Karnes, in the first edition of his ' Es- 
says on the Principles of Morality and Natural Eeligion,' admitted this natu- 
ral conviction of freedom from necessity, maintaining it to be illusive. On 
this melancholy doctrine, — 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 511 

sault of the fatalist ; it retorts against himself the very objection 
of incomprehensibility by which the fatalist had thought to tri- 
umj)h over the libertarian. It shows, that the scheme of free- 
dom is not more inconceivable than the scheme of necessity. For 
whilst fatalism is a recoil from the more obtrusive inconceivability 
of an absolute commencement, on the fact of which commence- 



' Man fondly dreams that he is free in act : 
Naught is he hut the powerless, worthless plaything 
Of the blind force that in his Will itself 
"Works out for him a dread necessity.' 

All necessitarians do not, however, admit the reality of this deceitful expe- 
rience, or fallacious feeling of liberty. ' Dr. Hartley,' says Mr. Stewart, ' was 
I believe, one of the first, if not the first, who denied that our consciousness 
is in favor of free agency ;' and in this assertion, he observes, ' Hartley was 
followed by Priestley and Belsham.' Speaking of the latter, ' We are told,' 
he says, ' by Mi*. Belsham, that the popular opinion that, in many cases, it 
was in the power of the agent to have chosen differently, the previous cir- 
cumstances remaining exactly the same, arises either from a mistake of the 
question, or from, a forgetfulness of the motives by wTritih our choice was deter- 
mined? — (Philosophy of the Active Powers, ii. p. 510.) 

To deny, or rather to explain away, the obnoxious phenomenon of a sense 
of liberty, had, however, been attempted by many Necessitarians before 
Hartley, and with far greater ingenuity than either he or his two followers 
displayed. Thus Leibnitz, after rejecting the Liberty of Indifference, says, 
'Quamobrem ratio ilia, quam Cartesius adduxit, ad probandum aetionum nos- 
trarum liberarum independentiam, ex jactato quodam vivido sensu inferno, 
vim nullam habet. JVbn possumus proprie experiri independentiam nostrum, 
nee causas a quibus electio nostra pendet semper percipimus, utpote ssepe sen- 
sum omnem fugientes. [He here refers to his doctrine of latent mental 
modifications.] Et perinde est ac si acus magnetica versus polum cowverti 
hztaretur ; putaret enim, se illuc converti independenter a quacunque alia causa, 
cum non perciperet motus insensibiles materia} magnetica}.' 1 But, previously to 
Leibnitz, a similar solution and illustration, I find, had been proposed by 
Bayle — his illustration is a conscious weather-cock , but both philosophers 
are, in argument and example, only followers of Spinoza. Spinoza, after 
supposing that a certain quantity of motion had been communicated to a 
stone, proceeds — 'Porro concipe jam si placet, lapidem dum moveri pergit 
cogitare et scire, se quantum potest conari ut moveri pergat. Hie lapis sane, 
quando quidem sui tantum modo conatus est conscius et minime indifferens, 
se liberrimum esse et nulla alia de causa in motu perseverare credet quam 
quia vult. — Atque Ticec liumana ilia libertas est quam omnes habere jactant, et 
quaz in hoc solo consistit — quod homines sui appetitus sunt conscii, et ciMsarum a 
quibus determinantur ignari." 1 Chrysippus's Top or Cylinder is the source. 
Eeid, pp. 599, 616, 617.— IF. 



512 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

ment the doctrine of liberty proceeds ; the fatalist is shown to 
overlook the equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability of an in- 
finite non-commeri cement, on the assertion of which non-com- 
mencernent his own doctrine of necessity must ultimately rest. 
As equally unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, 
schemes are thus theoretically balanced. But practically, our 
consciousness of the moral law, which, without a moral liberty in 
man, would be a mendacious imperative, gives a decisive pre- 
ponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of 
fate. "We are free in act, if we are accountable for our actions. 
Such ((pwvavra tfuvsrcHtfiv) are the hints of an undeveloped phi- 
losophy, which, I am confident, is founded upon truth. To this 
confidence I have come, not merely through the convictions of 
my own consciousness, but by finding in this system a centre and 
conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions. Above 
all, however, I am confirmed in my belief, by the harmony be- 
tween the doctrines of this philosophy, and those of revealed truth. 
' Credo equidem, nee vana fides.' The philosophy of the Condi- 
tioned is indeed pre-eminently a discipline of humility ; a ' learn- 
ed ignorance,' directly opposed to the false ' knowledge which puf- 
feth up.' I may indeed say with St. Chrysostom : — ' The founda- 
tion of our philosophy is humility.' — (Homil. de Perf. Evang.) 
For it is professedly a scientific demonstration of the impossibility 
of that ' wisdom in high matters ' which the Apostle prohibits us 
even to attempt ; and it proposes, from the limitation of the hu- 
man powers, from our impotence to comprehend what, however, 
we must admit, to show articulately why the ' secret things of 
God' cannot but be to man ' past finding out.' Humility thus 
becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation but of reason. 
This scheme proves, moreover, that no difficulty emerges in the- 
ology which had not previously emerged in philosophy ; that, in 
fact, if the divine do not transcend what it has pleased the Deity 
to. reveal, and wilfully identify the doctrine of God's word with 
some airogant extreme of human speculation, philosophy will be 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIO]5rED. 513 

found the most useful auxiliary of theology. For a world of false, 
and pestilent, and presumptuous reasoning, by which philosophy 
and theology are now equally discredited, would be at once abol- 
ished, in the recognition of this rule of prudent nescience ; nor 
could it longer be too justly said of the code of consciousness, as 
by reformed divines it has been acknowledged of the Bible : 

' This is the book, -where each his dogma seeks ; 
And this the book, where each his dogma finds.' 

Specially ; in its doctrine of causality this philosophy brings us 
back from the aberrations of modern theology, to the truth and 
simplicity of the more ancient church. It is here shown to be as 
irrational as irreligious, on the ground of human understanding, 
to deny, either, on the one hand, the foreknowledge, predestina- 
tion, and free grace of God, or, on the other, the free will of man ; 
that we should believe both, and both in unison, though unable 
to comprehend either even apart. This philosophy proclaims with 
St. Augustin, and Augustin in his maturest writings : — ' If there be 
not free grace in God, how can He save the world ; and if there 
be not free will in man, how can the world by God be judged V 
(Ad Valentinum, Epist. 214.) Or, as the same doctrine is per- 
haps expressed even better by St. Bernard : 'Abolish free will, 
and there is nothing to be saved ; abolish free grace, and there is 
nothing wherewithal to save.' (De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. c. 
i.) St. Austin repeatedly declares, the conciliation of the fore- 
knowledge, predestination, and free grace of God with the free 
will of man, to be ' a most difficult question, intelligible only to a 
few.' Had he denounced it as a fruitless question, and (to un- 
derstanding) soluble by none, the world might have been spared 
a large library of acrimonious and resultless disputation. This 
conciliation is of the things to be believed, not understood. The 
futile attempts to harmonize these antilogies, by human reasoning 
to human understanding, have originated conflictive systems of 
theology, divided the Church, and, as far as possible, dishonored 
32 



514 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

religion. It must however be admitted, that confessions of the 
total inability of man to conceive the union, of what he should 
believe united, are to be found ; and they are found, not, per- 
haps less frequently, and certainly in more explicit terms among 
Catholic than among Protestant theologians. 

Of the former, I shall adduce only one testimony, by a prince 
of the Church ; and it is the conclusion of what, though wholly 
■jverlooked, appears to me as the ablest and truest criticism of the 
many fruitless, if not futile, attempts at conciliating ' the ways of 
God' to the understanding of man, in the great articles of divine 
foreknowledge and predestination (which are both embarrassed by 
the self-same difficulties), and human free-will. It is the testimo- 
ny of Cardinal Cajetan, and from his commentary on the Sum- 
ma Theologise of Aquinas. The criticism itself I may take another 
opportunity of illustrating. 

'Thus elevating our mental eye to a loftier range [we may suppose that], 
God, from an excellence supernally transcending human thought, so foresees 
events and things, that from his providence something higher follows than 
evitability or inevitability, and that his passive prevision of the event does 
not determine the alternative of either combination. And can we do so, the 
intellect is quieted ; not by the evidence of the truth known, but by the in- 
accessible height of the truth concealed. And this to my poor intellect 
seems satisfactory enough, both for the reason above stated, and because, as 
Saint Gregory expresses it, " The man has a low opinion of God, who believes 
of Him only so much as can be measured by human understanding." Not 
that we should deny aught, that we have by knowledge or by faith of the 
immutability, actuality, certainty, universality, and similar attributes of God ; 
but I suspect that there is something here lying hid, either as regards the rela- 
tion between the Deity and event foreseen, or as regards the connection be- 
tween the event itself and its prevision. Thus, reflecting that the intelli- 
gence of man [in such matters] is as the eye of the owl [in the blaze of day 
(he refers to Aristotle)], I find its repose in ignorance alone. For it is more 
consistent, both with Catholic faith and with philosophy, to confess our 
blindness, than to assert, as things evident, what afford no tranquillity to the 
intellect ; for evidence is tranquillizing. Not that I would, therefore, accuse 
all the doctors of presumption ; because, stammering, as they could, they 
have all intended to insinuate, with God's immutability, the supreme and 
eternal efficiency of His intellect, and will, and power, — through the infalli- 
ble relation between the Divine election and whatever comes to pass. Noth- 
ing of all this is opposed to the foresaid suspicion — that something too deep 
for lis lies hid herein. And assuredly, if it were thus promulgated, no Chris- 
tian would err in the matter of Predestination, as no one errs in the doctrine 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 515 

of the Trinity ;* because of the Trinity the truth is declared orally and in 
writing, — that this is a mystery concealed from human intellect, and to which 
faith alone is competent. Indeed, the best and most wholesome counsel in 
this matter is : — To begin with those things which we certainly know, and 
have experience of in ourselves ; to wit, that all proceeding from our free- 
will may or may not be performed by us, and therefore are we amenable to 
punishment or reward ; but how, this being saved, there shall be saved the 
providence, predestination, &c, of God, — to believe what holy mother 
Church believes. For it is written, "Altiora te ne qusesieris" ("Be not 
wise in things above thee") ; there being many things revealed to man above 
thy human comprehension. And this is one of those.' (Pars. I. q. xxii., 
art. 4.) 

Averments to a similar effect, might be adduced from the writ- 
ings of Calvin ; and, certainly, nothing can be conceived more 
contrary to the doctrine of that great divine, than what has lat- 
terly been promulgated as Calvinism (and, in so far as I know, 
without reclamation), in our Calvinistic Church of Scotland. For 
it has been here promulgated, as the dogma of this Church, by 
pious and distinguished theologians, that man has no will, agency, 
moral personality of his own, God being the only real agent in 
every apparent act of his creatures ; — in short (though quite the 
opposite was intended), that the theological scheme of the abso- 
lute decrees implies fatalism, pantheism, the negation of a moral 
governor, and of a moral world. For the premises, arbitrarily 
assumed, are atheistic ; the conclusion, illogically drawn, is Chris- 
tian. Against such a view of Calvin's doctrine, I for one must 
humbly though solemnly protest, as not only false in philosophy, 
but heterodox and ignorant in theology. 



* This was written before 1507; consequently long before Servetus and 
Campanus had introduced their unitarian heresies. 



516 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 






N g 




g jmsii Mil 6 * 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 517 

§ II. — Philosophical Testimonies to the Limitation of our 
Knowledge, from the Limitation of our Faculties. 

These, which might be indefinitely multiplied, I shall arrange 
under three heads. I omit the Skeptics, adducing only speci- 
mens from the others. 

I. Testimonies to the general fact that the highest knowledge is a 
consciousness of ignorance. 

There are two sorts of ignorance : we philosophize to escape 
ignorance, and the consummation of our philosophy is ignorance ; 
we start from the one, we repose in the other; they are the 
goals from which, and to which, we tend ; and the pursuit of 
knowledge is but a course between two ignorances, as human 
life is itself only a travelling from grave to grave. 

' 'Ti's fitos ; — 'Ek tvh(3oio Oopuiv, iirl Tvpffov hSeiwS 

The highest reach of human science is the scientific recognition 
of human ignorance ; ' Qui nescit ignorare, ignorat scire.' This 
' learned ignorance' is the rational conviction by the human 
mind of its inability to transcend certain limits ; it is the knowl- 
edge of ourselves, — the science of man. This is accomplished 
by a demonstration of the disproportion between what is to be 
known, and our faculties of knowing, — the disproportion, to wit, 
between the infinite and the finite. In fact, the recognition of 
human ignorance, is not only the one highest, but the one true, 
knowledge ; and its first fruit, as has been said, is humility. 
Simple nescience is not proud ; consummated science is positively 
humble. For this knowledge it is not, which ' puffeth up ;' but 
its opposite, the conceit of false knowledge, — the conceit in truth, 
as the Apostle notices, of an ignorance of the very nature of 
knowledge : 

' Nam nesciens quid scire sit, 
Te scire cuncta jactitas.' 



518 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

But as our knowledge stands to Ignorance, so stands it alsc 
to Doubt. Doubt is the beginning and the end of our efforts 
to know ; for as it is true, — ' Alte dubitat qui altius credit,' so it 
is likewise true, — ' Quo magis quserimus rnagis dubitamus.' 

The grand result of human wisdom, is thus only a consciousness 
that what we know is as nothing to what we know not (' Quan- 
tum est quod nescimus !') — an articulate confession, in fact, by 
our natural reason of the truth declared in revelation, — that 
' noiu we see through a glass, darkly.' 

1. — Democritus (as reported by Aristotle, Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, 
<fec.) : — ' We know nothing in its cause for on a conjectural reading — in 
truth] ; for truth lies hid from us in depth and distance.' 

2. — .Socrates (as we learn from Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, &c.) was de- 
clared by the Delphic oracle the wisest of the Greeks ; and why ? Be 
cause he taught, — that all human knowledge is but a qualified ignorance 

3. — Aristotle (Metaphysica, L. ii., c. 1). — 'A theory of Truth, is 
partly easy, partly difficult. This is shown by the fact — that no one 
has been wholly successful, no one wholly unsuccessful, in its acqui- 
sition ; but while each has had some report to make concerning nature, 
though the contributions, severally considered, are of little or no avail, 
the whole together make up a considerable amount. And if so it be, we 
may apply the proverb — " Who can miss the gate ?" In this respect a 
theory of Truth is easy. — But our inability to compass some Whole and 
Part [or, to c. both W. and P.], may evince the difficulty of the inquiry ; 
(To i5' SXov ti (or r') $X tlv KaL t*tP°$ P'l fitvaaOai, StiXot rb x a ^^ v airrjs.) — 
As difficulty, however, arises in two ways ; [in this case] its cause may 
he, not in things [as the objects known], but in us [as the subjects 
knowing]. For as the eye of the bat holds to the light of day, so the 
intellect [vov;, which is, as it were (Eth. Mc. i. 1), the eye] of our soul, 
holds to what in nature are of all most manifest.' * 



* In now translating this passage for a more general purpose, I am strong- 
ly impressed with the opinion, that Aristotle had in view the special doc- 
trine of the Conditioned. For it is not easy to see what he could mean by 
saying, that ' we are unable to have [compass, realize the notions of] Whole 
and Part, 1 or of ' some Whole and Part ;' except to say, that we are unable 
to conceive (of space, or time, or degree) a whole, however large, which is 
not conceivable as the part of a still greater whole, or a part, however small, 
which we may not always conceive as a whole, divisible into parts. But this 
would be implicitly the enouncement of a full doctrine of the Conditioned. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 519 

4. — Puny. (Historia Naturalis, L. ii. c. 82.) — ' Omnia incerta ratione, et 
in naturas maj estate abdita.' 

5. — Tertullian. (Adversus Hasreticos, N. iv.) — ' Cedat curiositas fidei, ce- 
dat gloria saluti. Certe, aut non obstrepant, aut quiescant adversus regulani 
•—Nihil scire omnia scire est.' — (De Anima, c. 1.) — ' Quis revelabit quod 
Deus texit ? Unde scitandum ? Quare ignorare tutissimum est. Prses- 
tat enim per Deum nescire quia non revelaverit, quam per hominem scire 
quia ipse prsesumpserit.' 

6. — Aenobius. (Contra Gentes, L. ii.) — ' Quse nequeunt sciri, nescii'e 
nos confiteamur ; neque ea vestigare curemus, quse non posse compre- 
hendi liquidissimum est.' 

7.— St. Augustin. (Sermo xxvii. Benedictine Edition, vol. v.) — ' Quseris 
tu rationem, ego expavesco altitudinem. (" altitudo divitiarum sapientise 
et scientise Dei !") Tu ratiocinare, ego mirer ; tu disputa, ego credam ; 

altitudinem video, ad profundum non pervenio Ille dicii, 

" Inscrutabdia sunt judicia ejus :" et tu scrutari venisti ? Ille dicit, — " In- 
investigabiles sunt viae ejus :" et tu investigare venisti ? Si inscrutabilia 
scrutari venisti, et ininvestigabilia investigare venisti ; crede, jam peristi.' 
— (Sermo xciii.) — ' Quid inter nos agebatur ? Tu dicebas, Intelligam, ut 
credam ; ego dicebam, Ut intelligas, crede. K"ata est controversia, venia- 
mus ad judicem, judicet Propheta, immo vero Deus judicet per Prophetam. 
Ambo taceamus. Quid ambo dixerimus, auditum est. Intelligam, inquis, 
ut credam ; Crede, inquam, ut intelligas. Respondeat Propbeta : " xfisi 
credideritis, non intelligetis." ' [Isaiah vii. 9, according to the Seventy.] — 
(Sermo cxvii.) — ' De Deo loquimur, quid mirum, si non comprehendis ? Si 
enim comprehendis, non est Deus. Sit pia confessio ignorantice magis quam 
temeraria professio sciential. Adtingere aliquantum mente Deum, magna 
beatitudo est ; comprehendere autem, omnino impossible.'* — (Sermo clxv.) 
— ' Ideo multi de isto profundo quaerentes reddere rationem, in fabulas 
vanitatis abierunt.' [Compare Sermo cxxvi. c. i.] — (Sermo cccii.) — ' Con- 
Be this however as it may, Aristotle's commentators have been wholly una- 
ble to reach, even hy a probable conjecture, his meaning in the text. Alex- 
ander gives six or seven possible interpretations, but all nothing to the 
point ; whilst the other expositors whom I have had patience to look into 
(as Averroes, Javellus, Fonseca, Suarez, Sonerus), either avoid the sentence 
altogether, or show that they, and the authorities whom they quote, had no 
glimpse of a satisfactory interpretation. I have been unable to find (on a 
hurried search) in the able and truly learned ' Essay on the Metaphysics of 
Aristotle,' by M. Eavaisson, a consideration of the passage. 

* A century before Augustin, St. Cyprian had said : — ' "We can only justly 
conceive God in recognizing Him to be inconceivable.' I cannot, however, 
at the moment, refer to the passage except from memory. 



520 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

fessio ignorantiaa, gradus est scientise.' — (Epistola cxc. vol. ii.) — ' Qua, 
nullo sensu carnis explorari possunt, et a nostra experientia longe remota 
sunt, atque in abditissimis nature finibus latent, non erubescendum est 
homini confiteri se nescire quod nescit, ne dum se scire mentitur, nunquam 
scire mereatur.' — (Epistola cxcvii.) — ' Magis eligo cautam ignorantiam con- 
fiteri, quam falsam scientiam profiteri.' 

8. — St. Chrtsostom. ( .) — ' Nothing is 

wiser than ignorance in those matters, where they who proclaim that they 
know nothing, proclaim their paramount wisdom ; whilst those who busy 
themselves therein, are the most senseless of mankind.' 

9. — Theodoret. (Therapeutica, &c, Curative of Greek Affections, Ser- 
mon 1.) — ' The beginning of science is the science of nescience ;' or — ' The 
principle of knowledge is the knowledge of ignorance.' 

10. — St. Peter Chrtsologde. (Sermo li.) — ' Nolle omnia scire, summa 
sciential est.' 

11. — 'The Arabian Sage.' (I translate this and the two following from 
Drusius and Gale) : — ' A man is wise while in pursuit of wisdom ; a fool, 
when he thinks it to be mastered.' 

12. — A Eabbi: — 'The wiser a man, the more ignorant does he feel; as 
the Preacher has it [L 18] — " To add science is to add sorrow." ' 

13. — A Rabbi : — ' "Who knows nothing, and thinks that he knows some- 
thing, his ignorance is twofold.'* 

14 — Petrarch. (De Contemptu Mundi, Dial, ii.) — ' Excute pectus tuum 
acriter ; invenies cuncta quaa nosti, si ad ignorata referantur, earn propor- 
tionem obtinere, quam, collatus oceano, rivulus sestivis siccandus ardoribus : 
quamquam vel multa nosse, quid revelat ?' 

15. — Cardinal De Cusa. (Opera ed. 1565 ; De Docta Ignorantia, L. i. 
c. 3, p. 3.) — ' Quidditas ergo rerum, quae est entium Veritas, in sua puritate 
inattingibilis est ; et per omnes Philosophos investigata, sed per neminem, 

* Literally: 

' Te, tenebris jactum, ligat ignorantia duplex ; 
Scis nihil, et nescis te modo scire nihil.' 
Or, with reference to our German evolvers of the Nothing into the Every- 
thing ; and avoiding the positio debilis : 

' Te, sophia insanum, terit insipientia triplex ; 
Ml sapis, et nil non te sapuisse doces !' 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 521 

nti est, reperta ; et quanto in hac ignorantia profuudius docti fuerinius, 
tanto magis ad ipsam accedemus veritatem.' — {lb. c. IT, p. IS). — ' Sublata 
igitur ab omnibus eDtibus participatione, remanet ipsa simplicissima enti- 
tas, quae est essentia omnium entium, et non conspicimus ipsam talem en- 
titatem, nisi in doctissima ignorantia, quoniam cum omnia participantia 
entitatem ab amnio removeo, nihil remanere videtur. Et propterea mag- 
nus Dionysius [Areopagita] dicit, intellectual Dei, magis accedere ad 
nihil, quam ad aliquid. Sacra autem ignorantia me instruit, hoc quod 
jitellectui nihil videtur, esse maximum incomprehensibile.' — (Apologia 
Doctaa Ignorantise, p. 6*7.) — ' Augustinus ait: — "Deum potius ignorantia 
quam scientia attiDgi." Ignorantia enim abjicit, intelligentia colligit ; doc- 
ta vero ignorantia omnes modos quibus accedi ad veritatem potest, unit. 
Ita eleganter dixit Algazel in sua Metaphysica, de Deo : " Quod quisque 
seit per probationem necessariam, impossibilitatem suam apprehendendi 
eum. Ipse sui est cognitor, et apprehensor ; quoniam apprehendit, scire 
ipsum a nullo posse comprehendi. Quisquis autem non potest apprehen- 
dere, et nescit necessario esse impossibile eum appreheudere, per proba- 
tionem praedictam, est ignorans Deum : et tales sunt omnes homines, ex- 
ceptis dignis, et prophetis et sapientibus, qui sunt profundi in sapientia." 
Haec ille.' — See also: De Berylio, c. 36, p. 281 ; De Venatione Sapientiee, 
c. 12, p. 306 ; De Deo Abscondito, p. 338 ; (fee, <fec* 



* So far, Cusa's doctrine coincides with what I consider to be the true pre- 
cept of a ' Learned Ignorance.' But he goes farther : and we find his profes- 
sion of negative ignorance converted into an assumption of positive knowledge; 
his Nothing, presto, becoming every thing ; and contradictions, instead of 
standing an insuperable barrier to all intellectual cognition, employed in lay- 
ing its foundation. In fact, I make no doubt that his speculations have ori- 
ginated the whole modern philosophy of the Absolute. For Giordano Bruno, 
as I can show, was well acquainted with Cusa's writings ; from these he bor- 
rowed his own celebrated theory, repeating even the language in which its 
doctrines were originally expressed. To Cusa, we can, indeed, articulately 
trace, word and thing, the recent philosophy of the Absolute. The term 
Absolute (Absolutum), in its precise and peculiar signification, he everywhere 
employs. The Intellectual Intuition (Intuitio Intellectualis) he describes and 
names ; nay, we find in him, even the process of Hegel's Dialectic. His 
works are, indeed, instead of the neglect to which they have been doomed, 
well deserving of attentive study in many relations. In Astronomy, before 
Copernicus, he had promulgated the true theory of the heavenly revolutions, 
with the corollary of a plurality of worlds ; and in the science of Politics, he 
was the first perhaps to enounce the principles on which a representative 
constitution should be based. The Germans have, however, done no justice 
to their countryman. For Cusa's speculations have been most perfunctorily 
noticed by German historians of philosophy ; and it is through Bruno that 
he seems to have exerted an influence on the Absolutist theories of the 
Empire. 



522 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

16. — /Evf.as Sylvius. (Piccolomini, Pope Pius II. Ehet. L. ii.)— 'Cui 
plura nosse datum est, eum majora dubia sequuntur.' 

17. — Palingenius. (Zodiacus Vita, Virgo v. 181, sq.) — 
' Tunc mea Dux tandem pulcro sic incipit ore : — 
Simia coelicolum* risusque jocusque Deorum est 
Tunc homo, quum temere ingenio confidit, et audet 
Abdita naturae scrutari, arcanaque Divum, 
Cum re vera ejus crassa imbecillaque sit mens. 
Si posita ante pedes nescit, quo jure videbit 
Quae Deus et natura sinu occuluere profundo ? 
Omnia se tamen arbitratur noscere ad unguem 
Garrulus, infelix, caecus, temerarius, amens ; 
Usque adeo sibi palpatur, seseque licetur.' 

18. — 'Multa tegit saero involucro natura, neque ullis 
Fas est scire quidem mortalibus omnia ; multa 
Admirare modo, nee non venerare : neque ilia 
Inquires quae sunt arcanis proxima ; namque 
In manibus quas sunt, haec nos vix scire putandum. 
Est procul a nobis adeo praesentia veri !'f 

(' Full many a secret _n her sacred veil 
Hath Nature folded. She vouchsafes to knowledge 
Not every mystery, reserving much, 
For human veneration, not research. 
Let us not, therefore, seek what God conceals ; 

* The comparison of man as an ape to God, is from Plato, who, while ho 
repeatedly exhibits human beings as the jest of the immortals, somewhere 
says — ' The wisest man, if compared with God, will appear an ape.' Pope, 
who was well read in the modern Latin poets, especially of Italy, and even 
published from them a selection, in two volumes, abounds in manifest imi- 
tations of their thoughts, wholly unknown to his commentators. In his 
line — 

' And show'd a Newton as we show an ape' 

—he had probably this passage of Palingenius in his eye, and not Plato. 
Warburton and his other scholiasts are aware of no suggestion. 

t I know not the author of these verses. I find them first quoted by Fer- 
nelius, in his book ' De Abditis Eerum Causis' (L. ii. c. 18), which appeared 
before the year 1551. They may be his own. They are afterwards given by 
Sennertus, in his Hypomnemata, but without an attribution of authorship 
By him, indeed, they are undoubtedly taken from Fernelius. Finally, they 
are adduced by the learned Morhof in his Polyhistor, who very unlearnedly 
however, assigns them to Lucretius. They are not by Palingenius, nor Pale- 
arius, nor Hospitalius, all of whose versification they resemble ; for the last, 
indeed, they are almost too early. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 523 

For even the things which lie within our hands — 
These, knowing, we know not. So far from us, 
In doubtful dimness, gleams the star of truth !') 

19. — Julius Caesar Scaliger. (De Subtilitate, Ex. cclxxiv.) ' Sapientia 
est vera, nolle nimis sapere.' (lb. ex. cccvii., sect. 29.; and compare Ex. 
cccxliv. sect. 4.) 'Humanse sapientiae pars est, quaedarn aequo animo 
nescire velle.'* (lb. Ex. lii.) ' Ubique clamare soleo, nos nihil scire.' 

20. — Joseph Justus Scaliger. (Poemata : Iambi GnoniicL xxU 
' Ne curiosus qucere causas omnium. 
Quaecunque libris vis Prophetarum indidit 
Afflata cobIo, plena veraci Deo, 
Nee operta sacri supparo silentii 
Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter prseteri. 
Nescire velle, qua magister maximus 
Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.'\ 

21. — Grotius. (Poemata; Epigrammata, L. i.) 
Erudita Ignorantia. 
' Qui curiosus postulat Totum suae 
Patere menti, ferre qui non sufficit 
Mediocritatis conscientiam suae, 
Judex iniquus, aestimator est malus 
Suique naturaeque. Nam rerum parens, 
Libanda tantum quae venit mortalibus, 
Nos scire pauca, multa mirari jubet. 
Hie primus error auctor est pejoribus. 
Nam qui fateri nil potest incognitum, 
Falso necesse est placet ignorantiam ; 
Umbrasque inanes captet inter nubilia, 
Imaginosae adulter Ixion Deas. 
Magis quiescet animus, errabit minus, 
Contentus eruditione parabili, 
Nee quaaret illam, siqua quaarentem fugit. 
Nescire qucedam, magna pars Sapientiw esV\ 

* I meant, in another place, to quote this passage of Scaliger, but find that 
my recollection confused this and the preceding passage, with, perhaps, the 
similar testimony of Chrysologus (No. 10). Chrysologus, indeed, anticipates 
Scaliger in the most felicitous part of the expression. 

t It is manifest that Joseph, in these verses, had in his eye the saying of 
his father. But I have no doubt, that they were written on occasion of the 
controversy raised by Gomarus against Arminius. 

X In this excellent epigram, Grotius undoubtedly contemplated the corre- 
sponding verses of his illustrious friend, the Dictator of the Eepublic of 



524: PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

22. — Pascal. (Pensees, Partie I. Art. vi. sect. 26.) — ' Si l'homrne com 
mengoit par s'e"tudier lui-meme, il verroit combien il est incapable de pas- 
ser outre. Comment pourroit-il se faire qu'une partie connut le tout ?'* 
. . . . ' Qui ne croiroit, a nous voir composer toutes choses d'esprit et de 
corps, que ce melange-la nous seroit bien comprehensible ? C'est nean- 
moins la chose que Ton corcprend le moins. L'homrne est k lui-meme le 
plus prodigieux objet de la nature ; car il ne peut concevoir ce que c'est 
que corps, et encore moins ce que c'est qu'esprit, et moins qu'aucune chose 
comment un corps peut etre uni avec un esprit. C'est la le comble de 
ses difficultes, et cependant c'est son propre etre : Modus, quo corporibus 
adhceret spiritus, comprehendi ab hominibus non potest ; et hoc tamen homo 
est.'\ 



II. Testimonies to the more special fact, that all our knowledge, 
whether of Mind or of Matter, is only phenomenal. 

Our whole knowledge of mind and of matter is relative, — con- 
ditioned, — relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in 
themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, 
or know them only as incognizable ; and we become aware of 
their incomprehensible existence, only as this is indirectly and 
accidentally revealed to us, through certain qualities related to 
our faculties of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we cannot 
think as unconditioned, irrelative, existent in and of themselves. 
All that we know is therefore phenomenal, — phenomenal of the 



Letters ; but, at the same time, lie, an Arminian, certainly had in view the 
polemic of the Kemonstrants and anti-Kemonstrants, touohing the Divine 
Decrees. Nor, apparently, was he ignorant of testimonies Nos. 17, 18. 

* This testimony of Pascal corresponds to what Aristotle says : ' There is 
uo proportion of the Infinite to the Finite.' (De Coelo, L. i. cc. 7, 8.) 

t Pascal apparently quotes these words from memory, and, I have no 
doubt, quotes them from Montaigne, who thus (L. ii. ch. 12.) adduces them 
as from St. Augustin : ' Modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus, omnino 
mirus est, nee comprehendi ab homine potest ; et hoc ipse homo est.' — Mon- 
taigne's commentator, Pierre Coste, says that these words are from Augustiu, 
De Spiritu et Anima. That curious farrago, which is certainly not Augustin's, 
does not however contain either the sentence or the sentiment ; and Coste 
himself, who elsewhere gives articulate references to the quotations of hia 
author, here alleges only the treatise in general. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 525 

unknown.* The philosopher speculating the -worlds of matter 
and of mind, is thus, in a certain sort, only an ignorant admirer. 
In his contemplation of the universe, the philosopher, indeed, 
resembles JEneas contemplating the adumbrations on his shield ; 
as it may equally be said of the sage and of the hero,— 

' Miratur ; Rerumque ignarus, Imagine gaudeV 

Nor is this denied ; for it has been commonly confessed, that as 
substances, we know not what is Matter and are ignorant of what 
is Mind. With the exception, in fact, of a few late Absolutist 
theorizers in Germany, this is, perhaps, the truth of all others 
most harmoniously re-echoed by every philosopher of every 
school ; and, as has so frequently been done, to attribute any 
merit, or any singularity to its recognition by any individual 
thinker, more especially in modern times, betrays only the igno- 
rance of the encomiasts. 

1. — Protagoras (as reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, 
Lsertius, <fcc). — 'Man is [for himself] the measure of all things.' (See 
Baeon, No. 14.) 

2. — Aristotle. (Metaphysica, L. vii., c. 10.) — 'Matter is incognizable 
absolutely or in itself.' — (De Anima, L. iii., c. 5.) — ' The intellect knows 
itself, only in knowing its objects.' — The same doctrine is maintained at 
length in the Metaphysics, b. xii. cc. 7 and 9, and elsewhere. 

3. — St. Augustin. (De Trinitate, L. ix., cc. 1, 2.) The result is — ' Ab 
utroque notitia paritur; a cognoscente et cognito.' — (lb. L. x., cc. 3-12.) 
Here he shows that we know Mind only from the phenomena of which we 
are conscious ; and that all the theories, in regard to the substance of what 
thinks, are groundless conjectures. — (Confessionum, L. xii. c. 5.) — Of our 
attempts to cognize the basis of material qualities he says ; ' Dura sibi 

* Hypostasis in Greek (of oiaia I do not now speak, nor of hypostasis in 
its ecclesiastical signification), and the corresponding term in Latin, Substan- 
tia (per se subsistens, or substans, i. e. accidentibus, whichever it may mean), 
expresses a relation — a relation to its phenomena. A basis for phenomena, 
is, in fact, only supposed, by a necessity of our thought ; even as a relative 
it is not positively known. On this real and verbal relativity, see St. Augus- 
tin (De Trinitate, 1. vii., cc. 4. 5, 6). — Of the ambiguous term Subject 
{iiroKdji-tvov) I have avoided speaking. 



526 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

hsec dicit humana cogitatio, conetur earn, vel nosse ignorando, vel ignorare 
noscendo. 

4. — Boethids. (De Consolatione Philosophise, L. v., pr. 4.) — ' Onine quod 
cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius 
comprehenditur facultatem.' — (Pr. 6.) — ' Omne quod scitur, non ex sua, sed 
ex comprehendentium, natura cognoscitur.' 

5. — Aveeeoes. (In Aristotelem De Anima, L. iii. Text 8.) — ' Intellectus 
intelligit seipsum modo accidentahV 

6. — Albeetus Magnus. (Contra Averroem de Unitate Intellectus, c. 1.) 
— ' Intellectus non intelligit seipsum, nisi per accidens flat intelligible ; ut 
materia cognoscitur per aliquid, cujus ipsa est fundamentum. Et si ali- 
qui dicant intellectum intelligi per hoc, quia per essentiam est prsesens 
sibi ipsi, hoc tamen secundum philosophiam non potest dici.' (See also 
Aquinas (Summa Theologise, P. i. Qu. 89, Art. 2; De Veritate, Qu. 10, 
Art. 8) and Ferrariensn (Contra Gentes, L. iii. c. 46.) 

7. — Geescn. (De Concordia Metaphysicse.) — ' Ens quodlibet dici potest 
habere duplex Esse ; sumendo Esse valde transcendentaliter. Uno modo, 
sumitur Ens, pro natura rei in seipsa ; alio modo, prout habet esse, objec- 
tale seu reprassentativum, in ordine ad intellectum creatum vel increatum. 
— Hoec autem distinctio non conficta est vel nova; sed a doctoribus, tarn 
metaphysicis quam logicis subtilibus, introducta. Ens consideratum seu 
relictum prout quid absolutum, seu res quaedam in seipsa, plurimum 

differt ab esse, quod habet objectaliter apud intellectum 

Ens reale non potest constituere scientiam aliquam, si non consideretur in 
suo esse objectali, relato ad ipsum ens reale, sicut ad prunarium et princi- 
pale objectum.' 

8. — Leo Hebe^eus. (De Amore, Dial, i.) — ' Cognita res a cognoscente, 
pro viribus ipsius cognoscentis, baud pro rei cognitaa dignitate recipi solet.' 

9. — Melanchthon. (Erotemata Dialectices, L. i. Pr. Substantia.) — ' Mens 
humana, per accidentia, agnoscit substantiam. Non enim cernimus oculis 
substantias, tectas accidentibus, sed mente eas agnoscimus. Cum videmus 
aquam manere eandem, sive sit frigida, sive sit calida, ratiocinamur : — aliud 
quiddam esse formas illas discedentes, et aliud quod eas sustinet.' 

10. — Julius C^esae Scaligee. (De Subtilitate, Ex. cccvii. § 12.) — 
' JSTego tibi ullam esse formam nobis notam plene, et plane : nostramque 
scientiam esse umbram in sole [contendo]. Pormarum enim cognitio est 
rudis, confusa, nee nisi per Trtptcmiceis. Neque verum est, — formaa substan 
tialis speciem recipi in intellectum. Non enim in sensu unquam fuit.' — 
(lb. Ex. cccvii. § 21.) — ' Substantias non sua specie cognosci a nobis, sed 
per earum accidentia. Quis enim me doceat, quid sit substantia, nisi illis 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 527 

miseris verbis, — res subsistens? Quid ipsa ilia substantia 

sit, plane, ignoras ; sed, sicut Vulpes elusa a Ciconia, lambimus vitreum 
vas, pultem baud attingimus.' 

11. — Feancis Piccolomini. (De Mente Humana. L. i. c. 8.) — 'Mens in- 
telligit se, non per se primo, sed cum csetera intellexerit ; ut dicitur in L. 
iii. de Anima, t. 8, et in L. xii. Metaphysicse, t. 38.' 

12. — Giordano Bruno. (De Imaginum, Signorum et Idearum Compo- 
sitione ; Dedicatio.) — ' Quemadmodum, non nosmetipsos in profundo et 
individuo quodam consistentes, sed nostri quffidam externa de superficie 
(colorem, scilicet, atque figuram), accidentia, ut oculi ipsius similitudinem 
in speculo, videre posumus : ita etiam, tuque intellectus noster se ipsam in 
se ipso, et res ipsas omnes in seipsis, sed in exteriore quadam specie, siinu- 
lacro, imagine, figura, signo. Hoc quod ab Aristotele relatum, ab antiquis 
prius fuit expressum ; at a neotericorum paucis capitur. Intelligere nos- 
trum (id est, operationes nostri intellectus), aut est pbautasia, aut non sine 
phantasia. Rursum. Non intelligimus, nisi pbantasmata speculamur. Hoc 
est, quod non in simplicitate quadam, statu et imitate, sed in composition e, 
collatione, terminorum, pluralitate, mediante discursu atque reflexione, 
compr ebend imus.' * 

13. — Campanella. (Metaphysica. L. i. c. 1, dub. 3, p. 12.) — 'Ergo, non 
videntur res prout sunt, neque videntur extare nisi respectus.' 

14. — Bacon. (Instauratio Magna ; Distr. Op.) — ' Informatio sensus sem- 
per est ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi ; atque magr.o 
prorsus errore asseritur, sensum esse mensuram rerum.' (See Protago- 
ras, n. 1.) 

15. — Spinoza. (Ethices, Pars II. Prop, xix.) — ' Mens humana ipsum hu- 
manum corpus non cognoscit, nee ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affec- 
tionum quibus corpus afficitur.' — (Prop, xxiii.) — ' Mens se ipsam non cog- 
noscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.' Et alibi. — (See 
Bruno, n. 12.) 

16. — Sir Isaac Newton. (Principia, Scliol. Ult.) — ' Quid sit rei alicujus 
substantia, minime cognoscimus. Videmus tantuni corporum figuras et 
colores, audimus tantum sonos, tangimus tantum superficies externas, 
olfacimus odores solos, et gustamus sapores: intimas substantias nullo 
sensu, nulla actione refiexa, cognoscimus.' 

* Had Bruno adhered to this doctrine, he would have missed martyrdom 
as an atheist ; but figuring to posterity, neither as a great fool (if we believe 
Adelung), nor as a great philosopher (if we believe Schelling). Compare 
the parallel testimony of Spinoza (15), a fellow Pantheist, but on different 
grounds. 



528 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

17. — Kant. (Critik der reinen Vernunft, Vorr.) ' In perception every 
thing is known in conformity to the constitution of our faculty.' And a 
hundred testimonias to the same truth might be adduced from the phi- 
losopher of Koenigsberg, of whose doctrine it is, in fact, the foundation. 

III. — The recognition of Occult Causes. 

This is the admission that there are phenomena which, though 
unable to refer to any known cause or class, it would imply an 
irrational ignorance to deny. This general proposition no one, I 
presume, will be found to gainsay ; for, in fact, the causes of all 
phenomena are, at last, occult. There has, however, obtained a 
not unnatural presumption against such causes ; and this pre- 
sumption, though often salutary, has sometimes operated most 
disadvantageously to science, from a blind and indiscriminate 
application ; in two ways. In the first place, it has induced men 
lightly to admit asserted phenomena, false in themselves, if only 
confidently assigned to acknowledged causes. In the second 
place, it has induced them obstinately to disbelieve phenomena, 
in themselves certain and even manifest, if these could not at 
once be referred to already recognized causes, and did not easily 
fall in with the systems prevalent at the time. An example of 
the former is seen in the facile credence popularly accorded, in 
this country, to the asserted facts of Craniology ; though even 
the fact of that hypothesis, first and fundamental — the fact, most 
probable in itself, and which can most easily be proved or dis- 
proved by the widest and most accurate induction, is diametri- 
cally opposite to the truth of nature ; I mean the asserted cor- 
respondence between the development and hypothetical function 
of the cerebellum, as manifested in all animals, under the various 
differences of age, of sex, of season, of integrity and mutilation. 
This (among other of the pertinaciously asserted facts) I know, by 
a tenfold superfluous evidence, to be even ludicrously false. An 
example of the latter, is seen in the difficult credence accorded in 
this country to the phenomena of Animal Magnetism ; pheno- 
mena in themselves the most unambiguous, which, for nearly 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 529 

half a century, have been recognized generally and by the highes'. 
scientific authorities in Germany ; -while, for nearly a quarter of a 
century, they have been verified and formally confirmed by the 
Academy of Medicine in France. In either case, criticism was 
required, and awanting. 

So true is the saying of Cullen : — ' There are more false facts 
current in the world than false theories.' So true is the saying 
of Hamlet : — ' There are more things in heaven and earth, Hora- 
tio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.' But averse from 
experiment and gregariously credulous — 

' L'lionime est de glace aux writes ;. 
II est de feu pour les mensonges.' 

]. — Julius CLesab, Scaligee* In his commentary on Theophrastus 
touching the Causes of Plants, be repeatedly asserts, as the Aristotelic 
doctrine, the admission of Occult Causes. Thus (L. ii. c. 5) — ' Hoc dixit 
(Theophrastus), nequis ab eo nunc exigat occultas illarum, quas subticet, 
causas. Quasi dicat, — Sapienti multa licet ignorare.' In like manner 
(L. iv. c. 13). — ' Hunc quoque locum simul cum aliis adducere potes 
adversus eos qui negant Peripateticis ab occulta proprietate quicquam 
fieri. Apud hunc philosophurn saepe monuimus inveniri. Est autem 
asylum humana? imbecillitatis, ac simile perfugium illi Periclis, — els ra 
iiovTa,' This "we may translate — ' Secret service money.' The same he 
had also previously declared in his book De Subtilitate; where, for 
example (Ex. ccxviii., § 8), he says: — 'Ad manifestas omnia deducere, 
qualitates summa impudentia est ;' for there are many of these, ' quaa 
omnino latent amnios temperatos, illudunt curiosis ;' and he derides those, 
' qui irrident salutare asylum illud, occulta proprietatis.' 

2. — Axstedius. (Phtsica (1630), Pars. I. c. xiii., reg. 4.) — ' Quod Augus- 
tinus ait, " Multa cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando, cognosci," hie impri- 

* I have quoted the elder Scaliger under all the three heads of this article, 
for a truth in his language is always acutely and strikingly enounced. The 
writings of no philosopher, indeed, since those of Aristotle, are better worthy 
of intelligent study; and few services to philosophy would be greater than a 
systematic coUection and selection of the enduring and general views of this 
illustrious thinker. For, to apply to him his own expressions, these ' zopyra,' 
these ' semina ffiternitatis,' lie smothered and unfruitful in a mass of matters 
of merely personal and transitory interest. I had hoped to have attempted 
this in the appendix to a work ' De vita, genere et genio Scaligerorum ;' but 
this I hope no longer. 
33 



530 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 

mis habet locum, ubi agitur de Occultis Qualitatibus, quarum investiga- 
tio dicitur Magia Naturalis, id est, prsestantissima naturae indagatio in 
qua verbum modestiae, Nescio, subinde usurpandum est. Verbum mo- 
destiaa dico, non autem stultitias.' 

3. — Voltaire. (Dictionnaire Philosophique, voce Occultes.) — ' Qualites 
Occultes. — On s'est moque fort longtemps des qualites occultes ; on doit 
se moquer de ceux qui n'y croient pas. Repetons cent fois, que tout 
principe, tout premier ressort de quelque oeuvre que ce puisse etre du 
grand Demiourgos, est occulte et cache pour jamais aux mortels.' And 
so forth. — (Physique Particuliere, ch. xxxiii.) — ' II y a done certainement 
des lois eternelles, inconnues, suivarjt lesquelles tout s'opere, sans qu'op 
puisse les expliquer par la matiere et par le mouvement. . . . Ilya 
dans toutes les Academies une chaire vacante pour les ve"rite"s inconnues 
comme Athenes avait un autel pour les dieux ignores.'* 



* Besides the few testimonies adduced, I would refer, in general, for some 
excellent observations on the point, to Pernelius 'De Abditis Eerum Causis,' 
and to the ' Hypomnemata' of Sennertus. 



FINIS. 



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